V. 


LIBRARY 

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CAUFOKM  A 

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POLITICAL   AND    MORAL   ESSAYS 


POLITICAL  AND  MORAL 


ESSAYS 


Mm 

JOSEPH    RICKABY,    SJ. 

i.Sc.  Oxon. 


NEW  YORK,   CINCINNATI,   CHICAGO 

BENZIGER    BROTHERS 

PRINTERS   TO   THE   HOLY   APOSTOLIC   SEE 
I902 


Copyright,  1902, 
By  BENZIGER  BROTHERS. 


PREFACE 

Of  these  Essays,  the  first,  entitled  A  Disser- 
tation on  the  Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Au- 
thority, was  written  for  the  Degree  of  Bachelor 
of  Science  in  the  University  of  Oxford,  where 
the  Statutes  (tit.  vi.,  sect,  iv.,  §  i,  ed.  1899) 
provide  that  "  Science  shall  be  taken  to  in- 
clude Mathematics,  Natural  Science,  Mental 
and  Moral  Science."  The  Dissertation  is  here 
published  almost  exactly  as  it  was  submitted 
to  the  Examiners.  Of  the  remaining  Essays, 
Numbers  II.,  III.,  IV.,  V.  have  appeared  in 
the  pages  of  The  Month,  more  or  less  in 
their  present  shape.  A  work  by  the  same 
author,  Moral  Philosophy,  Ethics,  and  Natu- 
ral Law  (Longmans,  London),  has  found 
favour  as  a  text-book  in  many  Catholic  schools. 
The  author  begs  all  students  of  that  work  to 
accept  these  Essays  as  supplying  some  of 
its  deficiencies  from  an  historical  point  of 
view,  and  improving  upon  several  of  its 
statements. 


CONTENTS 

ESSAY  PAGE 

I.     A  Dissertation  on  the  Origin  and  Extent 

of  Civil  Authority i 

II.    Savages i75 

III.  Casuistry *97 

IV.  The  Catholic  Doctrine  of  Lying  and  Equivo- 

cation      215 

V.    Socialism  and  Religious  Orders      .        .        -235 

VI.     Morality  without  Free  Will  .        .        .     249 

VII.    The    Value    of     Sentiment    in    Ethics,    an 

Illustration 267 

VIII.  Occasional  Notes:  A.  The  Aristotelian  Di- 
vision of  Justice.  B.  The  Significance 
of  Types  in  the  Theory  of  Morals. 
C  The  Theory  of  Value    .        .        .        .285 


vu 


Political   and   Moral    Essays 


o^<>~- 


ESSAY    I 

A   DISSERTATION   ON   THE    ORIGIN   AND    EXTENT 
OF   CIVIL  AUTHORITY 

lcr\vp6v  Tt  ttoAis  icrrl  <j)v(xei.  —  Plato,  Politicus,  302  A 

Part  I.  —  Exposition 

§  1.  I  propose  first  to  set  forward  my  own 
views,  afterwards  to  criticise  the  views  of  others. 
I  shall  treat  of  the  '  origin  '  of  civil  authority 
theoretically,  then  historically :  then  I  come  to 
the  '  extent '  of  civil  authority.  Having  ex- 
posed my  own,  I  proceed  to  the  discussion  of 
other  opinions,  in  the  course  of  which  discus- 
sion my  own  thought,  such  as  it  is,  will  more 
fully  appear. 

§  2.  Civil  authority  is  the  supreme  power  of 
command  in  a  perfect  community  of  the  tem- 
poral order.  A  perfect  community  is  self- 
sufficient,  avTapKr)<;.  It  is  not  referred  to  any 
other  community  as  a  part  to  the  whole.  It 
takes  the  law  from  no  other :  it  is  a  community 


2  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

with  sovereignty  inherent  somewhere  within 
itself.  It  supplies,  or  is  capable  of  supplying, 
all  its  own  earthly  needs.  Were  the  rest  of 
mankind  to  perish,  it  could  still  subsist,  and 
flourish  in  some  sort.  Such  a  perfect  com- 
munity is  the  State.  The  State  may  be  either 
a  city  or  a  nation :  a  city  with  a  small  adjacent 
territory,  as  the  cities  of  ancient  Greece  and  of 
mediaeval  Italy,  or  a  nation,  as  States  commonly 
are  now.  Civil  authority  is  supreme,  final,  ulti- 
mate, in  a  State  as  such. 

§  3.  Self-sufficiency,  or  the  management  by 
a  community  of  its  own  affairs  in  perfect  inde- 
pendence of  all  neighbours,  is  a  position  at- 
tained by  degrees,  and  these  degrees  sh^de 
into  one  another.  The  United  States  have 
been  termed  "  a  sovereign  assembly  of  sovereign 
States."  But  the  war  of  forty  years  ago  evinced 
the  conclusion  that  the  Union  alone  is  sover- 
eign, not  the  individual  States  that  compose  it. 
The  question  whether  the  British  Empire  is 
one  State  or  many  is  partly  a  question  of  words, 
partly  of  fact,  involving  the  right  of  the  colo- 
nies to  secede  at  will,  as  to  which  right  various 
opinions  have  been  expressed  by  various  schools 
of  British  statesmen.  A  colony  is  more  like  a 
State  than  a  dependency ;  Canada,  for  instance, 
than  British  India. 

§  4.    Commerce    and    rapid    travelling    and 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     3 

transmission  of  news  have  thrown  all  States 
into  dependence  on  one  another  for  the  neces- 
saries and  luxuries  of  life.  A  State  is  no  longer 
able  or  willing  to  isolate  itself  and  live  on  its 
own  resources,  cLVTaipKrjs  re  /cat  avTovpyos,  a  con- 
dition which  the  theorists  of  old  wished  to 
realise  in  their  model  State,1  though  even  they 
despaired  of  its  perfect  attainment.  The  an- 
cient, ample,  and  exclusive  empire  of  China  is 
ceasing  to  be  an  exception  to  this  rule.  We 
are  fed  and  clothed  by  the  products  of  foreign 
States.  Financial  disorder  in  one  State  means 
confusion  to  many.  Men  need  one  another, 
and  live  by  one  another,  all  the  world  over, 
more  than  men  ever  did  before.  We  are  ap- 
proaching "  the  parliament  of  man,  the  federa- 
tion of  the  world,"  but  approaching  it  as  the 
solar  system  is  approaching  the  constellation 
Hercules,  —  never  to  arrive  there.  To  the 
end  of  all  history,  so  far  as  we  can  foresee, 
there  will  exist  States,  several  and  indepen- 
dent, fairly  well  answering  to  the  Aristotelian 
definition  of  a  State  as  an  '  independent  com- 
munity.' 

§  5.  Instead  of  self- sufficiency,  avT&pKtia, 
which  characterises  the  State  to  Aristotle, 
modern  minds  substitute  the  note  of  moral 
personality.     The  State,  they  tell  us,  must  be  a 

1  See  the  opening  of  Plato's  Laws,  IV. 


4  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

moral  person.  The  change  of  view  is  not  very 
great.  Without  sounding  the  depths  of  the 
mystery  of  personality,  I  observe  that  a  per- 
son is  (a)  one,  and  not  many;  (6)  distinct 
from  and  mainly  independent  of  others ; 
(c)  self-conscious ;  (d)  has  a  will  of  his  own.1 
Unity,  independence,  self-consciousness,  and 
volition  are  notes  of  personality,  and  attach 
to  the  State  as  a  moral  person.  The  greater 
number  of  the  States  that  figure  in  history 
are  in  one  way  or  another  imperfect,  either 
by  immaturity  or  decay:  consequently  they 
do  not  possess  these  notes  perfectly.  Unity 
distinguishes  a  State  from  a  federation,  or  an 
aggregate  of  powers :  such  an  aggregate  was 
the  State  under  the  feudal  system  (cf.  p.  53, 
note).  The  most  difficult  problems  in  politics 
arise  in  determining  the  proper  import  of  the 
maxim,  which  no  one  denies,  that  the  State 
should  be  one.  Aristotle  (Politics,  II.  1261  a) 
blames  Plato's  socialistic  proposals  as  carrying 
this  unity  too  far.  Erastianism,  I  should  say, 
is  another  excess  of  unity.  The  second  note, 
the  Aristotelian  avrapKeia,  of  itself  alone  always 
suffices  to  mark  the  State.  The  State  is  a 
Sovereign  Body,  or  a  body  bearing  sovereignty. 
The  third  note,  self-consciousness  in  a  State, 

1  I  need  hardly  say  that  in  laying  this  down  I  do  not  intend  to 
specify  the  meaning  of  hypostasis  in  any  theological  sense. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     5 

may  be  identified  with  national  spirit,  patriot- 
ism, conscious  enjoyment  of  a  common  power, 
and,  from  another  side,  conscious  acquiescence 
in  a  common  subjection :  this  consciousness  is 
often  defective,  but  never  entirely  fails.  About 
the  will  of  the  State,  otherwise  called  the  General 
Will,  or  the  Real  Will,  I  shall  have  to  treat 
more  in  detail  hereafter.  I  shall  also  have  to 
observe  that  there  are  in  States,  in  large  empires 
especially,  inorganic  elements,  or  masses  of  pop- 
ulation that  enter  but  slightly  into  the  national 
will  and  consciousness. 

§  6.  The  first  theory  of  the  origin  of  civil 
authority  is  at  once  Aristotelian  and  theologi- 
cal, a  theory,  I  may  add,  universally  taught  in 
the  Catholic  schools.  It  is  a  theory  of  Divine 
Right,  not  of  monarchy  alone,  but  of  any  and 
every  lawful  form  of  civil  government,  monarchy 
being  but  one  lawful  form  out  of  many.  The 
civil  ruler  is  God's  vicegerent.  There  is  no 
power  but  of  God,  mid  the  powers  that  be  are 
ordained  of  God  (Rom.  xiii.  1).  Soberly  ex- 
plained, this  theory  must  commend  itself  to  any 
man  who  believes  in  God  at  all.  God  is  the 
author  and  finisher  of  nature  no  less  than  of 
faith  (Heb.  xii.  2).  His  laws  are  founded 
upon  the  exigencies  of  nature :  what  nature  as 
a  whole  requires,  God  commands :  what  nature 
as  a  whole  abhors  as  subversive  of  itself,  God 


6  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

forbids  man  to  do.  But,  the  argument  goes 
on,  human  nature  absolutely  requires  the  insti- 
tution of  the  State  and  the  setting  up  of  civil 
authority  :  society  is  of  the  essence  of  humanity, 
and  society  supposes  government :  human  na- 
ture abhors  anarchy.  Therefore  God  forbids 
anarchy,  as  He  forbids  poisoning:  but  to  for- 
bid anarchy  is  to  command  and  charter  civil 
authority.  In  this  argument  two  things  are 
remarkable.  First,  that  it  supposes  no  positive 
intervention  of  God  to  found  the  State,  no 
revelation  from  heaven,  no  theocracy.  Chris- 
tian divines  maintain  that  God  did  positively 
descend  from  heaven  to  found  the  Church,  that 
He  prescribed  to  the  Church  a  certain  consti- 
tution, and  that  the  Church  to  this  day  is  a 
theocracy  established  for  the  salvation  of  souls. 
But,  they  observe,  the  State  is  not  a  theocracy: 
any  particular  form  of  government  which  the 
State  may  assume  is  always  of  human  insti- 
tution. It  was  far  from  the  Apostle's  mind 
to  affirm  that  the  powers  that  be  are  all  theo- 
cracies. The  second  thing  to  remark  is  that 
the  theological  account  of  the  origin  of  State 
authority  presupposes  the  philosophical,  is  based 
upon  it,  and  has  no  standing  without  it.  We 
know  that  government  is  of  God,  because  what- 
ever is  truly  natural,  or  meets  a  true  exigency  of 
human  nature,  is  of  God.     It  remains  then  to 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     7 

show  on  philosophical  grounds  that  the  State 
is  a  natural  institution. 

§  7.  The  old  name  for  a  '  nature '  was  a 
'  kind.'  '  Natural '  is  that  which  is  proper  to 
a  kind.  I  suppose,  what  even  J.  S.  Mill  admits, 
that  there  are  '  kinds '  of  things.  Thus  I  am 
sitting  at  a  table :  the  table  is  one  kind  of  thing 
and  I  am  another.  For  present  purposes  it  does 
not  matter  how  I  come  to  be  differentiated  from 
the  table :  all  I  need  say,  and  this  I  can  very 
truly  say,  is  that  there  is  a  difference  of  kind 
between  us.  Very  different  therefore  are  the 
things  proper  to  us  in  our  several  kinds,  or  in 
other  words,  our  natural  requirements.  The 
natural  requirements  of  a  table  are  few,  and 
those  of  a  negative  character,  not  to  be  subjected 
to  a  crushing  weight,  not  to  be  knocked  about, 
not  to  be  burnt.  Left  alone,  the  table  will  last 
for  centuries.  Man's  requirements  are  incessant, 
to  match  the  incessant  changes  occurring  in  his 
body  and  the  continual  movement  of  his  mind. 
They  are  incessant,  because,  unlike  such  a  thing 
as  a  table,  the  perfection  of  which  is  stationary, 
man  goes  through  a  progressive  development 
and  a  subsequent  decay  both  of  mind  and  body. 
For  the  furtherance  of  this  development,  and 
the  retarding  of  this  decay,  he  needs  continual 
refreshment  from  without,  and  continual  ac- 
tivity on  his  own  part,  as  well  organic  as  voli- 


8  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

tional  activity.  From  these  elementary  facts 
we  may  gather  a  definition  of  what  is  natural 
to  man.  That  activity  is  natural  to  man  which 
makes  for  human  conservation  and  development. 
Thus  every  healthy  activity  is  a  natural  activity  ; 
and  unhealthy  activities,  such  as  hard  drinking 
and  profuse  gambling,  are  unnatural.  But  the 
definition  needs  eking  out  by  a  distinction, 
according  as  the  bearing  of  any  given  activity 
upon  the  conservation  and  development  of  man 
is  essential  or  accidental.  An  activity  may 
further  this  development,  yet  so  that  the  said 
development  might  still  be  sufficiently  secured 
without  that  activity.  Thus,  healthful  and 
suitable  though  it  be  for  persons  of  both  sexes 
to  glide  about  on  wheels,  and  for  one  sex  at 
least  to  receive  a  university  education,  yet 
neither  cycling  nor  the  resorting  to  a  university 
is  simply  indispensable  to  the  possession  of  a 
sound  body,  or  of  a  duly  developed  mind.  On 
the  other  hand  food  is  so  necessary,  and  some 
education  is  so  necessary.  Eating,  then,  and 
education  in  general  cleave  more  to  nature, 
and  are  more  strictlv  natural,  than  such  par- 
ticular exercises  as  riding,  drawing,  verse- 
writing,  or  music.  In  this  stricter  sense,  a 
natural  activity  is  an  activity  which  is  simply 
indispensable  for  the  conservation  and  develop- 
ment of  man.     In  the  absence  of  such  a  natural 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     9 

activity  a  man  cannot  be  a  man  indeed,  worthy 
of  the  name :  he  will  only  be  some  stunted  fig- 
ure of  a  man.  In  this  sense  speech  is  natural, 
but  playing  the  flute  would  not  come  under  the 
definition.  In  the  same  sense  the  construction 
of  houses  and  the  making  of  clothes  is  natural 
to  the  species,  not  to  every  individual  of  the 
species.  We  must  all  wear  clothes,  and  some 
of  us  must  be  tailors.1 

§  8.  We  cast  out  as  irrelevant  to  our  pres- 
ent discussion  the  sense  of  '  ready-made,'  or 
'  spontaneous,'  which  the  word  '  natural '  bears 
to  some  minds,  as  though  that  alone  were  nat- 
ural which  comes  of  itself  and  is  not  acquired 
by  human  effort.  Thus  teeth  are  natural,  and 
the  fundamental  activities  of  sensation,  of  which 
Aristotle  says :  "  We  have  them  and  put  them 
in  practice :  we  did  not  come  to  have  them  by 
practice "  (fyovTes  i)(pr)(To.jxeda,  ov  ^piqcraLievoi 
eor>(oixev,  Nic.  Eth.  II.  1103  a,  31).  That 
meaning  of  the  word  is  too  narrow.  It  would 
be  most  unnatural  for  man  to  remain  havino- 
nothing,  and  doing  nothing,  but  what  his  physi- 
cal constitution  supplied  him  with,  and  blindly 
led  him  to  do.     By  appointment  of  nature,  man 

1  Perhaps  the  best  modern  equivalent  of  the  Aristotelian  <f>vai<; 
is  '  development ' ;  and  (frvo-et  ttoXltlkov  £woj/  would  be  rendered, 
'  a  living  creature  who  reaches  his  term  of  development  only  in 
the  7r6Ats.' 


io  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

is  the  architect  of  his  own  fortune.  Many 
things  are  natural  to  him  which  it  takes  an 
effort  of  his  intelligence  and  will  to  compass.1 

§  9.  Again,  there  are  things  '  natural  in  the 
advance  of  nature,'  and  of  them  we  have  made 
our  definition ;  and  things  '  natural  by  defect 
of  nature,'  such  as  sickness  and  death:  these 
latter  are  excluded  from  the  definition  and  from 
all  the  argument  yet  to  follow.  Both  are  of 
God  as  Author  of  nature :  but  the  former  are 
'  of  God  commanding,'  the  latter,  '  of  God 
permitting,'  where  '  permission '  is  not  to  be 
taken  in  any  moral  sense,  but  denotes  the  mere 
absence  of  hinderance.  We  should  say  that 
civil  authority  is  natural  and  of  God ;  and 
plague  and  famine  and  death  are  also  natural 
and  of  God,  but  not  in  the  same  way :  civil 
authority  is  of  God  commanding,  in  view  of 
the  exigency  of  human  nature  for  its  due  de- 

1  "Other  beings  are  complete  from  their  first  existence,  in 
that  line  of  excellence  which  is  allotted  to  them :  but  man 
begins  with  nothing  realised  (to  use  the  word),  and  he  has  to 
make  capital  for  himself  by  the  exercise  of  those  faculties  which  are 
his  natural  inheritance.  Thus  he  gradually  advances  to  the  ful- 
ness of  his  original  destiny.  Nor  is  this  progress  mechanical, 
nor  is  it  of  necessity :  it  is  committed  to  the  personal  efforts  of 
each  individual  of  the  species:  each  of  us  has  the  prerogative  of 
completing  his  inchoate  and  rudimental  nature,  and  of  develop- 
ing his  individual  perfection  out  of  the  living  elements  with  which 
his  mind  began  to  be.  It  is  his  gift  to  be  the  creator  of  his  own 
sufficiency ;  and  to  be  emphatically  self-made.1'  —  Cardinal 
Newman,  Grammar  of  Assent,   p.  349. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     n 

velopment:  plague  and  death  are  of  nature 
failing,  and  God  permitting  it  to  fail.  No 
wonder  then  that,  while  he  that  resisteth  the 
power  resisteth  the  ordinance  of  God  (Rom. 
xiii.  2),  the  feeding  of  the  hungry  and  the 
tending  of  the  sick  are  works  rewarded  in 
heaven  (Matt.  xxiv.  34-36).  Hunger  and  sick- 
ness, though  permitted,  are  evils  that  we  should 
endeavour  to  take  away :  but  the  endeavour 
to  overturn  the  State  is  treason  and  deadly 
sin,  inasmuch  as  the  State  is  not  simply  per- 
mitted, but  required  and  commanded. 

§  10.  There  is  little  room  for  originality  in 
the  proving  of  propositions  like  these,  —  that 
human  nature,  for  its  full  and  fair  development, 
requires  life  in  society,  domestic  and  civil : 
that  civil  society  is  impossible  without  some 
civil  authority  to  control  it;  and  that,  there- 
fore, in  the  strict  sense  laid  down  above,  civil 
authority  is  in  the  highest  degree  a  natural 
institution :  that  treason,  anarchy,  and  disrup- 
tion of  States  is  the  subversion  of  human 
nature,  in  contradiction  to  the  will  and  behest 
of  its  Creator.  A  proof  of  all  this,  a  little  less 
hackneyed  than  other  proofs,  may  be  derived 
from  consideration  of  the  pursuit  of  objective 
truth,  upon  which  all  human  minds  are  engaged 
with  more  or  less  of  diligence,  fidelity,  and 
success.     Objective  truth  is  the  same  for  all 


12  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

minds,  variously  apprehended,  comprehended 
by  none  except  by  the  Supreme  Mind,  with 
which  it  is  ultimately  identified  in  the  ideal 
order  of  being.1  Such  truth  is  not  of  human 
thinking,  but  is  the  standard  to  which  human 
thinking  is  conformed  whenever  it  is  right  think- 
ing. Thus  there  is  an  affinity  of  cognition 
between  the  minds  of  all  men.  All  march, 
some  in  straighter,  some  in  more  tortuous 
paths,  some  nimbly,  some  with  lame  and  falter- 
ing steps,  towards  the  same  goal  of  knowledge ; 
and  on  the  road  that  leads  thither  company 
is  a  necessity,  if  we  are  to  travel  far  or  fast 
or  safely.  It  is  our  own  thought  that  gets  us 
along,  not  any  one  else's  thought ;  but  fellow- 
thinkers  stimulate  our  thinking,  give  us  things 
to  think  about,  and  check  our  errors.  Com- 
monly speaking,  a  man  who  sets  to  thinking 
all  alone  will  either  give  up  his  task  or  become 
a  visionary.  If,  therefore,  thought  and  know- 
ledge are  natural  to  man,  and  indispensable  to 
the  due  elaboration  of  his  being,  the  common 
pursuit  of  knowledge  is  indispensable  also. 
But  knowledge  can  only  be  pursued  in  common 

1  By  the  'ideal  order'  I  mean  the  order  of  possibilities  and 
necessities.  The  ideal  order  covers  the  actual  and  transcends 
it.  It  is  the  order  of  science  and  of  art  also,  so  far  as  science 
and  art  reach  beyond  actualities.  As  leading  to  the  ideal,  history 
is  the  ladder  of  poetry.  But  all  this  speculation  is  out  of  my 
subject. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     13 

on  the  firm  and  ample  ground  of  civil  society, 
and  under  the  shelter  of  civil  authority.  Wher- 
ever that  ground  has  been  broken  up,  and  that 
authority  shaken,  the  course  and  flow  of  know- 
ledge has  been  interrupted,  as  in  the  overturn- 
ing of  the  Roman  Empire  by  barbarian  and 
by  Mohammedan.  Civil  society  is  the  nidus 
of  thought,  culture,  science,  art,  invention ;  and 
is  naturally  requisite,  as  those  pursuits  are  nat- 
urally requisite,  for  the  development  of  man. 
But  civil  authority  is  the  bond  of  civil  society : 
that  authority,  therefore,  is  in  the  nature  of 
things  requisite  and  indispensable. 

§  11.  Thus  far  of  the  theoretic  and  ethical 
ground  of  civil  authority,  or  of  the  reason  why 
such  authority  ought  to  be  among  men.  There 
is  further  question  of  the  actual  and  historical 
origin  of  this  authority,  how  in  point  of  fact  it 
has  come  to  be  in  the  world,  a  highly  complex 
enquiry.  Had  all  mankind,  from  the  first, 
formed  one  State  with  a  continuous  history, 
advancing  in  steady  progress  from  less  perfect 
to  more  perfect  stages,  then  the  rise  and  growth 
of  authority  in  that  State  would  have  been 
evawoiTTov  rt,  like  Aristotle's  model  city:  it 
could  have  been  grasped  by  the  mind's  eye  as 
a  whole,  and  pointed  out  and  exhibited  and 
rationally  explained.  Given  a  volume  of  liquid, 
the    temperature    of   which   always    rises    and 


14  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

never  falls,  or  always  falls  and  never  rises, 
never  rises  in  one  portion  while  it  falls  in  an- 
other, never  rises  or  falls  faster  in  one  portion 
than  in  another,  the  variations  of  temperature 
in  that  liquid  are  not  difficult  to  register  and 
explain.  But  with  a  vast  volume  of  liquid, 
steaming  hot  here,  frozen  there,  where  areas  of 
increasing  heat  coexist  with  areas  of  heat  de- 
creasing, where  what  has  been  increasing  in 
heat  suddenly  begins  to  cool,  and  what  has 
been  losing  heat  turns  to  recovering  it,  the 
thermometrical  record  of  that  liquid,  accurately 
made  out,  must  be  cumbersome  and  intricate. 
There  have  been  countless  States  in  the  world ; 
thousands  are  extinct:  each  has  had  its  own 
history.  Authority  has  rung  its  changes  in 
those  countless  States  in  endless  variety  of 
ways.  There  are  buried  and  extinct  civilisa- 
tions that  once  covered  large  portions  of  the 
earth.1     And   civilisation    means    the  develop- 

1  So  Plato,  Laws,  III.  676  B,  C :  — 

"  Must  we  not  admit  the  rise  of  thousands  upon  thousands  of 
States  within  this  period,  and  a  proportionate  number  of  cases 
of  the  ruin  of  States?  And  must  not  these  States,  each  on  its 
own  ground,  have  run  through  the  whole  cycle  of  revolutions, 
now  waxing,  now  waning,  now  improving,  now  deteriorating  ?  " 

This  and  the  following  pages  (676-681)  show  Plato  to  have 
been  no  stranger  to  the  historical  or  dynamical  conception  of  the 
State.  He  insists  on  what  is  perhaps  too  little  noticed  by  evolu- 
tionary historians,  that  there  have  been  losses  as  well  as  gains  to 
civilisation.     He  supposes   recurring  catastrophes   by   deluges, 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority      15 

ment  of  the  State.  There  have  been  ebbs  and 
flows  of  civilisation.  The  State  was  less  devel- 
oped in  England  under  Edward  the  Confessor 
than  at  Athens  under  Pericles  fifteen  centuries 
before.  England  was  then  an  adolescent 
Nation  :  Athens,  in  the  days  of  her  glory,  was 
a  City  State,  ripe  and  mature.1  The  most  I 
can  do  is  to  set  forward  some  typical  instance  of 
the  origin  of  government.  I  will  gather  certain 
facts  of  archaeology  into  an  historic  parable, 
or  mythus,  false  as  history,  but,  I  hope,  not 
wholly  inadmissible  as  an  illustration  of  his- 
tory. 

§  1 2.  The  land  of  Kasava  was  pleasant  and 
productive.  Like  other  lands,  it  existed  before 
its  population.  The  wild  fruits  ripened  while 
yet  there  was  no  human  hand  to  gather  them. 
The  animals  ranged  and  fed,  sometimes  on  one 
another,  but  no  man  had  arisen  to  kill  and  eat. 
Kasava  was  not  the  cradle  of  the  human  race. 
When  man  did  come,  he  came  in  a  multitude : 

pestilences,  and  other  causes.  He  describes  the  survivors  gradu- 
ally recovering  the  arts  of  life,  and  reweaving  the  web  of  a  po- 
litical community. 

1  This  dissertation  might  have  been  divided  into  two  parts : 
Civil  Authority  in  Europe,  Civil  Authority  in  Asia.  The 
two  accounts  would  have  differed  widely.  The  political  mind 
of  European  and  Asiatic  has  never  been  the  same  in  history. 
Nevertheless  the  study  of  anthropology  reveals  a  course  of  human 
development  more  uniform  on  the  whole  than  could  have  been 
anticipated. 


1 6  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

for,  take  him  at  his  lowest,  man  is  a  gregarious 
animal.  '  The  individual '  is  quite  a  late  con- 
ception in  human  history.  There  was  little 
individuality  in  primitive  times.  There  is  little 
even  now  among  the  poor.  The  poor  man  has 
not  a  free  hand :  he  is  bound  up  with  his  class, 
even  when  he  is  an  outcast  and  a  tramp.  Primi- 
tive man  was  no  solitary  wanderer.  He  was  a 
member  of  a  '  horde,'  that  is,  of  a  community 
having  no  fixed  abode,  still  keeping  together 
and  wandering  over  the  earth  in  company,  as 
gipsies  do  to  this  day.  The  company  protected 
its  members  from  the  attacks  of  men  of  other 
companies  and  from  wild  beasts.  The  members 
rendered  mutual  services  to  one  another,  do- 
mestic, medical,  religious.  They  lived  by  the 
chase  and  shared  the  quarry  in  common.  The 
individual  was  tethered  to  the  multitude  by  the 
strongest  social  ties.  He  had  no  thought  of 
setting  up  for  himself.  Nor  would  he  easily 
pass  from  the  horde  to  which  he  belonged  to 
any  other  community.  He  might  be  welcomed 
and  eaten,  if  food  were  scarce.  There  were 
great  men  and  small  men  in  the  horde  of  the 
Lapas :  so  these  nomads  were  called,  the  first 
men  to  appear  in  the  land  of  Kasava.  There 
were  Lapas  who  pushed,  and  got  things  arranged 
to  their  liking ;  and  there  were  quiet  Lapas  who 
gave   way;    also    indolent   and    incapable   and 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     if 

vicious  Lapas.  Thus,  while  all  was  supposed 
to  be  done  by  the  consent  of  the  grown  men  of 
the  horde,  the  active  and  leading  spirits  really 
governed.  They  directed  the  migrations  of 
the  horde  within  its  'sphere  of  influence,'  or 
tract  of  territory  within  which  this  mundane 
planetary  body  had  its  orbit,  and  was  accus- 
tomed to  revolve.  There  were  other  hordes 
besides  with  their  several  spheres  of  influence. 
The  orbits  of  migration  were  fitful  and  irregu- 
lar. The  spheres  of  influence  came  to  intersect 
one  another.  Horde  clashed  with  horde,  and 
fighting  ensued.  In  one  of  these  encounters 
there  were  so  many  Lapas  slaughtered  that  it 
was  resolved  in  common  council  of  the  sur- 
vivors, because  of  the  scarcity  of  game,  —  that 
was  the  pretext,  —  to  seek  other  lands.  They 
wandered  for  years,  enduring  great  privations, 
and  encountering  hostile  hordes  on  the  way, 
who  harassed  them  sorely.  The  whole  horde 
might  have  fallen  to  pieces,  and  been  dissolved 
like  a  comet  breaking  up  into  a  shower  of 
meteorites,  had  not  a  genius  arisen  among  them 
in  the  person  of  a  young  man  named  Sava. 
Sava  had  an  expedient  for  every  emergency. 
He  retrieved  the  desperate  fortunes  of  the 
horde ;  and  public  gratitude  and  confidence 
placed  the  entire  administration  in  his  hands. 
Crowns  were  not  yet  invented,  but  Sava  became 


1 8  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

virtually  king,  and  sat  on  a  high  turf-seat  in 
the  middle  of  the  camp,  the  first  monarch  on 
the  first  throne,  a  war-leader  and  public  bene- 
factor raised  to  royalty  by  the  grateful  enthusi- 
asm of  his  people.1  Sava  led  the  horde  into 
the  pleasant  land,  called  from  him  Kasava. 
Sava,  the  first  king  of  the  Lapas,  also  built  the 
first  city  in  the  land,  Savapore.  It  stood  at  the 
confluence  of  two  rivers,  and  was  cunningly 
intersected  with  ditches  and  dikes.  A  thick 
hedge  and  stockade  closed  it  in  on  the  land 
side.  The  post  was  primarily  military,  not  so 
much  to  keep  friends  in  as  to  keep  enemies  out. 
The  horde  did  not  settle  down  and  live  there. 
They  wandered,  nomads  as  before,  up  and 
down  the  land  of  Kasava.  But  Savapore  was 
their  secure  retreat,  when  they  were  hard 
pressed  by  enemies.  The  land  by  this  time 
had  attracted  other  hordes:  but  the  Lapas, 
under  Sava's  inspiration,  had  resolved  that  they 
alone  would  possess  Kasava,  and  this  resolution 
they  carried  out  in  the  main  successfully. 
They  expelled  some  invaders,  and  coalesced 
with  others.  To  Savapore  they  brought  home 
their  booty,   and   in   the   river  pastures   round 

1  "The  first  founders,  proving  benefactors  of  the  multitude, 
either  by  advancing  the  arts,  or  by  success  in  war,  or  by  gather- 
ing the  people  together,  or  by  providing  land,  were  made  kings 
by  the  consent  of  their  subjects,  and  bequeathed  their  power  to 
their  posterity."  —  Aristotle,  Politics,  III.  1285  b. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     19 

Savapore  they  fed  their  flocks  and  herds.1 
Huts  in  time  were  built  about  the  fort,  on  both 
sides  of  the  two  rivers  :  there  the  women  and 
children  were  left,  while  the  warriors  went  out 
to  hunt  and  fight.  To  Savapore  suitors  and 
complainants  came,  as  an  alternative  to  fight- 
ing the  contention  out  among  themselves  ;  and 
Sava  and  his  successors  sat  in  the  gate,  declar- 
ing dooms  and  customs,  not  without  the  advice 
of  wise  elders  with  long  memories,  for  whom 
seats  were  placed  around  the  king.  It  was 
found  advisable  to  secure  the  country  by  a  num- 
ber of  smaller  forts,  about  which  were  also 
erected  huts.  But  the  jealous  care  of  the 
kings  prevented  these  subsidiary  hamlets  from 
ever  emancipating  themselves  from  the  control 
of  Savapore.  Thus  in  Kasava  there  never  was 
any  call  for  a  Theseus,  to  destroy  the  council- 
chambers  of  the  smaller  settlements  (Thucyd- 
ides,  II.  15).  The  assemblies  that  met  in  those 
hamlets  were  never  allowed  to  rise  above  the 
rank  of  parish  councils.  The  government  was 
centralised  at  Savapore.  The  nomad  life  of 
the  Lapas,  and  of  the  hordes  who  amalgamated 
with  them,  has  long  since  been  exchanged  for 

1  Doubtless,  the  domestication  of  animals  took  longer  time  for 
man  to  learn  than  the  mythus  allows  for.  The  same  may  be  said 
of  any  art  of  delving  and  diking,  indeed  of  the  whole  transition 
from  the  savage  to  the  barbarian. 


20  Political  cmd  Moral  Essays 

pasturage  and  agriculture;  and  out  of  agriculture 
has  grown  commerce.  Kasava  is  now  a  rich 
and  powerful  State,  yet  not  altogether  so  inter- 
esting in  its  maturity  as  were  its  early  beginnings 
under  King  Sava  I. 

§  13.  The  my  thus  goes  no  farther  for  the 
present.  It  brings  home  this  consideration, 
that  it  is  a  mistake  to  look  for  the  earliest  oriein 
of  the  State  in  a  group  of  independent  house- 
holders, settled  upon  the  land  as  stock  farmers 
and  agriculturists.  Man  is  a  nomad  before  he 
is  an  agriculturist;  and  even  the  nomad  is 
already  a  member  of  a  State.  The  civitas  is 
prior  to  the  urbs,  the  ttoXi?  to  the  dcrrv,  not 
only  in  nature  but  even  in  time  :  az^Spes  17  77-0X15. 
There  was  a  State  before  there  were  towns, 
before  even  there  were  homesteads.  These 
nomads  had  a  polity,  but  not  a  settlement  (fxe- 
vovarav  tto\iv)\  that  was  to  come  (ixeWovcrav, 
Heb.  xiii.  14).1  They  were  governed,  not  by 
human  law,  for  human  law  is  the  outcome  of 
mature  civilisation,  but  by  the  custom  of  the 
horde,  which  left  the  individual  anything  but 
free  to  do  as  he  pleased.  A  nomad  horde  is 
not  an  ideal  political  community,  nor  a  Maori 
a  model  man,  nor  a  sponge  the  best  type  of 
animal.     Still,  the  perfection  of  the  higher  type 

1  But  the  Israelites  were  not  a  horde,  they  were  not  savages : 
they  were  a  patriarchal  society. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     21 

is  no  reason  for  refusing  the  generic  name  to 
the  imperfect  lower  form,  especially  where  that 
lower  form  holds  in  deposit  the  potency  of  the 
higher  development.1 

§  14.  The  my  thus  makes  no  mention  of  the 
family,  and  no  mention  of  religion,  two  great 
creative  influences,  it  will  be  objected,  away 
from  which  the  State  and  civil  authority  could 
never  have  been  engendered.  First  with  regard 
to  religion.  I  consider  the  influence  of  religion 
to  have  been  a  fostering  rather  than  a  creative 
influence,  confirmatory  rather  than  originative 
of  politics  and  government,  —  at  the  same  time 
a  fostering  influence  of  the  highest  efficiency, 
so  efficient  that,  without  it,  what  we  know  to 
have  been  the  historical  development  of  civil 
society  could  never  have  taken  place.  Religion 
surrounded  the  first  chiefs  of  patriarchal  society 
with  a  halo  of  divinity :  it  did  not  raise  them 
to  power.  They  were  '  sons  of  heaven  '  because 
they  were  '  kings  of  men,'  or  masters  of  house- 
holds. The  priesthood  followed  upon  royalty 
and  upon  paternity :  it  did  not  confer  royalty, 
it  did  not  make  the  pater  familias.  The  first 
felt  rational   need   of  man  is  for  social  union. 

1  In  writing  this  I  stand  with  Seeley  (Introduction  to  Political 
Science,  Lecture  II.  pp.  32-36)  rather  than  with  Green,  who 
declares,  "  A  nomad  horde  could  not  be  called  a  political 
society"  (Principles  of  Political  Obligation,  p.  102). 


22  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

When  men  came  together,  they  worshipped 
together:  they  did  not  first  come  together  in 
order  to  worship.  Treason  and  rebellion  are 
offences  immediately  against  the  social  order, 
and  thereby  against  God,  the  Saviour  and 
Supreme  Custodian  of  the  State :  they  are 
not  formally  crimes  against  religion.  The  first 
community  is  political :  the  political  tie,  once 
formed,  is  strengthened  by  a  religious  sanction. 
The  worship  of  departed  ancestors  hallowed  the 
person  of  the  pater  familias,  who  represented 
them  and  in  a  manner  continued  their  life. 

§  15.  The  origin  of  the  State  from  the  family 
has  been  traced  by  Aristotle  (Politics,  I.  i-iii) 
and  a  crowd  of  meaner  writers.  This  theory 
culminates  in,  though  it  does  not  necessarily 
involve,  the  'patriarchal  theory,'  pushed  to  ab- 
surd lengths  by  Sir  Robert  Filmer  in  Locke's 
day.  I  am  not  without  apprehension  of  difficulty 
in  the  treatment  of  this  subject.  My  apprehen- 
sions are  expressed  in  two  proverbs,  one  Greek, 
kclkov  KaKaj  iaaOai,  and  one  mediaeval  Latin, 
obscurum  per  obscurius.  The  darkness  that 
besets  the  origin  of  the  State  is  bad  enough : 
there  is  a  worse  and  deeper  darkness  enshroud- 
ing the  first  commencements  of  the  family. 
From  the  Bible  (Gen.  ii.  24,  quoted  Matt.  xix.  5) 
we  have  one  flash  of  light  as  to  the  law  of 
marriage    before    man   was    multiplied   on    the 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     23 

earth.  Then  the  darkness  comes  on,  and  we 
have  to  peer  into  it  as  best  we  may.  In  lack 
of  other  evidence,  we  may  agree  to  judge  of 
primitive  communities  of  men  by  the  savage 
communities  which  we  find  in  Central  Australia, 
in  Queensland,  in  Borneo,  among  the  Anda- 
mans  in  the  Bay  of  Bengal,  among  African 
Bushmen,  North  American  Indians,  and  else- 
where. Such  a  community  are  our  Lapas, 
when  they  first  appear  in  the  mythus.  Their 
food  consists  of  things  in  their  natural  state, 
wild  fruits,  roots,  and  the  flesh  of  such  animals 
as  they  can  kill.  Their  cookery  is  of  the  simplest. 
They  are  ignorant  of  baking,  as  of  sowing  and 
reaping  and  of  all  agriculture.  They  have  no 
domestic  animals  except  dogs.  They  have  no 
use  of  metals.  In  such  a  society  we  do  not 
expect  to  find  the  family  quite  as  the  institution 
exists  in  modern  England.  Not  exactly  families, 
yet  not  promiscuity.  The  hypothesis  of  primi- 
tive promiscuity  remains  an  unproved  hypothe- 
sis. The  laws  of  physiology  seem  to  forbid 
such  license.  It  would  have  been  a  bar  to  the 
increase  of  the  race.1  Among  our  Lapas, — 
whom  we  take  as  a  specimen  of  the  savages 
that  have  been  studied  by  modern  travellers,  — 
the  intercourse  of  the  sexes  is  subject  to  severe 
restraints.      The   horde    is    divided    into    two 

1See  Mr.  Devas's  Studies  of  Fa.7>iily  Life,  §101. 


24  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

classes,  or  phratries : 1  either  class,  or  phratry, 
again  is  subdivided  into  totem  groups.  Be- 
tween members  of  the  same  phratry  there  is  no 
intermarriage,  still  less  between  members  of 
the  same  totem  group.2  But,  without  any  con- 
tract, every  man  in  any  given  totem  group  is 
reckoned  to  be  the  husband  of  every  woman  of 
a  corresponding  age  in  some  particular  totem 
group  of  the  other  phratry.  Actually,  however, 
except  on  certain  rare  occasions,  he  will  not 
cohabit  with  more  than  one  or  two  women : 
these  are  assigned  to  him,  not  chosen  by  him,  — 
a  fair  approach  to  monogamy  after  all.  The 
children  stay  with  the  mother,  and  belong  to 
the  totem  group  to  which  she  belongs.     Such 

JNo  real  resemblance  to  the  Attic  <f>parpiai. 

2  In  the  language  of  the  Algonquin  Indians,  ote  means  group 
ncnne,  m  is  the  suffix  meaning  his,  and  oth  is  the  article  prefixed. 
Out  of  oth-ote-m,  a  certain  trapper,  named  Long,  caught  the  sound 
and  coined  the  name  'totam,'  or  'totem.'  The  group  name  is 
often  the  name  of  an  animal,  sometimes  of  a  plant,  sometimes  of 
neither.  A  savage,  finding  himself  named  from  an  animal,  can- 
not but  have  some  regard  for  that  animal :  he  may  even  tell  you 
that  he  is  descended  from  it :  but  the  story  of  such  descent  arises 
out  of  the  name,  not  the  name  from  the  story.  The  names  of 
these  totem  groups  have  little  or  nothing  to  do  with  the  religion 
of  the  savage  who  bear  them.  Totem  in  this  connexion  repre- 
sents a  matrimonial  custom  of  exogamy,  nothing  more.  The 
advantage  of  the  custom  is  that  it  prevents  outrages  and  quarrels  : 
to  attack  any  individual  is  to  attack  two  groups  instead  of  one. 
But  the  name  '  totem '  is  further  applied  by  anthropologists  to  a 
different  object  entirely.  Most  savages  have  some  natural  object, 
generally  an  animal,  which  they  venerate,  and  which  represents 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     25 

are  the  rudimentary  family  relations  of  this 
rudimentary  State.  The  rudimentary  State  is 
prior  to  the  developed  family.  Nor  was  the 
first  king  a  patriarch,  or  house-father,  magnified. 
In  the  beginning,  in  such  races  as  the  Lapas 
there  were  no  patriarchal  houses.  The  first 
king,  Sava  I.,  was  an  invicta  bello  dextera,  a  leader 
skilful  in  war,  an  early  prototype  of  Lord  Roberts 
on  the  veldt.  When  the  family,  in  some  sort 
as  we  know  it,  became  an  institution,  there 
appeared  one  sacred,  patriarchal,  royal  family, 
which  claimed  descent  from  Sava  I.  He  was 
the  eponymous  hero  of  that  family,  and  later 
tradition  looked  upon  him  as  the  first  house- 
father.    In  point  of  fact,  this  descent  was  much 

to  them  in  some  way  their  ancestors.  Out  of  this  fact  a  whole 
literature  has  arisen,  under  the  name  of  '  totemism.'  A  totem  in 
this  sense  has  nothing  to  do  with  marriage  customs.  Thus  we 
read  of  totems  among  races  like  the  Samoans,  who  have,  to  be 
sure,  their  sacred  tutelary  ancestral  animals,  but  the  exogamic  in- 
stitution of  the  totem  group  does  not  exist  among  them.  Hence 
it  appears  that  the  name  '  totem  '  was  something  of  a  mistake  to 
begin  with,  and  has  been  mistakenly  applied  to  two  perfectly 
distinct  features  of  savage  life,  the  one  a  feature  of  family  rela- 
tions, the  other  a  feature  of  religion.  Properly  speaking,  a  totem 
is  the  crest  and  name  of  a  sort  of  clan,  and  the  object  of  the 
designation  is  to  secure  exogamy.  The  totem  trees  in  the  Pitt- 
Rivers  Collection  display  the  crests,  or  one  might  say,  the  heral- 
dic bearings,  of  the  illustrious  barbarians  before  whose  houses 
they  stood.  For  any  scientific  value  that  this  note  may  possess, 
I  am  indebted  to  Dr.  Tylor,  F.R.S.,  of  the  University  Museum. 
(Cf.  Man,  A  Mottthly  Record of  Anthropological Science,  January, 
1902.) 


26  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

eked  out  by  adoption,  a  fertile  process,  of  which 
more  hereafter.  Meanwhile  the  mythus  re- 
sumes.1 

§  1 6.  Not  long  after  the  entry  of  the  Lapas 
into  the  land  of  Kasava,  they  began  to  change 
greatly  for  the  better.  They  ceased  to  be  sav- 
ages. They  learned  to  domesticate  animals. 
They  got  them  flocks  and  herds,  and  from  a 
nomad  horde  of  hunters  they  became  a  pastoral 
people.  The  cultivation  of  the  soil  followed 
upon  the  domestication  of  animals :  agriculture 
was  an  adjunct  to  pasturage.  But  the  law  of 
diminishing  returns  soon  asserted  itself.  The 
same  plot  of  earth  would  not  yield  in  the  fifth 
year  what  it  had  yielded  in  the  first.  The 
primitive  farmer  thought  there  was  some  curse 
upon  the  spot,  and  went  elsewhere.  Agricul- 
ture itself  was  nomadic  in  its  commencements.2 
The  secrets  of  fallow,  rotation  of  crops,  and 
manuring  were  yet  to  be  learned.  The  use 
of  metals,  even  to  the  smelting  of  iron,  followed 
in  due  course.  This  much  facilitated  the  clear- 
ance of  the  primeval  jungle,  which  at  first  had 
been  cleared  by  fire.     Thus  the  Lapas  reached 

1  The  silvaticus  solivagus  of  Hobbes  and  Rousseau  makes  no 
figure  in  this  veracious  history,  nor  indeed  in  any  history :  he  is 
a  figment  of  the  philosophic  brain,  ere  that  brain  was  disciplined 
by  the  historical  method. 

2  Arva  per  annos  mutant  et  superest  ager  (Tacitus,  Germania, 
xxvi) . 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     27 

the  '  patriarchal '  stage  of  development.  Their 
economy  was  no  longer  'savage,'  but  'barbaric,' 
such  an  economy  as  we  read  of  in  the  Germa- 
nia  of  Tacitus  and  in  the  Homeric  poems,  the 
economy  of  the  early  Romans  and  of  the  Kelts 
of  Britain  and  Gaul.  We  may  study  it  among 
the  Arabs  and  the  tribes  of  the  Panjab.  The 
important  feature  is  the  development  of  the 
family  under  the  patriarch,  or  house-father,  in 
some  such  way  as  the  following.  The  domesti- 
cation of  animals  made  a  beginning  of  personal 
property,  the  animals  attaching  themselves  to 
the  individual  who  had  domesticated  them  and 
understood  them.  He  required  the  services 
of  other  men  to  tend  his  pets.  Inasmuch  as 
the  animals  were  his,  their  natural  increase  was 
his  also.  Res  fructijicat  domino.  The  stronger 
sex  were  more  likely  to  become  small  proprietors 
in  this  way  than  the  weaker.  The  ascendency 
of  the  male  sex  over  the  female  gradually  grew. 
The  man  began  to  think  that,  as  he  had  do- 
minion over  his  cattle  and  their  increase,  so  he 
should  be  lord  also  of  his  wives  and  children, 
have  certain  women  for  his  own  exclusively, 
and  consequently  recognise  and  hold  certain 
children  for  his.1     Not  to  put  too  fine  a  point 

1  Not  that  I  base  the  sentiment  against  polyandry  on  mere 
desire  of  ownership.  In  no  age  of  the  world  can  man  love  woman 
passionately,   and  not  seek  to  possess  her  solely.      Have    not 


28  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

upon  the  matter,  the  man  insisted  on  being  lord 
of  his  whole  stock.  Thus  that  fortress  of  father- 
hood and  marital  right,  the  patriarchal  house- 
hold, was  reared  on  a  triple  basis :  — 

(i)  The  absolute  supremacy  of  the  house-father 
over  wives,  children,  domesticated  animals,  and 
the  servants  who  tended  them ;  all  being,  as 
the  Roman  lawyers  phrased  it,  in  manu} 

(2)  Monogamy  for  females,  one  husband  to 
one  or  several  wives. 

(3)  Kinship  traced  through  males,  the  house- 
father being  taken  for  centre  of  reference. 

§  1 7.  Among  the  Malays  there  are,  or  were 
thirty  years  ago,  —  for  such  interesting  vestiges 
of  barbarism  are  rapidly  fading  under  the  ad- 
vance of  a  civilisation  which  is  not  always  an 
obvious  improvement, — long-drawn-out  houses, 
or  casernes,  capable  of  holding  from  fifty  to  a 
hundred  persons,  built  in  sections,  each  sec- 
tion containing  a  monogamous  family.2  The 
whole  caserne  is  under  the  matriarchal  or 
maternal  rule  of  some  venerable  grandmother, 
having  for  lieutenant  her  brother.     The  fathers 

Othello  and  Desdemona  been  from  the  first  ?  Or  has  the 
passion  of  human  love  grown  only  gradually  with  human  intelli- 
gence? 

1  "Among  barbarians,  woman  and  slave  are  on  the  same  level " 
(Aristotle,  Politics,  I.  1252  b). 

2  In  what  are  called  '  pueblo  houses 1  the  economy  is  the 
same,  but  the  sections  are  built  vertically  one  over  the  other. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     29 

of  the  several  families  have  no  authority,  nor 
have  they  any  home  in  the  house :  they  come 
and  go ;  they  are  members  of  another  house. 
Like  Jacob  for  Rachel,  they  must  do  several 
years  of  service,  before  the  bride  whom  they 
seek  is  given  them.  Given  in  marriage,  the  girl 
still  stays  in  the  matriarchal  house.  This  ar- 
rangement is  in  no  way  connected  with  any 
primitive  promiscuity,  for  which  some  writers 
take  it  as  evidence :  it  rests  on  the  mere  eco- 
nomic consideration  of  the  value  of  the  girl's 
labour,  particularly  in  agriculture,  to  the  house 
in  which  she  was  born.  The  family  prefer  tak- 
ing the  man  in  occasionally  to  parting  with  her. 
If,  however,  the  husband  is  a  person  of  impor- 
tance,—  which,  among  the  Fuegians,  who  have 
similar  customs,  means  that  he  has  a  canoe  of 
his  own,  —  and  wishes  to  take  his  wife  away 
with  him,  he  pays  bride-money  (the  Homeric 
hhva)  not  to  the  girl's  parents,  but  to  the  matri- 
archal grandmother,  or  to  the  maternal  uncle, 
in  compensation  for  the  loss  of  her  services. 
Having  so  taken  her,  he  founds  now  a  patri- 
archal family  of  his  own.  The  bride-money 
still  survives  in  the  '  gold  and  silver,'  which  in 
the  Catholic  marriage  service  the  bridegroom 
presents  to  the  bride.  I  am  inclined  to  con- 
jecture that  the  Amazons  of  old,  and  some 
representatives    of   the  type   in   more    modern 


30  Political  and  Moiral  Essays 

times  (see  Mr.  E,  J.  Payne's  History  of  the 
New  World  called  America,  Vol.  II.,  Claren- 
don Press,  1899),  were  clusters  of  matriarchal 
families. 

§  18.  According  to  the  received  view,  the 
horde  passed  into  the  tribe,  the  tribe  dif- 
ferentiated itself  into  clans,  and  the  clan  into 
families,  whence  finally  has  emerged  the  modern 
'  individual.'  This  view  is  to  me  difficult. 
The  difficulty  of  the  whole  matter  is  to  see  how, 
in  such  a  loosely  organised  community  as  the 
horde,  the  well-knit  despotism  of  the  patriarchal 
family  came  to  be  erected.  I  believe  no  per- 
fect theory  of  the  transaction  has  yet  been 
found.  We  are  left  largely  to  guesswork  and 
provisional  hypotheses,  pegs  to  hang  facts  on 
as  they  are  discovered,  and  to  abandon  if  they 
will  not  bear  the  strain.  The  horde,  it  is  said, 
passed  into  the  tribe,  and  the  tribe  differs  from 
the  horde  by  the  strengthening  of  the  tie  of 
kinship.  But  how  can  the  tie  of  kinship  be 
strengthened  otherwise  than  by  the  develop- 
ment of  family  relations?  The  family  surely 
is  the  generating  point  both  of  clan  and  tribe. 
And  is  it  not  likely  that  from  the  family  the 
clan  would  be  formed  before  the  tribe,  the  clan 
being  the  smaller  union  of  the  two,  and  the 
kinship  of  family  with  family  in  the  clan  more 
real  and  visible  than  in  the  tribe  ?     I  therefore 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     31 

look  upon  this  order  of  development  as  more 
probable:  first  the  horde,  then  the  family, — 
either  matriarchal  or  patriarchal,  still  rudimen- 
tary and  imperfect, — then  the  clan,  and  lastly 
the  whole  horde  transformed,  or,  as  I  might  say, 
'segmented,5  and  making  the  tribe.  The  full 
strength  of  the  patriarchal  family  I  willingly 
allow  to  have  been  attained  only  as  the  organ- 
ism of  the  tribe  became  complete.  When  I 
say,  '  first  the  horde,  then  the  family,'  I  mean, 
'  first  in  the  order  of  progress  from  savagery  to 
civilisation,'  assuming  such  progress  to  be  made 
as  anthropologists  lay  down.  Savages  are  sav- 
ages by  living  in  a  horde,  and  by  the  imper- 
fection of  their  matrimonial  arrangements. 
Imperfect  as  they  are  when  tried  by  a 
Christian  standard,  these  arrangements  are 
still  highly  complex,  and  severely  enforced. 
Savage  life  in  this  respect  is  stricter  by  far 
than  the  lives  of  many  civilised  men  and 
women. 

§  1 9.  Thus  the  horde  came  to  be  honeycombed 
with  families,  segmented  into  families  as  into 
so  many  separate  cells,  This  process  of  seg- 
mentation transformed  the  '  horde '  into  the 
'  tribe.'  All  tribesmen  were  kinsmen,  whether 
by  real  descent  from  a  common  male  ancestor, 
or  by  adoption  into  his  family  or  clan,  the  body 
of  natural  or  factitious  descendants  who  bore 


32  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

his  name.  Adoption  —  a  conventionality  to 
English  ears  —  was  a  great  reality  in  the  patri- 
archal world,  as  every  Roman  lawyer  knows, 
and  every  theologian  should  know.  The  ac- 
counts that  we  read  of  the  rapid  multiplication 
of  certain  families  are  not  to  be  brushed 
aside  as  involving  physiological  impossibilities. 
Families  multiply  rapidly  enough,  when  the  head 
is  powerful,  and  alien  neighbours  are  glad  to  be 
adopted  into  his  house  and  bear  his  name.  The 
development  of  the  tribe  has  been  the  develop- 
ment of  the  State.  Aristotle,  therefore,  was 
right  in  making  the  family  prior  to  the  State 
in  time,  if  by  '  family '  he  meant  the  patriarchal 
family,  and  by '  State'  the  State  in  its  maturity. 
What  Aristotle  failed  distinctly  to  set  down, 
though  he  was  not  an  utter  stranger  to  the 
notion,  was  that  savagedom  preceded  barbarism, 
and  that,  previous  to  the  elaboration  of  the 
patriarchal  household,  there  existed  some  rude 
form  of  political  society,  now  known  as  the 
4  horde,'  with  such  imperfect  marital  relations 
as  I  have  described.  Such  at  least  is  the 
thesis  of  modern  anthropologists,  though  no 
one  supposes  that  the  thesis  is  yet  either 
adequately  stated  or  fully  demonstrated.1 

1  Men  may  fall  in  the  scale  of  civilisation  as  well  as  rise  in  it, 
fall  rapidly,  and  rise  again  slowly.  We  have  to  reckon  with  the 
possibility  of  retrogression  as  well  as  of  progress. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     33 

§  20.  Kindred,  whether  by  blood  or  by  adop- 
tion, was  the  cement  of  patriarchal  society.1 
The  man  who  could  not  name  the  family  to 
which  he  belonged,  at  least  as  client  or  slave, 
had  no  place  in  the  tribe :  he  had  no  social  or 
political  status  whatever:  he  had  no  rights  that 
any  other  man  would  champion,  he  could  suffer 
no  wrong  that  any  power  would  avenge  :  if  his 
own  strong  arm  failed  him,  he  was  a  lost  man, 
unless  indeed  his  very  weakness  and  poverty 
rendered  him  contemptible  and  safe.2 

§  21.  Reverting  to  the  royal  city  of  Sava- 
pore,  now  in  the  patriarchal  stage  of  develop- 
ment, we  are  surprised  at  the  procedure  which 
there  takes  the  place  of  our  criminal  law.  An 
offence  against  person  or  property  is  not  a 
crime  against  the  State  of  Kasava :  it  is  a  crime 
against  the  family  of  the  person  offended.     If 

1  On  the  decline  of  the  family  as  a  political  factor  in  our  civi- 
lisation, see  Seeley,  Introduction  to  Political  Science,  Lecture  III. 
pp.  54-58. 

2  M.  de  Coulanges,  La  Cite  Antique,  p.  234,  writes  of  patri- 
archal man  in  the  family:  Partout  ailleurs  il  est  sans  dieu  et  en 
dehors  de  la  vie  morale.  La  seulement  il  a  sa  dignite  d'homme 
et  ses  devoirs.  II  ne  peut  etre  homme  que  la.  This  eminent 
French  scholar  seems  to  me  somewhat  to  exaggerate  the  strength 
of  primogeniture.  The  cadet  branches  of  the  family,  and  the 
younger  brothers  of  each  generation,  naturally  the  more  numer- 
ous, often  the  more  capable,  would  never  have  brooked  such 
absolute  predominance  of  each  eldest  son  and  his  offspring  as 
M.  de  Coulanges  portrays.  I  find,  however,  some  justification  of 
M.  de  Coulanges  in  this  passage  of  Plato  {Laws,  740  B,  C)  :  "  Let 


34  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

the  sufferer  be  a  man  of  no  family,  '  a  land- 
louper,' aTLfxrjTos  ixeTai'dcrT7]<;,  there  is  no  crime 
of  which  any  one  will  take  cognisance,  unless 
the  outcast  show  pluck  and  vigour  enough  to 
avenge  himself.  But  slay  the  member  of  some 
household,  and  it  is  as  though  you  had  dis- 
turbed a  wasps'  nest :  the  whole  brood  will  be 
out  to  chase  you.  Dabunt  malum  Metelli, 
dabunt  malum  Metelli.  Nor  will  the  mischief 
end  with  vour  death.  Your  nearest  kinsman 
will  wreak  vengeance  on  your  slayer,  and  so 
on  either  side,  pugnabunt  ipsique  ncpotesque. 
There  is  evidently  some  false  principle  at  the 
root  of  this  regressus  in  infinitum,  on  which 
Euripides  moralises,  as  is  his  wont :  — 

If  a  wife  shall  slay  her  husband,  and  then  the  son  shall 
slay  the  mother,  and  that  son's  issue  must  pay  in  blood  for 
the  blood  his  father  shed,  how  far  on  shall  one  travel  to  find 

the  holder  of  the  allotment  always  leave  some  one  only  of  his 
children  as  heir.  ...  As  for  the  other  children,  where  more 
than  one  child  is  born,  ...  let  the  authorities  distribute  the 
males  to  be  adopted  as  sons  by  such  of  the  citizens  as  are  child- 
less."1 Scipio  Africanus  Minor  affords  an  instance  of  such  adop- 
tion. M.  de  Coulanges  insists  alike  on  the  strength  of  the 
patriarchal  family  and  the  strength  of  the  patriarchal  State.  Are 
not  these  two  powers  in  inverse  proportion  to  one  another  ? 
Does  not  Scottish  history  show  the  strength  of  the  family  to  have 
been  the  weakness  of  the  State  ?  And  was  not  the  policy  of 
Louis  XI.  the  aggrandisement  of  the  central  authority  at  the 
expense  of  the  great  houses  ?  M.  de  Coulanges  takes  no  ac- 
count of  any  stage  of  human  progress  prior  in  time  to  the  patri- 
archal. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     35 

a  term  to  miseries?  Wisely  did  our  sires  lay  down  the  law 
of  old  :  they  forbade  him  that  had  blood  on  his  hands  to 
appear  in  public,  or  to  meet  any  one  :  their  way  was  to  pu- 
rify him  by  banishment,  but  not  to  slay  him  in  revenge  : 
otherwise  some  one  was  bound  always  to  be  guilty  of  homi- 
cide, whoever  had  last  stained  his  hands  in  blood.  ...  As 
long  as  I  have  the  power,  I  will  stand  by  the  law,  and  check 
this  brutal  tradition  of  murder,  the  everlasting  bane  of 
country  and  commonwealths. — Orestes,  504  ff.1 

The  saner  portion  of  the  community,  the 
leaders  of  the  tribe,  and  the  men  of  religion,  de- 
vised various  checks  upon  this  hereditary  blood- 
feud.  Among  the  Hebrews,  cities  of  refuge  were 
marked  out,  as  we  read  in  Num.  xxxv.  9  ff. 
Among  the  Greeks,  as  the  quotation  shows, 
and  many  legends  refer  to  the  custom,  it  was 
enough  if  the  murderer  expatriated  himself. 
Religious  rites  of  purification  were  also  in- 
stituted (yEschylus,  Eumeuidcs,  237-239,  445- 
452).  But  the  great  remedy  was  the  insti- 
tution of  bote,  or  compensation  to  be  paid  to 

1  The  tragic  monarch  did  well  in  exerting  his  power  to  "  quell 
this  brutal  and  murderous  "  practice  of  blood-feud.  Yet  blood- 
feud  had  its  office  in  the  march  of  civilisation.  There  is  perhaps 
a  stage  in  which  this  is  the  only  form  of  justice  available  against 
crimes  of  violence.  "  The  grand  principle  of  Kaffir  law,"  says 
Sir  George  Gray,  —  and  we  must  remember  that  Kaffir  law  was 
once  European  law,  —  "is  collective  responsibility:  do  away  with 
this,  and  the  Kaffirs  will  speedily  become  unmanageable.11  Con- 
siderations of  this  sort  are  valuable  contributions  to  the  solution 
of  the  vexed  question  of  Old  Testament  morality.  See  the  Ap- 
pendix to  the  third  edition  of  my  Ethics  and  Natural  Law. 


36  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

the    relatives    of    the    slain,    of    which    by    de- 
grees a  regular    tariff  was    drawn   up,  accord- 
ing to  the  dignity  of  the  man  killed.     It  rested 
at  first  with  the  choice  of  the  kinsfolk,  whether 
they  would  take    bote   or  have    blood.     Some 
heinous    murders    were    boteless,    and   must  be 
expiated  in  blood.     It  became  the  object  of  the 
State  more  and  more  to  press  the  acceptance 
of  bote.     The  Christian  precept  of  forgiveness 
of  enemies,  a  vital  precept  in  a  barbaric  age, 
also  entered  in  to  prevent  slaughter.     But  no 
sooner  was  the  State  able   to  insist  upon  bote 
being  taken,  than  a  further  function  devolved 
upon  it,  the  function  of  criminal  trial,  and  from 
that,   of    civil  trial   also.     It  was  necessary   to 
determine  whether  the  offence  was  boteless  or 
not.     The  offender  brought  up  his  kinsmen  no 
longer  now  to  fight  for  him,  but  as  witnesses 
of  character,  or  compurgators.     If  the  offence 
was  boteless,  the  State  might  hand  the  criminal 
over  to  his  enemies   to  slay :  but  in   time  the 
State  preferred  to  keep  the  slaying  in  its  own 
hands.1     The  public  executioner  entered  upon 
his  office,  and  the  State  discovered  that  it  bore 
not  the  sword  in  vain  (Rom.  xiii.  4).     There 
was  a  difficulty,  not  soon  overcome,  in  getting 
the  contending  parties  to  come  into  court.     It 

1  Boteless   offences  were  the  original  type  of  what  are  now 
called  crimes,  matter  of  criminal  as  distinguished  from  civil  pro- 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     37 

long  remained  open  to  the  accused  to  decline 
trial,  and  settle  the  matter  by  righting  his  ac- 
cusers or  their  champions.  Provision  for  this 
'  wager  of  battle '  was  not  struck  off  the  Eng- 
lish statute-book  till  the  beginning  of  the  nine- 
teenth century.  Every  trial,  it  has  been  well 
observed,  whether  criminal  or  civil,  is  "  a  fight 
arrested."  What  we  call  'a  criminal  offence,' 
matter  of  jus  publicum,  is  taken  by  the  State 
for  an  offence  against  itself :  of  old  it  was  an 
offence  against  the  family  of  the  sufferer. 
What  we  call  '  civil  procedure,'  matter  of  jus 
privatum,  is  still  regarded  by  the  State  as  a 
private  contention,  of  which,  however,  the  State 
will  take  cognisance,  if  called  upon,  and  will 
enforce  its  decision. 

§  22.  We  have  travelled  a  long  way  from  the 
patriarchal  city  of  Savapore.  Returning  thither 
for  the  last  time,  we  discover  a  second  matter  of 
surprise,  quite  a  startling  paradox ;  it  is  this : 
here  is  a  State  without  any  legislative  power. 

cedure.  Plato  (Laws  vi.  767  B)  marks  the  distinction  thus, 
"  For  other  cases  let  there  be  two  tribunals  :  the  one  when  any 
private  individual  accuses  another  private  individual  of  doing  him 
wrong,  and  so  prosecutes  him  and  demands  judgment ;  the  other, 
when  the  commonwealth  considers  itself  aggrieved  by  any  of  the 
citizens,  considers  the  public  interest  threatened,  and  wishes  to 
support  it.11  To  have  risen  to  the  conception  of  the  common- 
wealth being  wronged  {to  Stj/jloo-lov  aSixeio-Otu)  argues  a  develop- 
ment of  self-consciousness  and  of  civil  personality  in  the  State 
(see§  5). 


38  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

There  is  absolutely  no  power  in  Savapore,  or  in 
the  whole  land  of  Kasava,  that  can  make  a  new 
law.1  For  laws  there  are  customs,  registered 
in  the  memories  of  a  Council  of  Elders.  These 
Conscript  Fathers  meet,  not  to  legislate,  but  to 
remember,  though  no  doubt  their  memories 
prove  rather  convenient  for  their  own  purposes. 
But  the  theories  of  Royal  Ordinances  and  of 
the  Omnipotence  of  Parliament  have  yet  to  be 
invented.  The  answer  of  Pope  Stephen  in  the 
third  century,  on  the  validity  of  baptism  con- 
ferred by  heretics,  Nihil  innovetitr,  nisi  quod 
tradition  est,  was  quite  a  patriarchal  utterance. 
There  are  considerable  remains  of  patriarchal 
civilisation  still  in  existence  in  India  and  else- 
where.    A  mistake  of  the  English  government, 

1  Si  nous  entendons  par  legislateur  un  homme  qui  crde  un  code 
par  la  puissance  de  son  genie  et  qui  l'impose  aux  autres  hommes, 
ce  legislateur  n'existait  jamais  chez  les  anciens.  La  loi  antique 
ne  sortait  pas  non  plus  des  votes  du  peuple.  La  pensee  que  le 
nombre  des  suffrages  pouvait  faire  une  loi  n'apparait  que  fort  tard 
dans  les  cites  (La  Cite  Antique,  p.  220).  Plato  somehow  divined 
this  truth,  that  there  was  a  civil  state  anterior  to  legislation. 
"  We  may  conclude,"  he  says,  "  that  those  ages  had  no  need  of 
lawgivers,  nor  was  there  any  legislation  at  that  time.  The  art  of 
writing  was  not  yet  in  vogue  at  the  period  we  are  considering :  the 
people  lived  in  obedience  to  customs  and  traditional  observances  " 
{Laws,  III.  680  A).  He  thinks  that  when  small  clans,  having  dif- 
ferent customs,  united  together,  legislation  then  first  became 
necessary,  to  decide  which  customs  should  prevail  in  the  newly 
formed  whole  (id.  681  A-C). 

For  the  general  concept  of  Law  see  my  Ethics  and  Natural  Law* 
Pt.  I.  ch  vii.  pp.  126-132. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     39 

now  happily  recognised  and  being  avoided, 
was  to  endeavour  by  legislation  to  supplant 
customs  which  were  as  fixed  and  firm  to  the 
inhabitants  as  the  law  of  gravitation  to  the 
astronomer.  Such  legislation  was  doomed  to 
failure.  Time-honoured  custom  overlaid  new- 
fangled law.1 

I  hasten  to  add  that,  at  the  moment  at  which 
I  write,  Kasava  has  passed  through  the  patri- 
archal stage  to  the  military  and  commercial 
stage  of  civilisation ;  that  "  the  substitution  of 
an  artificial  for  a  natural  basis  of  subsistence  " J 
is  complete ;  and  that  Savapore  under  King 
Sava  XCII.  is  as  modern  a  city  as  London  or 
New  York.  We  take  leave  of  His  Majesty  and 
his  Lapas.  koi  to  [xev  Sr)  tov  fxvdov  reA.os  e^erw 
(Plato,  Politiats,  274  D). 

§  23.  Civil  authority  in  its  maturity  is  at 
once  legislative,  judicial,  and  executive.  In  the 
rudimentary  State,  executive  functions  are  not 
less  undeveloped  than  legislative  and  judicial. 

1  There  is,  however,  one  striking  instance  of  abolition  of 
custom  even  in  the  age  when  custom  was  supreme,  in  the  half- 
patriarchal,  half-military  society  of  the  sixth  and  seventh 
centuries  of  our  era.  I  mean  the  conversion  of  the  Teutonic 
races  to  Christianity.  How  many  reputed  'good  customs'  must 
have  been  undone  when  Edwin  of  Northumbria  was  baptised, 
and  high-priest  Coiffi  flung  his  spear  at  the  idols  in  the  temple 
of  Godmundingham  ! 

2  History  of  the  New  World  called  America,  by  E.  J.  Payne, 
Vol.  I.  p.  276. 


40  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

We  may  divide  executive  functions  into  those 
which  are  executive  proper,  being  concerned 
with  the  execution  of  justice  as  decreed  in 
courts  civil  and  criminal,  —  such  functions  are 
an  appanage  to  the  judicial ;  military  and  diplo- 
matic functions,  pointing  to  foreign  relations  of 
war  and  peace ;  and  lastly,  functions  which  we 
may  call  administrative.  These  last  are  social 
and  economic  rather  than  political.  They  deal 
with  such  branches  of  the  public  economy  as 
the  State  takes  up  and  makes  matter  of  legis- 
lation—  education  and  the  public  health  are 
instances :  administrative  functions  have  to 
do  with  the  carrying  out  of  such  legislation. 
Excess  of  administration  makes  bureaucracy. 
The  administrative  staff  behave  in  some  coun- 
tries as  the  servants,  in  others  as  the  masters, 
of  the  people.  In  England  they  are  jealously 
watched  by  the  legislature,  by  the  judicature, 
by  public  opinion  and  the  press.  We  detest 
a  '  jack  in  office.'  The  delinquencies  of  an 
official  person  are  punished  as  severely  as  those 
of  a  pauper,  or  should  be.  This  is  a  great 
secret  of  real  liberty.  Without  this  vigilance, 
constitutions  and  plebiscites  may  cover  a  brood 
of  petty  despots.  The  Crown  is  the  chief  of 
the  executive,  in  the  widest  sense  of  the  term ; 
and  all  the  doings  of  the  executive  amongst 
us  run  in  His  Majesty's  name.     Originally  all 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Aiithority     41 

administration  was  for  military  and  fiscal  pur- 
poses, money  being  the  sinews  of  war.  A 
primitive  government  had  no  more  care  of  the 
public  health  than  the  War  Office  has  of  it  now. 
Highways  and  bridges  soon  became  matter  of 
administration,  because  they  were  of  impor- 
tance for  the  movement  of  soldiers.  Ancient 
commerce  followed  the  military  routes.  Coin- 
age had  to  be  attended  to,  because  the  military 
tribute  might  be  paid  in  coin.  In  England  at 
one  time  there  were  thirty  or  forty  different 
standards  of  weights  and  measures :  unity  had 
to  be  enforced,  otherwise  the  government 
could  not  be  sure  of  its  dues,  many  military 
aids  being  paid  in  kind.  The  king,  being  a 
great  landowner,  regulated  his  royal  estates: 
these  regulations  were  copied  by  neighbours, 
passed  into  customs,  and  finally  wrere  embodied 
in  law.  In  times  of  dire  calamity,  such  as  the 
dearth  of  labourers  after  the  Black  Death, — 
compare  our  modern  experience  of  famines  in 
India,  where  from  conquerors  we  have  been 
turned  into  purveyors,  —  people  fly  to  govern- 
ment as  to  the  strongest,  swiftest,  and  most 
present  power  to  help  them.  The  hand  of 
government,  once  called  in,  is  never  wholly 
taken  away  again.  The  government  learns  to 
administer,  and  the  people  to  expect  administra- 
tion.    Thus    much  of  the  gradual   growth  of 


42  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

that  branch  of  civil  authority,  in   our  days  so 
fertile  of  results,  administration. 

§  24.  To  prepare  the  way  for  defining  the 
extent  of  civil  authority,  I  must  be  allowed 
some  further  theoretical  enquiry  into  its  origin. 
The  origin  of  civil  authority  from  nature  and 
from  God  I  have  already  considered.  I  have 
now  to  consider  its  origin  as  derived  from  man, 
I  mean,  from  the  consent  of  the  governed. 
First,  I  observe,  there  can  be  no  asking  of  the 
consent  of  mankind  to  decide  whether  they 
will  have  any  government  at  all.  Willy  nilly, 
there  must  be  civil  government,  or  all  human 
development  is  lost.  The  question  is,  who 
shall  govern  and  under  what  forms?  The 
question  is,  whether  the  consent  of  the  gov- 
erned is  necessary  to  the  validity  of  the  polity 
under  which  they  live,  and  to  the  validity  of 
the  appointment  of  the  living  rulers  who  ad- 
minister that  polity.  Further  to  narrow  the 
question,  I  do  not  enquire  about  the  consent 
of  the  people's  ancestors  in  bygone  days,  but 
about  the  consent  of  the  living  generation  of 
people.  Does  civil  authority,  for  its  form  and 
personnel,  depend  upon  the  continued  approval 
of  the  people  governed  ?  And  that  again  may 
be  a  question  of  a  bare  actual  consent,  or  of  a 
hearty  consent,  approval,  and  good  will.  In 
point  of  actual  consent,  people  cannot  be  gov- 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     43 

erned  unless  they  choose  to  obey.  A  man  may 
obey  because  he  has  a  pistol  at  each  ear  and  a 
bayonet  behind  his  back ;  but  that  is  not  civil 
obedience,  nor  is  it  habitual  obedience,  it  is 
obedience  under  an  emergency  that  passes 
away.  No  government  can  be  erected  on  a 
basis  of  mere  coercion.  You  cannot,  it  is  said, 
sit  on  bayonets.  There  must  be  some  willing- 
ness of  the  people  to  submit,  if  the  State  is  to  be 
a  State  at  all.  It  may  be  an  unwilling  willing- 
ness, an  unwillingness  that  chooses  obedience 
as  the  less  of  two  evils ;  but  obedience  it  is  and 
consent  under  the  circumstances.  Our  actions 
are  done  and  our  practical  elections  made,  not 
in  the  general  but  in  the  singular,  under  the 
circumstances  that  surround  us  at  the  time.1 
Velleity  is  in  the  general,  but  volition  in  the 
singular.  The  actual  consent  of  the  governed, 
then,  is  an  essential  condition  of  the  exercise  of 
civil  authority.2 

§  25.  The  full  consent  and  good  will  of  the 
people  is  ordinarily  requisite  for  the  valid  set- 
ting up  of  a  new  government  over  them :  such 

1 "  An  action  is  consummated  and  complete  at  the  time  in  which 
it  is  done :  therefore  it  must  be  called  voluntary  or  involuntary 
accordingly  as  it  is  precisely  at  that  time."  Aristotle,  Nic.  Eth., 
III.  mo  a. 

2  Force  cannot  dispense  with  persuasion,  or  the  modelling  of 
public  opinion,  where  subjects  are  educated  and  refined  ;  nor 
even  with  such  subjects  can  persuasion  go  wholly  unsupported 


44  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

consent  is  not  requisite  to  validate  a  govern- 
ment already  established.  I  use  the  word 
'  ordinarily '  in  the  first  clause  of  the  proposi- 
tion, because  of  the  extraordinary,  though  by  no 
means  uncommon,  case  of  subjugation  by  war. 
When  a  people  go  to  war  unjustly  and  are 
overcome  in  the  same,  they  may  at  times  be 
made  to  pay  for  their  injustice  by  the  loss  of 
their  political  independence.  Otherwise  one 
State  must  not  absorb  and  annex  a  neighbour- 
ing State  against  its  will,  nor  one  section  in 
a  State  subjugate  the  rest  of  the  population 
without  their  free  consent.  The  thing  is  not 
less  wrong  for  having  often  been  done  in  his- 
tory. But,  it  is  asked,  may  not  the  consent 
of  the  people  be  dispensed  with,  or  taken  for 
granted,  when  they  need  governing,  and  are 
to  be  governed  to  their  own  advantage  and 
amelioration  of  their  lot,  not  of  course  without 
some  reciprocal  profit  to  the  strong  hand  that 
subjects  them  ?  An  affirmative  answer  would 
justify  many  a  coup  d'etat  and  many  a  con- 
quest. Strongly  in  favour  of  affirmation  is  the 
Aristotelian  docrine  of  <fy6aei  SovXol.  Aristotle 
advocates  the  use  of  violence,  upo?  t<x  d-qpia  kou 

by  force :  at  the  foundation  of  all  civil  obedience  lies  the  consid- 
eration that,  in  the  last  resort,  '  the  soldiers  will  fire.'  Cf.  Plato's 
fashion  of  prefixing  preludes  to  his  laws  {Laws,  iv.  720,  722, 
723),  —  persuasion  preambulatory  to  legislation,  and,  I  may  add, 
compulsion  consequent. 


\ 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     45 

7wv  avOpoiTTOiv  octol  7r€<f>VKOTe<;  apy^eadai  fxr)  BeXov- 
criv  {Politics,  I.  1256  b),  even  to  the  hunting  of 
them  for  slaves,  much  more  to  the  reduction 
of  them  to  political  vassalage.  He  quotes 
with  approval  the  line, — 

Justice  subjects  barbarian  to  Greek, 

i.e.  uncivilised  man  to  civilised.  The  stoutest 
Aristotelian,  however,  will  admit  that  this  prin- 
ciple must  be  carefully  limited,  or  we  shall 
have  universal  war.  What  but  the  sword  can 
ultimately  decide  which  is  the  superior  race  ? 

§  26.  I  have  said  the  continued  good  will 
of  the  governed  is  not  indispensable  to  the 
validation  of  a  government  already  established. 
To  shrink  from  this  somewhat  unpopular  prop- 
osition is  to  license  mutiny,  rebellion,  treason, 
revolution,  anarchy.  Speaking  generally,  an 
established  government  is  justified  in  using 
force  to  maintain  itself.  Even  against  the 
whole  people  ?  it  will  be  asked.  If  the  whole 
people  means  everybody  in  the  State,  the  ques- 
tion is  superfluous.  If  it  means  some  strong 
section  in  the  State,  the  American  Union' 
answered  the  question  in  the  affirmative  in  the 
war  of  1862,  and  the  British  Government  in 
the  suppression  of  the  Indian  Mutiny  in  1858. 
But  is  the  government  justified  in  maintaining 
itself  against  the  majority  of  the  entire  popu- 


46  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

lation  ?  First,  be  it  observed,  the  constitution 
of  the  country  may  be  based  on  an  acknow- 
ledgement of  the  ultimate  supremacy  of  the 
will  of  the  majority,  and  there  may  be  legal 
provision  for  the  expression  of  that  will.  In 
such  a  country  the  government  is  bound  to 
bow  to  the  constitutional  demand  of  the  ma- 
jority constitutionally  expressed.  Unconstitu- 
tional expressions,  such  as  riotous  public 
meetings,  may  be  disregarded.  Apart  from 
positive  facts  of  constitutional  history,  the  con- 
tinued free  consent  of  the  majority  is  not  the 
one  source  of  valid  civil  authority.  Authority 
q!oes  not  pass  into  usurpation  as  soon  as  ever 
the  affections  of  the  people  are  alienated  from 
their  rulers ;  nor  may  a  people  always  overturn 
any  government  which  as  a  people  they  dislike. 
These  are  impracticable  maxims.  They  do 
well  on  paper,  but  no  government  can  or  will 
tolerate  the  attempt  to  put  them  in  execution. 
The  sanctity,  natural  and  divine,  attaching  to 
civil  authority,  attaches  to  the  civil  authority 
here  and  now  constituted :  otherwise  it  would 
be  an  abstract  and  vain  sanctity,  hanging  idle 
in  the  air,  remote  from  practice,  and  meaning 
nothing.  By  this  it  is  not  pretended  that  gov- 
ernments should  neglect  the  trend  of  popular 
opinion.  Quite  the  reverse.  Such  fatuity 
leads  ever  to  fatal  issues.     A  government  has 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     47 

higher  duties  than  the  maintenance  of  its  rights 
over  the  governed.  Government  exists  for  the 
good  of  the  governed.  In  view  of  that  good, 
authority  must  not  wring  out  of  the  subject 
every  obedience  that  stern  justice  can  impose. 
Government  will  often  do  well  to  abate  some 
of  its  rights,  to  admit  the  people  to  a  greater 
share  of  power,  to  grant  some  sort  of  magna 
charta  or  '  constitution.'  The  more  share  the 
people  have  in  the  government  the  better,  so 
long  as  they  are  a  capable  people.  In  that 
proviso  the  difficulty  lies.1 

§  27.  Government  may  be  severe,  unreason- 
ably severe,  without  exceeding  its  powers. 
Subjects  may  remonstrate  in  that  case,  but  in 
the  last  resort  they  ought  to  obey.  When  gov- 
ernment grows  oppressive  in  excess  of  its  con- 
stitutional powers,  we  are  to  consider  whether 
these  unconstitutional  acts  are  isolated  and  ex- 
ceptional, or  whether  they  are  so  frequent  as 
to  amount  to  a  permanent  aggression  upon  the 
liberties  and  rights  of  the  people.  A  govern- 
ment whose  aggression  is  permanent,  and  whose 
excesses  of  power  are  flagrant  and  continual, 
puts  itself  in  the  position  of  a  usurper  and  be- 

1  The  ideal  of  government  I  think  would  be,  a  narrow  apex 
of  decisive  authority  (Kvpux  apxv)>  resting  upon  a  broad  basis 
of  discussion  (Xdyot),  the  limits  to  discussion  being  the  two 
needs  of  expedition  and  of  secrecy. 


4&  Political  and  Moral  JEssays 

comes  equated  to  anarchy.  Still,  attempts  to 
subvert  even  a  usurping  government  are  wrong, 
when  ill-concerted  and  unlikely  to  succeed. 
Such  ineffectual  risings  only  add  fuel  to  the 
fire.1  As  they  do  not  prosper,  they  will  be 
called  treason,  and  not  fall  far  short  of  deserv- 
ing the  name.  Much  better  than  recourse  to 
such  dubious  remedies  is  it  to  have  some  con- 
stitutional organ  provided  for  changing  the 
government,  whenever  that  begins  to  degen- 
erate into  a  tyranny.  A  long  political  devel- 
opment has  provided  us  in  England  with 
such  an  organ,  —  "a  government-making  organ  " 
Sir  John  Seeley  calls  it,'2  namely,  the  modern 
House  of  Commons.  The  real  government  in 
England  to-day  is  the  Cabinet,  which  we 
habitually  speak  of  as  'the  government'  The 
Cabinet  depends  for  its  collective  existence  on 
the  House,  and  the  House  again  on  the  con- 
stituencies. Thus,  as  the  Times  of  April  7, 
1880,  observed,  "We  save  ourselves  the  more 
virulent  and  destructive  diseases  of  revolution, 
sedition,  and  civil  war,  by  submitting  to  the 
milder  type  of  a  change  of  ministry."  A 
twentieth  century  Roboam,  were  such  a  prince 
to  arise  amongst  us,  would  not  rend  the  king- 

1  See,  in  my  Ethics  and  Natural  Law,  the  section  on  "  Resist- 
ance to  Civil  Power,"  pp.  338-343. 

2  Introduction  to  Political  Science,  pp.  193-227. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     49 

dom  in  pieces;  another  James  II.  would  not 
be  dethroned ;  but  the  Cabinet  of  Evil  Counsel 
would  fall  by  a  vote  of  '  want  of  confidence,' 
and  His  Majesty  would  be  constrained  to  lend 
the  lustre  of  his  royal  name  to  a  ministry  of 
moderate  and  popular  men. 

§  28.  There  is  no  governing  on  sufferance. 
There  can  be  no  constitutional  right  of  chronic 
revolution.  Every  government  must  hold  its 
head  some  little  height  at  least  above  the  daily 
good  pleasure  of  the  governed.  We  cannot 
base  civil  authority  simply  and  solely  upon  the 
consent  of  the  governed,  nor  again  upon  need 
to  be  governed  meeting  with  capacity  for  gov- 
erning. Civil  authority,  historically  considered, 
arises  in  many  various  ways.  Once  established, 
and  dwelling  within  the  compass  of  its  proper 
limits,  it  must  in  all  conscience  be  obeyed ; 
for  human  nature  is  political  and  abhors 
anarchy. 

§  29.  From  the  origin  of  civil  authority  I 
pass  to  the  more  difficult  part  of  my  subject, 
the  extent  of  that  authority.  For  complete- 
ness' sake  let  me  point  out  one  limitation  of 
civil  authority  by  the  limits  of  the  State  to 
which  it  belongs.  The  limits  of  a  State  may 
be  either  personal  or  territorial :  that  is,  the 
State  may  comprise  such  and  such  persons, 
wherever  they  live,  or  such  and  such  a  portion 


50  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

of  the  globe,  with  whatsoever  persons  live  upon 
it.  The  consent  of  civilised  times  has  tended 
to  prefer  the  territorial  limitation  of  States,  not 
however  without  considerable  regard  to  personal 
limitation,  as  processes  of  naturalisation  and 
extradition  treaties  show.1  No  State  can  be 
denied  such  authority  over  travellers  and  resi- 
dent aliens  as  is  necessary  to  the  maintenance 
of  public  tranquillity.  An  invasion  in  war  is 
a  partial  and  temporary  annexation. 

§  30.  By  '  authority '  in  this  dissertation  I 
mean  authority  that  is  practically  available 
without  injustice.  I  do  not  mean  the  authority 
which  one  claims  to  have  but  cannot  exercise, 
however  reasonable  and  just  the  claim.  Nor 
do  I  mean  authority,  however  vigorously  ex- 
ercised, if  the  exercise  be  unjust.  On  this 
definition  Charles  II.  had  no  authority  in 
England  in  the  year  1657,  nor  at  the  same 
time,  from  Charles's  point  of  view,  had  Oliver 
Cromwell  any  authority  there  either.2  The  two 
limits  of  authority,  then,  are  ineffectiveness  and 
injustice.     I  will  point  out  some  cases  of  limi- 

1  '  Once  a  British  subject,  always  a  British  subject,'  is  the 
saying.  Civil  authority  extends  over  all  who  owe  the  State 
military  allegiance.  Military  allegiance  is  the  bond  of  the  modern 
State,  as  kinship  was  of  the  patriarchal  State.  Yet  still  the 
sense  of  a  common  blood  and  ancestry,  or  as  we  say  '  racial  feel- 
ing,' binds  a  nation  together  and  makes  up  one  half  of  patriotism. 

2  Except  as  a  caretaker,  in  which  sense  Charles  might  have 
construed  the  title  'Protector.' 


Origin  and  Extejit  of  Civil  Authority     51 

tation  by  ineffectiveness.  They  are,  immatu- 
rity of  the  State,  excessive  distribution,  personal 
weakness,  fundamental  law. 

§  31.  What  has  been  already  written  on  the 
historical  origin  of  the  State  sufficiently  ex- 
hibits the  weakness  of  civil  authority  in  the 
early  stages  of  its  development.  There  is  much 
administration  in  the  infant  State,  as  there  is 
also  much  activity  in  a  child,  but  the  adminis- 
tration is  not  orderly,  scientific,  regular,  and 
centralised.  For  law,  there  are  dooms  and 
customs ;  for  judgment,  blood-feud  and  wager 
of  battle ;  for  policy,  impulse ;  for  kingship, 
sometimes  tyranny.  This  leads  me  to  ask 
whether  even  the  modern  State  is  yet  full 
grown.  The  active  exercise  of  civil  authority 
seems  to  be  everywhere  on  the  increase.  Can 
it  be  that,  as  we  speak  of  the  polities  of  the 
twelfth  century  as  immature,  succeeding  ages 
will  tell  of  the  unripe  and  imperfect  civil 
organisation  of  the  nineteenth  century?  In 
particular,  how  much  of  the  ownership  of  land 
and  capital,  what  control  of  commerce  and  of 
education,  —  education,  I  say,  of  boys  and 
youths  and  men,  — -  will  the  State  one  day  take 
into  its  own  hands  ?  We  had  better  not  make 
ourselves  ridiculous  to  posterity  by  prophesy- 
ing. I  am  not  inspired  to  foretell  the  future, 
however  I  may  have  an  opinion  as  to  expedi- 


52  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

ency  in  the  immediate  present.  Festina  lente. 
Let  the  State  go  slow  on  these  paths,  and  be- 
ware of  doctrinaires.1 

§  32.  A  'polity'  may  be  defined  'the  dis- 
tribution of  civil  authority.'  Where  authority 
is  all  concentrated  in  a  single  person,  we  have 
'  one  man  government,'  or  absolute  monarchy. 
Sheer  democracy  would  be  the  distribution  of 
authority  in  equal  shares  to  all  adult  males,  or 
even  to  all  adults.  One  special  mode  of  distri- 
bution we  see  in  '  local  government.'  The 
functions  of  local  government  are  all  derived 
from  the  imperial  government,  and  controlled 
by  it,  and  could  on  occasion  be  reabsorbed  by 
it.  Boroughs  get  their  powers  by  Act  of 
Parliament,  and  hold  them  at  the  pleasure 
of  Parliament.  The  central  government  is 
always  able  to  centralise  more,  if  it  pleases. 
Local  government  is,  in  fact,  a  department  of 

1  To  the  collectivist  of  the  Fabian  Society  type,  the  State  is 
still  immature.  The  saying  of  Seneca,  imperio  Casar  oimiia  pos- 
sidet,  singuli  dominio,  to  the  Fabian  marks  a  distinction  that  shall 
pass  away.  In  the  final  ripeness  of  States  he  expects  ownership 
of  capital  and  civil  authority  to  coincide.  From  such  coincidence 
strange  consequences  might  ensue  to  the  family.  So  long  as  the 
family  holds  its  present  position,  the  State  can  never  gather  into 
its  hands  the  entire  control  of  education,  for  this  most  natural 
reason,  that  none  has  such  a  presiding  influence  over  the  making 
of  a  child  into  a  man  as  its  father  and  mother,  if  they  know  how 
and  choose  to  exercise  it ;  an  influence  which  the  State  can 
neither  abrogate  nor  command,  unless,  as  I  say,  the  family  shall 
be  made  other  than  as  we  know  it. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     53 

imperial  government,  an  overflow  and  particu- 
lar application  of  sovereignty,  not  a  distinct 
power.1  At  the  same  time,  once  put  in  com- 
mission, authority  is  not  so  easily  resumed,  in 
a  parliamentary  country  especially.  There  is 
a  limit,  beyond  which  the  exercise  of  civil 
authority  will  be  hampered  and  weakened  by 

1  This  holds  where  the  unity  of  the  State  is  established.  The 
local  authorities  of  feudal  or  semi-feudal  kingdoms  made  up  to- 
gether not  so  much  a  State  as  a  federation.  Dr.  Gierke,  Politi- 
cal Theories  of  the  Middle  Age,  p.  84,  speaks  of  "  the  age  of 
feudalism,  and  the  age  in  which  the  community  appeared  as  a 
legal  system  of  estates."  Moral  and  quasi-personal  unity  marks 
a  higher  stage  of  political  organisation.  There  was  less  of  unity 
and  a  lower  organisation  in  the  mediaeval  State  than  in  the  Greek 
City  State.  Politics  had,  in  some  respects,  gone  back  from  the 
point  gained  in  classical  times.  But  the  Greek  City  State  was  full- 
blown, and  had  no  future  before  it :  while  the  large  and  cumbrous 
masses  of  mediaevalism  had  in  them  the  potency  of  the  modern 
world,  a  world  at  once  better  and  worse  than  the  mediaeval,  but 
anyhow  more  vast,  more  complex,  and  more  marvellous.  The 
mediaeval  State  was  a  cluster  of  corporations  :  the  modern  State 
tends  to  become  one  society.  This  is  a  reversion  to  the  Hellenic 
type.  Another  reversion  is  the  wearing  away  of  the  distinction 
between  the  State  and  the  people,  or,  what  is  much  the  same 
thing,  between  the  sovereign  and  the  people.  This  marks  the 
advent  of  democracy.  I  may  put  it  in  this  way,  that  the  term 
'people' is  changing  so  as  to  connote  less  and  less  of  subjec- 
tion and  more  and  more  of  sovereignty.  The  people  are  ceasing 
to  be  'subjects,'  except  when  taken  distributively.  Similar  was 
the  connotation  of  6  Srj/jios  at  Athens,  and  of  populus  at  Rome. 
I  speak  of  facts  and  received  theories,  leaving  aside  desirabilities 
and  all  that  ought  to  be.  Yet,  whatever  theory  be  received, 
Nature  will  ever  assert  her  rule  in  practice,  that  they  who  actually 
direct  and  administer  are  the  capable  or  the  audacious  few. 


54  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

any  further  step  in  the  way  of  democracy, 
or  any  further  development  of  local  govern- 
ment. This  I  call  '  limitation  by  excess  of 
distribution.' 

§  33.  A  wide  and  important  distinction  sep- 
arates authority,  or  prerogative,  from  capacity. 
By  capacity  I  understand  here  aptitude  for 
bearing  authority  with  dignity  and  credit,  and 
wielding  it  to  effect.  All  have  remarked  the 
well-earned  increment  of  the  credit  and  influ- 
ence of  the  Crown  in  the  late  reign.  Queen 
Victoria  was  endowed  with  eminent  capacity 
of  authority.  A  government  is  lost  when  it 
becomes  discredited.  A  discredited  parlia- 
ment would  be  soon  dissolved :  a  discredited 
ministry  falls :  but  unhappiest  of  all  mortals  is 
the  discredited  autocrat.  It  is  possible  to  be 
in  office  and  not  in  power.  Mark  two  men  in 
exactly  the  same  position,  armed  in  theory  with 
the  same  prerogative,  how  much  the  one  man 
will  do,  how  little  the  other  does  or  can  do. 
This  is  how  absolute  monarchy,  —  monarchy, 
I  mean,  where  the  single  person  has  a  free 
hand,  and  all  law  is  the  mere  breath  of  his 
mouth,  —  passes  into  a  practical  absurdity.  It 
takes  a  Caesar  to  wield  such  plenitude  of 
power.  If  the  autocrat  is  Caesar  in  name 
only,  either  the  government  goes  on  by  rou- 
tine, or  it  falls   into  the  hands  of  favourites, 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     55 

or  the  chiefs  of  departments  go  their  several 
ways  independently.  Limitation  of  capacity 
is  a  great  limitation  to  all  authority  borne 
by  man. 

§  34.  In  the  sovereign  assembly  at  Athens, 
any  proposer  of  changes  on  certain  reserved 
matters  laid  himself  open  to  an  indictment, 
known  as  the  ypa(f>r)  Trapavoficov.  In  another 
Greek  State  it  is  said  that  any  such  champion 
of  repeal  came  forward  with  a  halter  round  his 
neck :  the  halter  was  tightened  if  the  motion 
was  lost.  In  modern  States  generally,  although 
not  in  England,  there  are  'fundamental  laws,' 
or  a  written  '  constitution,'  with  which  the 
legislature  may  not  meddle.  The  consent, 
however,  of  some  definite  persons,  —  at  any 
rate,  of  the  whole  people,  —  can  abolish  any 
fundamental  law,  and  set  aside  any  constitu- 
tion, as  on  one  dark  day  of  disaster  the  Athe- 
nian assembly  overruled  the  ypa(fir)  Trapavojxcov. 
But  an  effort  is  required  to  such  effect,  and  a 
motive  strong  enough  to  rouse  the  whole  peo- 
ple. Failing  such  excitement,  civil  authority 
is  tied  up,  held  in  suspense,  impeded,  and, 
therefore,  according  to  our  definition,  dimin- 
ished, by  fundamental  laws.  Hence  Sidgwick 
speaks  of  a  '  rigid,'  as  opposed  to  a  '  flexible,' 
constitution.  Rigidity  has  its  advantages,  but 
it  may  lessen  efficiency. 


56  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

§  35.  The  activity  of  government  is  at  its 
maximum  in  the  worst  times,  unless  indeed  it 
be  part  of  the  evil  of  such  times  that  the  gov- 
ernment is  unstrung  and  paralysed.  When 
'  the  Gaul  is  at  the  gates,'  the  hand  of  author- 
ity is  untied  and  extended  to  its  utmost  reach. 
Short  of  deeds  wanton  and  useless,  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  assign  limits  then  to  the  power  of  the 
State  over  life  and  property.  I  do  not  say 
there  are  not  limits,  but  they  are  hard  to  fix. 
The  execution  of  Catiline  forms  a  test  case 
here.  Was  it  not  just,  if  necessary,  though 
against  the  ordinary  forms  of  law  ?  I  offer  no 
opinion.  Necessitas  facit  fere  ovinia  Cczsaris. 
Happy  the  government  whose  hand  is  seldom 
thus  strengthened  by  emergency.  A  wise 
ruler  has  no  passion  for  governing.  With  the 
insane,  the  consciousness  of  power  leads  neces- 
sarily to  the  exercise  of  it.  A  strong  wise 
man  holds  the  greater  part  of  his  power  and 
authority  habitually  in  reserve.  The  spectacle 
of  quiet  times,  slack  administration,  and  spon- 
taneous prom  >  Lion  of  the  public  good  by 
voluntary  associations  forms  a  pleasing  con- 
templation. Something  of  it  was  realised  in 
those  sleepy  old  ecclesiastical  Electorates  on 
the  Rhine,  which  gave  rise  to  the  proverb, 
"  It  is  good  living  under  the  cross." 

§  36.    The  special  province  of  civil  author- 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     57 

ity  is  not  religion,  not  temperance,  not  chastity, 
not  fortitude,  not  benevolence,  but  justice,  un- 
derstanding by  'justice'  the  'general  justice' 
described  in  the  Nicomachean  Ethics,  V.  pp. 
1 129,  1 130  a,  that  is  to  say,  social  virtue.  Acts 
of  other  virtues  the  State  can  only  command 
inasmuch  as  they  bear  upon  society,  and  there- 
fore in  some  manner  come  under  justice.  Thus 
the  State  enjoins  temperance,  that  a  man  be 
not  drunk  and  disorderly  in  public;  fortitude 
in  a  soldier,  to  fight  for  his  country;  chastity, 
to  the  exclusion  of  rape,  bigamy,  and,  to  some 
extent,  of  adultery  and  unnatural  crime.  There- 
fore it  is  said  that  the  State  commands  acts  of 
all  virtues,  but  not  all  acts  of  virtue,  not  even 
all  obligatory  acts,  if  we  speak  of  moral  obliga- 
tion. Nor  does  the  State  ever  enjoin  the  proper 
motives  of  each  virtue :  it  is  fain  to  be  content 
with   the  external    act,  whatever   the    motive.1 


1  This  is  the  meaning  of  the  saying,  de  interim  non  judicat  prtx- 
tor.  The  coercive  jurisdiction  of  the  State  does  not  extend  to 
motives,  except  in  so  far  as  motives  are  embodied  in  overt  acts. 
The  State  cannot  enforce  loyalty  of  heart  :  it  enforces  loyal  con- 
duct and,  to  some  extent,  loyal  language.  Loyalty  of  heart  is  a 
duty  all  the  same.  Treason  would  never  be  a  sin  in  external  act, 
if  treasonable  sentiments  and  desires  could  not  possibly  be  a  sin. 
But  the  enforcement  of  inward  loyalty  must  be  left  to  conscience 
and  to  the  Searcher  of  hearts.  No  statesman,  however,  will 
neglect  to  employ  the  moral  means  of  speech  and  persuasion  for 
the  kindling  and  propagation  of  the  sentiment  of  duty  towards 
the  State.     Cabinet  ministers  go  about  making  speeches.     Even 


58  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

Justice  being  essentially  ad  alteram,  '  in  rela- 
tion to  some  other  person,'  a  man's  private  life 
and  behaviour,  as  bearing  directly  and  immedi- 
ately on  himself  alone,  is  not  matter  of  justice, 
and  is  removed  from  State  control.  The  mu- 
tual relations  of  husband  and  wife,  of  parent 
and  child,  are  not  absolute  matter  of  justice, 
because  the  parties  are  not  entirely  other  and 
other:  there  is  not  a  thoroughgoing  and  com- 
plete moral  distinction  between  them :  the  child 
is  res  parentis,  and  husband  and  wife  are  one 
flesh.  That  is  to  say,  the  domestic  order  is 
not  entirely  merged  in  the  civil  order.  Inas- 
much, however,  as  husband  and  wife,  parent 
and  child,  are  distinct  human  beings,  a  certain 
measure  of  strict  justice  obtains  between  them, 
which  comes  under  the  cognisance  of  the  civil 
courts,  and  those  courts  have  the  right  of  inter- 
ference ab  abusu. 

§  37.  Some  rights  are  the  creation  of  the 
State,  as  the  privileges  of  the  Bank  of  Eng- 
land. Other  rights  are  not  created  by  the 
State,  but  are  safeguarded  and  determined  in 
detail  by  it.  These  I  call  '  natural  rights.'  I 
may  sufficiently  describe  them  by  saying  that 
they  are  the  same  in  all  civilisations,  and  that 
it  is  everywhere  the  mark  of  a  tyrannical  gov- 

a  military  dictator  publishes  manifestoes  to  the  army,  the  army 
under  such  a  constitution  being  the  people. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     59 

ernment  not  to  respect  them.1  Such  are  the 
rights  to  life,  to  limb,  to  personal  liberty,  to  the 
acquisition  of  property  and  the  possession  of  it 
when  acquired,  the  right  to  honour  and  reputa- 
tion, and  to  the  exercise  of  religion.  Except 
the  last  named,  the  State  may  withdraw  any  of 
these  rights  in  punishment.'2 

§  38.  It  is  the  function  of  civil  authority  so 
to  co-ordinate  these  rights  as  that  they  may 
work  harmoniously  in  an  organic  whole,  one 
man's  natural  right  not  marring  another's.  A 
natural  right  often  needs  '  determining,'  that  is 
to  say,  its  precise  extent  needs  to  be  fixed  by 
civil  law.  Hereditary  right  furnishes  a  good 
instance.     Nature  requires,  all  civilised  nations 

1  "  There  is  a  system  of  rights  and  obligations  which  should 
be  maintained  by  law,  whether  it  is  so  or  not,  and  which  may 
properly  be  called  natural."  —  Green,  Works,  Vol.  II.  p.  339. 
They  might  also  be  called  '  rational.1  In  the  language  of  Plato 
they  are  cpvaei  7]  <£wt£«js  ov-%  i)ttov,  e'nrep  vov  ye  iari  yevvrj/xara 
Kara  \6yov  opdov  (Laws.  X.  890  D). 

2  I  should  call  the  principle  of  habeas  corpus  a  natural  right 
which  the  State  cannot  withdraw.  Lettres  de  cachet,  consigning 
a  man  on  suspicion  to  the  Bastille,  and  keeping  him  there  for 
months  without  trial,  were  extravagances  beyond  the  limit  of  civil 
authority.  There  was  abundant  precedent  for  them,  it  is  true  ; 
but  I  quote  the  example  to  show  that  neither  the  historical 
method,  which  yields  facts,  nor  the  legal  method  of  precedent 
and  decree,  can  work  in  isolation  from  the  ethical  method,  which 
attends  to  the  moral  law.  Civil  authority  is  ever  limited  by 
morality,  that  is  by  opdos  Aoyos,  right  reason  reasonably  applied. 
The  State  is  no  more  licensed  than  the  individual  to  behave 
irrationally. 


60  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

have  acquiesced  in,  some  measure  of  transmis- 
sion  of  property  from   parent   to   child.     This 
vague  generality  is  rendered  express  and  partic- 
ular  and    practically   operative    by   legal    pro- 
visions.      The    babblings    of    nature    become 
articulate    speech    in    the    mouth    of    the    civil 
legislator   and    judge.      No    community    could 
hold    together    on    the    moral    law   of    nature 
alone,  e.g.  on   the  code  of  the   ten  command- 
ments.      Natural    law    demands    the    further 
creation  of  civil  law,  that  network  of  conven- 
tionalities  which    the    State    elaborates,  partly 
out    of    custom,    partly    by    enactment, — the 
cocoon  within   which   the    State    is  contained. 
§  39.    The    State     in    the    maturity   of    its 
strength  not  only  legislates,   it  also  arbitrates 
between  litigants.     Arbitration  is  a  permanent 
necessity.       No  code    can    be    so    distinct  and 
clear  as  to  settle  automatically  every  dispute. 
Private  arbitration  goes  some  way,  but  it  can- 
not bring  the  party  appealed  against  into  court, 
—  the  State  itself  at  first  had  much  difficulty 
in  doing  that:  and  private   arbitration  cannot 
enforce  its  award,  —  the  State  alone  can.     The 
early   State    was    reluctant    to    undertake    this 
arbitration  :   it  was  necessary  to  recur  to  some 
legal  fiction  of  the  king  being  a  party  to  the 
quarrel.       There    remained    the    old-fashioned 
alternative  of  private  war,  a  trial,  not  of  justice, 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     61 

but  of  strength.  Every  good  government  does 
its  best  to  supersede  private  war.  That  was 
the  aim  of  our  Plantagenet  and  Tudor  kings, 
in  the  days  when  the  nobility  were  armed  po- 
tentates. They  did  not  fight  much  with  one 
another,  but  at  times  a  good  deal  about  the 
king,  for  or  against  him.  The  nobility  have 
been  pacified,  but  not  the  mercantile  classes ; 
and  private  war  survives  amongst  us  in  the  shape 
of  strikes  and  lockouts. 

§  40.  The  State  guards  its  own  rights  and 
the  rights  of  its  subjects  by  the  punishment  of 
offenders.  It  would  be  incorrect  to  describe 
punishment  as  the  self-defence  of  the  State 
against  evil-doers.  It  were  doing  too  much 
honour  to  the  criminal  classes  to  allow  them 
the  style  and  title  of  belligerents.  War  is  be- 
tween equals,  self-defence  is  against  equals: 
but  punishment  is  an  act  of  jurisdiction  exer- 
cised upon  subjects.  The  Sword  of  State  is 
borne  before  the  king,  denoting  the  right,  in- 
herent in  every  State,  called  '  the  right  of  the 
sword,'  the  right  of  inflicting  capital  punish- 
ment. Every  sovereign  authority  has  this 
power  of  life  and  death :  no  other  than  sov- 
ereign authority  has  it.1     The  State  may  tie  its 

17rap'  yap  i/xoi  davaros,  Agamemnon  says  (Aristotle,  Politics 
III.,  1285  a:  the  words  are  not  in  our  Homers).  Readers  of 
Peveril  of  the  Peak  will  remember  the  indignation  of  the  Crown 


62  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

own  hands  by  decreeing  the  abolition  of  capital 
punishment ;  but  the  power  which  tied  may  at 
any  time  untie.  "  The  slaying  of  an  evil-doer 
is  lawful  inasmuch  as  it  is  directed  to  the  wel- 
fare of  the  whole  community,  and  therefore 
appertains  to  him  alone  who  has  charge  of  the 
community  ;  as  the  amputation  of  an  unsound 
limb  belongs  to  the  surgeon,  when  the  care  of 
the  welfare  of  the  whole  body  has  been  en- 
trusted to  him.  Now  the  care  of  the  common 
good  is  entrusted  to  rulers  having  public  au- 
thority ;  and  therefore  to  them  is  it  lawful  to 
slay  evil-doers,  not  to  private  individuals.  .  .  . 
To  do  a  thing  for  the  public  good  that  hurts  no 
man,  is  lawful  to  any  private  person ;  but  if  the 
doing  be  with  the  hurt  of  another,  it  ought  not 
to  be  done  except  according  to  the  judgment 
of  him  to  whom  it  belongs  to  estimate  what  is 
to  be  withdrawn  from  the  parts  for  the  good  of 
the  whole"  (St.  Thomas  Aquinas,  Smmna,  II- 
II,  q.  64,  art.  3).1     The  'whole  community' here 

lawyers  at  the  Countess  of  Derby,  who  in  1662  sentenced  one 
William  Christian  to  death  and  executed  him  on  the  strength  of 
the  title  '  King  in  Man,'  then  borne  by  the  Earls  of  Derby. 

1  Why  then  may  not  government  stamp  out  bubonic  plague 
as  we  once  stamped  out  rinderpest,  by  slaughter  of  the  first 
infected  victims  ?  The  answer  is  briefly,  that  no  man  may  be 
exterminated  as  a  beast,  who  does  not  liken  himself  to  a  beast  by 
anti-social  crime,  of  which  point  the  State  is  judge.  See  my 
EtJiics  and  Natural  Law,  pp.  349, 350,  and  Aquinas  Ethicus,  Vol. 
II.  pp.  40-42. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     63 

is  the  self-sufficient  community,  the  State.  The 
argument  fails  to  apply  to  the  father  of  a  family, 
because  domestic,  fatherly,  or  paternal  govern- 
ment is  primarily  for  the  good  of  the  individual 
governed,  as  an  individual.  Speaking  of  what 
obtains  ordinarily,  or  per  se,  not  of  what  is  per 
accidens,  or  incidentally,  it  is  not  good  for  the 
individual  to  be  hung.  A  criminal  is  not  hung 
for  his  own  benefit,  but  for  that  of  the  com- 
munity, as  the  example  of  amputation  shows. 
But  the  government  which  rules  primarily  for 
the  good  of  the  community  and  the  general 
weal  of  the  body  politic,  is  civil,  not  paternal, 
government.  Therefore  the  rod  belongs  to  the 
pater  familias,  but  the  axe  to  the  proconsul. 

§  41.  There  is  no  State  of  States.  When 
States  quarrel,  there  is  none  that  can  lay  his 
hand  upon  both  disputants  and  compel  them 
to  an  arrangement.  This  is  the  drawback  to 
international  law,  that  there  is  no  tribunal  to 
enforce  it,  no  sanction  of  punishment  for  the 
violation  of  it.  I  speak  of  things  as  they  are, 
not  as  they  might  perhaps  have  been.  State 
cannot  punish  State  for  a  breach  of  international 
law,  or  treaty,  or  convention,  or  for  refusal  to 
abide  by  arbitration.  Punishment  is  a  function 
of  authority:  but  a  State  is  essentially  sovereign, 
not  under  the  authority  of  any  other  State,  or 
combination  of  States.     States  cannot  punish 


64  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

one  another :  they  can  only  defend  themselves 
one  against  another,  —  a  very  different  thing. 
The  self-defence  of  States  is  war,  a  self-defence 
of  giants.  The  authority  of  a  State  in  war  is 
exerted  over  its  own  subjects,  compelling  them 
to  prosecute  the  war  according  to  their  several 
conditions,  paying  the  war-tax,  and  actually 
fighting  in  person,  as  the  State  shall  see  ex- 
pedient, meanwhile  rendering  no  aid  to  'the 
king's  enemies.'  This  common  concurrence  is 
due  to  the  unity  of  the  State.  Where  the  State 
is  small,  like  the  Greek  City  States,  war  be- 
comes a  very  present  reality  to  all  the  citizens. 
Sometimes  at  Argos  or  Corinth  a  whole  genera- 
tion of  youth  was  mown  down  by  the  scythe  of 
death  in  a  single  battle.  They  died  for  their 
country  and  at  the  bidding  of  their  country, 
which  authorised  them  to  strike  in  its  name, 
and  in  so  striking  to  expose  themselves  to  the 
sentence  that  all  who  take  the  sword  shall  perish 
by  the  sword.  A  war  does  not  constitute  all 
the  inhabitants  belligerents,  but  only  such  as 
the  State  shall  definitely  enroll,  and  shall  in 
some  manner  signify  to  the  enemy  to  be  per- 
sons empowered  to  bear  arms  in  the  public 
cause.     Audiant  agrestes. 

§  42.  The  State  should  not  be  the  only  as- 
sociation besides  the  family,  and  the  munici- 
pality, which  was  in  ancient  history  the  State. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     65 

Private  associations  must  be  permitted  to  flour- 
ish. The  absorption  of  all  private  associations 
into  the  State,  or  the  municipality,  makes  a 
good  definition  of  Socialism,  or  Collectivism, 
in  its  most  outrageous  form.  Not  being 
Socialists,  we  shall  be  champions  of  the  right 
of  private  association,  as  a  right  which  the 
State  should  superintend  and  moderate,  not 
suppress.  Where  public  control  is  unneces- 
sary, or  of  dubious  advantage,  it  should  not  be 
applied  to  such  bodies.  The  State  is  strong 
by  the  energy  and  spontaneous  activity  of  its 
individual  citizens.  Energies  grow  by  exercise : 
spontaneity  bursts  out  of  freedom,  and  is  apt 
to  die  of  swathing  bands.1     At  the  same  time 

1  Plato's  7roXtTat  are  not  '  citizens,'  as  that  term  is  understood 
in  the  United  States :  they  are  salaried  functionaries  of  State. 
Plato  will  not  allow  a  citizen  to  be  an  artisan  :  the  office  of  citizen 
is  enough  occupation  {Laws,  VIII.  846  D),  though  of  this  con- 
dition of  exemption  from  private  cares  the  philosopher  is  not 
without  his  misgivings,  and  labours  to  show  that  his  endowed 
model  citizen  will  have  enough  to  do  in  the  practice  of  virtue, 
under  the  pressure  of  the  multitudinous  vo/xot  and  Sikgu. 

I  can  imagine  no  better  argument  than  a  study,  —  unless  it 
were  an  actual  experience,  —  of  the  intolerable  meddlesomeness 
of  Platonic  government  to  convince  a  man  that  some  limit  must 
be  set  somewhere  to  civil  authority.  The  antithesis  of  statesman 
and  philosopher  reaches  its  height  in  Plato,  most  unpractical  of 
geniuses,  most  visionary  of  politicians.  It  has  been  proposed,  on 
the  strength  of  passages  like  Rep.  III.  403  B,  C,  vo/AodeTyjcrev; 
k.t.X.  d  8k  firj,  if/oyov  a/xovata<;  Kal  aTreipoKaXia';  vcjj£$ovTa,  to 
extend  the  meaning  of  vd/xos  to  include  public  opinion.  But 
Dlato  was  quite  aware  of  the  difference  between  law  and  public 

F 


66  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

the  State  will  sternly  suppress  any  private 
association  that  exercises  tyranny  or  intimida- 
tion, that  foments  rebellion,  that  sets  aside 
lawful  contracts,  or  levies  what  is  tantamount 
to  private  war.  The  State  will  suppress  such 
associations,  wherever  it  is  worth  while  making 
them  conspicuous  by  that  attention.1 

opinion  (cf.  Laws,  V.  730  B,  oct  av  fxr)  vd/xos  aW  €7raivos  TraiSeuwj/ 
Kai  i/'dyos),  and  admitted  that  some  matters  were  better  left  to  the 
latter  {Rep.  IV.  425  B,  C,  D).  He  looked  for  the  advent  of  a 
despot  for  the  establishment  of  his  vofj-ot  {Laws,  IV.  709  E  sqq.  ; 
V.  735  D).  He  defines  the  province  of  vo/aos  {Laws,  I.  631  B- 
632  C).  One  of  its  functions  was  to  'invigilate'  over  old  men 
in  their  cups  {Laws,  II.  671  B-E). 

In  Laws,  V.  746  A,  B,  C,  Plato  defends  himself  on  the  charge 
of  being  unpractical :  his  concern  is  with  ideal  excellence :  he 
leaves  practical  men  to  attain  it  as  nearly  as  they  may  through 
the  rough-and-tumble  ways  of  life.  In  Laws,  VI.  773,  he  has 
the  good  sense  to  admit  that  physiologically  desirable  marriages 
cannot  be  arranged  by  law.  He  deprecates  overminutc  legisla- 
tion in  Laws,  VII.  788  A,  B  ;  and  in  823  A  he  says  that  the  good 
citizen  will  obey  counsels  which  are  not  made  matter  of  law.  On 
the  other  hand,  he  writes  {Laws,  XII.  942  A,  B,  C,  a  remarkable 
passage)  as  though  he  would  carry  the  precision  of  military  obe- 
dience into  every  detail  of  private  life.  It  is  well  to  remember, 
what  Greek  political  writers  did  not  sufficiently  recognise,  that 
there  is  other  obedience  and  other  authority  besides  civil  obedi- 
ence and  civil  authority  ;  and  no  obedience  and  no  authority  can 
dispense  a  man  from  the  necessity  of  being  a  conscientious  and 
intelligent  lord  at  home,  or  from  the  exercise  of  the  virtue  of 
prudence  (St.  Thomas,  Samina,  2a-  2ae,  q.  47,  art.  12  ;  Aquinas 
Ethicus,  vol.  II.  p.  1). 

1  On  the  subject  of  laws  against  private  associations,  I  may 
observe  that  the  majesty  of  law  is  ill  served  by  provoking  sober- 
minded  and  conscientious  persons  to  turn  law-breakers.  Yet  I 
would  not  deny  that  there  is  a  certain  wisdom  in  passing  laws 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     67 

§  43.  Philosophy  is  capable  of  considering 
man  in  the  abstract,  away  from  any  determina- 
tion arising  from  contingent  facts  of  history. 
Such  a  contingent  fact  is  Christianity.  Chris- 
tianity is  not  a  factor  of  human  nature  as  such. 
This  is  sometimes  expressed  by  saying  that 
Christianity  is  supernatural.  This  abstraction 
enables  us  for  the  nonce  to  set  aside  the  problem 
of  Church  and  State.  Naturally,  man  is  a 
religious  animal  as  much  as  he  is  a  political 
animal.  No  main  tendency  of  human  nature 
can  have  its  fulfilment  except  under  some 
social  organisation.  If  learning  is  to  flourish 
among  men,  there  must  be  learned  societies : 
if  religion,  religious  societies.  Whether  the 
political  or  the  religious  element  of  his  nature 
lies  deeper  in  man,  we  need  not  enquire ;  nor 
again  whether  the  one  exigency  can  be  satisfied 
without  the  other.  Certainly  the  experiment 
has  never  yet  been  tried,  of  a  political  com- 
munity unsustained  by  any  religion.  It  might 
issue  in  an  explosion.       Its  history  might    be 

not  meant  to  be  executed,  or  keeping  such  laws,  when  passed,  on 
the  statute-book  as  'a  rod  in  pickle.'  A  statesman  must  do 
something  to  satisfy  popular  sentiment,  even  when  unwise.  A 
working  government  cannot  afford  to  be  overpunctilious  about 
logic  and  self-consistency  in  all  things.  Where  the  laws  are  gen- 
erally wise  and  well  administered,  some  little  grimace  of  oppres- 
sive legislation,  remaining  or  becoming  a  dead  letter,  will  be  no 
serious  blemish  on  the  majesty  of  law.  Still,  it  is  a  blemish,  and 
ought  to  be  removed  in  time. 


68  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

wound  up  in  one  sentence,  the  fall  of  that  house 
was  great.  Religion  will  last  as  long  as  politics. 
What  then  should  be  the  attitude  of  the  State 
towards  religious  bodies?  Should  there  be 
one  religious  society,  conterminous  with  the 
State,  the  ideal  of  the  ancient  polities,  and  of 
Queen  Elizabeth  and  Archbishop  Laud,  as 
also  of  the  Solemn  League  and  Covenant  men  ? 
Or  should  there  be  a  multitude  of  private  so- 
cieties, competing  with  one  another,  the  State 
acting  the  policeman  to  keep  the  king's  peace 
between  them  ?  Should  there  be  any  national 
religion  by  law  established  ?  All  these  ques- 
tions of  higher  politics  have  two  solutions,  one 
theoretical  and  ideal,  the  other  practical  and 
suited  to  facts  as  they  are.  We  welcome  the 
solution  at  present  obtaining  in  England  as 
the  best  practical  for  our  time. 

§  44.  The  academic  question  "whether  the 
magistrate  have  or  ought  to  have  any  com- 
pulsive and  restrictive  power  in  matters  of 
religion,"  was  gravely  argued  in  a  Council 
at  Whitehall,  December  14,  1648.1  Ireton 
argued  for  the  affirmative,  appealing  to  the 
provisions  of  the  Mosaic  law.  Goodwin  re- 
ferred the  case  to  the  discretion  of  the  people. 

1  See  the  discussion  in  the  Clarke  Papers,  edited  by  Mr.  Firth 
for  the  Camden  Society,  from  Mss.  in  Worcester  College,  Vol.  II. 
pp.  71-131. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Antlwrity     69 

"  Magistrates,"  he  said,  "  have  so  much  power  as 
the  people  are  willing  to  give  them."  Nye  took 
much  the  same  line,  saying,  "  Whatever  a  com- 
pany of  people  gathered  together  may  judge 
tending  to  the  public  good,  or  the  common 
weal,  that  they  have  a  liberty  to  do,  so  long  as 
it  is  not  sinful."  He  appeals  then  to  what  I 
should  call  the  principle  of  Voluntary  Public 
Control,  which  he  thinks  may  be  extended  to 
religion.  The  axiom  that  the  people  are  the 
source  and  origin  of  civil  authority,  had  a  firm 
hold  on  the  mind  of  all  these  anti-monarchical 
disputants.  They  professed  to  be  recovering 
Anglo-Saxon  liberties,  buried  under  six  cen- 
turies of  Norman  oppression.  The  leading 
debater  was  Ireton.  Cromwell  showed  himself 
shrewd  and  practical.  Ireton's  ideal  was  aboli- 
tion of  King  and  Lords,  and  a  House  of  Com- 
mons elected  every  two  years  by  electors  having 
a  certain  amount  of  real  property,  —  this  House 
not  to  be  omnipotent,  there  being  certain 
powers  reserved  and  not  entrusted  to  them 
(Papers,  vol.  II.  p.  177).  Ireton  failed  to  see, 
what  Cromwell  was  presently  to  demonstrate, 
that  such  a  House  was  too  unwieldy  and  too 
unstable  a  body  to  govern  in  time  of  danger. 

§  45.  Besides  the  proper  and  essential  func- 
tions of  civil  authority,  functions  necessary  to 
the    conservation    of    any    maturely    organised 


jo  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

political  society,  there  are  other  functions 
postulated  by  public  convenience,  which  gov- 
ernment, imperial  or  local,  may  take  up,  if  the 
people  by  general  consent  will  have  it  so.  This 
may  be  called  the  principle  of  Voluntary  Public 
Control.  It  goes  towards  clearing  up  the  diffi- 
culty which  we  all  feel  in  fixing  the  exact 
bounds  of  civil  authority,  what  the  State  may 
do  and  what  it  may  not  do  in  the  way  of 
abridging  the  liberty  of  the  individual.1  Ac- 
cording to  this  principle,  there  is  an  inferior 
and  a  superior  limit  to  civil  authority  ;  I  mean, 
there  is  a  minimum  of  civil  authority  which  the 
maturely  developed  State  can  never  forego,  and 
there  is  a  maximum  which  the  same  State  can 
never  exceed,  it  being  the  utmost  fulness  of 
power  which  any  State  can  ever  carry.  Between 
these  two  limits  civil  authority  is  just  what  the 
people  as  a  whole  wills  that  it  shall  be.2     The 

1  Thus  Mr.  Jenks,  "  To  dogmatise  upon  the  proper  limits  of 
State  interference  would  be  pedantry  of  the  worst  type"  {History 
of  Politics,  pp.  141,  143).  State  interference  can  have  no  legal 
limits,  inasmuch  as  the  State  makes  the  law ;  only  physical  and 
moral  limits.  It  is  more  important  to  assert  the  existence  of  such 
limits  than  to  trace  them  as  though  one  were  a  member  of  a 
boundary  commission.  The  principle  of  voluntary  public  con- 
trol has  this  advantage,  that  it  is  not  too  rigid  for  facts  and 
futurities. 

2  But  in  spontaneous  admissions  of  State  interference,  e.g.  in 
the  matter  of  education,  special  regard  should  be  had  for  the 
rights  of  minorities,  where  there  is  a  strong  minority  against 
interference  and  tenacious  of  their  liberty. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civit  Authority      71 

State  thus  becomes  the  organ  of  public  opinion. 
There  is  a  clear  trend  of  public  opinion  to 
widen'  further  and  further  still  the  region  of 
government  control.  We  are  imbibing  Greek 
notions  here.  The  '  shrinking  of  space,'  as  it 
is  called,  due  to  our  rapid  means  of  intercom- 
munication, brings  into  view  possibilities  in  the 
Nation  State,  which  formerly  could  have  been 
contemplated  only  in  the  City  State.  We  are 
looking  to  the  State,  and  to  educational  bodies 
chartered  by  the  State,  and  to  other  reforming 
agencies  abetted  by  public  opinion  and  statute 
law,  to  assume  certain  moralising  and  spiritual- 
ising offices,  which  in  the  Middle  Ages  were 
accounted  proper  to  the  Church.  How  far  the 
State  is  capable  of  discharging  such  offices,  we 
must  wait  to  see.  Thinking  men  are  feeling 
the  need  of  some  further  moral  government  of 
the  masses  of  our  population.  Our  people  are 
getting  out  of  hand.  The  truth  is  rising  on 
the  horizon  of  our  experience,  that  spiritual 
freedom  is  not  advanced  by  the  extinction  of 
spiritual  authority.  In  the  natural  order  of 
things  the  guardian  of  public  morality  is  public 
opinion,  or,  as  in  this  connexion  it  is  called, 
the  public  conscience.  The  public  conscience 
may  empower  the  State  to  clothe  with 
legal  sanctions  some  rule  of  morality  which 
otherwise  would  not  easily  fall  within  the  cog- 


72  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

nisance  of  the  State,  —  an  axiom  not  to  forget 
in  considering  the  prohibition  of  indecent  per- 
formances in  public  theatres  and  of  the  exhibi- 
tion of  indecent  pictures  for  sale.  Such  prohi- 
bition is  vain  where  the  public  conscience  does 
not  support  it :  at  the  same  time  the  prohibi- 
tion might  do  something  to  support  the  public 
conscience.  Thus  on  the  matter  of  the  liquor 
traffic  we  find  the  public  conscience  confronted 
by  a  class  interest:  we  have  still  hope  of  the 
State  stepping  in  to  good  effect  there.  There 
is  yet  another  traffic  in  frailty  and  sin,  which 
might  be  better  confined  to  regions  where  they 
will  find  it  who  go  thither  to  look  for  it.  And 
we  must  be  vigilant  against  the  spread  of 
disease.  But  some  evils  are  endemic  in 
human  society. 

§  46.  To  recapitulate.  The  origin  and  ex- 
tent of  civil  authority,  considered  ethically  and 
historically,  makes  a  tripartite  theme :  why 
such  authority  ought  to  be ;  how  it  has  gradu- 
ally come  to  be  in  various  ages  and  places  ;  what 
is  its  extent? 1  The  ethical  side  of  the  subject 
embraces  the  answer  to  these  two  questions : 
(Q.  1)  Why  must  I  obey  the  State?  (Q.  2)  What 
can  the  State  command  me  to  do  ? 

1  For  extent,  '  is '  and  '  ought  to  be '  need  not  be  distin- 
guished if  we  speak  of  the  authority  that  is  '  practically  available 
without  injustice '   (§30). 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     73 

(Q.  1)  I  must  obey  the  State,  St.  Paul  says, 
for  conscience  sake  (Rom.  xiii.  5).  Conscience 
bids  me  be  a  man,  that  is,  not  merely  to  rank 
as  a  member  of  the  human  genus,  and  come 
under  the  census  as  an  item  of  population,  but 
to  lead  the  conscious,  intelligent,  active  life  of 
a  man.  That  I  cannot  do  in  solitude :  I  mean 
the  normal  man  cannot  do  it,  the  anchorite  is 
out  of  our  purview,  rj  Oiqpiov  t)  Oeos.  Cut  off 
from  intercourse  with  his  fellows,  man  is  no 
more  man,  morally  speaking,  than  the  hand  of  a 
corpse  can  be  called  a  human  hand  (Aristotle, 
Politics,  I.  1253  a).  Nor  is  the  society  of  the 
domestic  circle  sufficient  to  bring  man  up  to 
what  man  should  be,  unless  that  circle  be  one 
of  an  aggregate  of  similar  circles,  intersecting 
each  other,  and  coalescing  in  the  unity  of  a 
State.  I  may  travel  little  out  of  my  family  cir- 
cle, but  that  circle  itself  is  affected,  humanised, 
and  civilised,  by  other  circles  in  contact  with  it, 
a  contact  only  maintained  in  virtue  of  their  civil 
union.  The  greatest  recluse,  a  Carthusian 
monk,  or  a  Poor  Clare  nun,  or  a  retired  colle- 
gian, would  find  the  little  society  of  convent  or 
collegiate  life  a  moral  impossibility,  were  it  not 
planted  in  a  land  of  agriculture  and  commerce, 
of  peace  and  order  and  State-administered  law. 
Neither  are  recluses  born  of  oaks  or  rocks:  they 
are  scions  of  families,  linked  to  other  families 


74  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

by  ties  both  connubial  and  civil.  I  must  then 
be  a  citizen,  to  be  a  man  :  at  least  I  must  be  the 
subject  of  some  State.  I  need  not  take  an 
active  part  in  politics,  I  need  not  be  a  member 
of  the  ruling  class,  but  I  must  be  an  item  in 
a  system  of  rulers  and  ruled.  That  is  why  I 
must  obey  the  State,  because  such  is  the  condi- 
tion of  the  humanity  that  is  in  me,  that  I  can- 
not develop  as  a  man  unless  I  fall  into  my 
place  as  subject  of  some  State. 

§  47.  (Q.  2)  What  the  State  can  command 
me  to  do,  is  not  such  an  easy  question.  The 
best  answer,  perhaps,  is  derived  from  consider- 
ing what  the  State  actually  does  command  me, 
or  certainly  would  command  me  in  readily  con- 
ceived circumstances.  The  scholastic  adage, 
Ab  esse  ad  posse  valet  illatio,  refers  to  physical, 
not  to  ethical,  possibility.  But  we  may  apply 
the  adage  even  in  the  ethical  order,  in  contem- 
plating the  action  of  a  reliably  good  agent. 
What  Cato  actually  has  done,  may  be  lawfully 
done,  if  we  are  to  take  Cato  for  a  saint.  I  am 
satisfied  with  the  government  under  which  I 
have  lived  for  more  than  half  a  century.  I 
have  never  been  wronged  by  it,  nor  do  I  think 
it  likely  ever  to  wrong  me.1     What   that  gov- 

1  I  take  to  myself  what  the  laws  of  his  country  say  to  Socrates 
in  Plato's  Crito,  51  D-52  B.  I  quote  the  last  words:  "Nor  did 
you  ever  undertake  any  other  journey  into  foreign  parts,  as  other 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     75 

ernment  commands  and  would  command  me,  I 
take  fairly  to  fill  the  area  of  control  of  the  indi- 
vidual citizen  by  the  normal  State.  With  this 
standard  before  my  eyes,  I  lay  down  the  follow- 
ing functions  of  government,  or  categories  of 
obedience  due  from  the  subject. 

(a)  The  State  has  the  right  to  tax  me,  and 
that  apart  from  my  consent,  so  far  as  I  am  a 
subject,  though  not  apart  from  my  consent  in 
so  far  as  I  happen  to  have  some  share  in  the  gov- 
ernment. Whether  I  ought  to  have  a  share  in 
the  government,  is  not  a  question  that  can  be 
answered  on  abstract  grounds,  arguments  from 
the  nature  of  man  and  so  forth.  It  can  only  be 
laid  down  that  I  ought  to  have  that  share  in  the 
government  which  the  constitution  of  my  country 
assigns  me.  For  the  matter  of  taxes,  I  ought 
to  be  taxed  constitutionally,  with  that  measure 
of  my  own  consent  which  the  written  or  unwrit- 
ten tradition  of  my  country  supposes.  But,  be 
it  remembered,  when  I  vote  taxes,  or  depute 
other  people  to  vote  them,  I  am  acting  as 
partial  ruler :  my  duty  as  a  subject  lies,  not  in 
voting  taxes,  but  in  paying  them. 

(b)  The  State  may  bid  me  take  part  in 
the    administration    of  justice,    whether   to   do 

men  do,  nor  did  any  desire  ever  possess  you  to  make  the  acquaint- 
ance of  any  other  State  or  any  other  laws,  but  we  were  sufficient 
for  you  and  the  State  which  we  constitute." 


j6  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

justice  upon  others  as  juror  or  witness,  or  to 
have  justice  done  upon  my  own  person  or  goods 
as  prisoner  or  defendant. 

(c)  The  State  may  punish  my  offences 
against  the  law  by  statute  penalties,  even  the 
penalty  of  death. 

(d)  The  State  may  enroll  me  in  its  armies 
even  without  my  consent  in  case  of  emergency, 
of  which  the  State  is  judge. 

(e)  The  State  may  superintend  me  in  any 
charge  that  I  may  have  of  others,  that  I  do  not 
grossly  abuse  the  same  to  the  detriment  of  their 
persons  or  goods. 

(/)  All  my  contracts  concerning  things  that 
have  a  monied  value  are  amenable  to  the  con- 
trol of  the  State,  not  arbitrarily  to  set  them 
aside,  but  to  provide  for  their  orderly  fulfilment, 
so  far  as  there  is  legal  evidence  for  the  existence 
of  such  contracts. 

(g)  It  is  an  axiom  of  the  casuists  that  we 
are  obliged  to  succour  a  neighbour  in  extreme 
need,  that  is,  when  we  can  help,  and  our  help  is 
necessary  to  him  for  the  averting  of  imminent 
grave  evil.  And  if  a  neighbour,  much  more  a 
parent.  The  needs  of  our  country  are  to  us 
like  the  needs  of  a  parent.  In  a  great  emer- 
gency, the  State  can  demand  of  its  citizens 
every  sacrifice  and  every  effort,  not  immoral. 
In    the    siege    of    Carthage,    during  those    last 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     77 

months  of  resistance  to  the  army  of  the  younger 
Africanus,  there  was  no  particle  of  a  Carthagin- 
ian's substance,  no  remnant  of  his  energy,  no 
drop  of  his  blood,  that  his  native  city  might  not 
have  called  upon  him  to  expend  in  her  defence. 
§  48.    A  word  further  on  the  historical  side 
of    my   theme.     There   is   a  national   infirmity 
which,    as    recognised    in    ourselves,    we    call 
'  insularity,'  the    inability  to  see  things  except 
from  the  point  of  view  of  our  own  countrymen. 
Thus  the  Roman  lawyers  took  Roman  law  to 
be  law  for  all  mankind,  as  though  nature  dic- 
tated whatever  Rome  decreed.     We  are  apt  to 
mistake    the  peculiar  instincts  of  the  English 
character  for  main  laws  of  human  nature.     We 
forget   that   civil  authority  must  be  suited    to 
civil  capacity,  which  is  not  everywhere  devel- 
oped as  it  is  in  England.     English  institutions 
will  not  bear  transplantation  in  the  fulness  of 
their  native  growth  to  Sicily.    When  Ferdinand 
II.    of   the    Two    Sicilies,    the    much    reviled 
'  Bomba,'    in    1848,    granted    a    parliamentary 
constitution  to  his  subjects,  the  grant  was  any- 
thing but  popular.     Petitions  from  general  and 
district     councils     and      other     administrative 
bodies,  to  the  number  of  2283,  were  sent  up,  pray- 
ing for  the  suppression  of  the  new  Constitution 


.  1 


1  '  The  last  struggle  of  expiring  bureaucracy,1  believers  in  the 
parliamentary  panacea  will  reply.     I  would  ask  them,  what  has 


j8  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

and  this  Parliament,  untimely  born,  died  in  a 
free  fight  in  the  streets  of  Naples.  The  moral 
is  "to  remember  that  the  individualism  of  the 
Anglo-Saxon  race,  and  the  spirit  of  self-help 
and  self-reliance  which  has  built  up  the  British 
Empire,  are  not  to  be  found  among  the  easy- 
going, pleasure-loving  races  of  the  South  of 
Europe,  which  prefer  to  expect  in  every  under- 
taking the  initiative  of  the  State,  and  allow  it 
to  guide  them  in  all  their  enterprises."  x  Cli- 
mate, racial  character,  the  fertility  or  barren- 
ness of  the  soil,  the  tendency  of  the  people  to 
agriculture  or  to  commerce,  make  different  con- 
stitutional histories.  Also  it  has  to  be  consid- 
ered whether  the  State  is  organised  mainly  for 
peace  or  mainly  for  war.  A  '  march  State,' 
continually  threatened  by  powerful  neighbours, 
must  maintain  much  of  the  discipline  of  a 
camp.  Law,  not  Liberty,  must  be  inscribed  on 
its  banner.  Quite  a  peculiar  build  of  vessel  has 
been  invented  to  stand  the  nip  of  the  Arctic 
ice-pack.  Types  of  governments  are  as  various 
as  types  of  ships. 

§  49.    With  our  social  cravings  for  commerce 
and  empire,  for  wealth,  education,  and  art,  we 

become  of  the  Turkish  Parliament,  last  heard  of  about  1876-78? 
A  nation  may  have  the  machinery  of  a  free  government  and  not 
know  how  to  work  it. 

1  From  a  review  of  Mr.  Bolton  King's  '  History  of  the  Italian 
Revolution'  in  The  Month  for  March,  1900. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     79 

take  personal  security  almost  as  a  matter  of 
course.  We  are  organized  in  large  masses  for 
mutual  protection.  The  murderer  of  one  poor 
girl  is  tracked  and  punished,  trouble  and 
expense  not  being  spared  to  that  end  by  those 
to  whom  the  victim  was  an  utter  stranger.  It 
was  not  ever  so.  A  man's  life  was  protected, 
and  his  death  avenged,  only  by  the  small  circle 
of  those  who  knew  him.  There  was  a  time 
when  a  foreign  city  was  as  a  wild  bees'  nest,  a 
thing  to  rob  and  destroy.  Heroes  gloried  in  the 
name  of  7nroA.1V op #os, '  sacker  of  cities.'  Ulysses 
and  his  companions,  passing  by  the  city  of  the 
Ciconians,  do  the  right  thing  for  tourists  of 
the  heroic  ages : 

evda  S'  iyco  tto\iv  errpadov,  wXecra  8'  avrovs.1 
Governments  were  then  organised,  from  the 
subject's  point  of  view,  not  for  liberty,  not  for 
empire,  but  for  personal  security  and  protec- 
tion. A  city  wall  was  something  to  cower  and 
crouch  behind:  the  city  gate  was  barred  to 
keep  out  the  wolf.  Much  political  history  is 
written  in  city  walls,  the  date  and  manner  of 
their  erection,  the  guarding  of  them,  their  grad- 
ual  neglect,  decay,  and  disappearance.     Early 

1  Odyssey,  IX.  40.  I  think  Dr.  Merry's  explanation  unneces- 
sary, that  the  Ciconians  had  been  allied  with  the  Trojans.  It 
was  more  than  enough  for  Homer  that  they  were  not  Greeks. 
Honest  men  in  those  days,  as  Thucydides,  I.  5,  tells  us,  freely 
confessed  to  piracy. 


8o  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

ages  were  little  favourable  to  the  'rights  of 
man  '  to  a  share  in  civil  authority.  Men  often 
had  no  ambition  to  exercise  such  authority. 
Universal  suffrage  entered  as  little  into  their 
calculations  as  travelling  by  steam  and  electric- 
ity. All  that  the  average  man  craved  was  to 
be  safe  from  the  marauder.  To  purchase  safety, 
he  was  willing  to  be  governed,  to  pay  tribute, 
to  serve  as  client  and  retainer,  or  even  as  serf. 
A  demagogue  would  have  been  stoned  by  the 
hands  which  he  pretended  to  set  free,  unless 
indeed  his  discourses  turned  on  social  griev- 
ances, the  abolition  of  slavery  for  debt,  and  the 
cancelling  of  usurious  bonds.  Otherwise,  men 
invoked  strong  despotism  to  shield  them  from  the 
foreigner  and  the  invader.  Social  security  was 
based  immediately  on  the  strength  of  the  house, 
clan,  or  petty  city  to  which  you  belonged,  not 
on  commercial  appreciation  of  peace,  and  na- 
tional defences.  A  sea  of  violence  beat  round 
every  city  wall,  and  almost  round  every  home- 
stead. A  foreigner  once  asked  me  at  Windsor 
whether  the  castle  was  fortified.  I  told  him 
that  it  was,  but  that  the  fortifications  were  out 
on  the  high  seas.  The  enemy  was  at  the  gates 
in  the  olden  time,  and  the  means  of  keeping 
him  out  sadly  ineffectual. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     81 


Part    II.  —  Criticism 

§  50.  Hitherto  this  dissertation  has  been 
mainly  expository.  The  rest  of  it  will  be  mainly 
critical  of  other  writers.  And  first  of  Hobbes 
(De  Give  and  Leviathan),  Locke  (Of  Civil  Gov- 
ernment), and  Rousseau  (Du  Contral  Social). 
Though  these  three  writers  differ  widely  from 
one  another,  they  have  enough  in  common  to 
stand  on  one  platform.  They  all  place  man 
initially  in  what  Hobbes  and  Locke  call  '  a  state 
of  nature,'  that  is,  an  extra-social  state,  as 
though  it  were  no  part  of  the  nature  of  man  to 
live  in  civil  society.  They  trace  the  origin  of 
such  society  to  an  arbitrary  compact.  They  all 
take  '  nature '  to  mean  that  which  man  is  of 
himself,  in  exclusion  of  what  he  does  for  himself, 
even  of  what  the  law  of  his  development  im- 
peratively requires  that  he  shall  do.1  Nothing 
is  '  natural '  to  these  writers  that  involves  any 
act  of  human  will.  They  see  no  difference 
between  a  '  voluntary  '  act  and  an  '  arbitrary ' 
act  of  the  will.  To  them  the  voluntary  adhe- 
sion of  men  to  the  social  system  is  an  arbitrary 
adhesion,  a  pure  conventionality, — vofxco  [Lev, 
<j>vcreL  8'  ov :  government  is  a  conventionality, 

1  See,  to  the  contrary,  John  Grote's  Examination  of  Utilita- 
rian Philosophy,  pp.  169,  207,  208  (and  above,  §§  7,  &\. 


82  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

education  a  conventionality,  so  are  clothes  and 
good  manners.1  They  fail  to  attach  due  im- 
portance to  that  something  in  human  nature 
which  requires  man  to  provide  himself  with  all 
these  things.  They  do  not  see  what  is  implied 
in  the  Wykehamite  motto,  '  Manners  makyth 
Man.'  Mr.  Bosanquet  well  says  in  this  connex- 
ion :  "  The  peculiar  naturalness  of  the  primitive 
and  simple  is  only  an  illusion "  {Philosophical 
Theory  of  the  State,  p.  132).  And  Aristotle 
{Politics,  I.  1252  b)\  "Nature  means  maturity: 
what  each  being  is  when  its  development  is 
complete,  that  we  say  is  the  nature  of  each." 
Man  develops  into  the  citizen.  The  citizen, 
then,  is  the  natural  man,  —  man  in  the  true 
state  of  nature.2 

1  Locke  does  not  go  quite  so  far  as  this.  His  '  state  of  na- 
ture '  is  taken  from  what  he  fancies  English  society  would  be 
without  government. 

2  Modern  languages  have  the  convenience  of  two  words, 
physical  and  natural,  whereas  Aristotle  had  only  one,  <}>v<tik6<s, 
and  the  Schoolmen  only  one,  naturalis.  Thus  the  latter  speak 
of  appetitus  naturalis,  meaning  '  a  physical  tendency,1  and  again 
of  lex  naturalis  in  quite  another  sense,  meaning  'the  moral  law.1 
The  ambiguity  of  the  word  naturalis  seems  to  have  misled 
Hobbes,  writing  in  Latin,  and  after  him  Locke  and  Rousseau. 
There  is  no  difficulty  in  admitting  that  man  is  not  'physically1  a 
political  or  social  creature.  Till  we  have  transcended  the  physi- 
cal order  we  do  not  enter  the  region  of  politics.  Politics  form  no 
part  of  physical  science,  or  of  what  used  to  be  called  *  natural 
philosophy.1  It  would  be  interesting  to  know  what  sense  the 
word  '  physical 7  bore  in  1650.  The  word  occurs  twice  in  Shakes- 
peare, and  is   a   derivative,  not   of  '  physics,1  but   of  4  physic,1 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Azithority     8 


o 


§  51.  Hobbes,  like  other  clear,  headstrong 
thinkers,  was  a  pessimist.  All  his  grim  power 
of  language  is  exerted  to  set  forth  the  desperate 
wickedness  of  human  nature.  'Es  a  stranger, 
'eave  a  'alf  brick  at  "  im,  expresses  the  view 
which  Hobbes  thought  it  natural  for  one  man 
to  take  of  another.  Or  rather,  there  is  more 
kindliness  in  this  speech  than  Hobbes  would 
allow  to  the  human  heart.  The  words  are 
suggestive  of  friends  and  acquaintances,  one's 
own  pais,  at  whom  'alf-bricks  are  not  to  be 
'eaved.  But  Hobbes's  ruffian  primeval  makes 
no  acquaintances  and  has  no  pals.  He  lives 
in  an  impartial  exchange  of  'alf-bricks  all  round. 
The  Apostle's  description  of  men  filled  with  all 
iniquity,  malice,  fornication,  covetousness,  wick- 
edness, fell  of  cjivy,  murder,  contention,  deceit, 
malignity ;  contumelious,  proud,  haughty,  in- 
ventors of  evil  things,  disobedient  to  parents, 
foolish,  dissolute,  without  affection,  ivithout 
fidelity,  without  mercy  (Rom.  i.  29-31),  might 
have  been  written  for  Hobbes's  mankind 
in  the  state  of  nature.  The  meaning  of  the 
word  "  humanity '  should  be  inverted  to  suit 
such  a  notion.     The  '  milk  of  human  kindness  ' 


meaning  i  medicinal.'  "  Is  it  physical  to  walk  unbraced  ?  "  {Julius 
Ccesar,  II.  1).  "The  blood  I  drop  is  rather  physical  than  dan- 
gerous to  me  "  (Coriolanus,  I.  5).  In  the  English  Bible  the  word 
does  not  occur. 


84  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

is  dried  up  at  its  source.  The  one  remedy  for 
human  nature  that  Hobbes  sees  is  to  become 
unnatural.  It  is  natural  for  man  to  live  alone  : 
let  him  take  the  unnatural  course  of  yoking 
himself  in  the  society  of  other  men.  His  nature" 
is  to  go  solitary :  let  him  denaturalise  himself 
by  a  convention,  binding  him  to  live  in  com- 
pany. Man,  however,  cannot  be  held  by  fidelity, 
only  by  force:  let  him  confer  upon  the  general 
assembly,  which  he  joins,  all  that  force  by  dint 
whereof  he  originally  lived  at  his  own  pleasure 
and  made  other  men  subservient  to  him.  In 
return,  the  other  parties  to  the  convention  re- 
nounce and  will  away  to  the  general  body  all 
the  force  that  they  had  severally  available  for 
treating  him  at  their  pleasure  and  making  him 
their  slave.  This  convention  and  compact  is 
the  generation  of  the  Leviathan,  or  State.  The 
result  is  thus  formulated :  "  Outside  the  State, 
any  man  may  be  justly  robbed  and  murdered 
by  any  other  man ;  within  the  State,  by  one 
only ':  (De  Cive,  ch.  10,  n.  1),  namely,  by  the 
sovereign.  Man  then  by  nature  is  placed  in 
an  "  ill  condition."  The  one  kind  thine  that 
nature  does  for  him  is  to  add  "  a  possibility  to 
come  out  of  it,  consisting  partly  in  the  passions, 
partly  in  reason."  The  passions  involved  are 
41  fear  of  death  and  desire  of  commodious  living:." 
Reason,  in  Hobbes's  theory,  has  two  opposite 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     85 

effects :  it  kindles  man's  passions  by  enlarging 
his  view  of  things  desirable,  and  on  the  other 
hand  it  condemns  the  unrestrained  indulgence 
of  passion.1  "  And  reason,"  he  adds,  "  suggesteth 
convenient  articles  of  peace,  upon  which  men 
may  be  drawn  to  agreement:  these  articles 
of  peace  are  called  '  the  laws  of  nature.'  The 
first  of  these  laws  is  "to  seek  peace,  so  far 
as  possible  " ;  the  second,  "  where  peace  is  im- 
possible, to  use  all  advantages  of  war "  ;  the 
third  is  to  observe  contracts ;  and  there  are 
others  {Leviathan,  Pt.  1.  chs.  xiii.,  xiv.,  xv.).  But 
in  mankind  generally,  he  observes,  reason  con- 
demns in  vain  the  excesses  of  passion ;  and  no 
man  is  bound  to  be  better  than  other  men 
around  him,  no  man  need  make  himself  a 
martyr  for  reason's  sake.  Thus  reason  argues 
fruitlessly,  till  the  State  supervenes  to  com- 
pel man  to  be  rational.  As  for  those  '  laws 
of  nature,'  that  make  for  peace,  they  bind  only 
in  foro  intemo,  or  in  inward  velleity,  not  in  foro 
externo;  or  actual  practice,  till  other  men  observe 
them,  which  never  will  men  do  in  the  state  of 
nature.    What  alone  makes  the  '  laws  of  nature  ' 


1  Cf.  Romans  vii.,  which  Hobbes  must  have  had  in  view  and 
construed  to  his  own  purpose. 

2  Hobbes  misapplies  these  terms,  which  refer  in  canon  law  to 
the  court  of  conscience  and  the  external  court,  civil  or  ecclesi- 
astical.    Conscience  does  bind  a  man  to  external  acts. 


86  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

efficacious  is  the  coercive  force  of  Leviathan : 
till  that  comes  into  operation,  those  laws  are  a 
dead  letter.1 

§  52.  Rousseau's  optimism  is  a  match  for 
the  pessimism  of  Hobbes.  To  Rousseau  every 
impulse  of  nature  was  good.  The  one  thing 
needful  for  human  perfection,  he  thought,  was 
to  give  nature  full  fling  and  liberty.  Its  riot 
and  excess  would  work  its  own  cure,  if  not 
opposed  by  artificial  checks.  All  evil  was 
born  of  conventionalism,  formalism,  artificial- 
ity. All  liberty  was  good :  for  limits,  let  it 
find  them  for  itself,  as  a  river  does  in  flood. 
To  the  objection  that  the  freedom  of  one  man 
to  do  as  he  liked   involved  the   constraint  of 

1  The  Imitation  of  C/irist,  a  book  which  Hobbes  is  not  un- 
likely to  have  read,  lends  itself  in  one  chapter  (III.  55)  to  an 
adaptation,  which  is  an  extraordinarily  felicitous  rendering  of  the 
Hobbesian  philosophy.  Remembering  how  he  calls  the  Levia- 
than "  the  mortal  god,11  we  indite  the  following,  '  Hobbes's 
Prayer 1 : — 

'  Great  Leviathan,  put  upon  me  thy  constraint,  so  necessary 
to  my  welfare,  that  I  may  overcome  my  most  wicked  nature, 
dragging  me  into  sin  and  perdition.  Resist  its  passions  I  can- 
not, except  under  thy  terror  and  constraint.  The  little  power  of 
good  left  in  my  nature  is  like  a  spark  buried  in  the  embers :  that 
is  sheer  natural  reason,  surrounded  with  great  darkness,  still 
retaining  the  power  of  judging  between  good  and  evil,  and  of 
separating  truth  from  falsehood,  but  unable  to  carry  out  all  that 
it  approves.  There  is  need  of  thy  constraint,  and  strong  con- 
straint, for  the  overcoming  of  my  nature,  or  of  that  viciousness 
and  weakness  of  corrupt  nature  which  has  come  to  stand  for 
nature.1 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     87 

another  man  to  have  done  to  him  what  he 
liked  not,  Rousseau  replied  by  denying  the 
supposition:  in  the  ideal  state  of  nature  no 
man  would  cross  the  path  of  any  other  man : 
all  would  live  in  the  woods  (tropical  forests, 
we  presume),  free,  independent,  solitary.  So, 
Rousseau  affirmed,  men  did  live  in  the  happy 
days  of  old,  ere  fetters  were  forged,  ere  kings 
were  crowned,  and  evils  multiplied  upon  the 
earth.1     Being  so  happy,  how  came  men  ever 

1  En  considerant  Phomme  tel  qu'il  a  du  sortir  des  mains  de 
la  nature,  je  le  vois  se  rassasiant  sous  un  chene,  se  desalterant  au 
premier  ruisseau,  trouvant  son  lit  au  pied  du  meme  arbre  qui 
lui  a  fourni  son  repas,  et  voila  ses  besoins  satisfaits.  ...  Le 
premier  qui  se  fit  des  habits  ou  un  logement  se  donna  en  cela  des 
choses  peu  necessaires,  puisqu'il  s'en  etait  passe  jusqu'alors,  et 
qifon  ne  voit  pas  pourquoi  il  n'eut  pu  supporter,  homme  fait,  un 
genre  de  vie  qu'il  supportait  de  son  enfance  (Discours  sur 
Vorigine  de  Vinegalite,  pp.  42-47)  —  a  principle  which  would  bar 
all  progress.  It  is  now  known  that  Rousseau  derived  this  idea 
of  savage  beatitude  from  a  book  of  Pere  du  Tertre,  a  missionary 
among  the  Caribs.  Rousseau's  supreme  delight  was  passive 
enjoyment,  following  the  impulse  of  the  hour,  which  was  also 
characterfstic  of  Shelley.  He  would  lie  on  his  back  in  a  boat 
on  the  Lake  of  Lucerne  for  hours,  watching  the  clouds.  He 
envied  races  of  men  free  from  the  elbowing  and  jostling  of  civil- 
ised life,  as  he  saw  it  in  the  ancien  regime.  Compare  Livy's  admi- 
ration of  the  early  Romans,  as  he  conceived  them,  and  Tacitus's 
Germania.  In  the  Contrat  Social,  however,  Rousseau  goes  back 
somewhat  upon  the  Disconrs.  He  even  admits  that  "  although 
in  the  civil  state  man  is  deprived  of  many  advantages  that  he 
derives  from  nature,  he  acquires  equally  great  ones  in  return  :  .  .  . 
if  the  abuses  of  this  new  condition  did  not  often  degrade  him 
below  that  from  which  he  has  emerged,  he  ought  to  bless  with- 
out ceasing  the  happy  moment  that  released  him  from  it  for  ever, 


88  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

to  quit  this  paradise  of  individualism  ?  Men 
had  every  reason  for  quitting  Hobbes's  state 
of  nature,  where  life  was  "  nasty,  brutish,  and 
short  " ;  but  for  the  abandonment  of  Rousseau's 
natural  bliss  of  savagedom  the  philosopher  can 
assign  no  better  reason  than  qnelque  funeste 
hasard.  The  Contrat  Social  is  supposed  to 
preserve  for  the  citizen  the  liberty  of  the  sav- 
age :  he  always  does  what  he  likes,  because  he 
has  no  other  liking  than  the  fulfilment  of  the 
General  Will,  even  when  it  puts  him  in  irons 
or  hands  him  over  to  the  executioner. 

§  53.  Never  has  political  conclusion  found 
swifter  and  wider  acceptance  than  that  of  the 
sovereignty  of  the  General  Will.  The  Levia- 
than is  buried,1  the  Social  Contract  torn  up : 
but  the  General  Will,  or  what  purports  to  be 
such,  rules  Europe  and  America.  The  tran- 
scendental meaning  now  attached  to  the  phrase 
'  General  Will '  I  will  consider  presently :  but 
in  Hobbes  and  Rousseau,  as  we  read  them,  the 
General  Will  is :  — 

First  and  principally,  the  unanimous  consent 
of  all  individual  wills  without  exception,  agree- 
ing together  to  constitute  the  Leviathan,  or  the 
sovereign  people. 

and  transformed  him  from  a  stupid  and  ignorant  animal  into  an 
intelligent  being  and  a  man"  (C  S.  I.  8  ;  cf.  II.  4). 
1  Not  at  Oxford. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     89 

Secondly  and  derivatively,  as  interpretative 
of  that  unanimous  consent  once  for  all  given, 
—  in  Hobbes,  the  General  Will  is  usually  the 
will  of  the  monarch,  Leviathan  being  usually 
a  single  person ; *  in  Rousseau,  the  General 
Will  is  the  will  of  the  majority  of  the  sovereign 
people.     This  is  the  theory  of  plebiscites.2 

§  54.  The  strength  of  Rousseau  is  his 
brilliant  style  and  magnificent  audacity.  Self- 
consistency,  probability,  and  historical  research 
he  flings  to  the  winds.  The  characteristic  of 
Hobbes  is  force.  His  writing  is  like  mountain 
scenery,  grim,  bold,  awe-inspiring.  For  in- 
sight into  real  points  at  issue,  for  following  an 
argument  into  all  its  consequences,  for  clear- 
ness of  conception  and  expression,  I  doubt  if 
any  English  writer  on  philosophy  has  ever 
been  the  equal  of  Thomas  Hobbes.  His  errors 
are  manifold  and  extreme,  but  jueyag  /xeyaAajtrri. 
The  more  you  struggle  with  him,  the  less  you 
like  him,  but  the   more  strength  you   find  in 


1  See  the  figure  in  the  first  page  of  Molesworthfs  edition  of 
Hobbes's  works.  There  is  much  political  philosophy,  of  a  kind, 
gathered  in  that  figure.  The  figure  in  Molesworth  is  an  exact 
reproduction  of  that  on  the  title-page  of  the  first  edition  of  the 
Leviathan,  London,  165 1,  in  the  Bodleian  Library. 

2  It  would  be  more  correct  to  say  that,  in  Rousseau,  the  gen- 
*  eral  will  is  the  common  will  of  the  common  good ;   which,   in 

an  ideal  community,  is  ascertained  by  counting  heads  (Contrat 
Social,  IV.  2).     See  §  68. 


90  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

him.  He  is  a  veritable  Cromwell  in  philoso- 
phy. Still  Hobbes's  'state  of  nature'  is  wholly 
uncountenanced  by  history  and  anthropology ; 
and  if  it  is  not  a  fact  of  history,  what  is  the 
speculation  worth  ?  Not  even  Darwinism  bears 
it  out.  Supposing,  for  argument's  sake,  our 
ancestors  to  have  been  beasts,  they  were  at 
least  gregarious  beasts.1  It  was  never  good 
for  any  hypothetical  anthropoid  to  be  alone, 
like  a  beast  of  prey.  Out  of  sheer  malevolence, 
utter  selfishness,  contempt  and  hatred  of  one's 
kind,  humanity  could  never  have  been  evolved. 
No  compact,  borne  out  by  coercion,  could  have 
been  a  remedy  for  such  radical  malice.  An 
agglomeration  of  evil  individuals  cannot  have 
composed  a  beneficent  State.2  Love  has  no 
place  in  Hobbes's  philosophy:  yet  love,  the 
Greek  philosopher  said,  is  the  bond  of  the 
universe.3 


1  The  lowest  savages  are  quite  inoffensive. 

2  Perhaps  it  was  the  consciousness  of  this  that  made  Hobbes 
so  much  prefer  monarchy  to  democracy. 

3  "  Fire  and  Water  and  Earth  and  the  mighty  height  of  Air, 
dread  Strife,  too,  apart  from  these  and  balancing  every  one  of 
them ;  and  Love  among  them,  their  equal  in  length  and  breadth. 
Her  do  thou  contemplate  with  thy  mind,  nor  sit  with  dazed  eyes. 
It  is  she  that  is  deemed  to  be  implanted  in  the  frame  of  mortals. 
It  is  she  that  makes  them  have  kindly  thoughts  and  work  the 
works  of  peace  "  (Empedocles,  quoted  in  Mr.  Burnet's  Early  Greek 
Philosophy,  p.  222  ;  cf.  Plato,  Gorgias,  507  E).  In  Hobbes,  love 
appears  to  mean  sheer  sensuality  and  selfishness. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civ  it  Authority     91 

§  55.  Locke's  treatise,  Of  Civil  Government, 
is  a  political  pamphlet  in  defence  of  the  Revo- 
lution of  1688,  —  as  he  says,  "to  establish  the 
throne  of  our  great  restorer,  the  present  King 
William,  to  make  good  his  title  in  the  consent 
of  the  people."  Locke  may  be  said  to  have 
domesticated  the  Leviathan,  and  thrown  about 
the  shoulders  of  its  author  that  mantle  of 
respectability  and  moderation  which  English- 
men love.  In  my  Ethics  and  Natural  Law, 
pp.  307-309,  I  have  animadverted  upon  what  I 
call  the  '  Aggregation  Theory,'  as  it  stands  in 
Locke,  the  theory  which  makes  civil  authority 
a  mere  sum  and  mechanical  mixture  of  the 
powers  of  the  individuals  who  throw  their  lot 
together  in  one  commonwealth.  I  have  argued 
that  the  State  is  not  a  mechanical  aggdomera- 
tion,  but  an  organic  whole,  endowed  with 
powers  which  its  individual  components  do  not 
severally  possess. 

§  56.  If  the  will  of  the  majority  is  to  be  re- 
cognised as  uniformly  supreme  in  politics,  if  the 
State  is  to  be  defined  magistra  et  gubematrix 
sui  multitudo,  other  grounds  of  such  recogni- 
tion must  be  sought  than  those  supplied  by 
Hobbes  and  Rousseau.  No  argument  is  worth 
a  hearing  that  recurs  to  a  'state  of  nature.' 
A  less  assailable  and  more  commanding  posi- 
tion, —  indeed  the  grandest  of  all  positions  in 


92  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

political  philosophy,  —  is  this,  that  government 
is  for  the  good  of  the  governed  primarily  and 
directly,  not  for  the  good  of  them  who  hold  the 
reins  of  power.  Civil  authority  is  not  an 
estate,  but  a  ministration  :  it  is  the  service  of 
the  persons  subject  to  its  sway.1  Testing,  then, 
the  less  safe  principle  by  the  safer,  I  ask : 
Is  self-government,  in  the  sense  of  government 
by  the  majority,  always  for  the  good  of  the  mul- 
titude governed?'2     Philosophers  have  talked  of 

1  "What  is  man,  —  or  rather  mankind,  for  so  we  have  styled 
a  nation,  —  better  than  a  herd  of  sheep  or  oxen,  if  it  be  owned 
like  them  by  masters?"  (Thomas  White,  Grounds  of  Obedience 
and  Government,  London,  1655,  Ground  XVI).  Gerendum 
vero  (imperium)  est  ad  utilitatem  civium :  quia  qui  prcesunt 
ceteris  hac  una  de  causa  prasunt  ut  civitatis  titilitatem  tueantur. 
Neque  ullo  pacto  committenditm  unius  ut  vel  paucorum  commodo 
serviat  civilis  atictoritas,  cum  ad  commune  omnium  bonum  con- 
stituta  sit  (Leo  XIII.,  Encyclical  on  the  Christian  Constitution  of 
States,  November  1,  1885).  So,  too,  Aristotle,  Politics,  III.  1279  a. 
The  principle  was  fii36t  formulated  by  Plato,  Rep.  345  D,  "  Every 
power  of  command,  as  such,  regards  the  best  interest  of  none 
other  than  the  subject  commanded  and  cared  for."  Aristotle 
observes  that  this  does  not  hold  good  of  a  master's  authority 
over  his  servant,  which,  however,  belongs  not  to  the  political,  but 
to  the  economic  or  domestic  order. 

2  "  If  the  people  are  observant  of  moderation  and  principle,  and 
carefully  watch  over  the  common  interest,  it  is  right  to  enact  a 
law  empowering  such  a  people  to  appoint  their  own  magistrates. 
...  If  in  course  of  time  the  same  people  become  gradually 
corrupt,  sell  their  votes,  and  place  atrocious  criminals  in  office, 
the  power  of  conferring  offices  of  State  is  rightly  taken  away  frem 
the  people,  and  reverts  to  the  discretion  of  a  few  good  men " 
(St.  Augustine,  De  liber 0  arbitrio,  1.6). 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     93 

'  all  men,'  as  though  all  men  were  the  men 
of  their  acquaintance,  forgetting  how  small  a 
portion  of  mankind  lies  within  the  civilised 
area  in  which  philosophers  move.1  There  are 
capable  and  incapable  multitudes,  as  there  are 
capable  and  incapable  individuals.  A  multi- 
tude may  be  too  frothy,  raw,  and  undeveloped, 
for  self-government.  Or  they  may  be  too  de- 
praved, great  wickedness  having  rendered  them 
politically  effete.  Cicero's  whole  career  as  a 
statesman  was  spoilt  by  his  not  discerning,  what 
to  Julius  Caesar  was  plain  enough,  that  the  Sen- 
ate and  People  of  Rome  had  grown  too  corrupt 
for  republican  institutions  to  continue.  And,  in 
view  of  the  corruption  of  the  Athenian  Demus, 
it  may  be  doubted  whether  the  anti-Macedonian 
policy  of  Demosthenes  did  not  deserve  the 
appellation  of  '  heroism,  but  not  statesmanship.' 
Phocion  at  least  thought  that  it  did.  Or  a 
multitude  may  be  too  indolent  to  care  for  self- 
government  beyond  the  range  of  parochial  and 
municipal  matters.  Except  for  an  occasional 
recurrence  to  the  referendum,  no  one  now 
advocates  government  by  the  direct  vote  of  the 
majority:  it  is  no  government  for  empires,  as 

1  Forgetting,  I  should  say  in  particular,  the  difference  between 
European  and  Asiatic,  the  one  generally  aiming  at  self-govern- 
ment, the  other  acquiescing  in  passive  obedience  to  what  he 
regards  as  the  unalterable  will  of  Heaven,  uttered  by  princes. 


94  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

even  Rousseau  saw.  Nor  is  the  "  government 
of  the  best  on  the  approval  of  the  majority,"  — 
fxer  euSo^'tas  Tr\yj6ovs  apLo-TOKpaTta,  as  the  Pla- 
tonic Menexenus  has  it,  238  D,  —  a  practical 
polity  everywhere.  No  doubt  of  its  excellence 
where  it  is  practical.  The  people's  eye  is  the 
guardian  of  the  civil  ruler,  the  people's  approval 
his  strength ;  and  the  study  and  use  of  govern- 
ment advances  the  people  in  intelligence  and 
vigour.  But  the  people  thus  dignified  is  not 
a  mere  numerical  majority.  Their  individual 
wills  are  not  merely  numbered,  but  weighed. 
They  are  a  reverential,  or,  in  Walter  Bagehot's 
phrase,  "  a  deferential  people,"  confessing  supe- 
rior qualities  in  some  men,  and  assigning  place 
and  consideration  to  those  qualities  over  and 
above  the  simple  fact  of  a  man  being  a  man. 
Universal  suffrage,  an  excellent  thing  in  itself, 
as  giving  every  dweller  in  the  country  an  inter- 
est in  the  government,  should  be  tempered  by 
some  further  preponderance  allowed  to  the 
natural  chiefs  of  society,  to  the  noble,  the 
wealthy,  and  the  educated.1 

1  In  the  Clarke  Papers,  Vol.  I.  pp.  301-308,  there  is  an  inter- 
esting discussion  between  Ireton  and  Rainborow  at  the  Council 
of  Officers  at  Putney  in  October,  1647.  The  discussion  is  neatly 
given  in  Mr.  John  Morley's  Oliver  Cromwell,  Bk.  III.  Ch.  III., 
"The  Officers  as  Politicians."  Rainborow  argues  for  manhood 
suffrage  of  every  man  born  in  the  country.  Ireton  stands  for  a 
property  qualification,  on  the  usual  '  stake  in  the  country '  argu- 


Origii&and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     95 

§  57.  The  good  of  the  people  being  the 
end  and  aim  of  civil  government,  there  are 
three  instruments  for  compassing  it,  —  the  will 
of  the  people,  the  discretion  of  the  ruler,  and  the 
written  or  unwritten  constitution.  Of  the  three, 
the  third  is  the  safest,  though  none  of  them 
works  well  in  isolation  from  the  other  two. 
Plato  appears  his  worst  in  such  a  passage  as  his 
Statesman,  296-300,  where  he  goes  the  length 
of  saying  that  "a  wise  government"  —  and  what 
government  does  not  think  itself  wise  ?  —  "  may 
do  as  it  likes,  and  cannot  do  wrong,"  irdi'Ta  ttol- 
ovcriv  Toils  ejxfypocriv  apy^ovcriv  ovk  dcrriv  afxaprr^fxa, 
and  ridicules  constitutional  government  as  a 
Sevrepos  ttXovs,  or  second-best  article.  The 
practical  is  usually  a  second-best.  See  Aris- 
totle's just  criticism,  Politics,  III,  1286  b.  Yet 
even  Aristotle,  with  his  all-licensed  hero-king 
{Politics,  III  1284  b,  128S  a),  makes  a  very  near 
return  to  Plato.1     A  much  more  practical  man 

ment.  Universal  suffrage,  joined  with  the  multiple  vote,  as  sug- 
gested in  the  text,  seems  the  best  theory  in  the  abstract.  All 
political  theories  are  in  the  abstract.  It  is  from  inability  to 
descend  from  these  abstract  heights  to  the  region  of  concrete 
proprieties  that  political  philosophers,  from  Plato  to  J.  S.  Mill, 
have  made  such  poor  politicians.  But  'one  man,  one  vote1  is 
certainly  a  bad  theory. 

1  "  That  single,  sole  ruler  .  .  .  ruling  with  virtue  and  know- 
ledge .  .  .  conspicuous  at  once  as  excelling  in  body  and  in 
mind"  (Statesman,  301  C,  D,  E)  is  quite  the  Aristotelian  hero- 
king. 


96  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

than  Plato,  Oliver  Cromwell,  took  Plato's  line. 
"  'Tis  the  general  good  of  the  kingdom  that  we 
ought  to  consult :  that's  the  question,  what's  for 
their  good,  not  what  pleases  them."  So  Crom- 
well told  the  officers  of  the  army  at  Reading,  in 
July,  1647.  In  the  November  following,  the 
violence  of  the  soldiers  drove  him  to  insert  this 
qualification,  that  you  must  think  sometimes  of 
what  pleases  people,  else  they  will  not  endure 
what  is  orood  for  them.     Seated  on  his  chair  of 

O 

state  in  Westminster  Hall,  in  1653,  the  Pro- 
tector reverted  to  his  maxim  in  its  original  form. 
With  the  good  of  the  nation  before  his  eyes, 
and  his  own  discretion  for  the  measure  of  it, 
Oliver,  Lord  Protector,  carried  matters  with  as 
high  a  hand  as  any  royal  Charles  or  James, 
abundantly  laying  himself  open  to  the  cynical 
observation  of  Hobbes,  his  contemporary,  that 
when  men  cry  for  liberty,  they  want  power.1 
"  Wise  (unconstitutional)  government "  makes 
a  large  figure  in  English  history  from  Henry 
VIII.  to  James  II.  Since  1688  our  govern- 
ment has  often  been  unwise,  but  never  uncon- 
stitutional, and  the  good  of  the  people  has 
been  much   better  secured.2      There   is,   how- 

1  See  Mr.  John  Morley's  Oliver  Cromwell,  pp.  232,  240-241, 

395  >  405,  406. 

2  I  may  remark  that  a  too  fervent  worship  of  the  '  Real  Will,1 
unchecked  by  constitutional  forms,  would  readily  lead  one  to 
err  with  Plato  and  Cromwell.     One  should  be  loth  to  err,  even 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civ  it  Authority     97 

ever,  a  noble  passage  in  Plato's  Laws,  the 
child  of  his  old  age,  which  I  take  for  an  ex- 
planation and  rectification  of  the  somewhat 
crude  utterances  of  his  Statesman.  I  refer 
to  Laws,  IX.  874  E-875  D,  the  passage  be- 
ginning: "Men  must  necessarily  frame  laws, 
and  live  according  to  laws,  if  they  are  not  to 
sink  to  the  level  of  the  most  savage  beasts." 
The  need  of  laws  he  refers  to  the  fact  that  hu- 
man nature  cannot  be  relied  upon  for  a  steady 
discernment  of  the  best  course  and  a  steady  will 
to  take  the  same,  the  best  course  being  that 
which  makes  for  the  public  advantage,  in  the 
pursuit  of  which  the  good  of  the  individual  also 
is  ultimately  best  realised.  Absolute  power 
spoils  a  man,  and  turns  him  to  self-indulgence 
and  self-aggrandisement.  Hence  the  necessity 
of  law  and  order  and  constitutional  procedure. 
Still  constitutionalism  is,  after  all,  a  second-best 
sort  of  thing. 

If  ever  by  some  divine  dispensation  there  were  born  a 
man  on  earth  with  a  nature  capable  of  these  attainments 
(perfect  political  wisdom  and  self-control),  he  would  stand 
in  no  need  of  laws  to  rule  him  :  for  neither  law  nor  order  is 
superior  to  knowledge,  nor  is  it  meet  for  mind  to  be  subject 

in  such  authentic  company.  I  may  further  add  that  an  undue 
pressing  after  a  formula,  to  hold  good  of  all  States,  brings  on  a 
deadlock  in  political  philosophy.  To  many  anxious  questions 
the  one  safe  answer  is, '  It  depends  on  the  constitution,1  —  written 
or  unwritten.     And  constitutions  vary. 

H 


98  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

or  slave  of  any,  provided  it  be  genuine  mind,  truly  free  ac- 
cording to  nature.  But  as  things  are,  such  a  mind  nowhere 
is  found,  except  some  faint  traces  :  therefore,  as  a  second- 
best  course,  we  have  to  take  to  law  and  order,  which  has  an 
eye  for  that  which  is  for  the  most  part  correct,  but  not  for 
the  correct  thing  absolutely  and  in  every  case. 

There  is  some  residual  disadvantage  in  living 
under  law,  and  constitutional  obedience  will 
bear  hard  at  times  for  a  time  upon  its  best 
subjects. 

§  58.  Two  seventeenth-century  Catholic  writ- 
ers on  government  may  be  noticed  here.  Thomas 
White,  a  secular  priest,  resident  in  London,  was 
the  sun  and  centre  of  a  small  planetary  system 
of  religious  controversy,  as  old  libraries  bear 
witness.  He  became  intimate  with  Hobbes, 
and,  a  contemporary  tells  us,  would  "visit  Mr. 
Hobbes  and  argue  till  the  two  were  red  in  the 
face."  The  fruit,  perhaps,  of  these  discussions 
appears  in  a  small  volume  which  White  pub- 
lished in  1655,  Grounds  of  Obedience  and  Gov- 
ernment. He  rejects  Hobbes's  state  of  nature, 
saying  with  much  truth,  "  When  I  speak  of  a 
nation,  methinks  I  speak  of  nature  itself ' 
(Ground  IX.).  But,  agreeing  with  Hobbes, 
he  will  not  allow  that  reason  has  any  motive 
for  embracing  the  universal  good  other  than 
the  interest  of  self  in  that  good.  "  Reason 
takes  nothing  to  be  good  but  what  is  good  to 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     99 

himself    (Ground   VL).      "It   is   past    dispute 
that  for  him  who  expects  nothing  in  the  next 
world  there  can  be  no  rational  motive  of  vol- 
untarily endangering  his  life  for  the  common- 
wealth, if  himself  be  not  particularly  interested 
in   it"  (Ground   XL).      This  statement  would 
rather   be   true   if  put   the  other  way,  that  he 
would  have  nothing  to  expect  in  the  next  life, 
who    had    and    could    have    no    other    rational 
motive  than  private  interest  for  voluntarily  ex- 
posing his  life  on  behalf  of  his  country.     The 
fact  of  his  being  a  mere  creature  of  self  and 
selfishness,  devoid  of  all   appreciation   of    uni- 
versal good,  would  argue  him  to  be  devoid  also 
of  intelligence,  and  consequently  of  all  principle 
of  immortality.1     Reason  in  White's  argument, 
as  in  that  of   Hobbes,  is  not  sufficiently  raised 
above  the  animal  level.      Hence  I  take  excep- 
tion even  to  the  following  aphorism,  plausible 
as  it  appears :  "  The  proper  natural  way  of  gov- 
erning is  by  making  the  obeyer  understand  that 
it  is  his  own  profit  which  the  action  aims  at,  so 
as  to  make  him  work  out  of  the  inclination  of 
his  own  will  and  the  dictamen  of  his  own  un- 
derstanding" (Ground  I.).     The  motive  of  civil 
obedience  here  indicated  is  not  wrong,  but  imper- 

1  Of  most  men  we  may  say  that  their  soul  slumbers  within 
them,  and  their  intelligence  is  stunned  by  the  noise  of  life.  Still 
it  is  there. 


ioo  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

feet  and  informal.  It  is  a  useful  motive  for 
pacifying  the  recalcitrant  and  refractory:  it  is 
not  the  philosophic  motive  and  scientific  reason 
why  we  pay  obedience  to  the  State.  The  maxim 
is  a  pedagogue's  maxim,  not  a  statesman's,  except 
of  a  statesman  speaking  popularly,  as  he  will 
do  at  an  election.  The  precise  aim  of  the  leg- 
islator, as  distinguished  from  the  parent  and 
the  schoolmaster,  is  not  the  good  of  this  and 
that  individual,  but  the  common  good.  There- 
fore, if  any  individual  obeys  the  State  mainly 
in  view  of  his  own  particular  good,  he  is  not 
obeying  according  to  the  exact  drift  of  the  law, 
he  is  not  obeying  as  a  citizen.  He  may  readily 
complain  that,  though  obedience  be  the  best 
thing  for  him  under  the  circumstances,  and 
though  he  has  some  personal  interest  in  the 
social  order,  yet  that  order  befriends  his  wealthy 
and  honoured  neighbour  much  more  than  it 
befriends  him.  He  becomes  thus  a  lukewarm 
adherent  of  a  State  which  he  conceives  to  be 
organised  chiefly  in  the  interest  of  the  better 
classes.  He  would  like  to  see  society  remod- 
elled to  his  greater  private  advantage.  He  has 
not  learnt  to  regard  the  State  as  an  organism, 
and  to  rejoice  in  the  life  of  the  organism  as  a 
whole,  and  his  own  subordination  to  it.  There 
is  no  real  patriotism  in  that  man's  heart,  no 
public  spirit,  too  much  individualism,  too  much 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     101 

of  the  'casual  self.'  The  relation  between  society, 
once  formed,  and  its  rulers,  White  views  as  a 
contract  of  trust,  thus  falling  in  with  the  theory 
of  Locke  and  the  Whigs.  "  Such  trustees  are 
called  governors"  (Ground  VII.).  Like  Locke, 
too,  White  is  jealous  of  government  interference. 
"  Wherein,  then,  consists  the  liberty  of  every 
subject?  In  not  being  controlled  in  his  private 
affairs.  ...  If  he  be  molested  in  his  domestic 
menage,  otherwise  than  when  the  common  weal 
demandeth  his  assistance,  he  is  not  free.  But, 
for  serving  the  common,  it  is  the  freest  act  he 
hath.  It  was  his  choice  to  elect  it,  it  is  his 
good  to  conserve  it,  and  it  will  be  his  destruc- 
tion to  infringe  it "  (Ground  XV.).  He  says  of 
the  people  in  relation  to  their  prince :  "  They 
entrust  him  with  more  than  they  understand ; 
and  so  his  power  is  to  proceed  according  to  his 
understanding,  though  it  cross  theirs  "  (Ground 
XI.),  words  which  remind  us  of  Burke,  To  the 
Electors  of  Bristol.  Rousseau  would  have  writ- 
ten them,  not  of  what  the  people  entrust  to  the 
prince,  but  of  what  the  individual  gives  in  trust 
when  he  becomes  one  of  the  people.  I  end 
with  two  shrewd  sayings  of  Thomas  White. 
"  As  for  the  people,  they  are  but  a  weak  part, 
if  the  Governor  be  wise'  (Ground  XIII.). 
"  Truly  best  signifieth  that  it  were  not  only 
best  if  it  had  been  fore-ordered,  or  if  it  were 


102  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

in  practice,  but  that  it  be  best  to  be  brought 
into  practice"  (Ground  XL). 

§  59.  Francis  Suarez,  the  celebrated  theo- 
logian of  the  Society  of  Jesus,  is  the  author 
of  two  elaborate  legal  and  political  treatises: 
one,  De  Legibus:  the  full  title  of  the  other  is, 
Defensio  Fidci  Catholic cz  advcrsus  Anglicancz 
Sectce  errores,  cum  rcsponsione  ad  '  Apologiam 
pro  juramento  fide 'litatis  et  Epistolam  ad  Prin- 
cipes  Christianos '  Serenissimi  Jacobi  Anglice 
Regis:  the  date  is  161 2.  James  I.  had  claimed 
to  have  his  sovereignty  immediately  from  God, 
and  for  his  exercise  of  it  to  be  responsible  to 
none  other  than  God,  not  therefore  to  his  people, 
and  not  to  the  Pope.  The  truth  in  the  king's 
allegation  is  this :  (1)  that  sovereign  authority  in 
each  State  is  of  its  own  nature  absolute  and  irre- 
sponsible, so  far  as  States  are  concerned;  State 
is  not  accountable  to  State,  nor  one  private  indi- 
vidual to  another  as  such:  (2)  that  sovereign 
authority  is  of  God,  inasmuch  as  it  meets  an 
exigence  of  mans  rational  nature ;  and  what- 
ever the  rational  nature  of  man  exacts,  that 
God  as  Author  of  nature  commands,  —  all  which 
truth  we  have  already  seen.  But  James  I.  erred 
in  identifying  sovereign  authority  with  mon- 
archy, as  though  monarchy  and  sovereignty 
were  convertible  terms.  Sovereign  authority 
is  not  tied  to  monarchy,  nor  to  aristocracy,  nor 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     103 

to  democracy,  nor  to  any  other  definable  polity. 
Nature  demands  that  there  be  a  State,  and 
the  being  of  a  State  involves  civil  authority, 
and  civil  authority  must  have  some  mode  of 
distribution,  and  the  mode  of  distribution  of 
authority  makes  the  polity.  Therefore,  nature 
demands  some  polity,  but  not  this  or  that  polity 
in  particular.  Civil  authority  is  a  sacred  thing, 
a  morally  imperishable  thing.  But  cast  it  into 
the  form  of  monarchy,  it  is  not  more  sacred 
than  it  would  have  been  in  the  form  of  repub- 
lican government.  Neither  monarchy  nor  de- 
mocracy is  imperishable :  in  certain  cases  the 
one  may  lawfully  give  place  to  the  other.1  The 
point,  therefore,  which  James  I.  and  Charles  I. 
and  the  Stuarts  generally  ought  to  have  con- 
sidered, was  whether  by  the  precedents  of  Eng- 
lish history  (for  certainly  not  by  natural  law  or 
special  divine  appointment)  the  government  of 
England  was  an  absolute  monarchy,  with  the 
whole  civil  authority  centred  in  the  single  per- 
son of  the  king,  according  to  the  precedents  of 
Cassarism  at  Rome  and  Constantinople. 

§  60.  The  following  quotations  exhibit  the 
theory  of  the  origin  of  civil  authority  which 
Suarez  proposed,  in  opposition  to  the  king  of 
England,  and  not  altogether  to  the  liking  of 
the    king    of    Spain.     The    point    that   Suarez 

1  See  my  Ethics  and  Xatural  Law,  pp.  328,  329. 


104  Political  a?id  Moral  Essays 

labours  to  make  is  this,  that  civil  authority  is 
the  gift  of  God  immediately  to  the  civil  com- 
munity, or  commonwealth ;  and  that  the  com- 
monwealth gives  it  to  the  king,  who  thus 
holds  of  God  mediately,  not  directly :  in 
other  words,  that  government  is  the  creation  of 
God,  but  kings  are  the  creation  of  men,  —  a 
speech  of  utter  treason  in  the  ears  of  His 
Sacred  Majesty  James  I. 

"  The  supreme  civil  authority,  considered  in 
itself,  is  given  immediately  by  God  to  men, 
when  they  are  gathered  into  a  State,  or  perfect 
political  community.  But  that  involves  no 
peculiar  positive  institution,  or  gift  altogether 
distinct  from  the  production  of  human  nature, 
but  follows  naturally,  by  force  of  the  first  crea- 
tion of  that  nature.  Therefore,  by  virtue  of  the 
said  gift,  this  authority  is  not  in  one  person, 
nor  in  any  special  assembly  of  many  persons, 
but  is  in  the  whole  perfect  people  or  body 
of  the  commonwealth.  .  .  .  For  this  civil 
authority  is  natural :  since,  without  any  inter- 
vention of  supernatural  revelation  or  faith,  this 
authority  would  be  recognised  by  the  dictate  of 
natural  reason  in  the  human  commonwealth 
as  altogether  necessary  to  its  conservation  and 
equable  arrangement ;  which  is  a  sign  that  such 
authority  is  in  the  said  commonwealth  as  a 
proprium,  following  upon  the  nature,  or  crea- 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     105 

tion  and  natural  institution  of  the  same.  .  .  . 
All  things  that  follow  upon  a  nature  are  the 
immediate    gift  of   the  proper   and  immediate 
author  of  the  same  nature :  but  this  authority 
is  a  proprium,  following    upon  human   nature 
as  gathered  into  one  body  politic:  therefore  it 
is    given  immediately  by  God  as  Author  and 
Provider    of    that    nature.  .  .  .       For,    by    the 
mere  fact  of  men  being  gathered  together  into 
the  body  of  one  State  or  commonwealth,  the 
said  authority  results  in  that  community  with- 
out the  intervention  of   any  created  will,  and 
that  with  so  great  necessity  that  the  result  can- 
not be  hindered  by  any  human  will,  which  is  a 
clear  sign  that  the  authority  is  immediately  of 
God.     Hence  evidently  this  authority,  consid- 
ered precisely  as  emanating  from  the  Author 
of  nature  by  a  manner  of  natural  sequence,  is 
not  in  any  one  person,  nor  in  any  special  com- 
pany   of    persons,    whether    nobles    or   others 
whatsoever  of  the  people,  because  by  the  nature 
of  the  thing  this  authority  is  only  in  the  com- 
monwealth, inasmuch  as  it  is  necessary  for  the 
preservation  of    the  same  .  .  .  that   is   to  say, 
it  is  not  immediately  in  any  one  definite  per- 
son, as  Adam,  James,  or  Philip ;  nor  again  by 
the  nature  of  the  thing  does  it  need  to  be  in 
one  single  person,  and  the  same  holds  with  due 
proportion  of  a  Senate ;    .  .  .  because  by  dint 


106  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

of  natural  reasoning  no  reason  can  be  devised 
why  this  authority  should  be  determined  to  one 
person,  or  to  a  fixed  number  of  persons,  short 
of  the  whole  community,  rather  than  to  any 
other  number:  therefore  in  virtue  of  nature's 
grant,  it  is  immediately  in  the  commonwealth 
only.'  1 

1  Suprema  pot  est  as  c  wilts,  per  se  spec  tat  a,  immediate  quidem 
data  est  a  Deo  hominibus  in  civitatem  sen  perfectam  communitatem 
politicam  congregatis,  non  quidem  ex  peculiari  et  quasi  positiva 
institutione  vel  donatione  omnino  distincta  a  productione  talis 
natures,  sed  per  naturalem  consecutionem  ex  vi  prima:  creationis 
ejus  ;  ideoque  ex  vi  talis  donationis  non  est  ho2c  potestas  in  una 
persona,  neque  in  peculiari  congregatione  multorum,  sed  in  toto 
perfecto  popido  seu  cor  pore  communitatis :  .  .  .  quia  hoec  po- 
testas politica  naturalis  est :  quia  nulla  etiam  interveniente 
supernaturali  ratione  aut  fide,  ex  dictamine  ralionis  naturalis 
agnosceretur  hare  potestas  in  humana  republica,  ut  illius  conserva- 
tioni  et  csquitati  omnino  necessaria  •■  signum  igitur  est  esse  in 
tali  communitate  ut  proprietatem  conseqiientcm  naturam,  seu 
creationem  et  naturalem  ipsius  institutiouem.  .  .  .  Quo?  conse- 
quuntur  naturam,  immediate  dantur  a  proprio  et  immediato 
auctore  ejusdem  natures :  sed  hare  potestas  est  proprietas  qua- 
darn  consequens  humanam  naturam,  id  in  unum politicum  corpus 
congregatam :  ergo  datur  immediate  a  Deo,  ut  est  auctor  et  pro- 
visor  talis  naturce.  .  .  .  Nam,  eo  ipso  quod  homines  in  corpus 
unius  civitatis  vel  reipublicar  congregantur,  sine  interventu  alicujus 
creator  voluntatis  resultat  in  ilia  communitate  talis  potestas,  cam 
tanta  necessitate  td  non  possit  per  vohmtatem  humanam  impediri: 
signum  provide  est  esse  immediate  a  Deo.  .  .  .  Atque  nine  etiam 
evidens  est  potestatem  hanc  pra'cise  spectatam,  ut  est  ab  auctore 
natures  quasi  per  naturalem  consecutionem,  non  esse  in  una  per- 
sona, neque  in  aliqua  peculiari  communitate  sive  optimatum  sive 
quorumcunque  ex  popido,  quia  ex  natura  rei  solum  est  hare  potes- 
tas in  commiuiitate  quatenus  ad  illius  conservationem  necessaria 
est.  ...     Id  est,  non  est  immediate  in  una  cert  a  persona,  v.g. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civ  it  Authority      107 

§  61.  Suarez  goes  on  to  argue  that  govern- 
ment is  of  natural  institution  and  divine  ap- 
pointment, but  not  kingship:  for  were  king- 
ship a  divine  thing,  the  royal  power  would  be 
immutable,  and  comprehend  all  the  inalienable 
prerogatives  of  sovereignty,  —  as  indeed  to 
James  I.'s  mind  it  did ;  all  countries  would  be 
monarchical  and  the  succession  to  the  throne 
would  be  everywhere  the  same.1  Suarez  holds 
the  same  doctrine  in  his  treatise,  De  Legibus, 
where  we  read :  "  It  follows  that  civil  authority, 

Adamo,  Jacobo,  vel  Philippo :  neque  etiam  ex  natura  rei  postulat 
esse  in  una  singular!  persona,  et  ide?n  est  cum  proportione  de 
senatu  :  .  .  .  quia  ex  vi  rationis  naturalis  nulla  potest  excogitari 
ratio  cur  hac  potestas  deter  minetur  ad  unam  personam,  vel  ad 
certum  numerum  personarum  infra  totam  communitatem  magis 
quam  ad  alium ;  ergo  ex  vi  naturalis  concessionis  solum  est  imme- 
diate in  communitate  (Defensio  Fidei,  III.  c.  ii.,  rm.  6,  7;  cf. 
n.  18  ;  also  cf.  De  Legibus,  III.  c.  ill.,  n.  6 ;  c.  iv.,  n.  2). 

1  This  is  the  point  of  the  remark  in  John  Selden's  Table  Talk, 
"  Kings  are  individual,  this  king  and  that  king  :  there  is  no  species 
of  kings.1'  Suarez  assumes  that  civil  authority  is  a  constant 
quantity,  which  may  be  doubted,  considering  the  historical  devel- 
opment of  that  authority.  Still,  it  is  a  good  argument,  ad  hominem, 
as  eliciting  the  real  mind  of  the  adversary.  The  Stuarts  really 
seem  to  have  held  that  royal  authority  was  identical  with  civil 
authority,  and  was  a  constant  quantity.  Their  phrase  was  "  the 
inalienable  prerogatives  of  the  crown."  Any  concession  that  the 
king  made  to  his  subjects,  e.g.  in  the  Petition  of  Right,  1628,  they 
regarded  as  a  temporary  indulgence,  revocable  at  the  king's  pleas- 
ure. This  fixed  idea  explains  conduct  in  Charles  I.  which  other- 
wise looks  like  bad  faith.  After  all,  the  Stuarts  did  but  go  upon 
mediaeval  conceptions  of  royalty,  enhanced  somewhat  by  the  Ref- 
ormation, which  confounded  royal  and  papal  prerogative. 


108  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

so  often  as  it  is  found  in  one  man  or  prince, 
according  to  lawful  and  ordinary  right,  has 
proceeded  from  the  people  and  commonwealth 
either  proximately  or  remotely,  and  cannot  be 
held  otherwise,  consistently  with  justice"  —  a 
populo  et  communitate  manasse,  nee  posse  aliter 
haberi,  ut  justa  sit} 

§  62.  Suarez  differs  from  Rousseau  in  mak- 
ing the  people  transfer  their  authority  to  some 
king  or  assembly,  and  that  of  necessity  —  they 
being  too  unwieldy  a  body  to  exercise  it  them- 
selves—  an  irrevocable  transfer,  without  power 
of  resumption;  whereas,  to  Rousseau's  mind, 
the  authority  remains  inalienably  with  the  peo- 
ple, any  king,  or  senate,  or  '  prince,'  whom  they' 
elect,  being  the  mere  bailiff  of  the  sovereign 
people.  Also  with  Suarez,  authority  does  not 
arise  from  a  contract  to  live  in  civil  society, 
but  from  the  natural  necessity  of  such  society 
provided  for  by  God.  Lastly,  with  Rousseau, 
as  with  Locke,  civil  authority  is  the  agglomera- 

1  Suarez  was  not  the  author  of  the  doctrine  of  the  transference 
of  power  from  the  people  to  the  prince.  It  appears  in  the  mediae- 
val gloss,  Quod  principi  placnit  legis  habet  vigorem,  titpote  cuui 
lege  regia,  qiuz  de  imperio  ejus  lata  est,  populus  ei  et  in  eum  omne 
suiim  imperium  et  potcstatem  coiiferat.  See  Dr.  Gierke's  Politi- 
cal Theories  of  the  Middle  Age,  note  140,  p.  146;  and  note  142, 
p.  147.  The  point  that  Suarez  emphasised,  contrary  to  mediaeval 
ideas,  is  that  the  princeps  is  not  necessarily  a  king ;  and  again, 
that  the  transference  of  sovereignty  need  not  be  absolute  and 
entire. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  AutJiority     109 

tion  of  individual  powers;  with  Suarez  it  is  a 
new  creation  resultant  upon  social  union. 

§  63.  Suarez's  theory  has  had  great  vogue 
in  the  Catholic  schools,  where  it  has  led  and 
still  leads  to  much  disputation.  The  theory 
is  admirable  in  the  abstract.  The  objection 
to  it  is  that  it  is  not  sufficiently  historical. 
Suarez  speaks  as  though  the  getting  together 
of  a  people,  and  consequent  development  of 
authority,  was  the  work  of  an  instant.  We  do 
not  profess  to  know  how  the  '  horde '  came 
together,  but  it  takes  generation  upon  genera- 
tion to  form  the  'tribe,'  and  many  more  gen- 
erations before  the  tribe  assumes  the  full 
majesty  of  the  mature  State.  Again,  in  the 
sentence,  "  by  the  mere  fact  of  men  being 
gathered  together  into  the  body  of  one  com- 
monwealth, authority  results  in  that  com- 
monwealth without  the  intervention  of  any 
created  will,"  hardly  enough  is  made  of  the 
truth,  which  the  writer  well  knew,  that  men 
are  not  gathered  together  into  the  organic 
unity  of  a  commonwealth  without  the  inter- 
vention of  some  very  determined  human  will 
or  wills ;  and  that  the  will  which  gathers  and 
organises  is  apt  to  rule.  Still,  I  say,  the  theory 
is  admirable  in  the  abstract,  as  are  the  calcula- 
tions of  mathematicians,  where  they  assume 
uniform  mediums,  rigid  rods,  identity  of  tern- 


no  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

perature,  constant  barometric  pressure,  and 
generally  a  uniformity  and  persistence  of  con- 
ditions which  is  not  found  in  nature ;  all  the 
while  knowing  well  that  these  assumptions  are 
not  correct,  and  correcting  their  results  accord- 
ingly upon  observation  when  they  come  to 
practice.  So,  having  in  our  hands  a  theory 
formed  on  the  hypothesis  of  a  primitive 
equality,  we  must  make  the  necessary  correc- 
tions in  applying  it  to  the  inequalities  which 
history  reveals  in  the  constituent  materials  of 
the  first  commonwealths.  Suarez's  theory  then 
holds  good  as  a  '  first  approximation.'  It  holds 
Iv  toZs  6/xoiot?  /cat  Lcrois  (Aristotle,  Politics,  III. 
1288  a),  in  a  society  where  every  man  is  the 
peer  of  his  neighbour.  Perhaps  the  colonists 
who  broke  away  from  the  British  Crown  under 
George  III.  came  as  near  as  ever  men  came  to 
such  equality  among  themselves.  Then  the 
history  and  constitution  of  the  United  States 
will  be  the  best  example  of  Suarezian  theory 
put  in  practice.  But,  as  Aristotle  shows  (Poli- 
tics, III.  ad  Jin),  societies  frequently  start  from 
great  inequality  of  their  constituent  members, 
one  order,  or  house,  or  individual  being  pre- 
ponderant above  the  rest,  and  engrossing  the 
nascent  political  power,  whether  the  rest  will 
have  it  so  or  not.  This  leads  Suarez  himself 
to  admit  that  in  certain  cases  "  the  royal  power 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority      ill 

and  the  perfect  community  may  have  sprung 
into  existence  together"  {Dcf.  Fid.,  III.  ii.  19). 
In  such  cases  civil  authority  never  rested  with 
the  whole  people ;  and,  instead  of  the  people 
making  the  king,  the  king  made  the  people, 
much  as  the  queen  bee  makes  the  swarm. 

§  64.  It  may  be  said  for  Suarez  that  such 
portion  of  the  population  as  falls  below  the 
level  marked  as  laoi  /cat  6{jlolol  is  really  no 
organic  portion  of  the  State  at  all.  Aristotle 
{Politics,  III.  1278*2;  IV.  1326  a)  distinguishes 
between  those  who  are  citizens  and  portions 
of  the  State,  and  those,  avev  oyv  ov  yiverai  ttoXls, 
whose  presence  is  indispensable,  but  who  yet 
are  not  citizens  and  not  members  of  the  civil 
community.  The  Saxons  were  put  outside  the 
political  organism  by  their  Norman  conquerors. 
Wamba  the  swineherd  had  no  place  or  func- 
tion there ;  and  politically  the  Saxon  master 
went  for  little  more  than  the  Saxon  ceorl. 
Many  empires  known  to  history  have  included 
large  subject  populations  that  were  no  organic 
portions  of  the  empire  within  which  they  were 
imbedded  and  encrusted  and  preserved.  This 
consideration  yields  a  narrower  extension  of 
the  term  'the  people.'  The  Suarezian  concept 
of  the  primitive  equality  of  the  earliest  con- 
stituents of  the  State  becomes  more  applicable 
to   the   people    thus    viewed.     On    the    whole, 


112  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

judiciously  explained  and  not  driven  home  too 
rigidly,  the  Suarezian  theory  of  the  origin  of 
civil  authority  appears  to  be  as  accurate  as  any 
theory  can  be  accurate  under  the  vast  variety 
of  circumstances  that  have  affected  that  origin 
in  history.  Read  by  the  light  of  history,  it  is 
an  aristocratic  rather  than  a  democratic  theory. 
Whether  we  consider  the  patriarchal  society  of 
early  times,  or  the  military  constitutions  which 
were  erected  upon  the  ruins  of  the  Roman 
Empire,  '  the  people  '  with  whom  any  bestowal 
of  authority  could  rest  were  a  select  few.  Not 
all  hangers-on  of  a  tribe  were  tribesmen.  Not 
all  residents  in  a  city  were  citizens.  When 
a  band  of  warriors,  led  by  the  leader  of  their 
choice,1  conquered  a  land  and  possessed  it,  they 
disfranchised  the  ancient  inhabitants.  They 
raised    the    man    of    their    choice    upon    their 


1  The  comitatits  of  Caesar  (De  Bello  Gallico,  III,  22)  and  Taci- 
tus (Germania,  XIII.,  XIV)  ;  see  Bishop  Stubbs's  Constitutional 
History  of  England,  pp.  24,  25.  There  was  much  Visigothic 
blood  in  Spain ;  and  I  believe  Suarez  to  have  been  not  uninflu- 
enced by  this  tradition  of  the  comitatus,  which  certainly  took 
great  hold  of  St.  Ignatius  Loyola  and  of  the  Society  which  he 
founded.  Cf.  Mr.  Jenks,  History  of  Politics  (pp.  71-74)  :  "The 
origin  of  the  State  or  political  society  is  to  be  found  in  the  devel- 
opment of  the  art  of  warfare.  ...  A  State  is  founded  when  one 
of  these  host-leaders,  with  his  band  of  warriors,  gets  permanent 
control  of  a  definite  territory  of  considerable  size.1'  This,  I 
think,  may  be  called  the  Suarezian  theory  recast,  in  view  of  the 
history  of  Europe  a.d.  500-1500. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     1 1  -> 


.■> 


shields :  he  led  them  to  victory,  and  they  made 
him  king.  The  former  proprietors  of  the  soil 
had  no  more  voice  in  the  election  of  the  mon- 
arch than  they  had  in  the  revolution  which 
overthrew  their  patriarchal  polity,  and  set  up 
in  its  stead  the  new  militarism.  The  king,  the 
electus,  as  he  is  called  in  the  Latin  coronation 
services,  —  and  indeed  he  owed  his  position  to 
the  choice  of  his  people,  that  is,  of  his  warriors, 
—  gradually  found  means  to  render  the  crown 
hereditary  in  his  family.1  Thus  hereditary 
right,  and  even  '  divine  right,'  sprang  up  in  the 
course  of  generations.  When  Suarez  wrote, 
the  doctrine  of  divine  right  flourished  exceed- 
ingly, in  England,  in  Spain,  and  in  France. 
The  writings  of  the  great  Jesuit  theologian  re- 
called monarchs  to  the  rock  whence  they  were 
hewn,  and  to  the  hole  of  the  pit  from  which  they 
were  dug  out  (Isa.  li.):  it  told  them  that  they 
were  of  the  people,  of  the  fighting-men  whom 
their  ancestors  once  led,  and  that  this  people 
had  originally  placed  the  orb  and  sceptre  in 
their  hands :  royalty  and  the  insignia  and  pre- 
rogatives of  royalty  were  not,  like  Numa's 
ancilia,  sent  down  straight  from  heaven.  Civil 
authority  and  royal  prerogative  are  not  one  in 

1  Tacitus's  remark  (Germam'a,  VII),  reges  ex  nobilitate,  duces 
ex  virtute  summit,  shows  the  patriarchal  hereditary  principle  and 
the  military  elective  principle  working  side  by  side. 


114  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

essence :  monarchy  and  government  are  not 
identical.  The  State  must  be,  the  king  may- 
be. The  polity  may  be  this  or  that,  but  there 
must  be  a  polity,  though  there  need  not  be  a 
monarch. 

§  65.  I  pass  to  some  consideration  of  T.  H. 
Green's  Principles  of  Political  Obligation, 
and  Mr.  Bosanquet's  Philosophical  Theory  of 
the  State}  And  first  I  note  with  pleasure  in 
these  works  what  I  take  to  be  a  sounder  view 
of  freedom  than  obtained  thirty  years  ago,  when 
Mill,  On  Liberty,  was  in  vogue.  "  The  good  will 
is  free,  not  the  bad  will,"  says  Green  (P.  P.  O., 
ed.  1895,  p.  15).  This  does  not  mean  that  the 
evil  will  does  not  choose  for  itself  and  incur 
responsibility  :  it  means  that  the  evil  choice 
makes  for  the  subversion  of  the  '  true  self '  of 
the  chooser,  a  subversion  which  none  would  go 
about,  had  he  not  surrendered  himself  to  some 
delusion :  but  delusion,  even  culpable  and  vol- 
untary, makes  against  freedom,  so  far  as  free- 
dom is  a  privilege  and  a  thing  to  value.  The 
freedom  not  for  good  —  overestimated  by  Mill 
and  the  school  of  Locke  —  is  happily  described 
by  Mr.  Bosanquet  as  "  a  maximum  of  empty 
space,  to  be  preserved  against  all  trespassers, 
round  every  unit  of  the  social  whole  "  (P.  T.  S.y 
p.    124);  and   again,    as    "the    empty    hexagon 

1  I  refer  to  them  as  P.  P.  O.  and  P.  T.  S.  respectively. 


O right  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     115 

round  each  individual'  (id.,  p.  196);  and 
again,  "  an  arrangement  by  which,  at  the  sacri- 
fice of  some  of  its  activities,  it  (the  individual) 
is  enabled  to  disport  itself  in  vacuo  with  the 
remainder"  (id.,  p.  125).  It  is  not  the  aim  of 
the  State  to  secure  to  each  of  its  citizens  as 
much  of  the  liberty  of  a  Robinson  Crusoe  as  is 
compatible  with  their  living  together  and  hav- 
ing dealings  with  one  another.  This,  on  the 
plain  ground  that  Robinson  Crusoe  represents 
a  man  under  misfortune,  no  less  under  misfor- 
tune than  a  patient  in  a  hospital.  He  is  a  type 
of  anything  but  the  normal  and  natural  man. 
Normally  and  naturally,  man  is  a  member  of 
the  organism  called  the  State.1  Man  out  of 
society  is  in  a  manner  a  dead  man,  only  called 
'  man  '  by  courtesy.'2  The  true  desirable  liberty 
of  the  individual,  then,  is  that  which  befits  him 
as  a  healthy  member  of  the  State,  and  enables 
him  heartily,  earnestly,  and  with  intelligent 
interest  to  co-operate  towards  the  common 
good;  not  that  which  allows  him  to  play  his 
pranks   and    approximate    to   the   style   of   the 

1  Or  at  least  dependent  on  the  State,  there  being,  as  I 
have  just  said,  following  Aristotle,  '  inorganic  elements '  in  a 
State. 

2  "When  the  man  as  a  whole  is  undone  by  death,  neither  foot 
nor  hand  will  remain  otherwise  than  nominally :  we  speak  of  the 
hand  of  a  corpse  as  we  might  of  the  hand  of  a  marble  statue  " 
(Aristotle,  Politics,  I.  1253  a). 


1 1 6  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

"  monarch  of  all  I  survey." 1  The  ideal  citizen 
is  not  an  absolute  sovereign  in  reduced  circum- 
stances, or  a  despot  with  his  claws  cut.  The 
ideal  citizen  is  one  who  has  found  his  proper 
place  in  an  organic  body,  and  therein  bends  his 
powers  to  the  common  good.  His  rights  are 
the  endowments  which  fit  him  for  his  social 
position,  deprived  of  which,  not  only  he  would 
be  worse  off,  but  the  State  would  be  worse  off 
too  by  the  loss  of  his  public  services.  It  follows 
that  many  rich  men  are  not  ideal  citizens.  It 
does  not,  however,  follow  that  they  should  be 
deprived  of  their  wealth :  for  the  public  good 
requires  this  indulgence,  that  in  every  class, 
high  and  low,  some  unfit  members  be  tolerated. 
A  man  should  not  be  forced  by  the  State  to 
do  absolutely  all  that  he  ought  to  do.  Moral 
duties,  as  such,  cannot  be  enforced  by  law, 
because  they  involve  dispositions.  Legal  com- 
pulsion, carried  too  far,  induces  atrophy  of 
moral  dispositions.  Thus  excessive  poor-rates 
dry  up  the  springs  of  private  charity.  Hence 
Green  lays  down  this  rule  of  limitation  to  State 
interference  :  "  Those  acts  only  should  be  mat- 
ter of  legal  injunction,  or  prohibition,  of  which 
the  performance,  or  omission,  irrespectively  of 
the  motive  from  which  it  proceeds,  is  so  neces- 

1  "  In  truth,  there  is  no  such  right  to  do  as  one  likes  irrespective 
of  society"  (Green,  P.  P.  O.,  pp.  109,  no). 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     117 

sary  to  the  existence  of  a  society,  .  .  .  that  it  is 
better  for  them  to  be  done,  or  omitted,  from 
that  unworthy  motive  which  consists  in  fear  of 
legal  consequences,  than  not  to  be  done  at  all ' 
(P.  P.  0.y  pp.  38,  39).  This  maxim  has  to  be 
qualified  by  the  observation  that  a  legal  sanc- 
tion sometimes  develops  and  directs,  strengthens 
and  guides,  the  public  conscience.  Law  is  not 
always  operative  in  the  way  of  slavish  fear. 
Coercion  does  not  always  supplant  worthier 
motives.  It  does  or  it  does  not,  according  to 
the  manner  of  its  application  and  the  persons 
to  whom  it  is  applied.  Legal  pressure  may 
help  the  growth  of  a  habit  of  spontaneous  good- 
ness, provided  such  goodness  be  recommended 
at  the  same  time  by  other  considerations  proper 
to  itself.  Still,  there  is  a  danger,  as  Green 
points  out,  of  the  legally  must  suffocating  the 
morally  ought,  a  danger  to  be  considered  by 
Collectivists,  who  would  abolish  the  upper 
class  that  now  is,  and  the  social  function  of  the 
upper  class,  supplanting  all  that  by  a  legally 
compelling  and  legally  compelled  bureaucracy.1 
§  66.  In  days  when  so  many  earnest-minded 
men  differ  entirely  as  to  the  scope  and  aim  of 
human  existence,  it  is  a  boon  if  we  can  discern 

1  The  endeavour  of  every  one  in  a  socialist  commonwealth 
would  be  to  get  into  the  bureaucracy,  as  now  men  strive  to  be 
rich.     The  bureaucrats  would  be  the  upper  classes. 


1 1 8  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

any  break  in  the  clouds  of  dissension  and 
doubt,  any  omen  of  a  reconciliation  to  be 
worked  out  perhaps  in  the  twentieth  century. 
It  is  an  omen  of  especial  interest,  when  the 
advance-guard  of  modern  thought,  of  which  we 
may  consider  Thomas  Hill  Green  a  standard- 
bearer,  proclaims  important  conclusions  in 
political  philosophy  identical  with  some  of 
those  advocated  by  that  time-honoured  teacher 
of  mankind,  the  Catholic  and  Roman  Church. 
I  refer  particularly  to  the  Encyclical  Letter  of 
Leo  XIII.  on  Human  Liberty,  issued  June  20, 
1888.  Leo  XIII.  there  distinguishes  "physical 
freedom,"  or  what  Green  (P.  P.  O.,  p.  9)  calls 
"  self-determination  simply,"  from  "  moral  free- 
dom," which  Green  calls  "self-determination 
according  to  the  true  idea  of  self,"  upon  which 
he  adds,  "  the  good  will  is  free,  not  the  bad," 
(id.,  pp.  9,  15).  The  Pope  observes  that,  as 
sickness  is  a  sign  of  something  good,  namely 
of  life,  so  the  fixing  of  the  will  upon  unworthy 
objects  is  a  sign  of  free  will,  a  good  thing  in 
itself.  But  perfect  life  excludes  sickness,  and 
a  perfect  free  will  is  inconsistent  with  unworthy 
choice.1     Hereupon  His  Holiness  quotes  some 

1  Green's  words  (P.  P.  O.,  p.  14),  "  Given  the  man  and  his 
object  as  he  and  it  at  any  time  are,  there  is  no  possibility  of  the 
will  being  determined  except  in  one  way,'1  are  hard  to  understand 
otherwise  than  as  a  repudiation  of  all  that  Catholic  divines  under- 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     119 

apposite  words  of  St.  Thomas :  "  Everything  is 
properly  that  which  its  nature  fits  it  to  be.1 
When,  then,  a  thing  is  moved  by  some  extrinsic 
and  foreign  cause,  it  does  not  work  according 
to  itself,  or  organically,  but  under  the  impression 
of  another:  such  working  argues  a  servile  ne- 
cessity. But  man  according  to  his  nature  is 
rational.  When,  then,  he  moves  according  to 
reason,  he  moves  of  his  own  proper  motion 
and  works  according  to  himself,  which  argues 
liberty.  But  when  he  does  wrong,  he  swerves 
from  reason  in  his  work ;  and  then  he  may  be 
said  to  be  moved  by  another,  and  to  be  held 
within  bounds  prescribed  by  a  foreign  power; 
and  therefore  he  that  doeth  sin,  is  the  servant  of 
sin? 2  We  have  it,  then,  that  physical  freedom 
is  the  freedom  which  a  man  has  by  the  fact  of 
his  being  a  man  at  all ;  moral  freedom  is  the 
freedom  that  a  man  attains  to  by  becoming 
the  man  that  he  ought  to  be. 

stood  by  'free  will.'  But  the  matter  belongs  to  psychology,  not 
to  political  science. 

1  Cf.  the  meaning  of  tcAos  and  tcAcios,  and  of  <£vtns  as  being 
the  process  by  which  a  thing  grows  to  its  tc'Ao?. 

2  Umujiquodqae  est  illud  quod  convenit  ei  secundum  naturam. 
Quando  ergo  movetur  ab  aliquo  extraneo,  non  operatur  secundum 
se,  sed  ab  impressione  alterius,  quod  est  servile.  Homo  autem 
secundum  suam  naturam  est  rationalis.  Quando  ergo  movetur 
secundum  rationem,  proprio  motu  movetur,  et  secundum  se  opera- 
tur, quod  est  libertatis:  quando  vero  peccat,  operatur  prater 
rationem,  et  tunc  movetur  quasi  ab  alio,  retentus  ter minis  alienis  : 
et  ideo  qui facit  peccatum,  servus  est  peccati  (Joan.,  VIII.  34). 


120  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

§  67.  Man's  "working  according  to  himself" 
would  be  called  by  Green  and  Mr.  Bosanquet 
his  realising  his  "  real  self."  That  he  cannot 
do  in  isolation.  True  individuality,  Mr.  Bo- 
sanquet well  says,  is  not  isolation.  The  indi- 
vidual finds  his  '  real  self '  only  as  the  member 
of  a  community,  governed  by  law,  —  which  law 
is  the  expression  of  the  '  real  will,'  or  right  will, 
of  that  community,  in  view  of  the  good  of  the 
organic  whole,  and  of  the  individual  as  a  con- 
stituent of  that  whole.  The  average  individual 
in  his  ordinary  moods  is  not  to  be  mistaken 
for  his  '  real  self.'  "  In  order  to  become  our- 
selves, we  must  be  always  becoming  something 
which  we  are  not "  (P.  T.  S.,  pp.  125-126).  We 
must  put  down  "  the  rebellion  of  our  casual 
private  selves  "  (id.,  p.  127) ;  the  "  centre  of  grav- 
ity of  self "  must  be  "  thrown  outside "  (id.,  p. 
155),  not  outside  however  of  the  true  self,  for 
that  would  be  to  suffer  annexation  and  be  led 
into  slavery.  Rousseau,  if  he  returned  to  this 
world,  would  marvel  to  see  himself  '  translated ' 1 
under  the  hands  of  Mr.  Bosanquet  (P.  T.  S.,  pp. 
144  ff.).  But  I  find  no  evidence  that  Rousseau's 
eyes  were  ever  lifted  up  to  heights  above  the 
'  casual  private  self '  and  a  numerical  majority 
of  such  hap-hazard  beings. 

1  "  Bless  thee,  Bottom,  bless  thee,  thou  art  translated! "  (Mid- 
summer Nighfs  Dream,  III.  i.) 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     121 

§  68.  A  reperusal,  however,  of  the  Contrat 
Social  has  convinced  me  that  I  have  scarcely 
done  justice  to  Rousseau  hitherto.  Jean  Jacques, 
optimist  and  romanticist,  sighed  after  an  ideal 
State,  a  typically  good  people,  or,  as  he  said, 
uu  peuple  de  dieux,  amongst  whom  things  could 
not  but  go  well  ex  hypothesi.  He  is  optimistic 
and  pragmatical  by  turns.  Some  things  he  lays 
down  in  disregard  of  the  wickedness  and  folly 
of  mankind :  at  other  times  he  stands  in  rueful 
contemplation  of  facts  as  they  are.  The  '  gen- 
eral will,'  according  to  him,  is  the  constant  will 
of  all  the  members  of  the  State,  together  willing 
their  common  interest,  willing  it  too  without 
any  mistake  of  the  quarter  in  which  that 
interest  really  lies.  That  cannot  be  called 
the  general  will,  which  is  not  guided  by  an 
enlightened  judgment.  Le peuple  (ideally  con- 
sidered) veut  toujours  le  bien,  mais  de  lui- 
meme  (actually  considered)  il  ne  voit  pas 
toujours.  La  volonte  generale  est  toujours 
droite  (when  it  is  not  right,  it  is  not  the  general 
will),  mais  le  jugement  qui  la  guide  nest  pas 
toujours  eclaire.  When  a  law  is  proposed,  the 
real  question  at  issue  is  whether  the  law  be 
in  conformity  or  not  with  the  general  will 
(here  assumed  to  be  fixed  upon  the  general 
interest).  Conformity  with  the  general  will 
is  the  precise  aim  of  each  citizen  in  voting  for 


122  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

or  against  the  law.  If  he  finds  himself  in  a 
minority,  he  discovers  that  he  has  been  voting 
unconsciously  against  himself,  in  voting  against 
that  general  will  in  which  his  own  will  is 
bound  up.  He  rejoices  to  have  his  mistake 
rectified,  and  the  general  will  revealed  and 
made  law  by  the  voice  of  the  (sapient)  major- 
ity. All  this  supposes  that  the  citizens  as  a 
body  do  will  the  common  good,  and  that  the 
majority  at  least  are  wise  enough  to  discern  it. 
But  in  a  corrupt  State  the  general  will  is 
no  longer  the  will  of  all.  The  will  of  all  there 
is  an  aggregate  of  individual  wills,  severally 
seeking  their  private  interests  in  the  first  place, 
and  in  the  second  place  seeking  the  public 
good  so  far  as  it  does  not  run  counter  to 
those  private  interests.  These  private  striv- 
ings in  opposite  directions  may  neutralise  one 
another :  there  remains  as  a  resultant  the  resid- 
uary will  of  the  general  good,  but  how  feeble 
that  will  be !  Party  combinations  may  secure 
a  majority  in  the  interest  of  party.  The  vote 
of  such  a  majority  is  no  longer  the  general 
will,  but  a  private  resolution :  Vavis  qui 
Vemporte  nest  quun  avis  particulier.  Thus 
the  general  will  —  ideally  speaking,  "  constant, 
indestructible,  always  right  "  —  is  unrecognis- 
able in  practice.  A  majority  vote  is  no  indica- 
tion of  it.     The  general  will  may  be  the  will  of 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority      123 

the  wise  and  patriotic  few,  against  the  factious 
and  foolish  multitude.  The  general  will  is,  in 
fact,  the  will  of  the  common  good,  whosoever's 
will  that  may  be.  But  what  partisan  does  not 
profess  to  be  animated  by  the  most  transcen- 
dent wisdom  to  discern,  and  the  purest  desire 
to  compass,  the  common  good  ?  There  are 
"six  Richmonds  in  the  field,"  half  a  dozen 
general  wills.  A  sovereignty  so  difficult  to 
recognise  cannot  be  admitted  by  the  philoso- 
pher as  promising  a  practical  polity.  Clear 
and  incisive  as  is  Rousseau's  language  at  first 
reading,  he  is  found  upon  closer  study  to  be 
involved  in  that  swamp  of  perplexity  into 
which  Mr.  Bosanquet  so  manfully  plunges  to 
his  rescue.  See  Contrat  Social,  1.  2,  chs.  3,  6 : 
1.  3,  ch.  4:  1.  4,  chs.  1,  2. 

§  69.  The  general  will,  nevertheless,  is  a  con- 
sideration of  supreme  importance  to  the  states- 
man. It  is  something  of  a  manufactured  article ; 
and  he  may  have,  nay,  should  have,  some  hand 
in  the  manufacture.  The  general  will  is  dis- 
tinct from  the  general  advantage.  The  general 
will  is  the  will  of  the  majority  of  persons  in 
the  State,  most  influential  and  best  capable 
of  judging:  it  is  the  will  of  this  enlightened 
majority  bent  upon  what  they  take  to  be  for 
the  general  advantage.  Such  a  general  will 
exists  in  various  degrees  of   strength,  and   in 


124  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

some  countries  scarcely  at  all.  The  objective 
general  advantage  is  not  a  thing  to  insist  upon 
imperiously  when  the  general  will  runs  counter 
to  it.  A  lesser  good  that  the  people  will  take 
to  kindly  is  a  better  good  for  them  than  a 
superior  advantage  forced  down  their  throats. 
Nevertheless  wrong-headed  and  unconscionable 
people  must  at  times  be  saved  by  force.1 

§  70.    These  casual  creatures  Mr.  Bosanquet 
dismisses,  and  sets  up  to  reign  in  their  stead 
what    he  calls  the   "  Real    Will,"    or  what   an 
ordinary    person    would    call    the    'ideal    will,' 
or  perhaps  the  '  interpretative  will '  (cf.    Plato, 
Republic,  I.  340),  meaning  what  would  be  the 
will   of    the    individual    and    of   the    multitude 
under  ideal   conditions   of    wisdom   and  good- 
ness.     All  which    exposition    may  be    accord- 
ins  to   the   '  real   mind '   of    Rousseau :    but,   I 
fear,    much    transcends    the    actual    mind    of 
Jean    Jacques,  apparent    in    his    writings,    and 
read    there  by  his  admirers,  the    men    of   the 
French  Revolution.    Like  Shelley,  Jean  Jacques 
was  a  very  '  casual '  mortal  indeed,  the  sport  of 
whims  and  fancies  and  varying  moods.     He  was 
a  man  of  genius  for  all  that,  and,  like  other 
geniuses,  suggests  much   that  his  own  under- 
standing never  clearly  discerned. 

§  71.    It    may    be    asked,    why    this    phrase, 

1  See  Cromwell's  view  quoted  on  p.  96. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     125 

1  real  will  '  ?  The  answer  I  take  to  be  as  follows. 
The  great  reality  in  the  view  of  the  sticklers 
for  '  real  will '  is  one  universal  consciousness, 
whereof  actual  individual  minds  are  feeble 
representations.  The  universal  conscious- 
ness discerns  and  desires  whatever  is  good  for 
the  whole,  and  for  each  individual  as  part  of 
the  whole.  No  will  ever  desires  any  private 
good  inconsistent  with  the  good  of  the  whole, 
except  under  some  ignorance  or  misunderstand- 
ing.1 Thus  the  appeal  lies  from  Philip  drunk  to 
Philip  sober.  From  drunkenness  to  sobriety  is 
an  advance  in  reality.  From  the  particular  to 
the  universal  consciousness  is  also,  in  this  view, 
an  advance  in  reality.  So  too  is  the  transition 
from  the  private  to  the  general  will.  The  '  gen- 
eral will '  is  the  more  real  of  the  two.  Only,- 
be  it  ever  remembered,  this  general  will  is  not 
necessarily  the  will  of  the  majority.  It  is  the 
rational  will,  and  that  may  be  the  will  of  a  small 
minority.  Mr.  Bosanquet  and  Green  protest 
against  the  method  of  simple  enumeration  of 
heads  for  purposes  of  popular  suffrage.  Thus 
Green  (P.  P.  O.,  pp.  109,  1 10),  after  saying  that 
law  is  the  expression  of  a  general  will,  contin- 

1  An  assertion  strongly  backed  by  Plato,  still  very  debatable, 
and  involving  a  point  of  great  subtlety  in  the  theory  of  the  free- 
dom of  the  will.  It  is  discussed  by  St.  Thomas  Aquinas,  Contra 
Gentiles,  III.  ch.  10. 


126  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

ues  :  "  If  the  common  interest  requires  it,  .  .  . 
neither  can  its  enactment  by  popular  vote 
enhance,  nor  the  absence  of  such  vote  diminish, 
its  right  to  be  obeyed."  '  Mr.  Bosanquet  would 
even  go  the  length  of  taking  for  his  social  unit, 
not  the  actual  individual,  but  "  appercipient 
svstems,"  or  correlations  of  thought  which  one 
man  shares  with  another."  Each  man  has  his 
part  in  many  such  systems.  Thus  the  head  of  a 
college,  who  had  shares  in  a  gold  mine,  and  was 
the  father  of  a  family,  would  embody  portions  of 
at  least  three  appercipient  systems.  The  share 
in  the  franchise  allotted  to  such  a  many-sided 
personage  should  be  as  three  to  one,  compared 
with  the  share  of  a  poor  solitary  student.^ 

§  72.    Ancient    dualism    and    modern    mon- 

1  What  authority  then  has  the  popular  vote? 

-  This  is  a  curious  reversion  to  a  primitive  position.  "  In  the 
infancy  of  society  .  .  .  men  were  regarded  .  .  .  not  as  indi- 
viduals, but  always  as  members  of  a  particular  group :  .  .  .  nor 
was  he  ever  regarded  as  himself,  as  a  distinct  individual  "  ( Maine, 
LaiL'.  p.  183). 

8  In  his  short  paper,  On  the  Reality  of  the  General  Will 
(p.  331).  Mr.  Bosanquet  writes:  "We  may  identify  the  general 
will  of  any  community  with  the  whole  working  system  of  domi- 
nant ideas."  Then  the  individual  into  whose  composition  a 
larger  number  of  dominant  ideas  enter  has  by  right  a  prepon- 
derant share  of  political  power.  More  thought,  more  authority. 
There  remains  a  difficulty  as  to  how  far  the  dominant  ideas  of 
any  given  epoch  are  likely  to  be  rational  ideas.  Elsewhere 
(/'.  T.  Si)  Mr.  Bosanquet  has  told  us:  "The  general  will  must 
be  the  rational  will,  even  though  people  are  not  aware  of  it.1' 


Origin  and  Ex  ten  I  of  Civil  Authority      127 

ism,  so  far  as  they  recognise  a  Divine  Mind, 
both  agree  in  constituting  that  mind  the  stand- 
ard of  all  sound  thought  and  wise  volition,  so 
that  not  the  actual  wills  of  erratic  individuals, 
however  strong  a  majority  they  make,  but  the 
will  which  conforms  to  the  standard  mind,  so 
far  as  such  conformity  is  ascertainable  and 
effective,  should  rule  the  State.  Without  ac- 
cepting Mr.  Bosanquet's  psychology,  without 
being  prepared  to  go  all  lengths  with  Hegel, 
I  accept  this  somewhat  conservative  conclusion, 
that  the  general  will  which  ought  to  be  su- 
preme is  quod  major  et  sanior  pars  communita- 
tis  vult,  as  the  canonists  say,  —  the  rule  in  fact  of 
intelligence,  not  of  numbers.  So  also  Leo  XIII. 
lays  down  in  his  Encyclical  of  April  20,  1884.1 

1  Pares  inter  se  homines  esse  universos  nemo  dubitat.  si  genus 
et  natura  communis,  si  finis  ultimus  unicuique  ad  assequendum 
propositus,  si  ea  quce  inde  sponte  fluunt  jura  et  officia  spectentur. 
At  vero  quia  ingenia  omnium  paria  esse  non  possunt,  et  alius  ab 
alio  distat  vel  animivel  corporis  viribus,plurimaeque  sunt  morum, 
voluntatis,  naturarum  dissimilitudines,  idcirco  nihil  est  tarn  re- 
pugnans  rationi  quam  una  velle  coniprehensione  omnia  cotnplecti, 
et  Mam  omnibus  partibus  expletam  cequabilitatem  ad  vita  civilis 
instituta  traducere.  Quemadmodum  perfectus  corporis  habitus 
ex  diversorum  exist  it  juncture/,  et  compositione  membro/'um,  qua 
forma  usuque  differunt,  compacta  tamen  et  suis  distributa  locis 
complexionem  efjiciunt  pulcram  specie,  fir  mam  viribus,  utilitate 
necessarian! :  it.i  in  republica  hominum  quasi  partium  infinita 
propemodum  est  dissimilitudo :  qui  si  habeantur  pares  arbitri- 
umque  singuli  suum  sequantur,  species  erit  civitatis  nulla  deterior : 
si  vero  dignitatis,  studiorum,  artium  distinctis  gradibus,  apte  ad 


1 28  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

§  73.  I  am  less  satisfied  with  Mr.  Bosanquet's 
attempt  to  revivify  Rousseau's  celebrated 
phrase,  "  Each  individual,  uniting  himself  to  all, 
shall  obey  none  but  himself "  {Contrat  Social, 
I.  6).  Mr.  Bosanquet  writes  (P.  T.  S.,  p.  144): 
"  The  claim  to  obey  only  yourself  is  a  claim 
essential  to  humanity ;  and  the  further  signifi- 
cance rests  upon  what  you  mean  by  '  yourself.' ' 
Let  us  pursue  the  meaning  of  'yourself  under 
Mr.  Bosanquet's  guidance.  From  the  outset  it 
is  clear  that  he  means,  not  what  the  plain  man 
means  by  the  term,  but  something  much  more 
transcendental.  He  tells  us  (P.  T.  S.,  pp.  149, 
150):  "The  imperative  claim  of  a  will  that 
wills  itself  is  our  own  innermost  nature,  and  we 
cannot  throw  it  off.  This  is  the  ultimate  root 
of  political  obligation.  ...  It  is  such  a  real 
or  rational  self  that  writers  after  Rousseau  have 
identified  with  the  State."  '  Yourself '  then 
means  '  your  better  self,'  in  fact,  '  your  reason  ' : 
you  obey  your  own  reason  in  obeying  the  State. 
So  far  we  are  agreed  :  it  is  an  elementary  truth, 
though  not  much  to  the  mind  of  Rousseau, 
who  makes  of  civil  society  an  arbitrary  conven- 
tion, not  dictated  by  reason.  Whether  you  obey 
your  own  reason  only  in  obeying  the  State,  is  a 
much  larger  question,  involving,  what  is  not  to 

commune  bonnm  conspirent,  bene  constitutes  civitatis  imaginem 
referent  cotigruentemque  naturce. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority      129 

be  expected  here,  an  entire  examination  of  the 
Kantian  '  autonomy  of  reason.'  The  plain  man 
will  ask:  Do  I  not  also  obey  God  ?  and  what 
is  the  relation  of  my  reason  to  God  ?  Such 
questions  must  stand  over.  But  I  am  at  a  loss 
to  understand  how  my  "  real  or  rational  self  "  is 
"  identified  with  the  State,"  as  Mr.  Bosanquet 
has  already  told  me ;  and  again  he  speaks 
(P.  T.  S.,  p.  154)  of  "the  identification  of  the 
State  with  the  real  will  of  the  individual  in 
which  he  wills  his  nature  as  a  rational  being ; 
in  which  identification  we  find  the  only  true 
account  of  political  obligation."  This  is  a 
great  saying,  and  very  much  to  our  purpose,  if 
it  be  true.  But  it  is  also  a  hard  saying.  Are 
'  the  State '  and  '  the  real  or  rational  will  of 
the  individual '  convertible  terms  ?  Is  it  then 
impossible  for  the  real  or  rational  will  of  the 
individual  to  disapprove  of  the  policy  of  the 
State  ?  I  should  say,  moreover,  that  the  real 
or  rational  will  of  the  individual  extends  to 
many  things  in  heaven  and  on  earth  which  are 
not  comprised  in  the  State.  The  State  is  of 
the  temporal  order,  but  man  has  eternal  inter- 
ests. Even  in  this  world  man  has  domestic 
interests  in  the  bosom  of  his  own  family,  and 
intellectual  interests  within  the  arcanum  of 
his  own  thoughts :  to  call  these  '  political  in- 
terests '    would  be,  not  an   enlargement,  but  a 

K 


130  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

distortion  of  view.1  There  is  more  than  the 
citizen  in  the  individual  man.  Man,  adequately 
considered,  cannot  be  regarded  as  standing  to 
the  State  in  the  mere  relation  of  a  part  to  the 
whole.2 

§  74.  Further,  I  am  at  a  loss  to  understand 
what  State  Mr.  Bosanquet  has  in  mind.  He 
can  never  have  meant  to  identify  any  and 
every  State  known  to  history  with  the  real  and 
better  self  of  the  individuals  composing  it, — 
France,  for  instance,  under  Louis  XV.,  or 
Austria  under  Joseph  II.  He  must  distinguish 
'  the  State  '  from  any  actual  bad  government 
that  may  have  gained  the  upper  hand.  But 
remove  the  government,  and  where  is  the 
State  ?  There  is  no  longer  any  tangible  body 
left   to    philosophise    upon.      Even    a    whole 

1  Mr.  Bosanquet,  I  feel  sure,  would  not  call  them  '  political 
interests.' 

2  "  Man  is  not  subservient  to  the  civil  community  to  the  extent 
of  his  whole  self,  all  that  he  is  and  all  that  he  has,1'  —  homo  non 
refertur  ad  communitatem  politicam  secundum  se  totum  et  secun- 
dum omnia  sua  (St.  Thomas,  Summa,  I— II.  q.  21,  art.  4,  ad  3). 
This  I  take  to  be  a  very  pregnant  saying.  It  cannot  be  denied 
that  the  best  work  of  the  artist,  of  the  mathematician,  of  the  phi- 
losopher,—  not  to  say  of  the  saint,  —  is  done  without  any  con- 
scious reference  to  civil  society  and  away  from  civil  control. 
Even  allowing,  with  the  first  French  Revolution,  that  the  two 
terms,  'man'  and  'citizen,'  have  the  same  extension,  or  (as  Mill 
says)  denotation,  yet  we  must  add  that  greater  is  the  intension, 
or  connotation,  of  'man'  than  of  'citizen.'  Rousseau  (Coutrat 
Social,  1.  2,  ch.  4)  comes  very  near  to  admitting  this. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority      131 

people  may  have  become  corrupt,  as  probably 
the  people  of  Constantinople  were  corrupted 
before  their  city  finally  succumbed  to  the  Mos- 
lem. How  shall  any  one  find  his  real  will,  his 
better  self,  in  the  whims  and  caprices  of  a 
corrupt  multitude  !  Phocion  evidently  saw  no 
reflection  of  his  better  self  in  the  mind  of  the 
Ecclesia  at  Athens.  We  have  as  much  reason 
to  be  on  our  guard  against  the  'casual  State,' 
and  against  '  the  average  people  in  its  ordinary 
moods,'  as  against  "  our  casual  private  selves," 
and  against  "  the  average  individual  in  his 
ordinary  moods,"  who,  Mr.  Bosanquet  warns  us 
(P.  T.  S.,  pp.  125,  127),  "is  not  to  be  taken  as 
the  real  self."  We  are  referred  for  "  the  real 
will  of  the  individual,"  or  "  the  real  self,"  to 
"the  State,"  —  evidently  ' the  real  State,'  which 
will  be  found  non  in  fcece  Romuli,  sed  in 
repiiblica  Platonis,  and  is,  I  fear,  as  visionary  a 
thing  as  the  Republic  of  Plato. 

§  75.  Plato's  words  at  the  end  of  the  ninth 
book  are  apposite :  "  You  mean,  in  the  city 
whose  constitution  we  have  just  drawn  out, 
the  theoretical  city  (777  eV  Xoyois  Kei/xeV^),  for 
surely  I  ween  it  exists  nowhere  on  earth. 
Well,  said  I,  in  heaven  possibly  it  is  exposed 
to  view  as  a  model  for  any  one  who  wishes  to 
see,  and  seeing  to  settle  himself  there " 
(Rep.  IX.  592).     The  '  real  will '  is  simply  the 


132  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

'  rational  will,'  and  the  '  real  State  '  the  '  rational 
State,'  the  ideal  after  which  we  ought  continu- 
ally to  strive,  and  which  we  shall  never  perfectly 
attain.  Meanwhile  it  is  our  duty  to  submit  to 
civil  authority,  imperfect  and  more  or  less 
irrational  as  such  authority  actually  is  on 
earth.  To  wait  for  the  '  real '  or  perfectly 
rational  will,  and  deny  obedience  to  any 
authority  short  of  that,  would  be  to  live  in 
chronic  insurrection.  The  '  real  will '  is  to 
be  promoted,  the  '  real  State '  looked  for  as  a 
kingdom  to  come :  but  the  imperfect  powers 
that  be  claim  our  present  actual  obedience. 
Thus  far,  —  and  practice  hardly  goes  any 
farther,  —  I  trust  I  am  in  agreement  with  Mr. 
Bosanquet,  widely  as  our  theories  differ. 

§  76.  Or  will  any  one  venture  to  affirm  that 
he  obeys  himself,  his  real  and  better  self,  by 
obeying  the  behests  of  the  State  that  he 
lives  in,  whatever  they  be  ?  Such  a  one  will 
rank  with  those  who  are  ready  to  raise  up 
Leviathan,1    to   fall    in    with    the    worship    of 

1  Par at  i  sunt  suscitare  Leviathan  (Job  iii.  8,  Vulgate).  I  do 
not  wish  to  couple  Mr.  Bosanquet's  name  with  Leviathan  and 
Dea  Roma.  The  State  which  he  has  in  view  I  take  to  be  an 
academic  entity,  consisting  of  the  dominant  thought  of  the  age. 
which  ought  to  control  the  doings  of  the  age,  and  in  the  end 
commonly  succeeds  in  controlling  them.  Am  I  wrong  in  my 
further  conjecture  of  Mr.  Bosanquefs  position?  —  that  he  agrees 
with  Auguste  Comte  in  considering  the  dominant  thought  of  each 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     133 

Dea  Roma,  the  apotheosis  of  emperors,  the  can- 
onisation of  the  Vicar  of  Bray,  and  the  uncan- 
onising  of  all  martyrs.  A  clear  point  of  political 
wisdom  it  is,  in  view  of  the  maintenance  of  the 
State,  not  to  exaggerate  civil  authority.  There 
is  a  nemesis  of  reaction  against  all  over- 
strained and  overvaunted  power.  As  we  love 
and  cherish  the  State ;  as  we  recognise  it, 
with  Aristotle,  for  the  highest  and  best  of  all 
human  institutions ;  as  we  hold  the  disruption 
of  the  State,  and  the  local  wreck  of  any  civil 
society,  to  be  a  calamity  worse  than  famine 
and  pestilence ;  as  we  confess  that  the  Church 
presupposes  the  State,1  coexists  with  the  State, 
and  perishes  locally  wherever  civil  anarchy 
ensues,  —  we  must,  in  the  State's  own  interest, 
insist  on  the  essential  limitations  of  civil 
authority.  The  most  obedient  subjects  are 
they  who  do  not  profess  to  be  ready  to  obey 


successive  age  to  be  right  for  that  age ;  or,  in  terms  of  another 
philosophy,  takes  the  educated  public  opinion  of  the  day  to  re- 
present such  expression  as  the  universal  consciousness  so  far  has 
found  for  itself,  though  not  all  that  it  will  find.  I  would  add  this 
remark  in  taking  leave  of  the  general  will.  The  general  will  of 
an  educated  community  is  anctoritas,  not  potestas :  it  becomes 
potestas  only  as  organised  in  definite  constitutional  forms. 

1  A  Christian  cannot  remain  a  savage.  Witness  the  Jesuit 
Reductions  in  Paraguay,  and  the  efforts  of  all  missionaries  to 
convert  and  civilise  together.  Only,  I  observe,  neither  civilisa- 
tion nor  sanctity  either  involves  of  necessity  the  wearing  of 
European  clothes. 


134  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

the  State  in  all  things.  A  firm  No  carries  a 
hearty  Yes.  As  in  extreme  cases  they  will 
obey  God  rather  than  man  (Acts  iv.  19),  so  in 
all  ordinary  circumstances  they  will  be  subject 
for  conscience1  sake  (Rom.  xiii.  5).  They  bear 
much  even  of  hard  ruling,  because  they  dis- 
cern, at  the  back  of  the  State,  a  Power  higher 
than  any  State.  We  must  beware  of  weakening 
those  delicate  springs  of  religion  and  con- 
science upon  which  the  State  is  borne.  Polit- 
ical obligation  is  a  moral  obligation.  Morality 
goes  deeper  than  politics.  And  the  moral  law 
is  something  else  than  the  registered  determina- 
tion of  king  and  people. 

§  77.  Rights  which  the  civil  power  cannot 
ignore  or  set  aside  beget  a  duty  in  that  power 
to  respect  them,  and  every  duty  is  a  limitation. 
The  civil  power  also  has  its  rights.  This  leads 
to  some  consideration  of  the  nature  of  '  a  right.' 
First,  then,  a  right  is  only  possessed  by  one  who 
has  a  rational  will  to  hold  it  against  trespassers. 
Inasmuch  as  they  have  no  rational  will,  dumb 
animals  have  strictly  no  rights,  nor  does  the 
law  of  any  country  recognise  rights  in  them. 
The  will  of  idiots  and  of  infants  is  said  to  be 
'  radically '  rational,  a  sufficient  basis  for  some 
possession  of  rights,  not,  however,  such  full  pos- 
session as  grown  men  of  sane  mind  have.  The 
adage,  volenti  nonfit  injuria,  might  be  expanded 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Aictkority      135 

into  71011  fit  injuria  nisi  nolenti.  Secondly,  as 
rights  are  against  other  persons,  that  is,  against 
other  rational  wills,  it  follows  that  a  man's  rights 
are  dormant  where  he  comes  into  contact  with 
no  other  persons.  No  man  has  rights  against 
himself:  no  man  can  do  himself  a  wrongf,1  or 
complain  of  injustice  suffered  at  his  own  hand. 
The  rights  of  Robinson  Crusoe  slept  on  his 
desert  island  till  he  found  his  man  Friday. 
But,  as  I  have  argued  already,  by  nature  all 
men  either  are  citizens  or  are  in  the  way  of 
becoming  such:  all  men  are  naturally  either 
actual  or  potential  citizens.  In  the  phraseology 
of  the  Schoolmen,  if  we  consider  a  man's  ter- 
minus a  quo,  he  has  the  germ  of  civil  life  in 
him  ;  if  wTe  consider  him  arrived  at  his  terminus 
ad  quern,  he  lives  a  full  and  perfect  citizen.'2 
The  <£uVi<?,  or  process  of  his  natural  develop- 
ment, would  be  arrested,  and  violence  would  be 
done  to  him,  if  he  were  stopped  in  his  progress 
from  the  former  term  to  the  latter.     Only  in 


1  A  man,  however,  may  do  what  is  wrong  to  himself,  or  even 
to  a  dumb  animal. 

2  " '  Nature,' "  it  has  well  been  said,  "  is  used  for  what  you 
start  with,  and  it  is  used  for  what  you  want  to  get  to."  In  the 
'  state  of  nature,'  considered  as  a  terminus  a  quo,  there  was  no 
mature  civitas,  nor  aught  else  mature,  but  there  was  a  rudi- 
mentary chritas  with  germinal  capacity  of  development.  That 
development  was  effected  by  human  acts,  natural,  not  arbitrary, 
acts. 


136  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

the  terminus  ad  quern  is  his  nature  complete, 
and  therefore  it  is  not  the  initial,  but  the  final 
stage  of  human  development  that  properly  re- 
presents the  natural  state  of  man.  Fallen  from 
this  state,  bereft  of  citizenship,  a  man  was  well 
styled  by  the  Roman  jurists  capite  diniinntns, 
—  as  it  were,  a  headless  trunk  of  a  man,  the 
superior  and  better  part  of  his  nature  being 
lopped  off.1  Two  individuals,  like  Robinson 
Crusoe  and  Friday,  isolated  from  the  rest  of 
the  world,  unassociated  by  any  ties  of  domestic, 
tribal,  or  political  community,  are  in  an  un- 
natural state :  it  is  not  in  them  that  we  can 
study  rights.  They  have,  indeed,  certain  pri- 
mary rights,  as  that  one  should  not  kill  and 
eat  the  other.  But  they  have  over  them  on 
earth  no  judge  of  right,  no  avenger  of  wrong. 
Their  rights  are  as  the  relations  that  lie  between 
them,  few  and  simple.  In  a  formed  society 
relations  spring  up  and  rights  multiply,  com- 
plicated, intricate,  needing  much  determination 
and  adjustment :  so  rights  grow  with  the  growth 
of  the  family  and  of  the  village  community  and 

1  We  often  hear  —  and  this  is  said  to  be  the  truth  latent  at 
the  bottom  of  Hobbes's  grim  philosophy  —  that,  apart  from 
society,  there  would  be  no  morality.  Yes,  but  apart  from  society 
man  would  not  be  man.  A  '  rational  animal '  means  a  social 
animal.  The  three  adjectives,  social,  rational,  natural  (not 
physical}  may  often  be  interchanged.  The  same  obligation  is 
social,  rational,  and  natural,  as  you  consider  it. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     137 

of  the  State.  Under  these  explanations  I  agree 
in  the  main  with  the  following  remarks  of  Green. 
A  right,  he  says,  is  "a  claim  of  an  individual, 
arising  out  of  his  rational  nature,  to  the  free 
exercise  of  some  faculty,"  and  also  "  a  concession 
of  that  claim  by  society."  "  Rights  have  no  being 
except  in  a  society  of  men  recognising  each 
other  as  lctol  kou  o/xoioi ;  they  are  constituted  by 
that  mutual  recognition  "  (P.  P.  O.  p.  1 44).  "  No 
rights  antecedent  to  society."  "  No  right  without 
a  consciousness  of  common  interest  "  (id.,  p.  48). 
"  Rights  do  not  begin  till  duties  begin  .  .  .  only 
by  the  recognition  by  certain  men  of  a  common 
interest  "(id.,p.  1 24).  "  A  State  presupposes  other 
forms  of  community  with  the  rights  that  arise 
out  of  them,  and  only  exists  as  sustaining,  secur- 
ing, and  completing  them  "  {id.,  p.  139).  "  The 
State  .  .  .  does  not  create  rights,  but  gives  fuller 
reality  to  rights  already  existing"  (id.,  p.  138). 
"  Rights  are  not  arbitrary  creations  of  law;  .  .  . 
certain  powers  ought  to  be  secured  as  rights ; 
...  no  rights  antecedent  to  society,  none  that 
men  brought  with  them  into  a  society  which 
they  contracted  to  form.  .  .  .  They  (rights) 
are  '  natural  '  in  the  sense  in  which,  according 
to  Aristotle,  the  State  is  'natural'"  (id.,  p.  47). 
"A  right  is  a  power  claimed  and  recognised  as 
contributory  to  a  common  good  "  (id.,  p.  109). 
And,  more  elaborately,  "  a  right  is  a  power  of 


138  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

which  the  exercise  by  some  individual,  or  by 
some  body  of  men,  is  recognised  by  a  society, 
either  as  itself  directly  essential  to  a  common 
good,  or  as  conferred  by  an  authority  of  which 
the  maintenance  is  so  essential "  (id.,  p.  1 1 3). 
"  The  State  .  .  .  presupposes  rights,  and  is  an 
institution  for  their  maintenance,  not,  however, 
the  rights  of  individuals  irrespective  of  others, 
but  as  members  of  a  society  of  free  agents  "  (id., 
p.  143).  "  A  right  to  act  unsocially  is  a  contra- 
diction "  (id.,  pp.  143-144).  To  which  I  would 
add  that  '  a  right  irrespective  of  others  '  is  a 
contradiction.  Every  human  right  is  a  claim 
to  be  respected  by  other  men,  and  is  a  limited 
thing,  the  limitations  being  the  rights  or  claims 
to  be  respected,  which  other  men,  your  fellows, 
have  upon  you  in  that  matter.  A  right  is  a 
transaction  of  give  and  take.  "  It  is  on  the  rela- 
tion to  a  society,  to  other  men  recognising  a 
common  good,  that  the  individual's  rights  de- 
pend, as  much  as  the  gravity  of  the  body 
depends  on  relations  to  other  bodies.  ...  A 
right  against  society,  in  distinction  to  a  right 
to  be  treated  as  a  member  of  society,  is  a  con- 
tradiction in  terms  "  (id.,  p.  109).  That  is  to  say, 
there  is  no  right  to  break  away  from  human 
society   and    renounce    its    claims    upon    you.1 

1  A  principle  which  the  Fathers  of  the  Church  applied  to 
monks  and  even  to  hermits.     St.  John  Chrysostom  is  full  of  the 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority      139 

Spinoza  and  Hobbes  fell  into  what  Green 
characterises  as  the  common  error  of  their 
time,  "admitting  right  in  an  individual  apart 
from  his  life  in  society,  the  members  of  which 
have  a  correlative  claim  on  one  another  as 
all  conspiring  to  a  common  end."  On  the 
contrary,  says  Green,  "the  individual  is  what 
he  is,"  and  has  the  rights  which  he  has,  "  in 
virtue  of  a  function  which  he  has  to  fulfil  in 
view  of  the  society  to  which  he  belongs  "  (id., 
p.  56).  This  he  calls  a  "  teleological "  view  of 
rights.  Rights  in  this  view  are  a  sort  of 
elbow-room,  claimed  by  the  individual,  and 
allowed  by  society,  in  order  to  his  rendering 
free  service  toward  the  realisation  of  a  certain 
end,  —  the  ultimate  end  of  man  and  of  human 
society,  and  the  fulfilment  of  man's  "  vocation 
as  a  moral  being,"  namely,  "  effectual  self-devo- 
tion to  the  work  of  developing  the  perfect 
character    in   himself   and   others"  (id.,  p.  41). 

praises  of  monks :  at  the  same  time  he  tells  them  (in  his  Homily 
on  St.  Philogonius)  that  unless  the  Church  is  to  be  the  better 
for  their  co-operation,  all  the  austerity  of  their  life  is  thrown  away. 
Monasticism  is  conspicuous  in  history  as  a  great  social  factor. 
As  for  hermits,  very  few  of  them  lived  in  absolute  solitude. 
Theodoret,  a  familiar  friend  of  the  hermits  of  Syria,  shows,  in  his 
Historia  Religiosa,  how  they  attained  to  local  celebrity  and  drew 
crowds  to  their  cells.  The  English  ancre,  or  anchoress,  lived 
in  the  churchyard,  and  gave  audience  to  the  congregation  on 
Sundays.  The  Ancren  Rewle  warns  her  against  becoming  a 
babbling  ancre.1 


140  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

What  Green  calls  the  "  perfect  character,"  Pro- 
fessor Stewart  (Notes  on  Nicomachean  Ethics, 
I.  p.  96)  calls  the  "orderly  and  beautiful  life," 
and  ranks  it  with  the  Platonic  Idea  of  the 
Good  (Rep.  VI.  505  ff.).  So  Mr.  Bosanquet 
(P.  T.  S.  p.  203);  "the  system  of  rights  may  be 
described  as  the  organic  whole  of  the  out- 
ward conditions  necessary  to  the  rational  life." 
Upon  all  which  I  would  suggest,  in  a  tenta- 
tive way,  and  merely  as  a  thing  to  consider, 
the  following  description :  A  right  is  a  social 
endowment,  which  a  man  possesses  as  a  mem- 
ber of  some  society,  to  enable  him  to  co-operate 
intelligently,  and  not  merely  mechanically, 
towards  the  end  and  aim  of  that  society.1 

§  78.  Rights  after  all  are  but  "  outward  con- 
ditions "  to  the  end  for  which  man  and  human 
society  finally  exist.  State  compulsion,  which 
secures  a  man  in  his  rights  and  presses  upon 
him  his  social  duties,  is  no  more  than  a  "  hin- 
derance  of  hinderances,"  as  Mr.  Bosanquet  calls 
it  (P.  T.  S.  p.  191),  rendering  the  Schoolmen's 
phrase,  removals  prohibens.  Secured  in  his 
own  rights,  and  prevented  from  thwarting  the 

1  The  primitive  view,  then,  was  correct,  so  far  as  it  went,  that 
rights  and  duties  are  tribal.  Its  defect  was  its  failing  to  recognise 
a  wider  social  union,  binding  tribe  to  tribe,  and  man,  as  such,  to 
man.  Theologically,  this  widening  of  society  reflects  the  differ- 
ence between  monotheism  and  polytheism,  or  again  between 
Catholicism  and  nationalism. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority      141 

rights  of  his  fellows,  a  man  may  run  with  limbs 
free,  and  a  fair  field  before  him,  to  the  goal  of 
the  "  perfect  character  "  and  of  the  "  orderly  and 
beautiful  life."  He  will  have  to  run,  he  is  not 
yet  arrived  there.  No  State  compulsion  and 
no  State  protection  can  make  a  good  man  of 
him.  The  State  removes  certain  obstacles,  and 
affords  certain  facilities  of  environment,  but 
goodness  must  come  of  the  inner  workings  of 
a  man's  own  heart,  which  no  magistrate  can 
touch. 

§  79.  "  The  State,"  writes  Mr.  Bosanquet 
(P.  T.  S.  p.  150),  "  includes  the  entire  hierarchy 
of  institutions  by  which  life  is  determined, 
from  the  family  to  the  trade,  and  from  the  trade 
to  .  .  .  the  University."  1  And  Green  (P.  P.  O. 
p.  146),  "  The  other  forms  of  community  which 
precede  and  are  independent  of  the  formation 
of  the  State  do  not  continue  to  exist  outside  it, 
nor  yet  are  they  independent  of  it ;  .  .  .  they 
are  carried  on  into  it."2  The  State  is  the 
aggregate  of  all  these  human  and  temporal 
societies  ;  and  more  than  the  aggregate,  it  is 
the  organic  unity  of  them  all.  In  it  they  have 
their  civil  being.  The  State,  thus  amplified,  is 
a  very  much  wider  thing  than  'government.' 
The  individual  does  not  belong  for  all  his  tem- 

1  Mr.  Bosanquet  says,  "  to  the  Church  and  the  University." 

2  Much  as  the  life  of  the  '  cell '  is  carried  on  into  the  body. 


142  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

poral  estate  to  government :  he  is  never  a  mere 
government  official :  he  is  essentially  something 
more  than  an  organ  of  the  executive.  Nor  is 
the  family  a  government  department,  nor  the 
res  familiaris  a  driblet  of  the  aerarium.  Pri- 
vate life  and  domestic  life  are  only  in  part  sub- 
servient to  political  life.  Both  domestic  and 
political  life  are  ultimately  ministerial  to  the 
private  life  of  the  soul,  of  the  thoughts,  specu- 
lations, and  affections.  Citizenship  is  meant  to 
help  us  towards  being  more  thoroughly  men. 
The  inner  life  of  the  soul  in  man  is  more  valid 
and  real  than  the  outer  life  of  external  behaviour 
and  public  duty,  not  that  the  two  lives  can  ever 
be  divorced.  But  in  the  region  of  the  external 
and  temporal  order  there  is  nothing  so  noble  as 
the  State.  Bad  government  abases  the  sense 
of  nobility  in  a  people.  Vide,  Domiue,  et 
coiisidera,  qtioiiiam  facta  sum  vilis,  is  one  of 
the  Lamentations  of  Jerusalem  under  oppres- 
sion (Lam.  i.  11). 

§  80.  While  a  certain  separation  of  States 
will  be  always  necessary,  and  mutual  competi- 
tion, and  even  jealousy,  —  a  separation  and 
jealousy,  however,  which  may  come  in  time  to 
be  rather  of  races  than  of  States,  —  we  are  pro- 
gressing and  shall  progress,  unless  war  throws 
us  back,  towards  a  commonwealth  of  civilised 
mankind.     The  organisation  of  the  earth  is  a 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civ  it  Authority      14 


1 


nobler  work  than  the  organisation  of  any  one 
State,  and  a  better  good  both  'in  itself '  and  '  to 
us'.  It  is  well  to  '  adorn  our  Sparta,'  because 
it  is  ours,  and  our  first  duty  is  to  the  land  of 
our  birth ;  but  our  human  sympathies  are  not 
to  be  bounded  by  mountain  ranges  or  oceans. 
Man's  blood  calls  for  man's  love,  be  the  con- 
taining walls  white,  brown,  yellow,  or  black. 
The  perfect  State  and  the  commonwealth  of 
perfect  States  are  ideals  not  to  lose  sight  of. 
Far  away  as  they  seem,  in  them  only  can  the 
perfection  of  humanity  on  earth  ever  be  real- 
ised. All  the  world  over,  such  aims  as  these 
stand  out  to  unite  in  a  common  effort  the  o:ood 
wills  of  men  of  all  nations  and  creeds,  —  the 
decent  housing  of  the  poor ;  the  regulation  of 
the  liquor  traffic  in  the  best  interest  of  the 
consumer ;  sanitary  reform ;  the  conciliation  of 
labour  with  capital ;  the  protection  of  children 
and  innocence ;  the  discipline  of  youth  after 
leaving  school ;  the  suppression  of  usury  and 
commercial  frauds  and  anarchical  conspiracy 
and  slavery.  To  these  ends  may  Great  Britain 
and  America  join  their  forces  and  lead  the 
world !  Logic  and  metaphysics  are  not  our 
strong  points, — Hegel  complained  that  the  Eng- 
lish periodical,  Annals  of  Philosophy,  treated  of 
the  construction  of  fireplaces,  —  but,  a  French 
writer  has  remarked  it,  every  Englishman  you 


144  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

meet  is  a  political  philosopher.  Nowhere  has 
the  union  of  liberty  and  law  been  better  under- 
stood than  in  this  country.  We  are  studious 
of  statecraft,  and  over  every  sea  and  land  we 
wander,  giving  and  receiving  lessons  in  govern- 
ment. With  one  or  two  exceptions,  govern- 
ments generally  have  gathered  experience  in 
the  nineteenth  century,  and  are  wiser  now  than 
they  were  at  the  Peace  of  Amiens. 

§  8 1.  "  Neither  the  State,  however,  nor  the 
idea  of  humanity,  nor  the  interests  of  mankind, 
are  the  last  word  of  theory,"  says  Mr.  Bosanquet 
(P.  T.  S.  p.  332).  I  repeat  it,  when  the  State 
has  done  its  best  for  humanity,  more  remains  to 
do.  The  perfect  working  of  the  State  can  do 
no  more  than  raise  the  individual  to  a  platform 
where  he  shall  be  able,  unimpeded,  to  develop 
for  himself  the  intellectual  and  spiritual  side 
of  his  nature,  and  to  aid  the  like  development 
of  his  fellow-men.  Man  is  not  a  political 
animal  all  over  (§  jt»  note),  nor  are  politics 
and  economics  the  sum  of  human  interests. 
By  virtue  of  the  spirit  that  is  in  him,  man  be- 
longs to  a  higher  order,  and  is  referable  to  a 
higher  society,  than  the  civil  and  political. 
The  State  is  not  a  union  of  souls.  The  State 
belongs  to  the  visible,  temporal,  and  material 
order.  Souls  are  immortal,  States  are  mortal. 
'In  a  fine  frenzy  '  the  Platonic  Socrates  pours 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority      145 

out  his  complaint  against  statesmen  like  Them- 
istocles  and  Cimon  and  Pericles,  that  '  with- 
out provision  for  self-control  and  justice,  they 
have  pestered  the  city  with  harbours  and  dock- 
yards and  fortifications  and  tribute-moneys  and 
the  like  trash  "  (Gorgias,  519  A).  With  Plato's 
(fiXvapiojv  we  may  compare  St.  Paul's  o-KvfiaXa 
(P/iit.  iii.  8).  Both  terms  are  employed 
comparatively,  not  absolutely.  St.  Paul  was 
not  the  man  to  cry  down  a  Jewish  education 
(cf.  Acts  xxii.  3),  nor  Plato  the  provisions  for 
national  defence.1  But  they  looked  beyond 
these  things  to  things  immeasurably  nobler. 
Justice  and  self-control  are  more  germane  to 
man,  and  touch  him  nearer,  than  the  material 
securities  of  empire.2  The  State  sets  store  by 
justice,  fortitude,  self-control,  and  other  virtues, 
but  on  public  grounds  rather  than  for  their 
intrinsic  worth.  Intrinsically  these  virtues  are 
perfections  of  the  soul  that  is  endowed  with 
them :  they  are  good  things  in  themselves. 
But  the  State  values  them  as  means  to  the 
order  and  prosperity  of  the  commonwealth: 
consequently  the    statesman's  solicitude  is  for 

1  Dockyards  and  city  walls  he  was  too  </>iAoAa/«ov  ever  to 
appreciate  (Laws,  IV.  704;  VI.  778  D). 

2  Plato,  or  the  author  of  the  First  Alcibiades  (134  B),  explains 
Plato  :  "  It  is  not  walls,  then,  or  ships  of  war,  or  arsenals,  that 
cities  need  for  their  prosperity,  nor  population,  nor  size,  without 
virtue." 


146  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

the  outward  act  of  the  virtue,  not  for  those 
inward  dispositions  which  alone  make  the  act 
truly  virtuous.  He  apprizes  virtues  politically, 
not  ethically.  Ethics  go  beyond  politics,  and 
there  is  that  in  man  which  even  goes  beyond 
ethics.  Still,  Plato  was  right  in  maintaining 
that  virtue,  even  on  the  mere  political  aspect, 
is  nobler  and  of  more  consequence  than  dock- 
yards and  tribute  money.  Alexander  found 
tribute  money  enough  and  to  spare  in  the 
coffers  of  Darius  Nothus. 

§  82.  The  Greek  mind  was  imbued  with  the 
maxim  that  it  is  the  business  of  the  State  to 
make  the  citizens  virtuous.  Aristotle  {Politics, 
III.  1280  b)  assigns  this  as  one  distinctive 
feature  of  a  State,  770X19,  marking  it  off  from 
a  military  confederacy,  or  cru/^a^ta,  that  the 
State  enforces  a  standard  of  virtue :  "  the  State, 
rightly  so  called,  must  make  virtue  its  care." 
The  maxim  is  misleading  to  us,  because  neither 
'  State '  nor  '  virtue,'  in  our  common  speech, 
means  exactly  what  770X15  or  apeTrj  meant  to  the 
Greek.  With  us,  Church  and  State,  and  again 
State  and  parish,  and  again  State  and  public 
opinion,  make  three  pairs  of  different  things. 
They  were  all  one  at  Sicyon  and  Megara,  and 
even  at  Athens.  These  City  States  knew  their 
citizens  individually,  and  influenced  them  as 
Parliament  never  influences  us.     There  is  an 


Origin  a?id  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     147 

amusingly  parochial  air  about  Greek  political 
proceedings.  The  restrictions  on  the  size  of 
Aristotle's  model  city  {Politics,  IV.  4)  —  it  was 
to  be  evcruVo7rro9,  like  the  old  grey  Oxford ;  and 
its  citizens  not  too  numerous  to  stand  within 
earshot  of  one  herald,  and  him  no  Stentor,  — 
are  laughable  and  childish  till  we  remember 
that  this  sovereign  city  was  likewise  the  par- 
ish.1 Then  for  the  Greek  conception  of  virtue, 
—  apery],  —  it  was  originally  a  physical  excel- 
lence, the  quality  of  one  who  is  'a  good  man 
of  his  hands.'     Of  the  two  ideas,  rectitude  and 

1  Local  government,  could  they  have  entered  into  it.  might 
have  preserved  to  the  Athenians  their  empire,  as  representative 
government  might  have  prolonged  republican  institutions  in 
Rome.  The  Romans  early  mastered  the  grand  political  art  of 
respecting  the  municipal  privileges  and  local  institutions  of  the 
cities  which  they  conquered  and  annexed.  An  Athenian  in  the 
days  of  Trajan  would  have  told  you  that  Athens  was  still  free  and 
autonomous  :  did  not  the  Ecciesia  still  meet  ?  were  there  not 
archons  and  dicasts  as  in  the  days  of  Pericles  ?  Athens,  however, 
was  treated  with  greater  consideration  than  other  cities.  The 
exchange  of  letters  between  Pliny  and  Trajan  reveals  a  habit  of 
centralisation  and  autocracy  which  grew  with  the  principate. 
Still,  the  provincial  cities  appear  to  have  been  happy  under  it. 
They  were  not  plundered,  one  great  negative  attribute  of  good 
government.  They  enjoyed  the  splendour  and  prosperity  of 
which  Rome  was  the  centre  and  Roman  rule  the  guarantee.  We 
must  remember  that  when  the  people  (as  distinguished  from  the 
politicians)  are  discontented,  it  is  usually  on  social  rather  than  on 
political  grounds.  An  impoverished  nation  blames  the  govern- 
ment. We  have  not  to  sail  far  from  English  shores  to  see  an 
example.  Remedy  their  poverty,  and  you  will  remedy  their  dis- 
content. 


148  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

efficiency,  the  latter  made  up  the  greater  part 
of  what  a  Greek  meant  by  '  virtue.'  Thus 
there  were  intellectual  '  virtues,'  for  instance, 
'  art.'  The  o-oifypuiv  was  virtuous,  because  he 
had  himself  in  hand  for  all  occasions  of  work : 
the  cUdAacrTo?  was  vicious,  because  he  was 
thoroughly  unreliable  and  good  for  nothing. 
The  maxim  then  really  meant  this,  that  it 
should  be  the  care  of  the  laws,  and  of  the  parish 
council,  and  of  the  beadles,  and  of  public  opin- 
ion as  voiced  by  public  speakers,  and  of  minis- 
ters of  the  State  religion,  in  the  Greek  city,  to 
render  the  citizens  the  most  efficient  possible 
guardians  of  their  city.  So  interpreted,  the 
maxim  will  be  accepted  without  discussion.1 

§  83.  This  interpretation  throws  light  on 
Aristotle's  saying  {Politics,  III.  1277),  that  in 
a  citizen  of  the  higher  and  ruling  class  the 
measure  of  virtue  of  the  good  man  and  of  the 
2;ood  citizen  is  one  and  the  same.  Aristotle 
merely  means  that,  to   manage    the    affairs  of 

1  There  is  one  virtue  which  no  Greek  government  ever  con- 
templated teaching  its  citizens  either  by  word  or  example,  the 
virtue  of  truthfulness.  Plato's  inculcation  of  official  lying,  as 
though  untruthfulness  could  ever  remain  a  government  monopoly 
{Rep.,  389  B,  C;  459  C,  D), — as  though  the  proverb  did  not 
hold,  A  bove  majori  discit  arare  minor,  —  is  one  of  the  weak 
points  of  the  Republic  neglected  in  Aristotle's  criticism.  Truth- 
fulness, over  and  above  observance  of  civil  contracts  and  sworn 
evidence  in  court,  is  a  good  instance  of  a  social  virtue  being 
matter  of  public  opinion,  not  of  civil  authority. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority      149 

State  in  a  position  of  great  trust,  a  man  must 
be  thoroughly  competent  and  efficient  in  the 
affairs  of  private  life :  the  measure  of  his  public 
and  private  capacity  must  be  alike  full.  The 
philosopher  had  doubtless  in  his  mind  the 
Greek  proverb,  "  Office  will  prove  a  man." 
High  office  in  the  State  calls  for  a  display  of 
courage,  of  perseverance,  of  forbearance,  and 
of  the  virtues  of  the  practical  intellect.  It  is 
also  desirable  that  the  civil  ruler  should  not  be 
morally  a  bad  man,  cruel,  rapacious,  or  licen- 
tious. Wickedness  is  the  undoing  of  princes? 
permeating  through  all  their  conduct,  public 
as  well  as  private,  tainting  their  patriotism  and 
marring  their  policy.  Still,  we  must  say,  mere 
removal  from  the  ranks  of  the  wicked  does 
not  place  a  man  on  the  high  level  of  the  per- 
fectly virtuous.  Nor  arc  those  virtues  the  most 
indispensable  in  the  ruler  which  most  perfect 
man  as  man.  More  important  for  political 
purposes  is  the  ruler's  being  experienced  and 
prudent,  resourceful  and  unflinching,  and  even 
his  being  of  robust  bodily  frame  and  capa- 
ble of  protracted  toil,  than  his  personal  piety 
and  meekness,  or  his  invariable  sobriety  and 
chastity.  Cromwell  was  more  fit  to  sit  on  a 
throne  than  Henry  VI.  There  would  have 
been  no  Wars  of  the  Roses,  had  an  Oliver 
Cromwell  succeeded  the  victor  of    Agincourt. 


150  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

We  want  a  statesman  rather  than  a  saint  to 
govern  us,  a  king  in  preference  to  a  philosopher, 
though  if  kings  could  become  philosophers 
without  loss  of  kingcraft,  and  statesmen,  re- 
maining statesmen,  could  be  advanced  to  holi- 
ness, that  combination,  Plato  said  {Rep.  V. 
473  D),  would  be  a  radical  cure  for  the  miseries 
of  earth,  —  rather  much  to  expect. 

§  84.  St.  Thomas  Aquinas  (Stimma,  1 1 — 1 1. 
q.  161.  art.  1,  ad.  4),  accounting  for  the  omis- 
sion of  humility  from  the  list  of  Aristotelian 
virtues,  writes :  "  The  philosopher  intended  to 
treat  of  virtues  according  as  they  are  referred 
to  the  end  of  civil  life  :  .  .  .  but  humility,  as  it  is 
a  special  virtue,  particularly  refers  to  the  sub- 
jection of  man  to  God."  This  may  be  ad- 
mitted. But  it  would  not  be  true  to  say  that 
Aristotle  had  no  conception  of  virtues  except 
"  as  they  are  referred  to  the  end  of  civil  life  " ; 
in  other  words,  that  the  only  virtue  which 
Aristotle  cared  to  discuss  was  virtue  in  its 
social  aspect,  as  it  is  the  care  of  the  politi- 
cian. There  is  a  very  clear  distinction,  both  in 
Aristotle  and  Plato,  between  social  and  philo- 
sophic virtue.  The  distinction  led  to  great 
results  in  the  history  of  philosophy.  Social 
virtue,  ttoXltlkt)  apeT-q,  is  motived  by  law  and 
custom,  by  a  sense  of  shame  (cuSwg)  and  feel- 
ing   of   good    fellowship  (r/nA.ia).      Philosophic 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     151 

virtue  is  formed  upon  the  internal  standard  of 
Xdyo?  dpdos.  I  may  refer  to  Aristotle,  Nic. 
Eth.  III.  1 1 16  0,  15  ff.;  X.  1 1 77,  1 1 78; 
Plato,  Phcsdo,  82  B;  Rep.  619  C;  TimcEiis, 
90  C.  I  have  said  in  effect  several  times 
already  that  philosophic  virtue  is  not  the  direct 
aim  or  result  of  any  exercise  of  civil  authority. 
Motives  and  dispositions  elude  the  magistrate. 
Philosophic  speculation  is  none  of  his  procur- 
ing, nor  art,  nor  literature,1  neither  is  inward 
rectitude  of  purpose.  Even  of  exterior  and 
overt  acts  the  State  can  enforce  but  few,  where 
there  is  question  of  domestic  virtue  and  of 
private  and  personal  virtue.  He  is  far  from 
being  a  good  father,  or  a  good  husband,  who 
obeys  the  bare  letter  of  the  most  minutiose 
laws  that  can  possibly  be  imposed  to  regulate 
his  relations  with  his  wife  and  children.  He 
is  not  a  temperate  man,  who  eats  and  drinks 
and  otherwise  indulges  himself  as  much  as  the 
policeman  will  allow.  He  is  not  a  generous 
man,  who  pays  rates  and  will  not  further  sub- 
scribe. The  virtue  whereby  man  worships 
God,  the  virtue  of  religion,  is  above  all  things 
else  a  thing  of  the  heart,  where  no  compulsion 
can  enter;  and  it  blossoms  forth  into  many 
outward  acts  of  reverence  and  devotion,  over 

1  "We  have  no  literature  :  it  is  the  fault  of  the  Minister  of  the 
Interior,"  wrote  Napoleon  from  camp. 


152  Political  mid  Moral  Essays 

which  the  State  functionary  would  make  a 
foolish  figure  as  master  of  ceremonies.  Pub- 
lic opinion  reaches  farther  than  legislation  and 
the  executive  power :  but  even  public  opinion 
does  not  penetrate  far  into  the  privacy  of  do- 
mestic life,  where  much  virtue  should  dwell. 
I  conclude  that  "society  was  never  meant  to 
be  the  principal  means  by  which  the  perfection 
of  the  individual  was  secured,  but  only  the  con- 
dition without  which  that  perfection  would  be 
impossible  "  (Woolsey,  Political  Science,  I.  4).1 

§  85.  Aristotle  tells  us  {Politics,  II.  1263  b) 
that  a  city  must  be  made  virtuous  "  by  cus- 
toms and  philosophy  and  laws."  Laws,  and 
in  some  sort  customs,  are  functions  of  the 
State:  but  philosophy  is  a  different  power 
entirely.  This  is  an  admission  on  Aristotle's 
part  of  the  insufficiency  of  the  civil  authority 
by  itself  for  the  task  of  making  the  citizens 
virtuous  in  the  higher  sense  of  the  term.  He 
never  took  philosophy  for  a  function  of  the 
State.  He  would  have  resented,  as  an  in- 
terference of  the  human  with  the  divine,  any 
attempt  of  the  Ecclesia  to  regulate  the  dis- 
cussions at  the   Lyceum:2     Formally,  the  phi- 

1  Here  I  am  in  thorough  accord  with  Mr.  Newman,  Politics  of 
Aristotle,  Introduction,  Vol.  I.  pp.  77,  7S,  ed.  1887. 

2  He  might  have  quoted  from  Plato  (Rep.  VI.  492  E)  :  "  As  the 
proverb  says,  let  us  leave  the  element  of  Divinity  out  of  the 
reckoning." 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority      15 


j 


losophcr  is  distinct  from  the  statesman ;  and 
this  formal  distinction  led,  in  Greek  and  Roman 
history,  to  an  actual  separation  and  opposition, 
and  almost  a  quarrel.  We  can  trace  it  all  the 
way  from  Socrates  to  Plotinus.  Socrates  assured 
his  judges  that  the  restraining  voice  which  he 
had  heard  from  childhood  had  always  kept  him 
out  of  politics.1  Plato  took  no  part  in  Athe- 
nian politics,  which  he  looked  upon  with  disgust, 
vtto  t€lx£ov  a,7Tocrra<;,2  and  wrote  of,  almost  in  the 
language  of  Alcibiades  at  Sparta,  as  nepl  ofjioko- 
yovjxiwqs  avoia^  (Thucydides,  VI.  89).  Still,  he 
held  stoutly  that  the  philosopher  could  save 
the  State,  if  he  were  allowed  (^era  tqjv  1$l<oi> 
koi  koivol  crcoaet,  Rep.  VI.  497  A),  and  should 
be  forward  to  do  so  {Rep.  VII.  519  C,  D,  E; 

1  Apol.  31  D  sq.,  where  he  says:  "Whoever  really  means  to 
be  a  champion  of  righteousness,  if  he  is  to  survive  an  hour,  must 
live  retired  in  private  life  and  keep  out  of  politics.1'  Bishop 
Magee  of  Peterborough  some  years  ago  startled  people  with  the 
paradox  that  a  State  could  not  be  conducted  on  Christian  princi- 
ples for  a  week.  It  is  well  at  least  that  some  representatives  of 
Christian  principles  should  stand  aloof  from  Montagues  and 
Capulets. 

2  From  the  celebrated  passage,  Rep.  VI.  496  C,  D,  E  :  cf.  the 
description  of  Athenian  democracy.  Rep.  VI.  492  B,  C:  VIII. 
557,  558,  563.  Best  of  bad  governments  {Statesman,  303  A,  B) 
is  all  the  praise  that  Plato  can  find  for  the  government  of  his 
native  city.  Neither  Plato  nor  Xenophon  seems  ever  to  have 
forgiven  Athens  for  the  death  of  Socrates.  Did  either  of  them 
ever  reflect  how  impossible  the  whole  Socratic  school  would  have 
been  in  the  city  of  their  predilection.  Sparta? 


154  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

520).  Plato  exerted  himself  for  this  purpose 
at  Syracuse,  and  failed,  unless  we  can  suppose 
his  example  and  precepts  to  have  influenced 
Timoleon.  To  Aristotle,  the  question  of  the 
philosopher  engaging  in  politics  was  purely 
speculative.  Born  at  Stagira,  he  may  have 
not  enjoyed  the  citizenship  of  Athens,  where 
he  lived ;  and  besides,  the  sword  of  Philip  and 
Alexander  soon  cut  off  all  that  was  vital  from 
the  deliberations  of  the  Athenian  Ecclesia. 
In  his  Politics,  IV.  1324  a,  Aristotle  definitely 
asks  whether  the  life  of  the  statesman  or  that 
of  the  philosopher  is  preferable.1  He  answers 
that  the  active  life  is  decidedly  preferable,  but 
adds  that  the  philosopher  is  as  active  as  the 
statesman,  indeed  that  his  is  the  better  activity 
of  the  two.  The  philosopher,  to  Aristotle,  was 
the  flower  of  the  State.  The  State  was  the 
plant,  born  to  produce  the  philosopher  and 
to    maintain    him.2      The    flower    cannot    cut 

1  TTOTtpOV  6  TToXlTLKOS    KCU   7r/3O.KTlK0S    /SlOS    atpETOS,  7}    /XaAAoV    6 

■n-dvTwv  twv  e/cros  d7roAeAv/Ae'vos,  olov  Oewp-qriKos  tis,  6v  [xovov  tivcs 
(pamv  aval  (fsiXoaocjyov .  The  question  is  neatly  stated  by  Plato, 
Gorgias,  500  C,  and  became  a  commonplace  in  the  rhetorical 
schools,  whether  the  philosopher  should  engage  in  politics, 
rroTtpov  ttoXltzvtcov  tw  (fa\o(ro<j>w. 

2  In  true  Aristotelian  spirit  Professor  Stewart  writes  {Notes  on 
Nicomachean  Ethics,  Vol.  I.  p.  19)  :  "The  final  cause  of  civilisation, 
as  developed  through  the  stages  of  olkUl  and  kw/xtj,  is  the  produc- 
tion of  the  small  band  of  thinkers,  who,  when  the  stage  of  the 
7t6A.is  has  been  reached,  illuminate  each  generation."     Cf.   St. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority      155 

itself  off  from  the  stem.  And  Aristotle  would 
have  his  philosopher  no  recluse.  He  would  not 
have  him  cut  off  from  social  and  political  life, 
—  or  in  our  days  from  details  of  local  govern- 
ment, 'parks  and  gas.'  But  he  counted  him 
happiest  in  his  quiet  moments  of  contempla- 
tion.1 Under  the  rule  of  the  generals  who 
succeeded  Alexander,  and  again  under  Roman 
rule,  militarism  quite  excluded  philosophy  from 
the  conduct  of  the  State.  A  Marcus  Aurelius 
was  the  rare  exception.  The  philosophers 
dwelt  in  a  commonwealth  of  thought  apart. 
Sometimes  they  found  a  patron  in  a  Ptol- 
emy Philadelphus,  and  the  other  Ptolemies, 
founders    and    supporters    of   the    Museum    at 


Paul,  2  Tim.  ii.  10,  iravra  8lol  tovs  e/<AeKTovs,  howbeit  St.  Paul's 
elect  were  not  exactly  thinkers  (1  Cor.  i.  26,  27).  The  sentiment 
is  twice  repeated  in  the  Platonic  Epinomis,  ou  cp^fu  etvat  Swarbv 
avOpuyrroLs  fxaKapLois  re  kolL  eiBatfioaL  yevecrdai  TrXrjv  oAi'yojv  (973  C, 
992  C).  Humanitm  paucis  vivit  genus  are  words  placed  by  the 
Stoic  Lucan  on  the  lips  of  Caesar  (Pharsalia,  V.  343). 

1  Not  without  some  reminiscence,  I  think,  of  a  former  Christ 
Church  statesman,  Professor  Stewart  writes  (/Vic.  Eth.  I.  p.  96) 
of  one  who  "  enjoys  moments  of  inward  philosophical  ct^oAt/  in 
the  course  of  his  •  political1  career."  He  adds,  "Perhaps  the 
OewprjTiKos  fito?  is  most  successfully  realised,  not  as  a  separate 
life,  but  as  the  form  of  the  ttoXitlkos  /Jibs."  Even  in  Christian 
asceticism  there  is  an  antithesis  of  the  '  active '  to  the  '  contem- 
plative' life.  See  St.  Thomas  Aquinas,  Summa,  II— II.  q.  182, 
in  my  Aquinas  EtJiicits,  Vol.  II.  pp.  386-390.  The  two  lives 
are  not  irreconcilable,  and  the  latter  might  very  happily  be  called 
4  the  form '  of  the  former. 


156  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

Alexandria.  They  succeeded  in  converting 
Athens  into  a  university  town.  At  Rome, 
under  the  early  emperors,  philosophy  of  the 
Stoic  type  formed  itself  into  a  speculative 
opposition  to  the  palace ;  and  under  Nero  it 
even  gave  birth  to  a  conspiracy,  the  abortive 
attempt  of  Piso.  But  the  common  consent 
of  mankind  marked  off  the  philosopher  from 
the  man  of  the  world.  The  favourite  butt  of 
Lucian's  satire  is  the  impotence,  imbecility, 
and  quackery,  or  what  he  took  to  be  such, 
of  philosophers.1  His  jibes  furnish  evidence 
of  philosophy  existing  as  a  distinct  profession, 
—  i]  hiarpL^rj  it  was  called, — under  the  Roman 
Empire.  The  antithesis  of  the  philosopher  to 
the  statesman  —  as  it  were,  of  the  spiritual  to 
the  temporal  side  of  human  nature  —  fore- 
shadowed the  great  historical  antithesis  of 
Church  and  State  which  began  with  the 
establishment  of  Christianity. 

§  86.  When  Christianity  first  stood  forth 
to  the  gaze  of  Graeco- Roman  civilisation,  and 
was  asked  its  name,  the  new  comer  answered 
boldly :  '  I  am  a  philosophy.'  It  was  not 
exactly  a  philosophy  either :  but  that  name 
better  than  any  other  declared  to  the  Hellen- 
ised  mind  what  Christianity    really    was,    fiiov 

1  Great  families  in  Lucian's  day  kept  a  philosopher,  as  in  the 
days  of  our  grandfathers  they  kept  a  chaplain. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority      157 

ajaeiVw  tov  ttoXltlkov  (Rep.  521  B).  It  was  tanta- 
mount to  saying:  'I  am  a  Higher  Life,  I  am 
a  Spiritual  Power.' '  Christianity  took  up  at 
once  three  salient  traditions  that  it  found  in 
the  Gentile  world:  the  tradition  of  Philosophy, 
the  tradition  of  Mysteries,  and  the  tradition  of 
Roman  Law.  With  philosophy,  it  promised 
even  on  earth  "  a  life  above  the  level  of  man 
(KpetTTcop  7)  kolt  avOpomov),  a  life  that  man  shall 
not  live  as  man,  but  only  inasmuch  as  there 
enters  into  the  composition  of  his  being  a 
divine  element  "  (Aristotle,  Nic.  Eth.  X.  nyy  d). 
The  said  element  was,  not  his  intelligence,  as 
Aristotle  had  supposed,  but  his  membership 
and  participation  with  Christ  (1  Cor.  vi.  15  ;  xii. 
29:  Eph.  v.  30),  or  what  is  called  by  Catholic 
divines  '  the  supernatural  life.'  Christianity 
had  its  mysteries  also,  beginning  with  the 
'  initiation '  of  baptism.  The  baptized  were 
ready  with  the  cry  that  was  in  the  mouths  of 
the  initiated  at  Athens   in   Demosthenes'  day 


1  In  the  pages  of  the  Greek  Fathers  </>iAocroc/>ia  frequently 
stands  for  Christian  life  and  practice,  e.g.  in  St.  John  Chrysostom, 
Homily  4,  ad  Philipp.  —  "the  great  and  philosophic  soul,  .  .  . 
such  was  the  soul  of  Paul :  it  had  occupied  an  eminence  higher 
than  any  other,  the  high  ground  of  spiritual  philosophy,  the  true 
philosophy  " ;  and  Homily  6,  in  1  T/iess.,  "  nothing  will  be  diffi- 
cult to  us,  if  we  will  play  the  philosopher."  Had  not  Plato  said: 
"  Greater  good  than  philosophy  never  hath  come,  nor  ever  shall 
come,  God-given,  to  mortal  race"?  (Tzmceus,  47  A,  B). 


158  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

(Z)e  corona,  n.  259),  ecfrvyov  kolkov,  rjvpov  dfxeivov. 
Baptism  was  to  them  the  entrance  into  the 
higher  life,  called  newness  of  life  (Rom.  vi.  4). 
This  life  was  to  continue  beyond  the  grave : 
indeed,  its  fruit  and  best  enjoyment  were  there. 
In  the  Panegyric  of  Isocrates  we  read  the 
praise  of  the  Eleusinian  Mysteries,  how  they 
opened  to  men  a  nobler  life  here  and  good  hope 
for  hereafter.  The  initiated  in  those  mysteries 
looked  forward  beyond  death  to  life  everlasting 
in  the  company  of  the  gods  (Plato,  Phcedo, 
81  A).  To  these  vague  longings  of  Hellenism, 
Christianity  imparted  defmiteness  and  assurance, 
pointing  for  the  argument  of  the  higher  life  to 
the  Incarnation,  and  for  the  argument  of  the 
life  enduring  beyond  the  grave  to  the  Resurrec- 
tion of  the  Saviour.  To  put  in  one  word  this 
'  higher  life  '  of  Christianity,  I  should  say  that 
Christianity  inspired  '  holiness,'  as  something 
over  and  above  'goodness.'  Civil  authority  is 
exerted  on  behalf  of  political  goodness,  or  (in 
Aristotelian  phrase)  'general  justice.'  No  one 
has  ever  dreamt  of  saying  that  the  formal  ob- 
ject of  the  exercise  of  civil  authority  is  to 
make  men  holy.1 

§  87.    Not  content  with  setting  up  a  high  ideal 
of  life  and  encouraging  aspirations  after  immor- 

1  See  the  section,  "Of  the  Scope  and  Aim  of  Civil  Govern- 
ment,1' in  my  Ethics  and  Natural  Law,  pp.  354-357.  nn.  1,  2,  3. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority      159 

tality,  Christianity  undertook  a  task  which  no 
school  of  philosophy  had  undertaken,  except  in 
some  small  measure  the  Pythagorean  Brother- 
hood. It  developed  a  government  analogous 
to  that  of  the  Roman  Empire,  making  of  bishops 
its  spiritual  proconsuls,  and  fixing  in  Rome  it- 
self the  centre  of  a  world-wide  spiritual  author- 
ity. It  declared  itself  a  spiritual  kingdom,  a 
polity  of  positive  divine  institution  in  the  super- 
natural order.1  It  clothed  its  ordinances  in  the 
forms  of  Roman  law,  till  there  came  to  be 
recognised,  and  indeed  are  to  this  day  recog- 
nised, two  great  branches  of  law,  the  civil  and 
the  canon  law.  Christianity  always  repu- 
diated any  intention  of  subverting  the  State,  or 
of  swallowing  up  the  civil  power  in  the 
spiritual. 

Crude/is  Herodes,  Deum 
Regem  venire  quid  times  ? 
Non  eripit  mortalia, 

Qui  regno,  dat  coelestia. 

So  it  sang  in  the  vesper  hymn  of  the  Epiphany, 
still  retained  in  the  Roman  Breviary.  And  its 
founder  had  said  Ccesaris  Ccesari?     Christian- 

1  It  may  help  to  clearness  if  I  say  that  '  the  supernatural '  is 
whatever  of  itself  tends  to  bring  man  to  the  vision  of  God  face  to 
face  in  heaven,  called  'the  beatific  vision,1  a  consummation  not 
due  to  human  nature  as  such,  but  opened  to  man  by  the  grace  of 
his  Redeemer. 

-Jus  a  ut  an  diviiunn,  quod  est  ex  gratia,  non  tollit  jus  hit  ma- 


160  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

ity  argued  itself  compatible  with  civil  govern- 
ment, as  operating  in  a  different  sphere  and 
contemplating  a  different  end.  Canon  law 
was  directed  to  the  sanctiflcation  and  eternal 
salvation  of  men's  souls :  whereas  the  State,  as 
such,  and  the  civil  law  of  the  State,  was  a 
natural  institution,  in  view  of  public  tranquil- 
lity, social  security  and  justice,  and  the  protec- 
tion and  co-ordination  of  temporal  rights.  Thus 
the  Church  had  no  concern  with  commercial 
tariffs,  with  the  sewage  question,  or  vaccination. 
But  it  stood   ready   to    denounce    commercial 


num,  qtwd  est  ex  naturali  ratione  (St.  Thomas,  II— II.  q.  10, 
art  10) .  But  what  shall  I  say  of  these  words,  written  at  Little  more 
in  1845  by  a  future  Cardinal?  "There  is  a  religious  communion 
claiming  a  divine  commission.  ...  It  is  a  natural  enemy  to 
governments  external  to  itself;  it  is  intolerant  and  engrossing, 
and  tends  to  a  new  modelling  of  society  ;  it  breaks  laws,  it  divides 
families.  .  .  .  Apologies,  however  eloquent  or  true,  availed  no» 
thing  with  the  Roman  magistrate  against  the  sure  instinct  which 
taught  him  to  dread  Christianity.  It  was  a  dangerous  enemy  to 
any  power  not  built  upon  itself;  he  felt  it,  and  the  event  justified 
his  apprehension"  (Newman,  Essay  on  Development,  ch.  vi.). 
There  is  a  weight  of  history  in  these  words,  but  they  are  not,  I 
think,  inconsistent  with  the  statement  in  the  text.  It  is  not  ne- 
cessary to  be  an  invader  to  provoke  resentment.  It  is  sufficient 
to  mass  a  large  force  on  the  frontier  of  a  suspicious  and  un- 
friendly power.  As  I  have  shown,  you  cannot  draw  a  hard  and 
fast  line  of  limitation  to  civil  authority.  On  some  such  principle 
as  that  which  I  have  called  l  voluntary  public  control,1  the  civil 
power  may  wish  to  pour  itself  out  on  to  certain  march  lands,  and 
find  the  ground  preoccupied  by  the  Church.  A  non-Christian 
power  will  not  brook  this  check.     Cf.  §  45. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority      161 

frauds  as  a  sin,  an  obstacle  to  salvation,  and  to 
punish  the  dishonest  Christian  trader,  —  the 
usurer,  for  instance,  —  by  withdrawal  of  spirit- 
ual privileges.  Beyond  this,  the  Church  came 
to  claim,  and  the  Christian  State  to  allow,  the 
right  of  visiting  offences  against  religion,  and 
scandalous  immoralities,  particularly  of  '  crim- 
inous clerks,'  with  temporal  penalties.  Further- 
more the  Church  laid  it  down  that,  while  the 
civil  and  ecclesiastical  polities  existed  in  differ- 
ent orders  and  for  different  puiposes,  and  were 
so  far  forth  independent  of  one  another  as 
their  orders  and  purposes  were  different,  yet 
the  spiritual  order  was  superior  to  the  temporal, 
salvation  of  more  consequence  than  political 
well-being.  In  practice,  the  priority  in  dignity 
of  the  spiritual  order  was  balanced  by  the  fact 
that  the  armed  force  was  in  the  hands  of  the 
State  ;  money  was  more  abundant  in  lay  coffers, 
especially  after  the  rise  of  commerce,  forbidden 
by  canon  law  to  ecclesiastics  ;  and  though  the 
preponderance  of  intellect  and  education  rested 
at  first  with  the  clergy,  yet  that  inequality  came 
in  time  to  be  redressed,  or  even  reversed.  The 
difficulty  was,  that  both  powers  dealt  with  the 
same  subjects,  with  the  same  living  Christian 
men,  women,  and  children,  with  their  persons 
and  with  their  wordly  interests,1  although  not 

1  E.g.  in  marriage  questions. 

M 


1 62  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

from  the  same  point  of  view.  Human  nature 
would  have  needed  to  be  far  more  perfect  than 
as  history  has  known  it,  had  conflicts  of  Church 
and  State  never  arisen.  But  so  there  are  con- 
flicts of  man  and  wife. 

§  88.  I  have  laid  down  the  relations  of 
Church  and  State  briefly,  according  to  the  ex- 
position of  Bellarmine  and  Suarez,  who  assign 
to  the  Church  only  an  indirect,  or  incidental, 
power  in  temporal  matters.  This  doctrine  is 
detailed  with  admirable  clearness  in  Cardinal 
Manning's  The  Vatican  Decrees  in  their  Bear- 
ing on  Civil  Allegiance  (London,  1875),  and  in 
Cardinal  Hergenrother's  "Essay  XIII.,  The 
Power  of  the  Church  in  Matters  Temporal "  (in 
The  Catholic  Church  and  the  Christian  State, 
Vol.  II.  pp.  204-232,  Eng.  transl.).  But  in  Dr. 
Gierke's  Political  Theories  of  the  Middle  Age, 
translated  by  Professor  Maitland  (pp.  12-14, 
105-120),  I  find,  directed  against  Hergenrother, 
a  great  array  of  quotations  purporting  to  show 
that  "  it  is  a  mistake  to  represent  the  great  Popes 
as  proclaiming,  and  the  common  opinion  of  the 
later  Middle  Age  as  accepting,  only  that  sort 
of  '  indirect  power  in  temporalities '  (in  Bellar- 
mine's  sense  of  these  terms)  which  was  claimed 
for  the  Apostolic  See  by  later  theorists  "  (p.  108). 
The  theory  which  Hergenrother  brands  as  an 
extravagance,  —  that  theory  which  is  the  oppo- 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Chit  Authority      163 

site  pole  to  Erastianism,  and  delivers  over  the 
civil  power,  hand  and  foot,  to  the  ecclesiastical, 
—  Dr.  Gierke  will  have  to  be  the  accredited  the- 
ory of  the  Middle  Age.  But  he  admits  that  it 
was  not  the  sole  theory  then  in  vogue,  and  that 
there  coexisted  with  it  another  theory,  which 
is  substantially  the  same  as  Bellarmine's  (pp. 
16-19,  with  notes  38,  49,  50,  jj*i,  pp.  118,  124, 
125).  He  quotes  Petrus  Paludanus  (De  causa 
immediata  eccl.  pot.  a.  4) :  Papa  est  superior  in 
spiritualities,  et  per  consequents  in  temporalibus, 
quatenus  necesse  est  pro  bono  spirituaii:  not 
observing  how  this  sentence  makes  entirely  for 
Bellarmine.  He  relies  on  Augustinus  Trium- 
phus  and  Alvarius  Pelagius,  two  authors  already 
noted  by  Hergenrother  as  extravagant.  The 
extravagant  view  certainly  was  held :  the  ques- 
tion is,  was  it  the  dominant  view  ? x  Of  two 
conflicting  theories,  both  in  the  field  six  centu- 
ries ago,  to  say  which  predominated  requires 
not  only  erudition  and  vast  reading,  but  also  a 
nice  discernment  of  language,  and,  if  the  theo- 
ries are  theological,  a  considerable  acquaint- 
ance with  mediaeval  theology.  Thus,  to  a 
theologian,  the  declaration  in  the  Unam  Sauc- 
ta?n  of  Boniface  VIII.,  that  every  human  crea- 
ture is  subject  to  the  Roman  Pontiff,  means 
that  the  Church  is  of  right  coexistent  with  the 

1  It  is  censured  by  Dante,  Pi(?-gatorio,  c.  xvi. 


164  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

human  race,  and  that  the  Pope  is  supreme  in 
the  Church  for  the  purpose  for  which  the 
Church  exists,  that  is,  for  the  salvation  of 
souls :  no  more  than  that  is  defined,  and, 
therefore,  no  more  than  that  can  be  argued 
from  the  Bull  as  the  belief  of  the  Universal 
Church.1  Nor  can  things  said  of  the  Impera- 
tor  Romanorum  semper  Augustus  be  applied 
without  discretion  to  any  and  every  temporal 
prince :  the  Emperor,  as  none  knows  better 
than  Dr.  Gierke  (cf.  his  n.  35,  p.  118)  was  in  a 
quasi-ecclesiastical   position.2     There    are    buc- 

1  The  reasons  alleged  in  a  papal  bull  definitive  of  doctrine  are 
no  part  of  the  definition.  What  Boniface  says  of  the  "  two 
souls"  (by  accommodation  of  the  text,  Luke  xxii.  38),  and  of 
the  temporal  sword  being  drawn  ''at  the  beck"  {ad  nutiiui)  of 
the  spiritual  power,  will  not  appear  such  a  monstrous  pretension, 
if  we  consider  the  Papacy  as  :  — 

a.  Watching  over  the  defence  of  Christendom  and  civilisation 
against  Islam : 

(3.    A  court  of  arbitration  to  forestall  war. 

We  have  had  our  battles  with  dervishes :  we  are  groaning 
under  the  burden  of  a  costly  war,  and  of  armaments  said  to  be 
on  a  '  peace  footing.'1  War,  like  the  poor,  may  be  destined  to  be 
always  with  us  :  but  the  attempts  of  the  mediaeval  Papacy  to  regu- 
late war  may  claim  to  rank  with  the  efforts  of  modern  philanthropy 
to  alleviate  poverty. 

'2  The  first  thing  to  do  in  order  to  any  understanding  of  the 
mediaeval  relation  of  Pope  and  Emperor  is  to  cast  out  all  modern 
notions  which  attach  to  the  latter  term.  Such  a  book  as  Mr. 
Bryce's  Holy  Roman  E7npire  serves  this  purpose  well.  To  me- 
diaeval eyes  there  could  be  but  one  Emperor  in  Christendom,  one 
Emperor  and  one  Pope.  The  Emperor  was  advocatus  Ecclesiae, 
the  champion  of  Christendom  against  her  temporal  enemies,  the 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     165 

cinatores  in  every  camp :  even  good  men  wax 
hot  and  say  strong  things,  which  are  not  accord- 
ins  to  knowledge.  A  theological  doctrine  is 
first  held  vaguely,  is  then  drawn  into  discus- 
sion, is  exaggerated,  is  contradicted,  and  only 
after  much  tossing  to  and  fro  does  it  assume  a 
definite  scientific  form :  so  Newman  explained 
the  development  of  doctrine.  The  definite,  scien- 
tific, developed  doctrine  of  the  Catholic  Church 
on  the  (ideal)  relations  of  Church  and  State  is 
not  that  which  Dr.  Gierke  has  gathered  from 
sundry  mediaeval  enthusiasts :  it  is  the  doctrine 
of  the  three  Roman  Cardinals,  Bellarmine,  Her- 
genrother,  and  Manning,  and  finally  of  Pope 
Leo  XIII.1 

born  leader  of  Crusades;  and  to  this  intent,  in  St.  IgnatiuVs 
words  (Exercit.  Spir.  de  regno  Christi),  he  was  "a  king,  to  whom 
all  princes  and  all  Christian  men  pay  reverence  and  obedience." 
To  this  intent  he  was  crowned  by  the  Pope.  Till  his  coronation 
the  Church  spoke  of  him  as  'emperor  elect,'  a  title  beyond  which 
the  Emperors  after  Charles  V.  never  cared  to  proceed,  till  the  very 
name  of  Holy  Roman  Empire  perished  in  1806.  This  is  he  for 
whom  a  collect,  Pro  Imperatore,  is  still  printed  in  the  Roman 
missal,  and  for  whom  several  lines  of  prayer,  now  passed  over  in 
silence,  may  be  read  at  the  end  of  the  Exultet,  which  is  sung  on 
Holy  Saturday.  The  Emperor  was  also  a  temporal  prince,  usu- 
ally King  of  Germany.  Who  made  the  Emperor?  is  a  question 
foreign  to  the  scope  of  this  dissertation.  But  it  is  a  different 
question  from  that  other,  Who  made  the  King  of  Germany  or  the 
King  of  England? 

1  Itaque  Dens  human i  generis  procurationem  inter  dicas  po- 
testates  partitus  est,  scilicet  ecclesiasticam  et  civilem,  alteram 
quidem  divinis,  alteram  humauis  rebus  prapositam.     Utraquc 


t  66  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

§  89.  The  bonds  of  Church  and  State  have 
been  loosened  in  our  time.  So  far  as  we  can 
peer  into  proximate  futurity,  the  Church  seems 
likely  in  point  of  fact  to  remain  ranked  among 
those  numerous  voluntary  associations  that  have 
their  rights  safeguarded  by  the  State  in  the  or- 
dinary administration  of  criminal  law  and  main- 
tenance of  contract,  —  associations  that  the  State 


est  in  suo  genere  maxima :  Ziabet  utraqzie  certos  qiiibus  contineatur 
terminos,  eosque  sua  cujusque  natura  causaque  proxima  definitos  ; 
nude  aliquis  velut  orbis  circumscribitur,  in  quo  sua  cujusque  actio 
jure  proprio  versetur.  Sed  quia  utriusque  imperium  est  in 
eosdem,  cum  usuvenire  possit  ut  res  una  atque  eadem,  quamquam 
aliter  atque  aliter,  sed  tamen  eadem  res  ad  utriusque  jus  judi- 
ciumque  pertiueat,  debet  prorndentissimus  Deus,  a  quo  sunt  anibae 
constitute,  utriusque  itinera  rede  atque  ordine  composuisse.  .  .  . 
Quidquid  igitur  est  in  rebus  humanis  quoquo  inodo  sacrum,  quid- 
quid  ad  sa/utem  animarum  cultu/uve  Dei  pertinet,  sive  tale  Mud 
sit  natura  sua,  sh>e  rursus  tale  intelligatur  propter  causam  ad 
quam  refertur,  id  est  omne  in  potestate  arbitrioque  Ecclesia? : 
cetera  vero,  qua  civile  et  politician  genus  complectitur,  rectum 
est  civili  auctoritati  esse  subjecta  (Encyclical,  Immortale  Dei, 
November  1,  1885).  His  Holiness  goes  on  to  speak  of  concor- 
dats as  compromises  favourable  to  the  civil  power.  The  distinc- 
tion of  that  power  from  the  ecclesiastical  is  clearly  recognised. 

As  a  witness  from  the  Middle  Age,  I  quote  St.  Thomas  Aqui- 
nas (Sunima,  2a-2ac,  q.  60,  art.  6,  ad.  3),  Non  est  usurpatum 
judicium  si  spiritual  is  prcelatus  se  intromittat  de  temporalibus, 
quantum  ad  ea  in  quibus  subditur  ei  s&cularis  potestas,  vel  qua> 
ei  a  sa-culari  potestate  reliuquuutur.  The  two  relative  clauses 
are  evidence  that  no  unqualified  subjection  was  expected  of  the 
secular  power. 

I  may  remark  of  concordats  that  they  stand  to  the  essential 
relations  of  Church  and  State  something  as  civil  law  stands  to 
natural  law,  determining  the  indeterminate. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civ  it  Authority      167 

would  act  unwisely  in  endeavouring  to  suppress 
or  absorb.  Should  Christianity  ever  recover 
such  a  hold  on  the  human  heart  as  that  nations 
shall  wish  to  pay  deference  to  the  Church,  and 
recognise  it  as  endowed  with  rights  and  privi- 
leges above  those  of  a  mercantile  company,  not 
on  that  account  must  the  precedents  of  the 
Middle  Ages  all  recur.  We  copy  the  mediae- 
val architecture,  adapting  it  to  our  own  senti- 
ment and  practice.  We  no  longer  build  two 
churches  under  one  roof,  an  open  nave  for  the 
people,  a  screened-off  choir  for  the  clergy.  The 
following  are  some  of  the  differences  that  may 
mark  any  future  resuscitation  of  mediaeval 
Christianity.  They  are  all  differences  for  the 
better. 

(1)  The  clergy  will  never  again  constitute 
the  multitude  of  '  clerks,'  or  educated  persons, 
distinguished  from  the  '  lewd,'  or  illiterate 
'  layfolk.'  There  will  be  no  need  for  a  man 
to  take  Orders  simply  because  he  wants  to 
study. 

(2)  We  are  likely  to  have  seen  the  last  of  epis- 
copal lord  chancellors,  and  of  Cardinal  min- 
isters of  State  in  secular  governments,  —  of 
Wolseys,  Beatons,  Richelieus,  and  Alberonis. 
The  barbarism  of  lay  nobles,  fit  for  nothing 
but  hunting  and  war,  will  no  longer  afford 
an  excuse  for  prelates  living  away  from  their 


1 68  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

dioceses  in  civil  positions,  '  to  keep  out  worse 


men.'1 


(3)  Works  of  education  and  charity,  though 
proper  to  the  clergy,  are  not  their  exclusive 
appanage.  The  intelligent  layman  will  often 
make  a  better  charity  commissioner  or  a  better 
educator  for  purposes  of  this  life. 

(4)  And  generally,  the  spheres  of  civil  and 
ecclesiastical  authority  will  intersect  less,  to  the 
saving  of  interference  and  conflict.2 

§  90.  Had  there  never  been  any  appropria- 
tion of  Church  property  by  the  State,  the 
Church  by  this  time  would  have  been  rich 
beyond  the  bounds  of  calculation.  That  fact 
does  not  justify  the  spoliation ;  but  it  points  to 
a  need  that  would  probably  have  arisen  of  some 
concordat  between  the  ecclesiastical  and  the 
civil  authority,  whereby  the  expenses  which 
now  fall  upon  imperial  and  local  taxation,  and 
upon  the  munificence  of  private  generosity,  for 
educational  purposes  and  the  relief  of  distress, 

1  to  vtto  TrovrjpoTepov  ap^arOni  iav  fJLT)  avrbi  iOeXrj  ap\€tv  (Plato, 
Rep.  347  C). 

2  This  speculation  proceeds  on  the  principle  of  the  division  of 
labour  and  the  necessity  of  specialisation,  things  operative  now  as 
they  were  not  operative  under  the  Plantagenet  and  Tudor  kings. 
The  ways  of  life  have  been  trodden  into  distinctness.  Is  it,  fur- 
ther, too  much  to  hope  that  history  may  not  have  been  written 
in  vain,  and  that  experience  on  both  sides  may  tend  to  render 
strife  less  probable?  ora^ci  8'  iv  vttvio  irpo  KapSias  p.vr\rnT?r)p.iav 
7rdvos,   .   .   .  Sai/wwv  Si  ttov  x^P's  (.-E.schylus,  Again.,  179-182). 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civil  Authority     169 

—  to  say  nothing  of  new  churches  and  foreign 
missions,  —  might  have  been  largely  met  out 
of  existing  Church  revenues.  Wolsey's  endow- 
ment of  his  '  Cardinal  College '  with  the  prop- 
erty of  several  decadent  religious  houses, 
suppressed  by  papal  brief  for  that  purpose, 
gives  an  inkling  of  more  that  might  have  been 
done  but  for  Henry  VIII.  and  his  rapacity. 

§  91.  However  future  history  shall  take  its 
way,  there  remains  the  theoretical  truth,  that 
the  highest  perfection  of  which  mankind  is 
susceptible  is  not  the  official  aim  of  the  State, 
and  cannot  be  directly  reached  by  any  action 
of  the  civil  authority.  The  civil  authority  is 
removens  prohibens  (§  78).  The  perfection  and 
happiness  of  man  is  an  individual  work,  which, 
under  God,  each  man  must  accomplish  in  his 
own  soul.1  It  is  also  a  social  work,  but  the 
society  charged  with  achieving  it  is  not  the 
State. 

§  92.  You  cannot  prove  Christianity  a  priori 
(§  43).  You  cannot  get  Christianity,  as  you 
get  civil  authority,  out  of  human  nature  and 

1  "And  thus,  as  the  whole  city  grows  and  is  well  established, 
we  must  leave  room  for  the  operation  of  nature  allotting  to  the 
several  classes  of  citizens  their  due  participation  in  happiness  " 
(Plato,  Rep.  IV.  421  C).  Every  robust,  clean-cut  individual 
character  is  the  type  of  a  distinct  class,  —  as  divines  say  every 
angel  makes  a  species  by  himself.  Where  State  development 
stops  short,  individual  development  goes  on. 


170  Political  a,7id  Moral  Essays 

natural  exigency.  Christianity  is  not  a  neces- 
sity of  man,  as  man,  though  it  is  a  necessity 
of  the  present  historical  order  of  Provi- 
dence. Had  no  Christianity  been  given  to  us, 
religious  societies  of  some  sort  would  have  had 
to  be  founded.  They  might  have  coincided 
with  the  several  States,  so  that  the  State 
should  have  been  a  civil  commonwealth  under 
one  formality,  a  religious  commonwealth  under 
another,  —  to  borrow  a  comparison  from  Aris- 
totle {Politics,  III.  1276  6),  as  the  same  choris- 
ters may  be  formed  now  into  a  chorus  for 
comedy,  now  for  tragedy,  —  or  as  in  the  days 
of  the  prince-bishops  the  Ecclesia  Dunolmensis 
and  the  Comitatus  Dunolmensis  were  two  as- 
pects of  the  same  quasiStaXe,  where  prince  and 
bishop,  being  one  and  the  same  person,  used  to 
indite  letters  to  each  other.1  Or  otherwise,  the 
boundaries  of  religious  societies  might  have 
outgrown  the  boundaries  of  States,  or  they 
might  have  been  less,  many  religious  bodies  in 
one  State.     That  is  speculation  of  what  might 

1  See  the  Register  of  Bishop  Kellawe,  a.d.  1311-1316,  in  the 
Rolls  Series.  The  mediaeval  conception  of  the  Ecclesia  Roman  a 
and  the  Imperium  Romanmn  was  similar,  one  body  with  two 
formalities,  intended  to  gather  into  itself  the  entire  world.  Simi- 
lar, yet  not  altogether  alike :  for,  according  to  the  distinction  of 
formalities,  there  was  to  be  a  distinction  of  heads,  the  Pope  and 
the  Emperor.  This  bears  out  what  I  have  written  of  the  distinc- 
tion of  the  temporal  from  the  spiritual  power. 


Origin  and  Extent  of  Civ  it  Authority      171 

have  been,  nay,  of  what  in  the  present  condi- 
tion of  Christendom  actually  is.  Still,  by  posi- 
tive divine  institution,  the  one  Church  of  Christ 
holds  the  field.  To  her  it  is  given  to  supple- 
ment the  State,  and  to  operate  beyond  the 
farthest  reach  of  civil  authority,  —  rinding  man 
a  citizen  of  earth,  to  exalt  his  conversation  and 
citizenship  to  heaven :  r^koiv  yap  to  iroXiTevfxa  lv 
ovpavols  vTrdp-^ei  (Phil.  iii.  20). 


& 


APPENDIX 

To  the  Catholic  theologian,  preoccupied  with  his  own 
science,  and  indeed  to  any  mind  that  has  concerned  itself 
with  the  Bible  rather  than  with  anthropology  and  geology, 
the  term  '  primitive  man '  does  not  mean  the  man  whose 
bones  and  stone  implements  are  turned  up  in  quaternary 
deposits,  —  the  man  whose  social  condition  is  estimated  by 
observation  of  the  social  condition  of  savages,  —  but  it 
means  Adam  and  his  children  strictly  so  called,  that  is, 
the  sons  and  daughters  born  to  him  of  his  wife  Eve.  A 
lorious  creature  as  he  came  from  the  hands  of  his 
Creator,  Adam  must  have  still  retained  after  his  fall 
much  of  that  knowledge  of  God  and  of  the  moral  law 
wherewith  his  Maker  had  endowed  him.  Thus  he  knew 
the  unlawfulness  of  divorce  and  of  polygamy  (Matt.  xix.  5), 
and  taught  the  same,  as  we  may  suppose,  to  his  children  ; 
although  of  polygamy  we  have  an  early  record  in  Gen.  iv.  19. 
No  Christian  anthropologist  would  call  Adam  a  savage  ;  or 
deny  that  Adam  and  Eve  and  their  immediate  offspring 
constituted  a  perfect  family,  antecedent  to  the  formation 
of  any  State.  What  the  anthropologist  will  not  allow  is  that 
we  have  any  Biblical  evidence,  or  any  evidence  whatever, 
of  the  perfect  family  existing  as  an  institution  over  any 
wide  area  of  the  earth  in  the  930  years  of  Adam's  life,  or 
generally  in  the  earliest  age  of  humanity  ;  and  by  '  human- 
ity '  I  mean  here  a  multitude  of  '  much  people '  and  a  race 
of  mankind. 

Apparently,  man  is  by  origin  a  tropical  animal.  He  still 
delights,  when  the  climate  will  allow  him,  to  live  out  of  doors, 
to  eat  and  drink  al  fresco,  and  part  with  much  of  his  other- 

173 


1 74  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

wise  enforced  burden  of  clothing.    But  these  favourable  condi- 
tions of  human  life  seldom  obtain  and  rarely  endure.    In  most 
times  and  places  man  is  engaged,  as  was  foretold   (Gen.  iii. 
17-19),   in   a   struggle    in  which   nature    has    him    by  the 
throat.     The  labours  of  generations  are  requisite  to  over- 
come nature,  to  endow  some   portion   of  the    community 
with   leisure,  to  set  art  and   literature   and   philosophy  on 
their  way,  —  in    a    word,   to    establish    civilisation    and    the 
State.     '  Primitive  man  '  to  the  anthropologist  means  man 
at  the  commencement  of  this  struggle.     How  far  and  by 
what  steps  of  degradation  this  '  primitive  man '  is  separated 
from   the  '  primitive  man  '  of  theology,  the    anthropologist 
does  not  know,  no  one  knows.     It  is  as  though  some  very 
slow   train,    anything   but   a   Scotch   express,   were    traced 
from  Edinburgh  to  the  Border,  and   finally  reappeared  in 
sorry  plight  at    Grantham,  no  one  being  able   to    tell   the 
story  of  its  intermediate  passage.     The   remote  date  now 
assigned  to  early  Assyrian  and  Egyptian  civilisation  makes 
one  wonder  whether  some  strand  of  culture  and  art  has 
not  run  through  all  human  history  from  the  very  first.     If 
that  hypothesis  were  tenable,  it  would  follow  that  at  no  epoch 
were  all  the  men  on  earth  together  in  a  state  of  savagery. 
However,    it    is    generally    argued    that    they    were ;    and 
that   we   have   passed    through    horde    and    totem    group, 
and  matriarchal  and  patriarchal   households,  to  the  tribe, 
and  by  the  tribe  to  the  developed  family  and  State.     No 
one  supposes  that  this  progress  is  made  out  with  accuracy 
and  certainty  for  every  step.     The  study  of  it  involves  many 
plausible  provisional  hypotheses,  hypotheses,  however,  which 
the  student  of  political  philosophy  in  these  days  cannot  afford 
to  shut  his  eyes  to. 


ESSAY    II 

SAVAGES 

The  scientific  study  of  savages  is  dignified 
with  the  name  of  Anthropology.  It  is  a  new 
science.  The  savage  used  to  be  matter  of 
curiosity  and  amusement  to  his  civilised  elder 
brother.  Now  that  brother  sees  in  him,  in  the 
Maori  and  the  Algonquin  and  the  Bushman, 
the  pattern  of  his  own  early  ancestors.  This 
view  has  been  greatly  furthered  by  the  accept- 
ance of  the  Darwinian  theory.  But  anthro- 
pology is  a  science  by  itself  apart  from  biology. 
It  takes  man  when  and  wherever  it  finds  him 
as  a  man,  and  is  not  concerned  to  know  how 
man  came  to  be.  Apart  from  Darwin,  apart 
from  all  derivation  of  the  human  species  from 
lower  forms,  we  may  believe,  if  we  will,  that 
when  there  first  came  to  be  upon  the  earth, 
not  this  individual  man,  or  that  particular 
family,  but  a  race  of  men  and  a  multitude, 
the  race  was  in  the  state  and  condition  of 
savages ;  and  that  from  these  savage  ancestors 
the  most  civilised  races  on  earth  have  been 
evolved    through    ages    of    gradual    progress. 

175 


176  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

This  belief  is  everywhere  dominant :  you  can- 
not open  a  book  of  modern  science  or  philoso- 
phy in  which  it  is  not  presupposed.  Leaving 
biology  out  of  the  question,  the  anthropological 
and  antiquarian  argument  on  which  the  belief 
is  founded  comes  to  this.  Practices,  institu- 
tions, modes  of  thought,  common  to  savages 
and  to  the  remote  ancestors  of  civilised  people, 
and  still  traceable  underneath  the  civilisation 
of  the  said  people,  are  evidence  that  those 
ancestors  were  in  the  same  stage  of  evolution 
in  which  these  savages  now  are.  But  there 
are  innumerable  such  practices,  institutions, 
and  modes  of  thought,  common  features  of 
existing  savages  and  our  ancestors,  and  dis- 
cernible even  in  ourselves:  this  is  proved  by 
many  careful  observations  of  antiquarians  and 
travellers.  The  conclusion  follows.  The  argu- 
ment looks  stronger  when  the  record  of  those 
observations  is  read  than  when  put  in  this 
abstract  syllogistic  form.  To  do  it  justice, 
some  such  books  should  be  read  as  Keane's 
Ethnology  and  Primitive  Man  (Pitt  Press),  and 
the  Anthropology  of  Dr.  Tylor,  of  the  Univer- 
sity Museum,  Oxford. 

When  I  say  that  books  of  modern  science 
and  philosophy  all  presuppose  this  conclusion, 
I  reserve  Catholic  books.  I  cannot  say  how 
far  the  conclusion  is  accepted  in  the  Catholic 


Savages  177 

schools.  My  impression  is  that  it  is  not  defi- 
nitely discussed  there.  Catholic  teachers  are 
taken  up  with  urging  the  necessity  of  a  Cre- 
ator against  extreme  forms  of  Darwinism. 
Their  debate  is  biological,  not  anthropolog- 
ical. Anthropology  does  not  receive  due  at- 
tention in  Catholic  philosophy.  I  mean  that, 
leaving  the  origin  of  man  alone,  and  confin- 
ing ourselves  to  undoubted  facts  of  human 
history,  we  do  not  sufficiently  concern  our- 
selves about  the  moral  and  social  condition 
of  primitive  mankind.  So  far  as  I  know,  there 
is  no  pronouncement  of  the  Church  on  the 
matter.  All  that  the  Church  asserts  is  the 
unity  of  the  human  race,  all  descended  from 
one  ancestor,  all  born  in  original  sin  through 
the  transgression  of  that  ancestor,  and  all  in 
need  of  the  redemption  of  our  common  Saviour. 
Of  course,  the  Church  also  asserts  whatever 
is  meant  and  asserted  by  the  narrative  of  Gen- 
esis. But  the  Church  has  afforded  us  no  au- 
thoritative interpretation  of  that  most  obscure 
narrative.  No  theologian  will  undertake  to 
say  who  were  the  inhabitants  of  the  city  that 
Cain  built.1  Like  all  early  historians,  the 
writer  of  Genesis  is  mainly  concerned  with 
genealogy,  with  the  descent  of  that  particular 
family  which  produced  Abraham  and  the  Jew- 

1  Gen.  iv.  17. 

N 


178  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

ish  people.  He  throws  no  light  on  the  social 
condition  of  earliest  mankind  at  large,  be- 
yond informing  us  that  they  were  very  wicked. 
Whatever  knowledge  Adam  had  in  Paradise, 
we  are  nowhere  told  that  he  was  able  to  per- 
petuate that  knowledge  in  his  children  over 
any  wide  region  of  the  globe.  Abel  had  flocks 
of  sheep,  and  Cain  was  a  husbandman :  but  we 
do  not  read  that  the  domestication  of  animals 
was  generally  practised  from  the  first,  or  that, 
wherever  man  went,  he  mapped  the  earth  out 
into  agricultural  districts.  A  few  may  have 
known  what  the  many  were  ignorant  of,  as 
to  this  day  the  ways  of  Pall  Mall  are  not  the 
ways  of  the  valley  of  the  Zambesi.  Fallen 
into  sin,  struggling  with  a  nature  both  within 
and  without  no  longer  subject  to  him,  roaming 
in  search  of  a  livelihood  over  an  earth  under 
a  curse,  man  would  have  degenerated  rapidly, 
and  soon  fallen  very  low.  The  Church,  I  say, 
is  silent  on  the  subject ;  and  from  my  own 
private  searching  of  the  Scriptures,  I  do  not 
gather  anything  to  settle  the  question  whether 
the  primitive  races  of  mankind,  as  races,  were 
savages  or  not.  Thus  we  are  referred  back 
from  the  Bible  record  to  anthropology.1 

1  The  Bible  was  not  written  for  a  manual  of  anthropology, 
nor  of  any  other  ology,  not  even  of  theology,  of  which  last  it 
affords  the  materials,  but  is  not  a  scientific  treatise.     But  though 


Savages  i 79 

To  the  anthropologist,  'savage'  is  no  term  of 
moral  censure.  It  does  not  mean  'bloodthirsty 
and  ferocious.'  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  lowest 
savages  are  quite  harmless  and  peaceable  in 
their  everyday  life,  hospitable,  and  even  kind 
to  strangers.  A  man  may  be  a  very  good  man 
after  the  fashion  of  his  time,  and  yet  be  a  sav- 
age. Above  the  'savage,'  in  the  scale  of  civili- 
sation, ranks  the  '  barbarian.'  That  again  is  not 
a  term  of  reproach.  The  contemporaries  of  the 
patriarchs  were  'barbarians':  a  'barbaric'  civili- 
sation means,  in  fact,  a  patriarchal  condition  of 
society.  Lastly,  as  regards  the  word  'civilised.' 
All  men  are  more  or  less  civilised,  for  'civilised' 
means  simply  'humanised.'  When  we  speak  of 
'civilised'  times  as  supervening  upon  savage  and 
barbaric  times,  we  mean  times  of  higher  civili- 
sation, —  the  times  of  Tr€iraihevfx4voL  (educated 
and  humanised  mankind)  as  compared  with 
TTaL&evojxevoi  (mankind  under  education).  No 
modern  population  is  yet  through  its  whole 
extent  '  civilised  ' :  nay,  how  many  or  how  few 
individuals  are  there  perfectly  7re7ra.1Setyi.eV01  ? 

Savages  to  the  anthropologist  are  more  inter- 
esting than  the  most  highly  educated  persons, 
at  least  when  he  gets  not  too  much  of  their 
company.     To  his  regret  savages  are  disappear- 

it  does  not  settle  things  for  him,  the  Bible  yields  the  anthropolo- 
gist most  valuable  and  authentic  side-lights. 


i8o  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

ing,  some  dying  out,  others  aping  European 
dress  and  manners,  and  relinquishing  their  own 
deft  handicrafts  to  make  gaudy  third-rate  articles 
in  the  London  or  Manchester  style.  Travellers 
in  the  seventies  of  the  bygone  century  saw  what 
is  not  to  be  seen  now.  Hence  old  books  of 
travels  and  collections  made  years  ago  teach 
things  that  would  not  be  learnt  by  observation 
of  savage  life  as  it  actually  goes  on  at  this  hour. 
If  any  one  would  read  through  the  twenty-six 
volumes  of  the  Lettres  Edifiantes,  and,  being 
a  person  capable  for  that  purpose,  would  note 
down  and  publish  all  that  bears  on  the  man- 
ners and  conditions  of  savages,  he  might  render 
a  service  to  science.1 

Man  is  measured  by  his  tools.  The  evidence 
of  geology  goes  to  show  that  primitive  man 
had  no  tools  but  wood,  presumably,  which  has 
perished  long  ago,  and  stone  tools,  not  ground 
at  first  (though  they  were  ground  later),  but 
sharpened  by  chipping  off  pieces,  and  held  in 
the  hand  without  a  handle.  Better  stone  im- 
plements, and  then  copper,  and  then  iron  in- 
struments, came  later.  It  is  commonly  argued 
from  geology  that  in  the  days  of  primitive  man 
all  mankind  were  savages,  closely  resembling 
the  savages  that  are  now,  or  have  existed  till 

1  The  Lettres  Edifiantes  are  letters  of  French  missionaries  in 
the  eighteenth  century. 


Savages  1 8 1 


<s 


quite  recently.  What  then  is  a  savage  ?  Of 
his  tools  I  have  spoken.  Stone  tools,  and  sticks 
pointed  like  spears  by  charring  in  the  fire: 
with  these  he  digs  up  roots,  with  these  he 
assaults  or  repels  his  enemies,  as  modern  men 
do  with  sword  or  bayonet.  He  is  acquainted 
with  the  use  of  fire.  One  of  the  greatest  efforts 
of  his  life  is  the  kindling  of  fire  by  means  of 
pieces  of  wood,  rubbed  against  each  other,  or 
turned  round,  as  we  turn  a  gimlet,  one  within 
the  other.  The  making  of  a  fire  being  difficult, 
he  is  anxious  not  to  let  his  fire  go  out.1  He  is 
a  cooking  animal,  in  the  sense  that  he  roasts 
things  sometimes,  but  often  devours  them  raw. 
You  may  know  a  savage  from  a  civilised  man 
by  his  food.2  Of  the  food  of  a  civilised  man, 
great  part  is  far  removed  from  the  state  in 
which  nature  originally  presented  it,  so  trans- 
formed as  to  be  quite  unrecognisable  to  the 
eye  for  what  it  originally  was.  The  savage 
eats  things  almost  as  he    finds    them,  berries, 


1  "  And  as  when  a  man  hath  hidden  away  a  brand  in  the  black 
embers  at  an  upland  farm,  one  that  hath  no  neighbours  nigh,  and 
so  saveth  the  seed  of  fire,  that  he  may  not  have  to  seek  a  light 
otherwise,  even  so  did  Odysseus  cover  him  with  the  leaves  " 
(Homer,  Odyssey,  V.,  Butcher  and  Lang).  The  mention  of  the 
"  upland  farm,"  however,  shows  that  this  savage  has  passed  into 
the  barbarian. 

-  This  distinction  is  drawn  out  in  Mr.  E.  G.  Payne's  History 
of  the  New  World  called  America,  2  vols.,  Clarendon  Press. 


1 82  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

roots,  herbs,  nuts,  and  the  flesh  of  hunted 
animals.  He  practises  no  agriculture.  He 
has  no  domestic  animals  but  dogs.  He  is  no 
solitary,  but  lives  in  the  society  of  his  fellows. 
In  his  ordinary  practice  he  is  a  monogamist, 
and  will  not  have  two  wives  at  the  same  time, 
unless  he  is  a  great  man  ;  but  the  family,  as 
we  understand  families,  is  not  yet  formed.  He 
believes  that  he  has  a  soul,  which  he  calls  his 
'  shadow,'  or  his  '  breath.'  He  is  a  great  believer 
in  disembodied  souls  or  spirits,  with  which  he 
peoples  all  nature.  The  capricious  action  of 
these  spirits  stands  in  his  philosophy  for  what 
we  know  as  physical  causes.  It  is  hard  to  say 
what  the  savage  thinks  of  any  Supreme  God : 
but  of  the  spirits  he  is  vastly  afraid,  and  pro- 
pitiates them  with  observances  and  offerings 
of  things  useful  to  himself,  which  he  takes  to 
be  also  useful  to  them. 

But  supposing  all  mankind  to  have  been  at 
some  remote  epoch  together  down  on  the  low 
level  of  savagery,  it  is  a  serious  difficulty  to 
conceive  however  they  can  have  risen  to  civilisa- 
tion. The  lowest  savages  that  we  know  are  not 
progressive  races :  it  does  not  look  as  though 
a  thousand  years  of  existence  would  improve 
them.  If  we  may  trust  the  traditions  of  the 
indigenous  races  of  America  and  other  coun- 
tries,   whenever    an    improvement    has    been 


Savages  183 

effected,  it  has  been  by  means  of  strangers 
from  without,  superior  persons,  coming  in  upon 
and  educating  an  inferior  race.  With  all  the 
world  on  a  dead  level  of  savagery,  there  would 
be  no  superior  persons.  There  was  a  Dutch 
ship  once,  so  the  story  goes,  in  which  all  the 
sailors  in  a  storm  were  lashed  to  the  rigging 
in  such  a  way  that  they  could  not  loosen  them- 
selves, all  except  one,  who  was  to  loosen  the 
rest ;  and  he  lost  his  balance,  and  remained 
hanging  by  his  feet  inextricably,  so  there  was 
no  deliverance  for  any  of  that  crew.  This  is 
one  of  the  many  difficulties  of  anthropology. 
I  have  never  seen  it  considered  and  met.  If 
all  mankind  were  Ainos  ten  thousand  years 
ago,  they  would  probably  be  Ainos  to  this 
day;  or,  possibly,  the  breed  would  have  died 
out.  I  have  a  suggestion  to  meet  this  diffi- 
culty. I  opine  that  there  are  savages  and 
savages :  savages  who  are  such  merely  by  stress 
of  circumstances,  and  other  savages  who  have 
in  their  blood  the  elements  of  degeneracy  and 
degradation;  in  other  words,  progressive  sav- 
ages and  stationary  savages,  just  as  a  farmer 
might  have  on  his  land  stock  that  he  could 
improve  in  time,  and  bad  cattle  that  can 
never  be  improved.  How  came  these  sta- 
tionary savages  to  be?  Principally,  I  take  it, 
by  gross  violation  of  the  natural   laws  of  mar- 


184  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

riage.1  Other  causes,  as  poverty  and  hardship, 
may  have  helped.  The  stationary  savage  then 
is  a  savage  who  has  deteriorated,  coming  of 
better  ancestors,  and  in  his  degeneracy  has 
sunk  so  low  as  to  have  become,  at  least  if 
left  to  himself,  hopeless.  If  this  be  true, — 
and  I  merely  put  it  forward  as  an  hypothesis 
to  be  considered,  — scientific  enquirers  are  com- 
mitting an  error,  when  they  put  together  and 
fuse  into  one  common  mass  of  evidence  all 
particulars  that  they  find,  no  matter  about 
what  savages,  and  argue  thence  the  common 
characteristics  of  the  savage  state.  Instead  of 
that,  they  should  distinguish  savage  from  savage, 
the  savage  progressive  from  the  savage  degene- 
rate and,  of  himself,  unimprovable.  I  think  the 
hypothesis  worthy  of  consideration,  because 
while  there  are  many  observed  facts  of  savage 
life  remaining  savage,  little  or  nothing  has 
been  observed — I  do  not  say,  nothing  has 
been  argued,  but  nothing  has  been  observed  — 
of  savages  actually  making  progress  of  them- 
selves unaided  by  any  superior  race.  More- 
over, observation  of  certain  savages  seems  to 
show  them  destitute  of  all  native  aptitude  for 
progress,  when  left  to  themselves.  Are  we  not 
rash  in  taking  any  and  every  savage  race  that 

1  The  Zulus,  I  am  informed,  do  say  this  of  the  inferior  races 
about  them. 


Savages  185 

we  encounter  for   a  type    of   the  ancestors  of 
civilised  man  ? 

It  may  then  be  a  mistaken  notion,  that  all 
savages  are  on  the  up  grade,  and  have  in  them 
the  capacity  of  progress.  There  is  another 
notion  which  I  think  quite  a  mistake,  that 
whatever  savages  do  and  think  is  wrong,  and 
that  the  thoughts  and  behaviour  of  barbarians 
also  are  for  the  most  part  wrong.  Were  that  the 
case,  there  would  be  no  progressiveness  either 
in  savage  or  barbarian.  Many  things  that  such 
people  do  may  be  quite  right  in  them,  though 
an  identical  conduct  would  be  wrong  in  us.  I 
do  not  merely  mean  that  they  know  no  better, 
and  so  are  excused  for  their  ignorance.  I  mean 
that,  and  something  more  than  that.  Things 
that  do  not  befit  us  are  sometimes  the  best 
things  available  to  the  savage  in  his  savage 
state,  and  are  objectively  right  in  him,  inasmuch 
as  they  do  so  befit  him.  If  he  is  converted  to 
Christianity,  —  and  he  ought  to  be  converted, 
when  Christianity  meets  him  in  a  form  that  he 
can  appreciate,  —  then  he  is  raised  to  a  higher 
state,  and  those  habits  of  an  inferior  being  befit 
him  no  longer :  they  would  be  in  him,  if  he 
continued  them  after  his  conversion,  inappro- 
priate, indecorous,  and  sinful.  Morality  is  con- 
duct befitting  human  nature.  But  "  human 
nature    is   changeable,    and  therefore  what    is 


1 86  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

natural  to  man  may  sometimes  fail  to  hold 
good." 1  What  befits  the  civilised  man  does 
not  exactly  and  in  all  points  befit  the  barba- 
rian ;  and  points  of  good  conduct  proper  to 
the  barbarian  cannot  be  expected  of  the  savage. 
The  natural  law  is  the  eternal  law  received 
in  human  consciences  as  a  norm  of  action. 
Where  humanity  is  imperfect,  the  reception  is 
imperfect,  and  the  law  does  not  fully  hold. 

You  cannot  bind  men  to  a  standard  of  con- 
duct, the  cogent  reasonableness  of  which  they  not 
only  do  not  see,  but  are  incapable  of  apprehend- 
ing. The  ideal  standard  of  rectitude  is  not 
obligatory  to  its  full  height  upon  such  incapac- 
ity. The  incapacity  of  individuals  here  and 
there  we  may  pass  over.  Law  is  not  framed 
to  suit  individuals  in  their  individual  varieties : 
law  is  a  standard  of  action  for  a  community. 
Only  when  a  whole  people  is  found  incapable 
of  it,  can  the  fulness  of  the  natural  law  be 
said  to  suffer  derogation.  And  we  must  not 
exaggerate  the  deficiencies  of  savage  nature. 
Like  the  scars  and  rifts  in  a  mountain  side,  the 
varieties  of  human  nature  are  accidental,  not 
substantial ;  and  the  saying  holds  good  of  man 
even  more  perhaps  than  of  mountains,  that  man 
is  now  at  heart  and  in  the  main  what  man  was 
at    the    beginning   of   history.     Therefore   the 

1  St.  Thomas,  2a-2',',,  q.  57,  art.  2,  ad.  1. 


Savages  1S7 

changes  in  the  natural  law  are  accidental, 
not  substantial.  Those  '  primary  precepts,'  or 
primary  moral  judgments  known  as  synderesis, 
have  never  changed  :  but  certain  '  secondary ' 
and  derivative  precepts  have  under  certain  cir- 
cumstances not  been  applicable,  or  advisable 
for  any  legislator,  even  the  Highest,  to  enforce. 
We  must  love  our  neighbour,  says  synderesis, 
but  is  an  enemy  a  neighbour?  A  fellow-citizen 
of  Pericles  would  not  have  owned  him  for 
such ;  nor,  I  suspect,  many  of  the  subjects  of 
King  Solomon.  For  centuries,  charity  was 
tribal,  and  a  stranger  came  near  to  the  rank 
of  an  enemy.  It  would  never  do  in  England, 
when  a  murder  is  committed,  to  punish  the 
whole  district  until  the  offender  is  detected  and 
brought  to  justice :  that  would  be  to  punish  the 
innocent  with  the  guilty,  an  unrighteous  pro- 
ceeding. But  among  the  Kaffirs  this  system  of 
vicarious  responsibility,  or  the  liability  of  the 
neighbourhood  for  crimes  committed  in  it,  is 
said  to  be  the  sole  method  of  prevention  of 
crime  :  it  suits  that  barbarian  people,  they  ex- 
pect it,  and  it  is  the  right  way  of  dealing  with 
them.1  We  have  here  the  key,  I  think,  to  the 
perplexities  of  Old  Testament  morality.  The 
men  that  we  read  of  in  the  Old  Testament  were 

1  On  vicarious  responsibility,  see  St.  Thomas,  2a-2ae,  q.   108, 
art.  4,  ad.  1  and  2  (in  Aquinas  Ethicus,  II.  210,  211). 


1 88  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

not  savages,  but  they  were  what  are  called 
technically  '  barbarians,'  ormen  in  the  patriarchal 
stage  of  civilisation ;  and  God  governed  them 
and  legislated  for  them  according  to  the  condi- 
tion that  they  were  in,  —  He  made  the  best  of 
His  materials,  —  not  as  He  governs  us  and 
legislates  for  us,  since  the  Sermon  on  the 
Mount.  Patriarchal  virtue  is  not  Christian 
virtue,  but  falls  short  of  it  in  many  respects. 

There  is  on  the  earth  in  our  time  a  Power, 
with  a  function  to  arrest  and  remedy  the  decay 
of  natural  law,  as  well  by  promulgating  the 
law  in  its  full  amplitude,  as  also  by  rendering 
it  practicable  and  possible  of  observance  in 
that  same  fulness.  The  living  authority  of  the 
Church  teaches  morality,  sometimes  by  explicit 
decree,  but  usually  by  the  writings  of  her  ap- 
proved moral  theologians,  by  the  tradition 
of  the  Moral  School  preserved  among  her 
clergy,  and  by  the  practice  of  the  confessional. 
Thus,  wherever  her  influence  goes,  the  Church 
maintains,  fixes,  and  crystallises  the  natural 
law.  But  if  the  Church  merely  kept  the 
theory  complete,  and  did  not  assist  the  practice 
of  the  law,  the  law  might  still  sink  into  abey- 
ance in  certain  points  for  lack  of  capacity  in 
human  kind  to  fulfil  it.  There  are  points  of 
the  natural  law,  such  as  the  forgiveness  of 
enemies,  and  generally  the  restraint  of  the  more 


Savages  189 


imperious  passions,  which  it  is  impossible  to 
observe  steadily  and  regularly  without  the  grace 
of  Christ.  The  public  channels  of  this  grace 
are  the  Sacraments  and  ordinances  of  the 
Church.  Mere  promulgation  of  the  law,  with- 
out supply  of  aids  to  keep  it,  would  put  the 
hearer  in  a  false  position,  as  St.  Paul  insists, 
writing  to  the  Galatians  and  Romans.  Better 
have  no  promulgation,  and  let  such  arduous 
observances  go  by  the  board,  as  indeed  they 
did  in  pre-Christian  times,1  than  have  the  law 
promulgated,  and  so  with  full  knowledge  broken, 
and  formal  sin  committed.2 

It  may  be  asked :  Since  natural  law,  or  the 
sum  of  recognised  reasonable  requirements  in 
the  matter  of  human  conduct,  grows  with  the 
development  of  human  society,  and  since 
human  society  cannot  be  supposed  to  have 
yet  attained  its  full  stature  and  perfection, 
may  we  not  look  for  a  heightening  of  human 
duty  by  a  further  extension  of  natural  law? 
May  not,  for  instance,  certain  points  of  charity 
and  almsgiving,  now  regarded  as  counsels 
only,  pass  into  downright  commands  and  exi- 
gencies of  human  nature  in  its  further  perfec- 
tion?    I  believe  Aristotle  would  have  replied 

1  See  my  Notes  on  St.  Paid,  on  Rom.  iii.  25,  26;  v.  13,  14. 

2  Rom.  vii.  7—1 1 .  See  the  late  Cardinal  Mazzella,  S.  J., 
De gratia  Christi,  pp.  247-268,  ed.  1878,  Washington. 


190  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

in  the  negative :  rj  <f>vai<;  ovk  els  dneLpoi',  he 
might  have  said :  there  are  limits  to  the  per- 
fectibility of  every  nature  or  kind  in  this  world. 
Remaining  mortal,  remaining  an  animal  of 
limited  reason  and  beset  with  passion,  there 
are  limits  to  the  moral  perfection  to  be  ex- 
pected of  a  being  such  as  man.  Mr.  Herbert 
Spencer  .apparently  thinks  otherwise.  He  has 
such  faith  in  the  hereditary  transmission  of 
qualities,  that  he  looks  forward  to  a  far-off 
period  to  come,  when  man  will  do  his  duty 
with  the  same  zest  and  enthusiasm  with  which 
an  artist  goes  about  his  work.  Perhaps  hered- 
ity may  be  helped  out  to  this  conclusion,  as 
others  have  proposed,  by  the  gradual  system- 
atic extermination  of  the  incapable  members 
of  the  human  family ;  or,  as  others  recommend, 
by  the  bringing  on  of  socialism,  and  the  extinc- 
tion of  the  greed  of  private  capital.  But  this 
is  a  consummation  too  far  off  to  be  worth  argu- 
ing about.  Meanwhile  popular  sentiment  bids 
fair  to  insist  upon  certain  observances,  not 
heretofore  considered  as  morally  binding,  and 
to  erect  them  into  terms  of  communion  in 
civilised  society.  I  refer  to  such  points  as 
cleanliness,  hygiene,  physical  training,  preven- 
tion of  pain,  and  kind  treatment  of  the  lower 
animals.  These  are  human  commandments  in 
process    of    enactment.     But    with    these    new 


Savag&s  i 9 i 

enactments,  whatever  their  moral  force,  is  there 
not  coming  in  a  certain  disregard  of  the  deca- 
logue ?  The  new  era  does  not  promise  to  be 
conspicuous  for  worship  of  the  true  God,  nor 
for  obedience  to  parents ;  it  threatens  the  over- 
throw of  dogmatic  religion  and  the  weakening 
of  the  family  tie.  The  recognised  area  of 
moral  obligation  seems  to  be  moving  slowly, 
like  a  glacier,  advancing  to  new  ground,  but 
leaving  old  ground  uncovered.  Purity  and 
meekness  cannot  be  said  to  be  coming  into 
greater  voo;ue.  The  standard  of  these  virtues, 
upheld  by  the  Christian  Church,  and  by  her 
insisted  upon  as  of  natural  obligation,  is  high 
above  the  average  practice  of  the  most  civilised 
societies  of  to-day.  It  will  be  long  enough  be- 
fore human  nature  grows  so  perfect  as  to  exact 
any  higher  observance  than  that  of  the  purity 
and  meekness  prescribed  in  the  Sermon  on  the 
Mount  and  the  acceptation  of  that  discourse 
traditional  in  the  Catholic   Church.1 

But  it  is  time  to  return  to  our  savages. 
There  are  people  who  would  agree  to  this, 
that  what  savages  do  is  sometimes  right  in 
them  when  it  would  be  wrong  in  us ;  but 
then   they  go   round   nearly  so  far  as  to  hold 

1  On  the  variability  of  the  moral  standard,  see  Dr.  Fowler's 
Progressive  Morality,  or  Fowler  and  Wilson's  Principles  of 
Morals,  Pt.  II.  pp.  227-248. 


192  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

that  what  was  right  in  the  savage  is  always 
wrong  in  us,  —  that  it  is  always  wrong  in 
us  to  cherish  any  beliefs  or  practices  that  can 
be  traced  to  the  beliefs  and  practices  of  our 
savage  ancestors.  They  would  have  us  put 
off  the  savage  with  all  his  works  and  ways, 
as  though  his  religion  were  a  sheer  delusion, 
and  his  poor  makeshift  for  a  philosophy  radi- 
cally erroneous.  For  example :  the  savage  is 
convinced  that  he  has  a  soul,  though  he  hardly 
rises  to  the  conception  of  an  immaterial  being: 
he  peoples  the  air  and  the  woods  with  ghosts, 
the  shadowy  forms  of  his  ancestors :  he  ascribes 
the  operations  of  nature  to  ghostly  agencies: 
he  is  anxious  to  propitiate  these  unseen  powers 
with  prayers  and  offerings :  his  idea  of  sacrifice 
is  to  give  to  the  ghost  or  ghoul  something  that 
the  latter  is  in  need  of,  or  is  glad  to  have,  as 
we  fee  a  physician :  the  thing  offered  is  burnt 
or  put  to  death,  because  by  death  or  by  fire  it 
passes  to  the  world  of  spirits,  and  so  reaches 
him  whom  it  is  meant  to  propitiate.  There- 
fore, it  is  argued,  we  can  have  no  souls :  did 
not  our  savage  forefathers  think  of  the  soul  in 
a  grotesque  way?  and  is  not  that  argument 
enough  to  show  that  we  have  no  souls  at  all  ? 
And,  by  the  same  reasoning,  all  belief  in  angels 
is  utterly  fond  and  foolish.  Say  the  same  of 
all  prayers   put  up  to  Heaven  for  aid   in  our 


Savages  193 

bodily  necessities:  we  recognise  laws  of  nature, 
whereof  the  savage  had  no  idea ;  and  where 
laws  of  nature  obtain,  what  room  is  there  left 
for  divine  interference  ?  As  for  sacrifice, 
either  you  believe  in  no  God  at  all,  or  you 
believe  in  a  God  who  is  self-sufficient  and  in 
need  of  nothing:  either  way  the  tradition  of 
sacrifice,  come  down  from  days  of  savagery, 
must  be  dropped.  Because  God  is  in  need  of 
nothing,  it  would  seem,  He  is  not  pleased  to  be 
honoured  by  His  creatures.  Because  His  chil- 
dren's presents  are  trifles  in  themselves,  the 
Father  does  not  care  to  have  them.  Reasoners 
of  this  cast  really  believe  in  no  personal  God 
at  all,  that  is  to  say,  not  in  any  God  who  has 
any  will  and  choice.  Did  not  savages  worship 
a  Great  Spirit  ?  and  is  not  that  enough  to  con- 
firm civilised  man  in  the  rejection  of  every 
form  of  '  anthropological '  Deity  ?  To  the  civ- 
ilised man,  disciple  of  Comte,  it  is  quite  enough. 
I  refer,  of  course,  to  Comte's  three  stages  of 
human  thought,  the  Theological,  the  Metaphys- 
ical, and  the  Positive  stage ;  the  first  stage 
being  subdivided  into  fetishism,  polytheism, 
and  monotheism.  Savage  life  begins  in  the 
first  subdivision  of  the  Theological  stage ;  and 
civilisation,  according  to  this  authority,  ends  in 
the  Positive  stage,  where  the  method  of  physi- 
cal science  reigns  supreme   and  sole,  and    no 


194  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

causation  is  recognised  but  that  of  physical 
causes,  as  they  are  the  concern  of  the  physicist. 
Thus  for  everything  there  is  a  mechanical,  or 
chemical,  or  biological  explanation,  and  we  can 
explain  no  further.  In  this  system,  carried  to 
extremes,  each  successive  stage  is  attained  by 
the  utter  wreck  and  abolition  of  the  previous 
stage.  C  is  the  undoing  of  B,  as  B  was  of  A  ; 
as  though  youth  kept  nothing  of  childhood, 
and  maturity  killed  and  cast  out  youth. 

This  is  not  evolution  and  orderly  develop- 
ment, but  a  processus  per  saltum  of  revolution 
and  catastrophe.  Nor  is  there  any  guarantee 
that  the  Positive  stage  and  the  dominance  of 
physical  science  will  be  final.  It  may  be  swept 
away  to  make  room  for  a  Spiritualist  stage, 
occupied  by  nothing  but  thoughts ;  and  that 
again  may  give  place  to  a  Pessimist  stage, 
which  will  exhibit  the  vanity  of  all  thinking, 
and  lay  bare  the  essential  misery  of  con- 
sciousness even  to  western  minds. 

Philosophy  has  no  liking  for  cataclysms:  it 
is  a  respecter  of  the  thoughts  of  men  that  have 
been  from  the  beginning,  cogitationes  antiquas, 
fideles.  Science  is  the  study  of  continuities. 
The  savage  is  continuous  with  civilised  man  ; 
and  the  thoughts  of  the  savage  should  have 
their  analogue  in  the  most  highly  educated 
thought  of  our  day.     So  far  from  the  belief  of 


Savages  195 

the  savage  in  a  world  of  spiritual  beings,  in 
prayer,  in  a  ritual  of  propitiation,  militating 
against  any  similar  beliefs  being  still  entertained 
by  us,  it  furnishes  some  reason  why  we  should 
entertain  such  beliefs,  —  improve  upon  them, 
but  not  utterly  discard  them. 


ESSAY    III 

CASUISTRY 

Casuistry  is  the  study  of  cases  of  conscience. 
Its  aim  is  to  define  the  exact  limits  and  fron- 
tiers of  wrong-doing.  The  casuist  says  to  a 
man :  '  Thus  far  mayest  thou  go,  but  no 
farther :  another  step  is  wickedness.'  He 
does  not  invite  him  to  go  even  so  far.  To 
fix  a  mark  on  the  ice  by  way  of  showing  that 
it  is  unsafe  to  go  beyond,  is  not  any  recom- 
mendation of  the  ice  immediately  short  of  that 
mark  to  the  special  attention  of  skaters.  He  is 
a  useful  man  who  places  such  marks  on  the  ice, 
provided  he  lays  them  judiciously,  neither  assum- 
ing the  objects  of  his  care  to  be  as  light  as  gos- 
samer nor  as  heavy  as  wagons.  So  we  might 
have  thought  the  casuist  to  be  a  useful  man, 

O 

and  one  entitled  to  public  favour  and  con- 
sideration. But  in  fact  he  is  very  unpopular, 
he  and  his  art.  If  we  might  define  it  accord- 
ing to  the  ordinary  English  estimate  of  it,  we 
should  say:  Casuistry  is  the  art  of  minimising, 
and  teaching  others  to  minimise,  moral  obliga- 
tions as  well  in  speculation  as  in  practice. 

197 


198  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

Sir  James  Mackintosh,  for  example,  writes 
thus  :  "  The  tendency  of  casuistry  is  to  discover 
ingenious  pretexts  for  eluding  that  rigorous 
morality  and  burdensome  superstition,  which 
in  the  first  ardour  of  religion  are  apt  to  be 
established,  and  to  discover  rules  of  conduct 
more  practicable  by  ordinary  men  in  the 
common  state  of  the  world.  The  casuists 
first  let  down  morality  from  enthusiasm  to 
reason ;  then  lower  it  down  to  the  level  of 
general  frailty,  until  it  be  at  last  sunk  in  loose 
accommodation  to  weakness,  and  even  vice." ' 

It  would  be  idle  to  pretend  that  there  is  no 
danger  of  this  abuse  ever  occurring.  "  The 
Jesuits,"  as  Sir  James  goes  on  to  tell  us, 
"  were  the  casuists  of  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury." The  General  Congregations  of  the 
Order,  assembled  in  the  course  of  that  century, 
passed  repeated  decrees  against  "  novelties 
and  laxities  of  opinion  in  matters  of  moral." 
It  is  not  the  wont  of  these  Congregations  to 
legislate  against  wholly  imaginary  dangers. 
But  there  is  a  higher  authority  in  the  Catholic 
Church,  ever  vigilant  to  prevent  the  keen 
intellects  of  moral  professors  from  whittling 
away  the  law  which  they  are  set  to  expose. 
No  great  extravagance  of  casuistry  will  ever  go 
unrebuked  at   Rome.     And  the  rebuke  is  writ- 

1  Memoirs.  I.  p.  41 1. 


Casuistry  199 

ten  down  and  preserved  as  a  warning  to 
future  generations.  Innocent  XI,  in  1679, 
condemned  sixty-five  moral  axioms  together 
as  lax  or  loosely  worded.  Here  are  some  of 
them :  — 

"  With  a  cause  it  is  lawful  to  take  an  oath 
without  any  intention  of  swearing,  as  well  in 
trifles  as  in  grave  matters." 

"  He  satisfies  the  Church's  precept  of  hear- 
ing Mass,  who  hears  two  parts  of  it,  or  even 
four  together,  said  by  different  Celebrants  at 
the  same  time." 

"  It  is  lawful  to  steal,  not  only  in  extreme  but 
even  in  grave  necessity." 

No  professor  of  casuistry  in  a  Catholic  semi- 
nary, who  valued  his  place,  would  venture  to 
teach  any  proposition  that  had  ever  been  con- 
demned at  Rome. 

The  Church  has  every  reason  for  watching 
with  jealous  eyes  over  what  we  may  call  the 
purity  of  casuistry.  For  as  cases  are  solved 
in  her  schools,  so  are  they  decided  in  her 
confessionals :  the  one  is  a  preparation  for 
the  other.  And  the  confessional  is  a  vital 
organ  of  the  Catholic  Church.  Where  it 
works  healthily,  she  flourishes  and  thrives : 
where  it  is  out  of  order  and  ceases  to  act 
normally,  her  very  existence  is  there  threatened. 
And  this  lets  us  into  the  reason  why  casuistry 


200  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

is  unpopular  in  England:  it  is  unpopular  as  the 
confessional  is  unpopular.  The  study  of  the 
law  is  wrapped  in  the  same  cloud  of  odium 
which  rests  upon  the  court  where  that  law  is 
administered.  It  came  very  well  from  Pascal 
and  other  writers  of  Jansenist  proclivities  to 
lampoon  casuists  and  turn  casuistry  into  a 
byword  of  reproach:  this  same  school  virtually 
abolished  the  confessional  also,  by  making  it 
to  be  really,  under  their  direction,  what  the 
heretics  at  the  time  of  the  Council  of  Trent 
had  mendaciously  styled  it,  a  carnificina 
conscientiariim,  "  a  torture-chamber  of  con- 
sciences."1 If  Jansenism  had  held  its  way,  and 
had  not  been  restrained  by  the  hand  of  God, 
and  by  the  vigorous  action  of  Popes  like 
Innocent  X  and  Clement  XI,  there  would 
have  soon  been  no  more  casuistry,  for  people 
would  have  ceased  to  go  to  confession. 

Casuistry  is  the  study  of  the  law  which  is 
administered  in  the  confessional.  It  is  by  no 
mere  metaphor  that  the  confessional  is  called 
"the  tribunal  of  penance."  The  Council  of 
Trent,'2  speaking  with  dogmatic  precision,  says 
that  Christ  being  about  to  ascend  into  Heaven 
"left  priests  behind  in  place  of  Himself  as 
judges,  that  all  crimes,  amounting  to  mortal 
sin,  into  which  Christ's  faithful  ever  fell,  miorht 

1  Cone.  Trid.  Sess.  14,  c.  5.  2  Sess.  14.  c.  5. 


Casuistry  201 

be  brought  under  their  cognisance,  in  order 
that,  using  the  power  of  the  keys,  they  might- 
pronounce  sentence  of  remission  or  retention"; 
and  further,  that  priests  "could  not  exercise 
this  power  of  judgment  without  examination 
of  the  case  " ;  and  again,  in  the  ninth  canon  of 
the  same  Session,  the  Council  anathematises 
"any  one  who  shall  say  that  the  sacramental 
absolution  of  the  priest  is  not  a  judicial  act." 
Every  time  that  a  priest  is  seated  in  the  con- 
fessional, he  is  there  as  a  judge.  He  must,  then, 
possess  jurisdiction  as  well  as  order;  other- 
wise his  acts  are  invalid,  and  his  absolution 
goes  for  nothing.  He  must  be  in  fact  either 
the  ecclesiastical  superior  of  his  penitent,  or 
the  delegate  of  that  superior.  Being  a  judge, 
he  is  bound  to  decide  according  to  the  law  of 
the  court  where  he  sits  —  the  court  of  con- 
science it  is  called.  The  law  there  current 
presents  many  nice  points  for  decision.  The 
study  of  these,  as  I  have  said,  is  casuistry. 
It  is  essential  to  the  training  of  a  priest.  It 
is  matter  of  professional  interest  to  him,  and 
occasionally  of  keen  discussion,  as  the  treat- 
ment of  wounds  is  to  a  surgeon. 

The  law  which  governs  the  decisions  of  the 
tribunal  of  penance  is,  first,  the  law  of  the 
ten  commandments,  which  is  the  natural  law 
of  God;  then  the  law  of  faith  and  of  the  sac- 


202  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

raments,  which  is  the  positive  law  of  God ; 
then  the  canon  law,  which  is  made  by  the 
Church ;  and  the  civil  law  of  each  particular 
country,  so  far  as  it  is  addressed  to  consciences. 
The  science  which  is  conversant  with  all  these 
varieties  of  law,  so  far  as  they  have  any  bear- 
ing on  the  confessional,  is  called  moral  theo- 
logy. Moral  theology  gives  the  general 
principles,  which  casuistry  applies  to  particu- 
lar cases.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  the 
word  '  casuistry '  is  hardly  ever  heard  in  the 
Catholic  schools.  We  say  of  one  who  is  a  re- 
feree in  cases  of  conscience,  not  that  he  is  a 
good  casuist,  but  that  he '  is  a  good  moral 
theologian. 

Moral  theology  is  principally  made  up  of 
two  other  sciences,  that  of  moral  philosophy 
and  that  of  canon  law,  without  however 
being  identical  with  either  of  them  singly  or 
with  both  of  them  put  together.  We  will  ex- 
amine how  each  of  the  two  sciences  named 
enters  into  moral  theology.  And  first  of 
moral  philosophy.  That  science  has  two 
branches  —  Ethics,  which  deals  principally  with 
the  theory  of  right  and  wrong,  and  the  exact 
import  of  those  two  ideas ;  and  Natural  Law, 
which  defines  what  actions  are  obligatory  or 
wrong  of  themselves  and  by  the  nature  of 
things,     antecedently     to     any     positive     law, 


Casuistry  203 

human  or  divine,  but  not  of  course  antece- 
dently to  the  Eternal  Law,  which  is  the  will 
of  God  enacting  whatever  the  nature  of  things 
requires.  Ethics  concern  the  moral  theolo- 
gian much  as  biology  is  the  concern  of  the 
physician.  The  latter  must  have  correct  bio- 
logical notions,  the  former  right  ethical  no- 
tions. A  biological  fad  might  set  a  doctor 
wrong  in  his  practice  on  a  nice  point  and  ex- 
traordinary case,  where  he  would  have  to  be 
guided  by  theory  rather  than  by  routine  and 
direct  experience.  Many  patients  in  bygone 
ages  suffered  from  their  doctor's  biological 
fads,  ideas  of  '  humours,'  '  vital  spirits,'  con- 
traria  contrariis,  and  so  forth.  In  like  man- 
ner, one  who  held  the  utilitarian  view  of 
morality,  which  we  presume  is  not  a  correct 
ethical  notion,  would  be  likely  to  be  over  lib- 
eral in  allowing  deception  or  the  taking  of  life, 
where  the  public  good  seemed  to  require  it. 
He  would  not  have  that  idea  of  the  sanctity  of 
human  life,  or  of  divine  truth,  or  of  heavenly 
purity  either,  which  comes  of  sound  ethics,  and 
is  necessary  in  practical  issues  to  enable  us 
firmly  to  refuse  to  barter  golden  right  for 
brazen  expediency. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  physician  need  not 
remember  all  the  grounds  and  arguments  on 
which  his  correct  biological  notions  rest.     It  is 


204  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

well  that  in  youth  he  should  have  made  some 
study  of  these  grounds,  and  even  have  been 
examined  in  them  as  in  a  point  of  preparatory 
learning,  previous  to  his  taking  his  degree : 
but  this  learning  is  after  all  only  preparatory, 
and  the  increase  of  it,  or  even  the  retention  of 
it,  is  not  necessary  to  that  competency  of  sci- 
ence and  skill  which  warrants  him,  not  only  in 
bearing  the  name,  but  in  doing  the  work  of 
a  doctor  of  medicine.  Nor  need  the  moral 
theologian  and  practising  confessor  be  versed 
in  the  controversies  which  lead  to  correct  con- 
clusions and  to  the  refutation  of  errors  in  eth- 
ics :  though  it  is  well  that  some  of  his  youthful 
ardour  of  enquiry  should  have  been  expended 
upon  these  points. 

Not  the  whole  of  ethics,  then,  enters  into 
moral  theology.  But  when  we  come  to  en- 
quire how  much  knowledge  of  natural  law 
the  moral  theologian  as  such  should  possess, 
the  answer  must  be  a  universal  and  a  sweeping 
one:  all  natural  law.  The  whole  of  this  sci- 
ence seems  to  be  comprehended  in  moral  theo- 
logy. Even  the  labour  question,  rent  and 
usury,  the  origin  of  property  and  of  the  civil 
power,  the  respect  due  to  the  one  and  to  the 
other,  the  exposition  of  the  follies  of  Rousseau 
and  of  the  Socialists,  —  all  these  topics  are  full 
of  matter  of  conscience ;  and  a  scientific  grasp 


Casuistry  205 

of  them  belongs  to  the  confessor  who  is  thor- 
oughly prepared  to  deal  with  all  sorts  and  con- 
ditions of  souls. 

To  moral  theology  there  also  belongs  a 
considerable  portion,  but  by  no  means  the 
whole,  of  canon  law.  The  latter  is  the  law 
of  the  exterior  tribunals  of  the  Church  ;  and 
as  this  law  binds  the  conscience,  and  is  made 
expressly  for  the  salvation  of  souls,  and  deals 
with  spiritual  matters,  such  as  the  Sacraments, 
it  needs  must  largely  regulate  procedure  in 
the  interior  tribunal,  or  court  of  conscience, 
which  is  the  sacrament  of  penance.  One  has 
but  to  take  up  any  of  the  ordinary  text-books 
of  moral  theology,  and  mark  the  quantity  of 
canon  law  that  it  contains,  making  perhaps 
as  much  as  one  third  of  the  whole.  The  com- 
mandments of  the  Church  belong  to  canon 
law :  so  also  do  the  provisions  for  the  lawful 
administration  of  the  Sacraments  and  the 
celebration  of  Mass :  also  questions  of  jurisdic- 
tion in  the  sacrament  of  penance,  and  re- 
served cases :  likewise  the  censures,  as  they 
are  called,  of  excommunication,  suspension,  and 
interdict ;  and  last,  but  not  least,  the  ecclesiasti- 
cal impediments  of  matrimony.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  moral  theologian  does  not  study 
canon  law  in  its  sources :  he  is  not  versed  in 
the  decretals   as  such:    he  is  not  a  master  of 


206  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

the  phraseology  and  procedure  of  the  ecclesias- 
tical courts  and  the  supreme  Roman  Congre- 
gations: nor  is  he  conversant  with  more  than 
the  outline  of  the  vast  subject  of  benefices. 
But,  most  noticeable  difference  of  all,  the 
moral  theologian  keeps  quite  clear  of  the 
forum  contentiosum,  where  canonist  meets 
canonist  and  there  comes  the  clang  of  (canon- 
ical) war.  Wis  fortcm,  the  tribunal  of  penance, 
is  not  a  place  of  contention  and  strife  between 
man  and  man,  for  there  is  only  one  man  pres- 
ent in  his  own  proper  person,  the  other  is  there 
as  God's  delegate,  and  the  transaction  between 
them  is  of  submission  on  the  part  of  earth  and 
pardon  on  the  part  of  Heaven. 

It  sometimes  happens  that  one  human  being 
who  has  a  contention  with  another,  which 
should  go  before  the  Church's  exterior  court, 
brings  the  matter  into  the  interior  court  of 
conscience.  This  he  does  that  he  may  be 
enabled  so  to  conduct  his  suit  with  men  and 
before  men  as  not  to  offend  God,  the  Sovereign 
Lord  and  Judge.  The  judge  of  the  interior 
court  must  have  such  knowledge  of  the  proced- 
ure of  the  other  court  as  to  be  able  to  direct  his 
penitent  to  this  effect.  In  particular,  he  must 
know  where  his  own  jurisdiction  ceases,  and 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  exterior  court  begins. 
Thus,  however  convinced  a  confessor  may  be 


Casuistry  207 

of  the  invalidity  of  a  marriage,  —  even  though 
his  conviction  be  so  strong  and  certain  that  he 
cannot  allow  the  parties  to  live  together  as  man 
and  wife,  —  yet  he  can  never  sanction  either 
party's  making  a  new  match,  until  a  juridical 
sentence  of  the  nullity  of  the  previous  marriage 
has  been  obtained  from  or  through  the  bishop. 
The  moral  theologian,  as  every  ecclesiasti- 
cal student  knows,  has  the  name  of  being  more 
indulgent  than  the  canonist.  The  canonist, 
it  is  believed,  will  bring  the  law  down  upon 
you,  if  he  can :  whereas  the  moralist  will  let 
you  off,  if  he  can.  The  effect  of  the  two 
courses  followed  together  is  supposed  to  be  to 
keep  the  student's  mind  in  equilibrium  between 
laxity  and  undue  rigour.  However  this  may 
be,  there  are  not  wanting  reasons  why  we 
should  expect  a  larger  and  more  liberal  allow- 
ance for  human  nature  from  the  moral  theo- 
logian than  from  the  canonist,  —  in  the  court 
of  conscience  than  in  the  exterior  tribunal. 
The  moral  theologian  and  confessor  gets 
nearer  to  his  penitent  than  the  canonical 
Judge  does  to  the  defendant  that  comes  before 
him.  In  this  sense  the  confessor  gets  nearer, 
that  he  hears  excuses  and  pleas  that  cannot  be 
substantiated,  sometimes  even  are  not  allowed 
to  be  pleaded  at  all,  in  the  outer  court.  In 
the  court  of  conscience  the  accused  is  the  wit- 


2o8  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

ness  against  himself,  and  the  only  witness. 
Now  a  man  cannot  be  witness  against  himself 
without  being  to  some  extent  also  counsel  for 
himself.  He  has  done  this,  but  with  these  ex- 
tenuating circumstances:  he  has  done  this,  but 
not  that,  simply  this  and  no  more.  And  it  is 
a  rule  of  law,  that  credcudum  est  pcznitenti. 
The  penitent  must  be  believed,  except  where 
he  is  manifestly  lying  or  mistaken.  But  in  the 
outer  court  there  are  a  multitude  of  witnesses 
against  the  defendant :  and  these  may  create  a 
legal  presumption  against  him,  which  he  is  not 
able  juridically  to  dispel.  Or  he  may  have 
incurred  an  obligation,  which  in  conscience 
binds  him  only  remotely,  or  as  they  say,  post 
sententiam  judicis,  that  is,  after  sentence  has 
been  pronounced  upon  him  in  the  outer  court. 
If  he  comes  only  into  the  interior  court,  and 
never  into  the  outer  court  at  all,  this  obliga- 
tion will  not  be  pressed  upon  him. 

Is  it  a  good  thing  for  morality  and  public 
order  that  there  should  exist  a  court  so  favour- 
able to  the  delinquent  as  the  tribunal  of  pen- 
ance ?  Most  certainly  it  is  a  good  thing,  for 
the  court  is  God's  own  personal  erection ;  and 
all  God's  works  are  good,  and  conducive  in 
themselves  to  that  beauty  and  tranquillity  of 
order  which  He  loves.  This  is  answer  suffi- 
cient for  Catholics.     Moreover,  Catholics  alone 


Casuistry  209 

have  experience  of  the  tribunal  of  penance  ; 
and  their  experience  of  it  is  practically  unani- 
mous, that  the  frequentation  of  it  makes  them 
as  well  more  inwardly  pure  before  God  as  also 
more  just  in  outward  act  towards  their  neigh- 
bour than  they  otherwise  would  have  been. 
For  others  who  are  not  Catholics,  and  who 
have  no  such  experience,  it  may  be  well  to 
remark  that  it  is  dangerous  to  drive  a  delin- 
quent to  desperation ;  that  it  is  well  that  there 
should  be  some  place  where  the  fallen  or  the 
falling  man  may  appear,  and  have  the  law  of 
God  administered  to  him  exactly  as  it  binds 
him  with  all  his  peculiar  dispositions  and  cir- 
cumstances, every  abatement  being  made  that 
the  calmest  and  kindliest  reason  can  allow  for 
his  case.  It  is  this  compassion  dwelling  in  the 
heart  of  the  priest  for  them  that  are  ignorant 
and  err,1  that  has  prompted  what  Puritans  have 
named  "  the  subtleties  of  casuistry."  Certainly 
this  compassion  has  at  times  gone  to  unwise 
and  unlawful  lengths,  and  to  airy  and  unreal 
distinctions  between  right  and  wrong;  and 
as  often  as  it  has  done  so,  it  has  been 
sternly  repressed  by  the  Church.  But  the 
motive  that  prompted  this  occasional  excess 
might  have  inspired  more  respect  than  it  has 
received. 

1  Heb.  v.  2. 


210  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

An  opinion  as  indulgent  as  a  strict  regard 
for  the  facts  and  likelihoods  of  the  case  will 
allow  is  especially  desirable  where  a  deed  of  a 
questionable  character  is  not  under  debate,  but 
has  actually  been  done,  and  the  debatable  point 
in  the  mind  of  the  confessor  is  as  to  the  amount 
of  reparation  that  it  is  necessary  to  exact  of 
penitents,  whose  good  dispositions  must  not 
have  a  needlessly  heavy  load  laid  upon  them. 
Supposing  A  has  been  guilty  of  a  piece  of 
gross  partiality  and  favouritism  in  the  making 
of  some  appointment.  When  he  enters  into 
himself  and  repents,  the  question  arises,  whether 
the  appointment  was  a  violation  of  strict  justice.1 
If  it  were,  he  would  have  to  offer  some  satis- 
faction to  the  injured  party.  Obviously  it  will 
be  easier  for  A  to  make  his  peace  with  God,  if 
a  solid  ground  can  be  found  for  thinking  that 
no  violation  of  justice,  strictly  so  called,  has 
been  committed,  and  consequently  no  obliga- 
tion of  making  satisfaction  can  be  urged  upon 
him.  Otherwise,  he  may  refuse  to  make  satis- 
faction :  or  what  is  more  likely,  he  will  promise 
and  then  not  make  it.  A  well-founded  opinion 
in  favour  of  liberty  here  is  not  a  smoothing  of 
the  way  down  the  abyss  that  the  man  may  fall 

1  As  moral  theologians  know,  an  act  may  be  a  sin  against 
distributive  justice,  or  some  other  virtue,  without  being  a  viola- 
tion of  strict  or  commutative  justice. 


Casuistry  2  1 1 

into  it,  but  a  smoothing  of  the  way  up  that  the 
man  may  come  out  of  it.  It  may  be  asked : 
Is  not  the  way  up  also  the  way  down  ?  Yes, 
it  is  the  same  way,  but  salutary  or  dangerous 
according  to  the  direction  in  which  it  is  trav- 
ersed ;  and  we  will  warn  people  from  going 
down  it.  In  other  words,  consult  a  wise 
casuist  before  you  leap,  and  he  will  hold  you 
back:  when  you  have  taken  the  leap,  he  will 
not  call  a  sprain  a  fracture,  and  he  will  not  put 
you  through  more  surgical  treatment  than 
necessary. 

As  for  the  subtlety  of  casuists  being  made 
matter  of  complaint  against  them,  the  com- 
plaint is  no  more  reasonable,  and  no  less  so, 
than  the  complaining  which  we  hear  of  lawyers 
and  their  subtleties,  especially  when  the  latter 
call  for  payment  in  pounds,  shillings,  and  pence. 
All  law  is  subtle,  divine  law  and  human  law, 
natural  and  positive  law :  every  law  has  its 
nice  points.  We  have  conscience  indeed  for 
our  guide,  but  not  an  omniscient  guide:  on  the 
contrary,  conscience  cries  to  be  instructed,  and 
often  stands  perplexed.  We  may  disregard 
the  perplexities  of  conscience,  and  act  as  our 
humour  prompts  us,  but  that  is  hardly  the  be- 
haviour of  a  conscientious  man,  or  of  one  who 
has  much  horror  of  sin.  Much  better  bring 
our   reason    to    bear  on  studying    the  path  of 


212  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

duty.  After  all,  it  concerns  us  more  to  know 
the  path  of  duty  than  the  paths  of  the  stars. 
Yet  astronomy  is  an  honourable  science :  so 
also  should  be  moral  theology,  or,  if  you  will, 
casuistry. 

There  is  a  difference  between  a  theoretical 
and  a  practical  casuist.  The  difference  is  this, 
that  the  latter,  with  all  the  knowledge  of  the 
former,  has  also  an  eye  to  take  in  all  the  relev- 
ant circumstances  that  attach  to  the  case  in 
hand,  and  has,  moreover,  the  invaluable  moral 
gift  of  being  able  to  make  up  his  mind.  There 
are  men,  stored  with  erudition,  who  can  never 
give  you  a  plain  you  may  or  you  may  not  in 
any  perplexity  of  conscience.  They  will  tell 
you  what  consideration  to  add  in,  and  what  to 
subtract,  but  they  never  can  trust  themselves 
to  pronounce  what  the  reckoning  comes  to. 
Such  theoretical  advisers  are  useful  to  intelli- 
gent people,  who  can  imbibe  their  erudition, 
and  thence  make  up  their  minds  for  them- 
selves ;  but  they  are  no  use  as  guides  to  the 
common  run  of  humanity. 

It  follows  that  the  endowments  of  the  con- 
fessor and  of  the  moral  theologian  are  not 
quite  identical.  The  confessor  must  be  a 
practical  casuist,  such  as  we  have  described 
him,  able  to  make  up  his  mind  and  to  '  intue ' 
present  facts.     This  intuition  of  the  facts  of 


Casuistry  2 1 3 

the  case  is  matter  of  considerable  tact.  The 
facts  of  any  case  met  with  in  a  book  of  moral 
theology  are  described  by  an  expert :  they  are 
reliable,  and  they  are  all  the  facts.  But  the 
one  witness  in  the  tribunal  of  penance,  the 
penitent  himself,  is  often  anything  but  an  ex- 
pert in  moral  matters,  often  obtuse  of  percep- 
tion and  incoherent  in  his  explanations,  often 
frightened  and  shy,  often  self-deceived,  and 
sometimes  something  of  a  wilful  deceiver. 
The  confessor  has  to  take  his  measure  of  his 
man,  and  calculate  the  import  of  what  he 
hears  accordingly.  This  power  of  divining 
the  facts  of  the  case  is  quite  as  important 
as  the  knowledge  of  the  principles  to  judge 
them  by. 

Lastly,  besides  moral  theology  and  insight 
and  tact  and  decision,  the  confessor  needs 
some  measure  of  personal  holiness,  not  cer- 
tainly for  the  validity  of  his  absolution,  but  for 
the  security  of  his  direction.  It  must  be  borne 
in  mind  that  the  confessional  is  intended,  not 
merely  to  withdraw  souls  from  sin,  but  to  lead 
them  on  to  greater  and  greater  good.  It  justi- 
fies the  sinner  and  perfects  the  saint.  But  on 
this  road  of  positive  goodness,  holiness,  and 
perfection,  he  must  prove  an  indifferent  guide 
whose  own  steps  and  longing  eyes  are  not  at 
all  set  that  way. 


2 1 4  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

Note.  —  We  so  seldom  hear  a  good  word  said  for  casu- 
istry, that  I  willingly  quote  the  following  from  a  high  and 
venerable  authority  in  the  University  of  Oxford  :  — 

"  It  would  be  disingenuous  to  conceal  my  opinion  that 
the  art  of  casuistry  has  often  been  most  unjustly  decried. 
It  has  unfortunately  been  associated,  owing  to  the  peculiar 
treatment  of  it  by  certain  Jesuit  divines,  with  lax  views  of 
morality,  and  especially  of  the  virtue  of  veracity  ;  but  the 
association  is  mainly  an  accidental  one.  Granted  that  duties 
may  clash,  ...  or  that  general  rules  may  be  modified  by 
special  circumstances,  it  is  surely  most  important  to  deter- 
mine beforehand,  so  far  as  we  can,  what  those  circumstances 
are,  and,  in  the  case  of  clashing  duties,  which  should  yield 
to  the  other.  Now  this,  and  this  alone,  is  the  task  which 
'  casuistry,'  or  the  attempt  to  '  resolve  cases  of  conscience,' 
proposes  to  itself.  Owing  to  the  infinite  variety  of  the  cases 
which  may  be  imagined  and  the  endless  complexity  of  the 
circumstances  which  occur  in  actual  life,  the  casuist  may 
not  be  able,  to  any  great  extent,  to  anticipate  practical  dif- 
ficulties ;  but  he  can,  at  least,  always  deal  with  cases  which 
have  already  occurred,  nor  do  the  limitations  of  an  art  seem 
to  furnish  conclusive  reasons  against  the  attempt  to  exercise 
it."  —  The  Principles  of  Morals,  by  Fowler  and  Wilson, 
Part  II.  pp.  247-248. 

Nelson,  in  his  leisure  moments,  loved  to  study  what  should 
be  done  in  possible  contingencies  which  he  imagined  for  a 
battle  at  sea.  In  this  our  great  admiral  was  a  sort  of  naval 
casuist.  As  for  "  certain  Jesuit  divines,"  the  fact  is  that 
some  Jesuits  did  say  some  foolish  things,  and  Pascal  invented 
for  them  many  more. 


ESSAY    IV 

THE   CATHOLIC   DOCTRINE   OF   LYING   AND 
EQUIVOCATION 

There  is  a  question  often  put,  and  probably 
never  answered  in  the  negative :  '  Can  you  keep 
a  secret  ? '  No  woman  certainly  ever  avowed 
that  she  could  not.  We  all  profess  to  know 
how  to  keep  secrets :  we  all  profess  likewise  to 
speak  the  truth :  yet  how  to  keep  a  secret  in 
the  face  of  an  impertinent  questioner,  and  still 
tell  no  lie  to  put  him  off,  is  a  delicate  moral 
operation  that  baffles  many  people's  skill. 
There  is  one  rough  way  of  doing  it,  which  I 
suppose  is  the  common  way.  It  begins  by 
assuming  that  the  essence  of  a  lie  consists  in 
a  violation  of  the  hearer's  right  to  the  truth. 
Then  the  consequence  is  drawn,  that  where  an 
enquirer  has  no  right  to  know  the  truth  about 
which  he  enquires,  and  an  untruth  is  necessary 
to  keep  the  truth  from  him,  there  an  untruth 
may  be  told  which  will  be  no  lie.  "  If  all  kill- 
ing be  not  murder,"  demands  Milton,  "  nor  all 
taking  of  another  man's  property  stealing,  why 
should  all  untruths  be  lies  ? '      I  will  not  call 

215 


2 1 6  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

this  doctrine  un-Catholic,  held  as  it  is  by  many 
loyal  children  of  the  Church,  but  I  submit  that 
it  is  unphilosophical,  and  may  be  brought  to 
bear  bitter  fruit  in  theology.  For  if  truthful- 
ness is  a  matter  of  strict  justice  and  the  hearer's 
right,  and  we  have,  as  the  best  theologians 
teach,  no  strict  rights  against  our  Creator, 
where  is  the  guarantee  of  the  truthfulness  of 
God  in  revelation  ? 

Another  way,  amusingly  described  by  Cardi- 
nal Newman,  is  the  way  of  those  who  will  have 
it  through  thick  and  thin,  that  all  lies  and  un- 
truths, and  all  manner  of  equivocation  and  lack 
of  sincerity  in  speech,  are  radically  wrong,  ex- 
tremely wrong  and  shameful ;  still  that  a  man 
would  not  be  man,  if  he  did  not  tell  a  lie  now 
and  then  at  a  hard  pinch;  and  that  the  best 
thing  he  can  do  is  to  come  out  with  the  lie, 
and  have  done  with  it,  and  forget  it,  and  rail 
louder  than  before  against  casuists  and  Jesuits, 
lying  lips,  and  all  who  speak  leasing. 

Both  these  ways  are  objectionable.  We 
must  not  lie  to  keep  a  secret,  neither  may  we 
tell  an  untruth,  for  all  formal  untruth  is  lying. 
Are  we  then  to  use  equivocation  ?  Equivoca- 
tion is  a  word  formed  from  the  Latin  cequivo- 
catio.  Many  good  theologians  writing  in  Latin 
have  advocated  what  they  call  cequivocatio. 
English    Catholic    authors,    treading    in    their 


Lying  and  Equivocation  2  1  7 

footsteps,  and  literally  translating  their  words, 
have  argued  in  favour  of  equivocation  as  being, 
in  case  of  need,  a  lawful  means  for  preserving 
what  ought  to  be  preserved  secret.  But  Eng- 
lish is  unfortunately  not  the  language  of  a 
Catholic  people.  Words  mean,  not  what  we 
would  have  them  mean,  not  what  the  corre- 
sponding word  means  in  the  language  of  the 
Church,  but  their  meaning  is  that  which  they 
commonly  bear  in  educated  English  society. 
Now  the  ordinary  educated  Englishman  takes 
equivocation  to  denote  a  practice  which  is  cer- 
tainly wrong,  and  carries  all  the  guilt  of  lying, 
as,  if  being  asked  whether  Antony  is  in  the 
house,  I  privately  press  my  foot  on  the  ground, 
and  say,  '  No,  he  is  not  here,'  meaning  he  is 
not  in  the  cellar;  or  if  I  deny  that  I  have  any 
Spanish  letters  about  me,  understanding  that 
such  letters  are  not  in  my  pockets,  but  in  my 
portmanteau,  which  is  lying  beside  me  on  the 
pavement.  The  answer  No  in  these  cases  may 
be  a  lie,  or  it  may  not,  but  it  is  not  saved  from 
being  a  lie  by  such  subterfuges  as  these,  which 
are  purely  mental  and  confined  to  the  mind  of 
the  speaker. 

What  ordinary  Englishmen  call  equivocation 
corresponds  to  that  which  Catholic  divines  know 
as  pure  mental  reservation,  and  that  is  a  cow- 
ardly fashion  of  lying.     Where  cequivocatio  is 


218  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

mentioned  with  approval  in  a  page  of  Latin 
casuistry,  the  word  ought  to  be  translated, 
broad  mental  reservation.  To  render  it  equi- 
vocation is  to  create  confusion,  just  as  much  as 
if  one  should  render  the  canonical  appeal,  peto 
apostolos  '  I  ask  for  the  apostles,'  or  the  old 
French,  entre  chien  et  loup,  '  between  a  dog 
and  a  wolf.'  On  this  understanding  I  venture 
to  assert  that  the  Catholic  doctrine  condemns, 
absolutely  and  under  all  circumstances,  all 
lying  and  all  equivocation. 

And  likewise  all  mental  reservation  ?  No, 
not  all  mental  reservation.  One  form  of  that 
is  lawful,  when  it  is  necessary  to  baffle  an  im- 
pertinent enquirer  and  keep  a  secret. 

Mental  reservation  is  an  act  of  the  mind, 
limiting  the  spoken  phrase  that  it  may  not  bear 
the  full  sense  which  at  first  hearing  it  seems 
to  bear.  The  reservation,  or  limitation  of  the 
spoken  sense,  is  said  to  be  broad  or  pure, 
according  as  it  is,  or  is  not,  indicated  exter- 
nally. A  pure  mental  reservation,  where  the 
speaker  uses  words  in  a  limited  meaning,  with- 
out giving  any  outward  clue  to  the  limitation, 
is,  as  I  have  said  already,  in  nothing  different 
from  a  lie,  and  is  wrong  as  a  lie  is  always 
wrong.  Is  then  a  broad  mental  reservation 
always  right  ?  May  we  amuse  ourselves,  try- 
ing the  quickness  of  our  friends'   perceptions, 


Lying  and  Equivocation  219 

meaning  less  than  we  seem  to  say,  and  leaving 
them  to  guess  the  '  economy  of  truth '  by  some 
delicate  hint  thrown  out  thereof?  Such  sharp 
practice  is  by  no  means  to  be  permitted  pro- 
miscuously. Mental  reservation,  even  on  the 
broad  gauge,  is  permissible  only  as  a  last  re- 
source, when  no  other  means  are  available  for 
the  preservation  of  some  secret,  which  one  has 
a  duty  to  others,  or  a  right  to  oneself,  to  keep. 
Here  I  must  explain  the  Catholic  doctrine 
concerning  secrets.  We  distinguish  natural 
secrets,  secrets  of  promise  (s  ecre  turn  promis  sum), 
and  secrets  of  trust  {secretum  commissum).  A 
natural  secret  is  all  a  man's  own  private  history, 
which  he  would  not  have  made  public,  as  also 
all  that  he  discovers  of  the  private  history  of  his 
neighbours  by  his  own  lawful  observation  with- 
out being  told,  supposing  the  thing  discovered 
to  be  one  that  requires  concealment.  If  I  find 
out  something  about  my  neighbour,  and  after  I 
have  found  it  out  for  myself,  he  gets  me  to 
promise  not  to  publish  it,  that  is  a  secret  of 
promise.  Lastly,  if  one  man  comes  to  another, 
as  to  a  lawyer,  or  a  surgeon,  for  professional 
advice,  or  simply  to  a  friend,  for  moral  counsel, 
and  in  order  thereto  imparts  to  him  some  of  his 
natural  secrets,  those  secrets,  as  they  are  re- 
ceived and  held  by  the  person  consulted,  are 
called    secrets    of    trust.     This    latter   kind    of 


220  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

secret  is  privileged  above  the  other  two.  A 
natural  secret,  and  also  a  secret  of  promise,  must 
be  delivered  up  on  the  demand  of  an  author- 
ity empowered  to  enquire  in  the  department  in 
which  the  secret  lies.  A  counsel  cross-examin- 
ing a  witness  would  not  be  put  off  with  the 
answer,  '  I  promised  not  to  tell.'  But  a  secret 
of  trust  is  to  be  given  up  to  no  enquirer.  Such 
a  secret  is  to  be  kept  against  all  who  seek  to 
come  by  it,  except  where  the  matter  bodes  mis- 
chief and  wrong  to  a  third  party,  or  to  the  com- 
munity, and  where  at  the  same  time  the  owner 
of  the  secret  cannot  be  persuaded  to  desist  from 
the  wrong.  In  particular  cases  it  is  often  ex- 
tremely difficult  to  decide  whether  this  excep- 
tion holds  or  not.  But  some  cases  are  plain. 
If  Father  Garnet  had  known  of  the  Gunpowder 
Plot  under  a  secret  of  trust  —  and  not  under 
the  seal  of  confession,  which  makes  a  secret 
supernatural,  and  absolutely  inviolable  —  he 
ought  certainly  either  to  have  turned  the  con- 
spirators from  their  purpose,  or,  failing  that,  to 
have  given  information  to  the  government. 

Therefore  a  secret  of  promise  is  to  be  kept 
against  all  enquirers  other  than  official.  A 
secret  of  trust  is  to  be  kept  even  against  official 
enquiries,  under  the  limitations  that  I  have  laid 
down.  The  keeping  of  a  secret  of  promise  is 
an  obligation  at  least  of  fidelity :  that  of  a  secret 


Lying  and  Equivocation  221 

of  trust  is  matter  of  strict  justice.  Both  are 
obligations  binding  under  sin.  It  is  a  sin  to 
lie,  no  doubt:  but  it  is  a  greater  sin,  usually,  to 
divulge  your  neighbour's  secret. 

The  difficulty  now  comes  round  again,  how 
to  keep  a  secret  against  an  impertinent  ques- 
tioner, without  lying.  The  main  art  of  keeping 
a  secret  is  not  to  talk  about  it.  If  a  man  is 
asked  an  awkward  question,  and  sees  no  alter- 
native but  to  let  out  or  lie,  it  is  usually  his  own 
fault  for  having  encouraged  the  questioner  up 
to  that  point.  A  wise  man  lets  drop  in  time 
topics  of  conversation  which  he  is  unwilling  to 
have  pressed.  He  is  never  the  first  to  introduce 
such  topics.  It  is  said  of  the  ploughman  in 
Ecclesiasticus,  that  his  story  is  of  the  sons  of 
bulls  —  cnarratio  ejus  in  filiis  taurorum.  After 
all,  cattle  have  no  secrets,  but  men  and  women 
have.  Of  that  class  of  persons  whose  profes- 
sion lies  in  the  way  of  hearing  them,  doctors, 
lawyers,  priests,  none  would  altogether  like  to 
hear  it  said  of  him  :  His  stories  are  of  his  peni- 
tents, his  clients,  or  his  patients. 

But  there  are  unconscionable  people,  avachels, 
who  will  not  be  put  off,  and  who,  either  out  of 
malice  or  out  of  stupidity,  ply  you  with  ques- 
tions against  all  rules  of  good  breeding.  This 
direct  assault  may  sometimes  be  retaliated,  and 
a  rude  question  met  by  a  rough  answer.     But 


222  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

such  a  reply  is  not  always  prudent,  and  would 
not  unfrequently  convey  the  very  information 
required.  Silence  would  serve  no  better,  for 
silence  gives  consent,  and  is  eloquent  at  times. 
There  is  nothing:  left  for  it  in  such  cases  but  to 
lock  your  secret  up,  as  it  were,  in  a  separate 
compartment  of  your  breast,  and  answer  accord- 
ing to  the  remainder  of  your  information,  which 
is  not  secret,  private,  and  confidential.  This 
looks  very  much  like  lying,  but  it  is  not  lying, 
it  is  speaking  the  truth  under  a  broad  mental 
reservation. 

"  What  news,  my  lord,  from  France  ?  "  some 
one  asked  of  a  cabinet  minister.  "  I  don't 
know,"  was  the  reply,  "  I  have  not  read  the 
papers."  The  story  is  Cardinal  Newman's. 
Here  the  sense  of  the  Idont  know  is  restricted 
and  reserved,  internally  in  the  mind  of  the 
speaker,  and  externally  by  the  words  added 
about  the  newspapers.  It  is  a  mental  reser- 
vation of  the  broadest,  such  as  no  Pharisee 
could  call  a  lie.  Now  suppose  the  reference 
to  the  papers  omitted.  It  would  still  be  very 
hard  to  call  the  dont  knozv  a  lie.  The  reser- 
vation of  official  knowledge  is  still  sufficiently 
apparent :  no  sensible  man  would  expect  that 
to  be  communicated  by  way  of  ordinary  chit- 
chat. Above  all,  when  a  topic  has  been  forced 
upon  one,  and  questions  put  that  admit  of  no 


Lying  and  Equivocation  223 

evasion,  by  an  enquirer  who  has  no  right  to  ask, 
then  surely  any  denial  or  disclaimer  that  may 
be  elicited,  however  direct  the  form  of  words, 
must  be  qualified  by  the  outward  circumstances 
in  which  it  is  spoken.  This  qualification,  un- 
spoken, but  not  unsignified,  will  be,  'secrets 
apart.' 

Indeed,  this  qualification  may  be  said  to  go 
along  with  all  human  replies  to  human  ques- 
tions. But  in  nine  hundred  and  ninety-nine 
cases  out  of  a  thousand,  the  facts  of  the 
position  indicate  that  the  value  of  the  quali- 
fication comes  to  zero :  there  can  or  ought 
to  be  no  secrets  about  the  matter.  "  Porter, 
what  time  does  the  night  mail  leave  for 
Paris  ? "  "  At  a  quarter  to  nine."  "  You 
mean,  of  course,  secrets  apart?  '  "  Well,  I  do  ; 
but  who  dreams  of  secrets  about  the  train  ser- 
vice ? '  On  my  way  to  Paris  I  come  across  a 
garrulous  Frenchman,  who  pesters  me  with 
politics  when  I  want  to  sleep.  I  conclude 
there  are  no  political  secrets  in  that  man's 
brain ;  if  there  are,  he  has  no  business  to  be 
so  free  with  his  tongue.  But  as  I  show  a 
resolute  unwillingness  to  talk  politics,  the  re- 
serve of  secrets  apart  has  an  appreciable  value 
in  the  yes's  and  nos  which  he  contrives  to 
wringr  out  of  me :  how  does  he  know  that  he 
has   not  to   do  with  a  confidential   diplomatic 


224  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

agent  ?  This  at  least  he  ought  to  know,  that 
a  man  who  is  honoured  with  the  confidence  of 
the  government  will  not  part  with  it  to  the 
first  puppy  who  sets  upon  him  to  worry  him, 
but  will  either  hold  his  peace,  or  when  that 
cannot  be,  will  return  an  answer  for  which  his 
interrogator  shall  be  none  the  wiser.  In  other 
words,  he  will  answer  out  of  his  communicable, 
and  not  out  of  his  incommunicable  knowledge. 
The  qualification,  secrets  apart,  should  be  borne 
in  mind  by  persons  who  are  in  the  habit  of 
asking  indiscreet  and  unwarrantable  questions. 
Dr.  Johnson  said  :  "  I  should  have  considered 
Burke  to  be  Junius,  .  .  .  but  Burke  spontane- 
ously denied  it  to  me.  The  case  would  have 
been  different  had  I  asked  him  if  he  were  the 
author:  a  man  so  questioned  as  to  an  anony- 
mous publication  may  think  that  he  has  a  right 
to  deny  it"  (Boswell's  Life  of  Johnson,  ed. 
Croker,  IV.  246).  Sir  Walter  Scott  consid- 
ered that  he  had  such  a  right,  while  he  chose 
to  remain  the  anonymous  author  of  the  Novels 
{General  Preface  to  the  Waver  ley  Novels,  1829, 
pp.  21,  22,  ed.  Black,  1865).  The  Spectator  for 
July  23,  1898,  allows  this  right  where  there  is 
question  of  other  people's  secrets,  not  where 
there  is  question  of  your  own.  The  distinc- 
tion seems  arbitrary,  and  too  favourable  to 
busybodies.      In  practice    the    difficulty   is    to 


Lying  and  Equivocation  225 

decide  when  a  secret  is  important  enough 
to  give  the  clause,  secrets  apart,  a  positive 
value.  No  general  rule  can  be  assigned.  The 
clause  is  not  available,  and  should  not  be  pre- 
sumed to  hold,  for  the  protection  of  any  and 
every  trumpery  secret.  We  must  not  make 
mysteries  of  trifles. 

But  also  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  a 
question  which  would  be  unwarrantable,  put 
by  equal  to  equal,  may  be  perfectly  fair  and 
proper  in  the  mouth  of  a  parent,  or  of  a  cross- 
examining  counsel  who  has  the  support  of  a 
court  of  law.  There  are  few  secrets  that  one 
has  a  right  to  hold  against  every  enquirer. 
Knowledge  that  is  incommunicable  here  is 
communicable  there :  absolutely  incommuni- 
cable knowledge  is  a  rare  possession. 

Mental  reservation  is  allowable  only  when 
we  are  driven  into  a  corner  by  captious  ques- 
tions about  a  matter  which  we  have  a  grave 
reason  and  a  right  to  keep  secret,  and  where 
we  have  no  other  escape.  This  doctrine  will 
not  justify  the  setting  of  false  or  equivocal 
statements  afloat  where  no  one  has  questioned 
you.  It  will  not  justify  the  practice  of  lying  to 
children  as  such.  But,  of  course,  in  meeting 
their  demands,  we  may  present  the  informa- 
tion in  a  childish  dress,  so  that  they  may  learn 
only  that  which  a  good  and  reasonable  child 


226  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

would  wish  to  know.  In  replying  to  a  sick 
person,  I  suppose  a  piece  of  news  highly  dan- 
gerous for  him  to  hear  might  be  treated  as  a 
natural  secret.  But  I  cannot  comprehend  the 
morality,  nor,  indeed,  the  wisdom,  of  inventing 
gratuitous  fictions  for  the  comfort  of  the  sick. 
As  for  lies  in  jest,  they  remain  lies,  unless  it  be 
tolerably  manifest  that  we  are  '  drawing  the 
long  bow.'  Words  may  be  explained  away 
by  looks  or  other  outward  circumstances,  some- 
times by  the  very  grotesqueness  or  absurdity 
of  the  statement  itself.  Friend  addressing 
friend  does  not  mean  all  he  says  to  be  taken 
au  pied  de  la  lettre :  it  is  part  of  knowing  a 
man  to  understand  his  jokes. 

It  will  add  very  much  to  clearness  of  notions 
in  all  this  matter,  to  define  wherein  the  essential 
wrongness  of  lying  consists.  What  is  there 
cleaving  to  a  lie  that  makes  it  always  wrong, 
so  that  one  must  never  lie,  no,  not  for  worlds  ? 
A  lie  is  made  up  of  two  elements,  one  in  the 
utterer,  and  one  in  the  hearer.  There  is  the 
deception  begotten  in  the  mind  of  the  hearer, 
and  in  the  speaker  there  is  the  discord  between 
what  he  says  and  what  he  thinks  to  be  true,  — 
not  necessarily,  be  it  observed,  between  what 
he  says  and  what  is  true.  Both  these  elements 
are  evil ;  the  former,  the  deception,  obviously 
so.     Human  society  cannot  go  on,  if  men  are 


Lying  and  Equivocation  227 

to  be  allowed  promiscuously  to  deceive  one 
another.  Then,  no  one  likes  to  be  deceived, 
and  we  are  not  to  do  to  our  neighbour  what 
we  would  not  have  done  to  ourselves.  The 
laws  of  good  fellowship  require  that  we  should 
speak  the  truth  to  one  another  in  ordinary  cir- 
cumstances, as  they  likewise  require  that  in 
ordinary  circumstances  we  should  respect  the 
life  and  property  of  our  fellow-men.  But  to 
take  life  and  to  seize  upon  property  is  lawful 
in  certain  emergencies,  in  self-defence  and  for 
self-preservation,  or  with  the  sanction  of  author- 
ity. These  exceptions  stand  very  well  with  the 
well-being  of  society,  or  rather  are  required  by 
it :  the  lives  of  brigands  and  assassins  must  not 
be  sacrosanct  as  the  lives  of  other  men.  No 
man  is  reasonably  unwilling  that,  if  taken  red- 
handed,  he  may  himself  be  slain.  The  law 
against  deceiving  our  neighbour,  so  far  as  it 
is  founded  on  the  prejudice  done  to  society  and 
the  annoyance  of  the  person  deceived,  seems  to 
admit  of  similar  exceptions.  Whoever  has  no 
reasonable  objection  to  have  life  and  property 
taken  from  him  in  certain  circumstances,  can- 
not reasonably  complain  of  any  hurt  or  incon- 
venience that  he  may  suffer  in  being  sometimes 
deceived.  There  is  a  well-known  story  told  by 
the  younger  Pliny  of  the  Roman  matron  Arria, 
who,  having  lost  her  son  by  sickness,  and  all 


228  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

but  lost  her  husband,  used  to  tell  the  latter  in 
his  convalescence,  when  he  enquired  about  the 
boy :  "  Oh,  he  has  slept  well ;  he  has  had  quite 
an  appetite."     Then  she  would  rush  out  of  the 
room  to  conceal  her  tears.     I  will   not  vouch 
for  the  objective  morality  of  these  replies :  they 
may  or  may  not  be  justified  as  broad  mental 
reservations.     But  they  are  much  more  easily 
justified,  if  the  whole  harm  of  lying  consists  in 
the   hearer's   unwillingness  to  be  deceived,  by 
saying  that  the  sick  man  was  not  unwilling  to 
suffer  a  deception   rendered   necessary  by  his 
state  of  health.     The  same  doctrine  would  jus- 
tify other  speeches  of  a  much  more  objection- 
able character.     It  would,  in  fact,  contain  the 
reaffirmation   of   the   old    Greek   position,   that 
deceit  is  a  medicine  and  a  drug,  and  may  be 
administered,  lv  §ap\xa.Kov   et'Sei,  especially  by 
persons  in  authority,  wherever  they  judge  that 
it  will  work  a  wholesome  effect,  and  wherever 
the  person  deceived  is  not  unwilling,  or  at  least 
ought  not  to  be  surprised  or  complain,  consid- 
ering the  circumstances.     But  this  would  be  to 
throw  the  door  open  wide  to  the  whole  crowd 
of  official,  officious,  and  jocose  lies.     Untruths 
told  for  a  purpose  to  enemies,  to  children,  to 
subjects,  to  servants  ;  pleasant  fictions  to  gratify 
a  friend ;  hoaxes  unlimited,  where  we  think  the 
victim  ought  not  much   to  mind,  —  these  will 


Lying  and  Equivocation  229 

he  withdrawn  from    the  category  of    lying,  or 
will  be  registered  as  white  lies  and  lawful. 

Worst  of  all,  if  the  whole  harm  of  lying  is  in 
the  unpleasant  effect  wrought  upon  the  deceived 
hearer,  or  in  the  scandal  and  bad  consequences 
to  society  at  large,  it  is  not  clear  that  lying  is 
impossible  to  God ;  and  our  faith,  based  on  the 
divine  veracity,  is  shaken  to  the  foundation. 
God,  as  Master,  might  bid  the  deceived  listener 
bear  the  mortification  and  shame  of  being  duped. 
He  might  by  His  providence  prevent  any  scan- 
dal or  general  bad  consequences  to  society ;  or, 
as  Sovereign,  He  might  impose  or  permit  such 
consequences,  as  He  sends  or  permits  a  pes- 
tilence. The  Lord  of  life  and  death,  who 
commanded  Isaac  to  be  slain,  and  who  daily 
"  taketh  awray  the  spirit  of  princes,"  is  not  to 
be  restrained  from  being  a  deceiver  by  the 
mere  reluctance  of  His  creatures,  unless  there 
be  some  element  in  the  divine  nature  itself 
which  makes  it  utterly  impossible  for  God  to 
deceive  and  speak  false. 

Undoubtedly  there  is  such  an  element.  It 
lies  even  at  the  root  of  the  sanctity  of  God. 
God  is  holy  in  that,  being  by  essence  the 
fulness  of  all  Being  and  all  Goodness,  He  is 
ever  true  to  Himself  in  every  act  of  His 
understanding,  of  His  will,  and  of  His  power. 
By  His    understanding    He    abidingly    covers, 


230  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

grasps,  and  comprehends  His  whole  Being. 
With  His  will  He  loves  Himself  supremely. 
His  power  is  exercised  entirely  for  His  glory 
—  entirely,  but  not  exclusively,  for  God's  last 
and  best  external  glory  is  in  the  consummated 
happiness  of  His  creatures.  Whatever  God 
makes,  He  makes  in  His  own  likeness,  more 
or  less  so  according;  to  the  degree  of  being 
which  He  imparts  to  the  creature.  And  as 
whatever  God  does  is  like  Him,  and  what- 
ever God  makes  is  like  Him,  so  whatever 
God  says  is  like  Him.  His  spoken  word 
answers  to  His  inward  word  and  thought. 
It  holds  of  God,  as  of  every  being  who  has  a 
thought  to  think  and  a  word  to  utter :  — 

To  thine  own  self  be  true, 
And  it  must  follow,  as  the  night  the  day, 
Thou  canst  not  then  be  false  to  any  man. 

God's  sanctity  is  in  His  being  true  to  Him- 
self. His  veracity  is  a  part  of  His  sanctity. 
He  cannot  in  His  speech,  or  revelation  of 
Himself,  contradict  what  He  really  has  in 
His  mind,  without  ceasing  to  be  holy  and 
being  no  longer  God. 

But  the  sanctity  of  intellectual  creatures 
must  be,  like  their  every  other  attribute  and 
perfection,  modelled  on  the  corresponding  per- 
fection of  their  Maker.     Holiness  must  mean 


Lying  and  Equivocation  231 

truthfulness  in  man,  for  it  means  truthfulness 
in  God.  God's  words  cannot  be  at  variance 
with  His  thought,  for  God  is  essential  holi- 
ness. Nor  can  man  speak  otherwise  than  as  he 
thinks  without  marring  the  attribute  of  holiness 
in  himself,  that  is,  without  doing  wrong.  And 
this  is  the  real,  intrinsic,  primary,  and  in- 
separable reason,  why  lying,  or  speech  in  con- 
tradiction with  the  thought  of  the  speaker,  is 
everywhere  and  always  wrong. 

This  is  the  simple  reason  assigned  by  St. 
Thomas  Aquinas :  — 

A  lie  is  wrong  in  its  kind,  for  it  is  an  act  falling  on  undue 
matter.  For  whereas  words  are  naturally  signs  of  thoughts, 
it  is  unnatural  and  undue  that  any  one  should  signify  by 
word  that  which  he  has  not  in  his  mind. 

He  admits  as  a  secondary  reason  of  the  evil  of 
lying,  that :  — 

Because  man  is  a  social  animal,  naturally  one  man  owes 
another  that  without  which  human  society  could  not  be 
preserved.  But  men  could  not  mutually  dwell  together, 
unless  they  mutually  trusted  one  another  as  mutually 
declaring  to  each  other  the  truth. 

But  when  he  faces  the  objection,  that  "the 
lesser  evil  is  to  be  chosen  for  the  avoidance 
of  the  greater;  but  it  is  less  harm  that  one 
should  engender  a  false  opinion  in  the  mind  of 
another  than  that  a  man  should  slay  or  be  slain  : 


232  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

therefore  a  man  may  lawfully  lie  to  keep  one 
party  from  committing  murder  and  to  save 
another's  blood,"  —  in  face  of  this  objection  he 
falls  back  upon  the  main  argument  already 
alleged,  and  replies :  — 

A  lie  is  a  sin,  not  merely  for  the  damage  done  thereby 
to  a  neighbour,  but  for  its  own  inordinateness,  as  has  been 
explained.  But  it  is  not  lawful  to  use  any  unlawful  inor- 
dinateness to  hinder  the  harm  and  prejudice  of  others. 
And  therefore  it  is  not  lawful  to  tell  a  lie  for  the  purpose 
of  delivering  another  from  any  danger  whatsoever.  It  is 
lawful,  however,  to  hide  the  truth  prudently  under  some 
dissembling. 

I  believe  that  this  doctrine  of  the  Angel  of  the 
Schools  has  never  been  departed  from  without 
danger  to  theology  and  to  morality,  to  the  one 
in  the  matter  of  the  divine  veracity,  and  to  the 
other  in  the  matter  of  officious  lying.  Never 
must  any  intellectual  being,  not  even  the 
highest  and  most  exalted  of  all,  be  permitted 
to  use  signs  in  contradiction  to  his  thought 
whereof  they  are  signs.  If  for  the  keeping 
of  a  secret,  and  under  sore  pressure,  a  man 
may  speak  by  his  communicable  knowledge 
alone,  and  ignore  what  he  has  of  incommuni- 
cable knowledge,  circumstances  must  outwardly 
suggest  that  reservation  to  a  prudent  listener. 
The  whole  man  speaks,  the  situation  speaks; 
the  words  must  not    be    considered    by  them- 


Lying  and  Equivocation  233 

selves  and  in  the  abstract ;  they  are  a  text 
to  be  taken  in  conjunction  with  the  note  and 
comment  which  accompany  them.  This  anno- 
tated text,  so  to  speak,  answers  to  the  thought 
of  the  author:  there  is  then  no  clash  of  sisrn 
and  thing  signified,  there  is  no  lie.  What  is 
required  is  that  the  comment  and  reservation 
be  not  all  inscribed  within  the  mind  of  the 
speaker,  but  be  legible  outwardly;  likewise, 
that  the  modifying  clause  be  not  resorted  to 
without  reason.  The  reservation  must  not 
be  needless,  and  it  must  be  broad,  not  pure. 
Thus  are  we  to  take  St.  Thomas's  hint,  "  It 
is  lawful  to  hide  the  truth  prudently  under 
some  dissembling."1 

1  See  Summa  Theologice,  2a-2ae,  q.  109,  art.  3,  ad.  1  ;  and 
q.  1 10.  art.  3,  corp.  and  ad.  4.  See,  too,  q.  no,  art.  1,  corp., 
where  lying  is  accurately  denned.  The  passages  are  in  my 
Aquinas  Ethicus,  II,  pp.  214-221. 


ESSAY   V 

SOCIALISM   AND   RELIGIOUS   ORDERS 

One  curious  change  coming  over  men's 
minds  in  this  country  is  the  growth  of  a  new 
regard  for  Religious  Orders.  This  is  due, 
not  only  to  the  Catholicising  party  in  the 
Church  of  England,  which  has  abolished  so 
much  of  the  blind  bigotry  of  the  Reformation, 
but  also  to  an  increased  and  increasing  disposi- 
tion to  combine  and  co-operate  and  bear  the 
fortunes  of  life  in  common.  Religious  Orders 
are  thought  in  one  way  to  have  solved  the 
problem  of  co-operation,  and  men  are  curious 
to  study  the  solution  which  they  present. 
Hence  the  modern  novelist  counts  upon  making 
one  impressive  chapter  by  a  description  of  the 
interior  of  a  religious  house,  a  practice  for  which 
he  finds  precedent  in  Sir  Walter  Scott.  For  all 
who  are  interested  in  Communism  and  Social- 
ism, the  social  aspect  of  a  Religious  commu- 
nity must  also  have  some  interest.  I  propose  to 
say  a  little  on  the  agreement,  but  more  on  the 
differences,  between  a  Socialist  commonwealth 
and   a   Religious   Order.      The  differences,   it 

235 


236  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

will  be  found,  are  all  in  the  way  of  facilitating 
the  workings  of  the  latter,  and  relegating  the 
former  far  away  into  the  region  of  the  impos- 
sible and  chimerical. 

The  point  of  agreement  between  Socialism 
and  Religious  life  is  that  in  both  economies 
the  goods  of  life  are  in  the  hands  of  individuals 
for  use  and  consumption  only ;  all  capital  is 
held  in  common,  and  is  administered  either 
by  the  votes  of  the  community,  or  by  some 
individual,  or  individuals,  acting  in  the  name 
of  the  community.  The  Socialist  citizen 
will  have  the  dominion  of  the  wages  that  he 
earns,  or  of  the  dole  that  is  distributed  to  him, 
with  this  large  limitation,  that  he  must  not 
invest  his  wages,  or  his  dole,  in  any  money- 
making  concern  for  his  own  profit.  The 
Religious  has  the  use  only,  not  the  dominion, 
of  what  is  assigned  to  him :  he  can  only  turn  it 
to  the  supply  of  his  own  personal  wants,  on 
such  scale  as  the  custom  of  his  Order  allows, 
always  a  modest  and  somewhat  frugal  scale. 
The  Socialist  here  has  more  liberty,  but  the 
large  limitation  mentioned  is  common  to  him 
and  to  the  Religious.  The  Religious  who  does 
better  work  for  his  Order  is  not  on  that  account 
better  fed :  whether  the  better-working  Social- 
ist is  to  be  better  fed  is  a  moot  point,  and  a 
difficulty  for    Socialism,    whichever   way   it  is 


Socialism  and  Religious  Orders        237 

determined.  The  Religious  lives  where  he  is 
stationed  by  his  superiors,  and  does  the  work 
that  they  assign  him.  How  the  Socialist  will 
be  eot  to  work,  what  choice  of  work  he  will 
have,  and  what  liberty  of  moving  about  from 
employment  to  employment  and  from  place  to 
place  —  nothing  of  all  this  is  quite  settled  ;  but 
it  is  hoped  that  every  individual  will  be  allowed 
to  choose  his  own  work,  and  that  individuals 
will  choose  their  several  occupations  so  wisely, 
and  with  such  self-devotedness  to  the  common 
good,  that  the  work  of  the  community  will  not 
suffer.  Religious  would  not  expect  their  pub- 
lic works  to  prosper,  if  they  were  thus  left  to 
the  casual  energy  of  individual  members. 
Socialists  may  find  it  necessary,  after  all,  to  fall 
back  upon  some  constraining  central  authority, 
which  will  assign  the  People  their  work,  and 
oblige  the  said  People  to  do  the  same. 

The  sources  of  wealth  in  a  Religious  Order 
are  threefold.  First,  what  individuals  bring 
into  the  Order  on  entering  it,  or  what  falls  in 
to  them  by  way  of  bequest  afterwards.  This 
may  be  reckoned  the  principal  source.  Sec- 
ondly, gifts  from  friends,  usually  for  some 
special  purpose,  and  that  often  of  an  ornamen- 
tal nature,  as  for  the  decoration  of  a  church  or 
the  erection  of  an  altar.  Thirdly,  what  is  made 
by  a  sort  of  quasi-capitalistic  production  analo- 


238  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

gous  to  the  incomes  of  professional  men.  It 
must  be  borne  in  mind  that  no  Religious  Order 
or  community  is  allowed  to  engage  in  trade, 
properly  so  called.  But  they  teach  schools, 
serve  churches,  preach  sermons,  attend  hospi- 
tals, and  render  other  ministerial  services,  for 
which  they  receive  monied  support. 

A  social  State  would  be  either  one  great 
trading  community,  or  an  aggregation  of  trad- 
ing communities.  Either  way,  its  methods 
of  finance  would  be  quite  dissimilar  to  those 
of  a  Religious  body,  and  would  be  beset  with 
difficulties  of  quite  a  higher  order  of  mag- 
nitude. 

The  members  of  a  Religious  Order  are  all 
trained  men,  or  trained  women.  Admitted 
first  as  postulants,  and  kept  in  that  state  some- 
times for  months,  they  then  go  through  a 
novitiate  of  one  or  two  years  before  they  take 
the  first  vows  of  religion :  then  more  years 
elapse  before  they  make  their  final  vows  of 
profession.  To  begin  with,  no  one  joins  as  a 
postulant  except  of  his  or  her  own  free  will. 
Postulants  are  examined  before  they  are  ad- 
mitted to  the  noviceship.  Novices  who  have 
no  mind  to  stay,  go  away.  Novices  who  are 
unfit,  are  sent  away.  They  who  after  the  novi- 
tiate discover  qualities  unfitting  them  for  their 
state  of  life,  are  released  from  their  vows,  and 


Socialism  and  Religions  Orders        239 

depart.  In  some  Orders  it  is  reckoned  that 
not  above  fifty  per  cent  of  those  who  enter  the 
novitiate  finally  die  in  the  Order.  So  difficult 
it  is  for  human  beings  to  resign  their  indepen- 
dent action,  and  coalesce  in  multitudes,  not  for 
a  passing  emergency  —  that  is  not  unusual  — 
nor  during  the  pliant  years  of  early  life,  for  the 
young  need  support,  but  in  all  the  vigour  of 
their  age  and  maturity  of  their  judgment.  A 
youth  will  not  enter  a  Religious  Order,  cer- 
tainly will  not  persevere  through  the  novitiate, 
unless  he  be  a  person  specially  susceptible  of 
religious  influences.  And  these  influences  are 
kept  at  work  all  life  long  upon  every  member 
of  the  Order,  by  daily  meditation,  prayer,  and 
solemn  ritual.  Without  them,  as  unanimous 
experience  testifies,  life  in  the  Order  would  be 
impossible. 

But,  it  seems,  no  education  is  needed  to  be 
a  Socialist.1  Only  an  Act  of  Parliament  or 
two,  and  we  shall  all  change  our  natures.  The 
individualism  that  has  come  down  from  father 
to  son  for  centuries  will  suddenly  vanish  from 
our  blood ;  traditions  will  be  upset,  precon- 
ceived ideas  reversed,  the  river  of  national  life 
will  turn  round  and  flow  upwards. 

1  The  Fabians,  it  must  be  said,  are  wiser  on  this  point.  They 
propose  to  educate  the  nation  for  years,  and  let  us  down  into 
collectivism  gradually. 


240  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

Surely  it  is  absurd  to  imagine  that  human  nature  can  be 
thus  completely  changed.  Socialism  requires  as  a  neces- 
sary condition  complete  suppression  of  self,  abiding  charity 
towards  all  our  associates,  and  intense  devotion  to  the  pub- 
lic good.  These  virtues  do  not  come  naturally  to  a  man 
even  when  he  enters  a  religious  order ;  still  less  would  they 
do  so  in  an  atheistic  or  secular  communistic  state.  Every 
member  of  a  religious  congregation,  every  student  of  eccle- 
siastical history,  nay,  every  reflecting  man,  must  see  that 
such  dispositions  can  only  be  acquired  and  retained  by 
continuous  mortification  of  our  natural  tendencies  and  pas- 
sions. But  constant  mortification  is  made  possible  only  by 
prayer  and  the  grace  of  God.  The  commonwealth  described 
by  Mr.  Bellamy  or  Mr.  Gronlund  would  be  the  very  last 
place  where  such  abnegation  would  be  likely  universally  to 
flourish.  The  goal  of  man's  existence  they  hold  to  be  tem- 
poral happiness ;  the  good  of  life,  pleasure  and  enjoyment. 
Constant  self-sacrifice,  we  need  hardly  remark,  is  not  a  likely 
offshoot  from  such  a  stock.1 

Religious  '  brothers '  are  trained  men :  So- 
cialist 'comrades'  are  wholly  untrained  to 
their  peculiar  mode  of  existence.  Religious 
are  volunteers,  and  the  unwilling  and  the  un- 
fit drop  out  of  their  ranks :  but  Socialism,  once 
established,  will  hold  people  to  it,  whether  they 
like  it  or  not.  State  compulsion  will  be  to 
them  instead  of  religious  vows,  and  the  State 
grants  no  dispensations. 

Of  the  men  and  women  you  meet  in  any 
public    place,    not   one    in   three  is    a    fit    and 

1  Father  Michael  Maher  in  The  Month  for  January,  1891,  p.  18. 


Socialism  and  Religious  Orders        241 

proper  person  to  be  in  a  Religious  Order,  even 
if  they  had  the  will  to  join.  Many  have  de- 
fects which  unfit  them  :  .some  few  are  unfitted 
by  reason  of  their  special  type  of  gifts.  The 
normal  Religious  finds  guidance  and  strength 
in  his  superior's  commands  and  the  prescrip- 
tions of  his  rule.  With  such  support  he  accom- 
plishes good  which  he  never  could  have  done 
by  himself.  The  members  of  Religious  Orders, 
working  together,  insignificant  in  themselves, 
but  mighty  in  combination,  have  been  compared 
to  those  little  diatoms  that  build  up  the  coral 
reefs.  But  minds  of  a  certain  order  of  original- 
ity  may  require  to  work  by  themselves,  untram- 
melled and  uncontrolled,  except  by  the  fear  of 
God  and  His  law.  The  Church  does  not  want 
all  her  children  to  enter  Religion,  even  were 
the  thing  physically  possible.  And  Religious 
men,  giving  advice  about  vocation,  warn  sun- 
dry peculiar  and  original  minds  off  the  ground, 
telling  them :  '  You  are  made  to  work  on  a 
line  of  your  own : '  '  You  must  operate  on 
your  own  account,  you  are  not  the  man  to 
march  shoulder  to  shoulder  in  a  battalion.' 
These  original  spirits  would  be  a  great  danger 
to  Socialism.  Properly  they  should  be  its 
leaders :  but  their  '  comrades  '  would  not  easily 
admit  them  to  lead.  What  they  could  neither 
lead  nor  accompany,  they  might  readily  turn 


242  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

to  destroy.  Socialists  seem  sometimes  to  dip 
into  Plutarch's  Lives:  they  might  find  instruc- 
tion there  in  the  Life  of  Alcibiadcs.  But  per- 
haps the  Socialist  commonwealth  will  be  too 
poor  and  sterile  a  soil  ever  to  bear  an  Alci- 
biades  or  a  Julius  Caesar.  In  dull  mediocrity 
it  will  find  its  salvation.  And  dull  mediocrity 
sets  in  where  individual  liberty  and  private 
enterprise  vanish. 

What  saves  individual  liberty  in  a  Religious 
Order,  and  keeps  the  members  of  the  body 
supple  and  elastic  in  their  work,  is  not  so  much 
the  machinery  of  the  constitution  as  the  spirit 
in  which  the  constitution  works.  The  heads 
of  the  Order  have  ample  powers  of  command, 
but  are  very  slow  to  draw  upon  them.  They 
hardly  ever  put  out  all  their  authority.  They 
tread  softly,  handle  gently,  and  are  loth  to  pro- 
ceed pro  imperio.  Rules  are  not  applied  with- 
out the  unction  of  charity,  and  what  theologians 
call  epicheia  (eVteucetot),  or  regard  for  circum- 
stances. Superiors  and  their  elder  subjects 
have  grown  up  together  from  early  youth, 
and  know  one  another's  ways  better  often  than 
brothers  of  the  same  family.  They  have  com- 
mon interests,  common  ideals,  and  are  on  the 
easiest  of  speaking  terms.  No  government  is 
at  once  so  gentle  and  so  firm,  so  considerate 
towards  the  individual,  and  at  the  same  time 


Socialism  and  Religious  Orders        243 

so  attentive  to  the  general  good,  as  the  gov- 
ernment of  a  healthy  Religious  body.  That 
Socialism  will  be  the  reverse  of  all  this,  is 
written  large  on  the  brow  of  the  Social  Demo- 
cratic Federation. 

Spontaneity  is  of  the  essence  of  a  Religious 
Order.  Such  Orders  are  approved  and  con- 
trolled by  the  Church.  They  may  also  be 
dissolved  by  the  Church.  But  they  are  not 
instituted  by  the  Church.  No  Pope,  acting 
as  Pope,  ever  founded  a  Religious  Order.  No 
General  Council  ever  instituted  one.  They  are 
not  things  prescribed  by  canon  law.  Every  Re- 
ligious Order  is  the  creation  of  individual  enter- 
prise. Thus  St.  Francis  started  the  Friars 
Minor,  and  St.  Dominic  the  Friars  Preachers: 
then  Popes  ratified  the  erection,  and  gave  it 
the  privileges  of  a  Religious  Order.  So,  too, 
the  Orders  are  maintained  by  the  voluntary 
enlistment  of  individuals.  If  no  more  nov- 
ices choose  to  join,  the  Order  simply  dies  out, 
and  the  Church  flourishes  without  it.  The 
Church  takes  no  trouble  to  procure  novices 
for  an  expiring  Order.  No  one  is  ever  sent 
into  an  Order  by  ecclesiastical  mandate.  It 
is  otherwise  when  the  vows  of  religion  have 
been  taken.  The  Church  does  take  some 
care  to  see  that  Religious  stand  to  their 
profession    and    observe    their    vows,  until   for 


244  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

approved  causes  she  dispenses  them  from  the 
obligation.  Religious  Orders,  then,  have  their 
origin  in  sheer  voluntary  association. 

Voluntary  associations  of  capital  are  also 
excellent  things  in  their  way.  The  State 
should  behave  to  them  as  the  Church  does 
to  Religious  Orders  —  give  them  charters  of 
incorporation,  maintain  their  rights,  hold  their 
members  to  their  obligations,  but  not  force 
men  into  them.  To  quote  Mr.  Egmont 
Hake :  — 

The  great  mistake  committed  by  the  votaries  of  Socialism 
is  not  to  distinguish  between  co-operation  and  Socialism  [i.e. 
between  voluntary  co-operation  and  co-operation  universal 
and  compulsory].  .  .  .  The  fundamental  idea  of  Socialism 
is  improved  co-operation,  and  it  is  only  because  the  Socialists 
cannot  see  their  way  to  arrive  at  a  system  of  free  co-opera- 
tion, satisfactory  to  all  the  members  of  the  community,  that 
they  have  fallen  back  on  the  desperate  plan  of  substituting 
an  artificial  co-operation  based  on  compulsion,  and  managed 
by  bureaucrats.  .  .  .  Now,  the  advantages  which  govern- 
ment departments  —  or  municipal  administration  —  afford 
spring  entirely  from  the  principle  of  co-operation,  and  the 
drawbacks,  difficulties,  annoyances,  and  persecutions  from 
the  Socialistic  [or  government  monopoly]  principle.1 

Workmen  might  do  wisely,  instead  of  im- 
poverishing themselves  by  strikes,  to  start 
co-operative    businesses    in  their   own    several 

1  The  Coming  Individualism,  p.  III. 


Socialism  and  Religious  Orders        245 

lines  of  trade,  and  work  these  in  competition 
with  their  masters.  The  capital  ought  not  to 
be  wanting,  with  workmen's  wages  what  they 
are  now,  especially  if  economy  were  practised 
in  the  luxuries  of  strikes  and  heavy  drinking. 
The  difficulty  would  be  that  which  is  the 
besetting  difficulty  of  co-operative  societies  — 
the  securing  of  competent  managers.  It 
would  be  necessary  to  pay  high  salaries  to 
secure  such.  There  is  talent,  however,  in  the 
market,  and,  given  a  proper  salary,  that  talent 
should  be  obtainable.  When  a  portion  of  the 
instruments  of  production  come  to  be  in  the 
workmen's  ownership,  they  will  be  able  to  put 
pressure  upon  the  masters  without  their  own 
life-blood  and  means  of  subsistence  ebbing 
away  in  the  effort. 

One  great  and  obvious  difference  between 
Socialism  and  Religious  life  we  have  kept  for 
the  last.  Relio-ious  men  have  no  wife  and 
children.  Being  single  persons,  without  family 
ties  and  private  family  interests,  they  are  able 
to  club  together:  their  Order  is  their  family, 
their  equals  in  age  are  their  brothers,  their 
seniors  are  to  them  as  fathers,  and  their  juniors 
as  sons.  The  property  of  the  Order  is  their 
family  property.  Among  married  people  you 
have  confraternities,  you  could  never  have  a 
Religious  Order.     The  precedent  of  Religious 


246  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

Orders,  therefore,  goes  little  or  no  way  in 
favour  of  the  feasibility  of  a  Socialist  common- 
wealth. We  gather,  however,  some  pretty 
plain  hints  from  the  pages  of  Socialist  litera- 
ture, that,  though  Socialists  cannot  do  without 
children,  some  of  them  at  least  intend  to  do 
without  the  family;  that  though  they  must 
have  women,  they  want  no  permanently 
wedded  wives.  Marriage  shall  not  stand  in 
the  way  of  their  collectivism.  The  morality 
of  this  procedure  we  may  leave  undiscussed. 
But  we  would  propose  one  question :  Where 
is  this  type  of  Socialist  going  to  have  his  home  ? 
Not  in  the  next  world,  for  he  believes  in 
none.  Not  with  wife  and  family,  if  the  State 
is  to  cut  off,  or  discourage  to  the  utmost, 
such  individualist  appendages,  and  take  his 
children  away  from  him.  The  lodging-house 
or  barracks  in  which  he  is  quartered  will 
be  no  home  to  him.  The  inmates  will  be 
strangers  to  the  charities  of  Religious  life.  If 
he  lives  by  himself,  like  Timon  and  Diogenes, 
he  finds  no  home  in  that  misanthropic  solitude. 
He  can  hardly  look  upon  the  Guildhall  as  his 
home,  or  the  House  of  Commons,  or  wherever 
be  the  meeting-place  of  the  General  Assembly. 
He  is  no  longer  a  man,  but  a  stone  in  the 
wall  of  a  Government  Office.  He  has  no 
individuality  and  no  home. 


Socialism  and  Religious  Orders        247 

Note.  —  Socialistic  settlements  and  experiments  are,  and 
always  have  been,  wrecked  on  the  common  rock  of  ignorance 
of  human  nature.     They  are  established  on  the  baseless  as- 
sumption that  a  number  of  heterogeneously  collected  people 
of  various   tastes,   temperaments,  and  dispositions  can  be 
machined  into  conforming  to  a  common  ideal.     In  practice 
only  the  strong  religious  impulse  and  sentiment  to  be  found 
in  convents  and  monasteries  can  permanently  achieve  this 
result.     The  Hon.  J.  Garrard,  a  member  of  the  New  South 
Wales  ministry,  has  just  made  a  tour  of  the  Socialistic  labour 
settlements  of  South  Australia.     He  reports  that  the  experi- 
ment has  not  worked  well  in  practice.     The  settlements,  he 
says,  started  with  much   enthusiasm   about   mateship   and 
brotherhood,  but  it  is  only  in  those  where  the  theory  of 
Socialism  was  abandoned,   and  private   ownership  in  land 
conceded,  that  any  success  has  been  achieved.     He  instances 
a  labour  settlement  at  a  place  called   Holder,  where  the 
industrious  men  "refused  to  carry  the  lazy  men  on  their 
shoulders."     It  was  at  this  place  also  that  the  single  men 
rebelled,  because  they  got  only  one  ration,  whereas  each 
married  man  got  a  ration  for  each  member  of  his  family 
down  to  the  youngest.     This  grievance  led  to  a  secession 
of  the  single  men,  who  started  a  new  socialistic  colony  —  an 
Eveless  Eden  —  of  their  own.     But  this  also  has  proved  a 
dire  failure,  for  when  Mr.  Garrard  visited  it,  he  found  most 
<jf  its  members  "  casting  about  for  wives." 

—  St.  James's  Gazette. 


ESSAY    VI 

MORALITY   WITHOUT   FREE   WILL 

There  is  a  philosophy  which  resolves  the 
universe  into  a  process  of  divine  thought  flow- 
ing on  irresistibly.  In  this  philosophy  every- 
thing happens  a  priori:  everything  that  happens 
is  a  foregone  conclusion,  following  necessarily 
upon  what  happened  before :  there  is  no  room 
anywhere,  whether  in  God  or  man,  for  what 
Catholic  divines  understand  by  free  will.  To 
be  sure,  this  philosophy  speaks  of  free  will, 
meaning  thereby  the  choice  of  a  man  of  good 
character,  acting  according  to  his  character, 
and  not  driven  out  of  his  ways  of  characteristic 
goodness  by  the  force  of  temptation :  such  a 
one,  so  doing,  is  said  to  act  up  to  his  '  real  self,' 
and  thereby  to  act  '  freely.'  In  all  this,  deter- 
minism lurks :  for  the  good  character,  taking 
its  free  and  unimpeded  course,  determines  the 
resultant  action,  as  surely  and  as  masterfully 
as  a  river,  unchecked  by  a  dam,  rolls  on  its 
course  towards  the  ocean.  All  pantheism  in- 
volves determinism.     Plato,  following  Socrates, 

from  first  to  last  is  a  thorough  determinist :  he 

249 


250  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

always  assumes  that  to  know  good  is  to  do  it : 
he  never  contemplates  the  case  of  a  man  look- 
ing away  from  the  good  that  he  knows,  or  fail- 
ing to  regard  it  steadily.1  I  refrain  from  all 
reference  to  St.  Augustine  and  Pelagianism  and 
Calvinism  and  Jansenism,  to  the  effects  of  the 
fall,  the  corruption  of  nature,  and  gratia  victrix. 
I  deal  with  philosophical  determinism  only, 
without  theological  complications. 

There  is  what  is  called  '  hard  determinism ' 
and  '  soft  determinism.'  The  soft  is  as  genuine 
determinism  as  the  hard  variety.  You  may 
wrap  a  millstone  in  a  cloth,  but  it  remains  a 
millstone.  Hard  determinism,  now  gone  out 
of  fashion,  makes  the  motion  of  the  will  like  the 
motion  of  a  material  particle  under  mechanical 

1  "  No  one  is  willingly  wicked  :  only  through  a  bad  habit  of 
body  and  unscientific  rearing  does  the  bad  man  go  bad,"  Plato, 
Timeeus,  86  D,  E  ;  cf.  Laws,  886  A,  B.  Aristotle,  Nic.  Eth.,  III. 
1 1 14  a  (c.  vii.),  corrects  Plato:  he  admits  that  no  man  intends 
to  form  to  himself  a  wicked  character,  but  he  says  that  man  does 
choose  to  do  acts  which  of  themselves  go  to  the  formation  of  such 
a  character ;  and  he  thinks  that  the  character  thus  formed  is  irre- 
sistible. Aristotle  seems  to  consider  that  man  is  free,  not  in  the 
main  purpose  of  life  (/Sou'A^tns),  but  in  the  choice  of  means 
thereto  (7rpoa<.pe(ns),  so  far  as  this  choice  is  not  determined  by 
some  previously  formed  character  (^#os),  or  habit  (efis).  whether 
of  virtue  (aperrj)  or  of  vice  (/caKta) .  I  do  not  think  that  Aristotle 
supposes  all  the  choices  (7rpoaipe<xas)  of  any  man  to  be  determined 
by  his  character  or  habits.  Aristotle,  it  seems  to  me.  does  stand 
for  a  limited  play  of  free  will,  especially  in  the  young  and 
unformed. 


Morality  without  Free   Will  251 

forces,  wholly  determined  from  without,  with- 
out the  set  and  form  of  the  will  itself  having 
any  influence  on  the  movement.     If  hard  de- 
terminism   were    right,  man  would    be    like    a 
weathercock,  the  sport  of  every  wind  of  impulse 
that    blew.       But    obviously    man    has   some- 
thing in  him  which  often  resists  present  solici- 
tation.   Men  behave  differently  under  the  same 
temptation :  one  man  yields,  another  holds  out. 
There  is  something  which  carries  a  man  above 
his    surroundings,   or   haply  sinks    him    below 
them.     This  is  said  to  be  'character.'     Charac- 
ter is  partly  inherited,  partly  acquired :  partly  a 
physical,  partly  a  mental,  property.     If  the  hard 
determinist  ignored    character,  —  I  am  not  so 
sure  that  he  did,  —  the  soft  determinist  at  any 
rate  makes    the  most  of  it.     But  character  in 
his  view  is  but  the  result  of  past  circumstances, 
a  sort  of  conglomerate  of  past  circumstances. 
It    is    ancient    circumstance,    crystallised    and 
preserved    and    still    effectual.      Thus,    in    the 
view  of  soft  determinism,  man  is  the  creature 
of  circumstances,  present  and  past.     He  is  led 
about  by  a  chain  of  circumstance,  many  links 
of  which  were  forged  before  he  was  born.     No 
other  view  is  possible  upon  the  hypothesis  of 
blind  evolution.      Man,  then,  in  this  soft  deter- 
minist view,  has  the  attribute  of  spontaneity,  in- 
asmuch as  many  of  the  things  that  he  does  are 


252  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

not  done  against  the  grain ;  he  is  not  reluctant 
to  do  them,  not  coerced,  bullied,  threatened, 
deluded,  or  deceived;  he  really  wishes  to  do 
them,  and  has  his  eyes  open,  and  is  free  from 
the  compulsion  of  his  fellow-men  in  the  trans- 
action. But  though  he  has  this  freedom  from 
compulsion,  as  it  is  called,  he  has  not  \\-\2X  free- 
dom of  indifference,  in  which  free  will  is  placed 
by  Catholic  divines.  What  he  wills  and  wishes 
to  do,  he  cannot  but  will  and  wish  to  do,  with 
the  character  that  he  has.  And  that  same 
character  was  made  for  him,  not  really  by 
him.  It  is  a  natural  growth  of  the  circum- 
stances of  his  past  history.  It  follows  the  law 
of  causation,  or  of  invariable  and  unconditional 
sequence,  as  much  as  any  other  physical  phe- 
nomenon, say  the  stratification  of  some  particu- 
lar rock. 

Under  much  contradiction,  the  Christian 
Church  has  always  taught  the  doctrine  of  free 
will.  Hard  determinism  is  heresy,  and  soft 
determinism  is  no  better.  The  doctrine  of  the 
Church  has  formed  the  thoughts  of  men  even 
outside  her  communion.  We  have  learnt  to 
think  in  terms  of  free  will.  If  determinism 
shall  pass  from  the  lecture  room  to  the  market- 
place, our  thought  and  our  speech  on  all  moral 
subjects  will  undergo  a  vast  change.  The 
change    may   be    compared    to    the    proposed 


Morality  without  Free   Will  253 

change  from  the  present  system  of  private 
capital  to  socialism.  One  has  to  think  oneself 
into  determinism  as  into  socialism.  In  either 
case,  more  remains  than  might  have  been  ex- 
pected. The  change  is  not  so  much  on  the 
surface  of  things  as  in  the  underlying  principle. 
And  first  of  what  remains  of  our  present  moral 
system,  when  it  comes  to  be  worked  on  deter- 
minist  principles. 

The  ten  commandments  remain  unchanged.1 
The  list  of  virtues  and  vices  remains  unchanged. 
The  ethical  motives  for  virtue  and  against  vice 
remain  unchanged.  The  State  continues  to 
frame  laws,  commanding  and  forbidding  the 
same  things  as  before.  The  same  conduct 
is  praised  and  rewarded,  or  blamed  and  pun- 
ished, as  before,  albeit  not  quite  with  the 
same  intention.  The  portraits  of  the  good 
man  and  of  the  bad  man  respectively  have  lost 
none  of  their  external  lineaments.  The  one 
is  still  self-controlled  and  self-denying,  brave, 
loving,  magnanimous,  and  just.  The  other 
remains  a  sensualist,  cruel  and  cowardly, 
frivolous,  idle,  heartless,  and  untrustworthy. 
Nero  is  still  bad,  and   Paul  good.      The   exi- 

1  The  determinist  is  likely  to  be  also  a  pantheist.  Pantheism, 
as  it  alters  men's  other  relations  to  God,  may  also  alter  their 
worship  of  Him.  But  I  leave  pantheist  worship  to  its  own  evolu- 
tion. 


254  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

gencies  of  human  nature  and  of  human  society 
have  not  lost  their  value.  The  good  and 
happiness  of  the  individual,  and  the  prosperity 
of  the  society  to  which  he  belongs,  require  of 
him  the  same  conduct  as  heretofore.  Good- 
ness has  not  become  less  profitable,  nor  wicked- 
ness less  detrimental  and  deplorable,  now  that 
both  are  recognised  necessities.  Wickedness 
is  what  it  was  in  every  respect  save  one ;  and 
the  same  deeds  are  wicked  that  were  wicked. 
Goodness  has  lost  only  one  of  its  attributes. 
Formerly  the  good  man  did  what  it  befitted  a 
man  to  do,  having  at  the  same  time  in  the 
very  act  and  circumstances  of  his  well-doing 
the  power  to  swerve  from  goodness :  still  he 
does  the  same  things,  but  further  it  is  to  be 
noted  that,  with  his  character  and  circumstances, 
he  cannot  help  doing  them.  And  conversely 
of  the  wicked  man,  who  is  rightly  enough 
pronounced  by  the  determinist  a  dangerous, 
disgusting,  and  offensive  animal.  Ugly  con- 
duct fits  in  with  the  determinist  hypothesis  as 
well  as  ugly  architecture. 

We  praise  a  flower,  or  a  gun,  or  the  '  points ' 
of  a  horse.  There  would  be  no  difficulty  in 
praising  in  that  way  a  man  in  whose  conduct 
we  recognised  no  free  will.  Still,  he  might 
be  to  us  a  grand  fellow,  a  very  useful  creature. 
We  might   further   encourage   him    with    pro- 


Morality  without  Free    Will  255 

spective  praise,  as  an  inducement  to  serve  us 
still  better,  much  in  the  same  way  that  a  driver 
pats  his  horse  and  utters  kind  cries  to  it  on 
a  hard  road.  Such  praise,  however,  and  the 
corresponding  blame,  cannot  be  called  moral 
approbation,  and  reprobation.  This  is  more 
apparent  in  the  case  of  blame.  We  blame 
stupidity,  but  we  have  a  very  different  censure 
for  malice.  We  are  angry  with  stupidity,  only 
as  we  imagine  it  to  contain  an  element  of  wil- 
fulness, or  carelessness,  which  approaches  very 
near  to  malice.  To  the  determinist,  a  malicious 
offender  could  not  but  have  been  malicious 
in  the  past :  there  is  no  use  being  angry  with 
him :  the  only  thing  to  do  is  to  devise  and 
apply  new  motives  in  order  to  his  cure.  This 
may  be  done  by  instructing  him :  it  may  also 
be  done  by  punishing  him.  Determinist  pun- 
ishment is  always  prospective,  never  retrospec- 
tive. It  is  inflicted  in  prospect  either  of  the 
amendment  of  the  offender,  by  supplying  him 
with  new  motives,  which  shall  '  make  him  help  ' 
what  he  rightly  pleads  he  '  could  not  help ' 
before,  or  else  of  deterring  the  community  from 
imitating  such  socially  harmful  conduct,  as 
when  we  hans:  a  man  for  murder.  No  con- 
sideration  of  suffering  as  expiatory  of  wrong- 
doing, no  idea  of  retribution,  must  ever  enter 
into  the  calculations  of  the  determinist.     The 


256  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

determinist  must  adopt  the  Stoic  profession  of 
never  being  angry.  Anger,  says  Aristotle,  is 
a  desire  of  vengeance :  but  there  is  no  ven- 
geance for  the  determinist,  as  there  is  no  retrib- 
utive punishment.  He  must  punish  with  the 
calmness  of  a  surgeon  performing  an  operation  : 
or  if  he  assumes  an  outward  mien  of  anger,  it 
must  be  for  the  humane  purpose  of  creating 
new  motives  in  the  breast  of  the  culprit  and 
backing  up  his  infirmity.  Believing  that  men 
are  literally  '  made  better,'  that  is,  are  made  to 
act  better  in  future  by  reprehension  and  punish- 
ment, the  determinist  will  not  stint  them  of 
these  beneficial  applications.  He  will  not 
spare  the  incapable,  where  he  believes  that 
punishment  will  amend  them.  He  will  not 
accept  the  usual  distinction  between  incapacity 
and  crime,  as  between  an  incapable  commander 
and  a  treacherous  one.  To  him  it  is  all  inca- 
pacity, '  crime  '  being  incapacity  of  will,  and 
'incapacity,'  commonly  so  called,  being  inca- 
pacity of  understanding.  He  will  punish  the 
former  more  severely  than  the  latter,  only  in 
so  far  as  it  appears  to  him  more  amenable  to 
the  motive  of  punishment.  His  distinction  will 
be  drawn  between  '  curable  '  and  '  incurable  ' 
incapacity,  whether  of  will  or  of  understanding; 
and  so  far  as  the  traitor  is  more  responsive  to 
punishment,  or  to  bribery,  than  the  blockhead, 


Morality  without  Free   Will  257 

he  will  consider  him  the  better  man  of  the  two. 
The  phrase,  'not  merely  a  crime  but  a  blun- 
der,' will  come  well  from  his  mouth.  The 
Carthaginian  practice  of  crucifying  unsuccessful 
generals  must  have  been  stimulating  to  persons 
in  command  to  do  their  best.  A  good  preced- 
ent for  determinists  likewise  is  the  execution  of 
Admiral  Byng,  shot,  as  Voltaire  remarked,  pour 
encourager  les  autres.  The  determinist  will 
fully  enter  into  the  definition  given  by  Dr. 
Alexander  Bain  in  his  work  on  The  Emotions 
and  the  Will,  that  "  responsibility  is  punish- 
ability." The  determinist  will  go  on  further 
to  define  punishability,  '  a  liability  to  painful 
inflictions,  and  thence  to  fear,  as  a  motive  to 
ensure  better  conduct  in  future.' 

The  proceedings  of  a  man-eating  tiger  in  a 
lonely  Indian  village,  where  with  his  huge 
shoulders  he  overthrows  frail  walls  and  doors 
at  night,  and  devours  the  sleeping  inhabitants, 
are  fearfully  destructive,  but  we  should  never 
call  them  disgraceful.  They  excite  no  moral 
reprobation  :  what  else  could  such  a  creature 
be  expected  to  do  ?  You  do  not  argue  with  a 
tiger:  you  shoot  him,  or  get  out  of  his  way. 
But  the  doings  of  a  thuof,  an  assassin  who  kills 
as  many  men  as  a  tiger,  are  called  disgraceful. 
The  reason  of  this,  the  determinist  tells  us,  is 
because  the  assassin  is  open  to  argument;  or 


258  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

if  the  professed  assassin  is  not,  at  least  novices 
and  aspirants  to  the  craft  are  so  open :  by 
calling  the  assassin's  doings  disgraceful,  crim- 
inal, wicked,  you  diminish  the  chance  of  assassi- 
nations in  future.  Assassins,  in  fact,  can  be 
talked  to,  though  tigers  can  not;  and  talk  is 
prophylactic.  This  is  all  very  true.  It  is  use- 
ful to  talk  of  thuggism  as  'disgraceful  conduct,' 
and  to  kindle  moral  sentiment  against  murder. 
But  is  thuggism  truly  and  really  disgraceful 
when,  to  parody  Watts's  hymn,  '  nature  has 
made  thugs  so,'  any  more  than  the  tiger's 
practice  of  preying  upon  human  kind,  once  it 
has  learnt  that  fatal  trick,  carries  with  it  any 
stigma  of  disgrace  ?  The  tiger  is  not  more 
thoroughly  determined  by  causative  agents  than 
the  thug,  so  the  determinist  must  allow.  The 
use  of  terms  of  moral  censure  in  speaking  of 
human  criminals  then  is  a  mere  f aeon  deparler, 
adopted  because  such  language  is  useful,  not 
because  it  is  true.  It  is  an  exemplification  of 
the  Platonic  yewalov  v/zevSo?,  the  "  noble  lie  "  told 
to  the  people  by  their  rulers  for  purposes  of 
Government.1  The  sentiment  of  moral  disap- 
probation  has  the  ground  cut  from  under  it 
when  it  is  thus  explained.  Were  determinism 
generally  accepted,  this  sentiment  would  disap- 
pear, and  give  place  to  the  very  different  senti- 

1  Plato,  Republic,  III.  414  B. 


Morality  without  Free   Will  259 

merits  of  dislike  and  dread  of  a  wicked  man, 
exactly  the  sentiments  with  which  we  regard 
a  '  man-eater  '  in  the  jungle. 

With  this  there  perishes  the  notion  that 
moral  evil  is  worse  than  all  other  evil,  that 
sin  is  more  to  be  avoided  than  any  amount 
of  suffering :  the  sentiment,  malo  mori  qnam 
foedari,  "  death  rather  than  moral  defilement," 
becomes  inane  and  foolish.  Moral  evil  no 
longer  dwells  in  a  category  apart  from  other 
evil.  It  is  henceforth  definable  as  a  public 
nuisance,  open  to  treatment  by  motives.  And 
as  motives  are  cheap,  terms  of  reproach  plen- 
tiful, and  rods  grow  on  every  bush,  this  pecu- 
liarity of  moral  evil,  that  it  is  remediable  by 
motives,  is  rather  in  its  commendation.  A 
small-pox  patient  in  a  crowded  neighbour- 
hood is  a  nuisance  harder  to  deal  with  than 
the  perjurer  or  the  bigamist,  and  may  set  the 
determinist  philosopher  musing  whether  he  be 
not  on  the  whole  the  worse  man.  This  is  utili- 
tarianism indeed,  but  not  moral  philosophy. 

With  the  sentiment  of  moral  reprobation  and 
righteous  indignation  in  regard  to  other  men's 
sins  goes  the  sentiment  of  remorse  for  our  own. 
What  we  really  believe  we  could  not  have 
helped,  as  matters  stood,  e.g.  the  loss  of  a 
piece  of  luggage  in  travelling,  we  regret  indeed, 
and  are  annoyed  at ;    but  we  do  not  feel  any 


260  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

remorse  over  it,  not  even  though  the  lost 
trunk  contained  some  precious  article  solemnly- 
entrusted  by  a  friend  to  our  care.  Such  reflec- 
tions as  /  could  not  help  it,  It  was  not  my  fault, 
are  a  salve  against  remorse.  So  long  as  we 
honestly  believe  that  we  took  all  the  care  that 
we  possibly  could  under  the  circumstances, 
the  poignancy  of  our  regret  never  passes  into 
remorse.  A  man  who  lays  the  unction  of 
determinism  to  his  heart,  even  soft  determin- 
ism, should  believe  that  in  every  circumstance 
of  his  past  history  he  has  done  the  best  thing 
that  he  could  possibly  have  done  there  and 
then ;  that  he  is  the  best  man  that,  with  his 
inherited  character  and  under  such  circum- 
stances as  have  been  his,  he  possibly  could 
have  been,  and  so  are  all  other  men  the  best 
men  possible ;  that  in  fact  we  are  living  in 
the  best  of  all  possible  worlds,  because  it  is 
the  only  world  that  could  have  been  so  far, 
though  we  hope  there  is  a  better  time  coming. 
If  still  the  determinist  feels  remorse  for  some 
harsh  word  or  deed  of  unfaithfulness,  it  is 
because  his  conscience  is  stronger  than  his 
philosophy.  He  ought  to  be,  like  the  ideal 
sage  of  Stoicism,  a  man  above  remorse  and 
incapable  of  sin.  Above  remorse,  but  not 
above  regret  for  what  was  inevitable  in  the 
past  but  may  perhaps  be  prevented  in  future. 


Morality  without  Free   Will  261 

The  nonconformist  conscience  affords  us 
occasional  surprises  of  hatred  of  religion  in  the 
name  of  religious  liberty.  The  determinist 
conscience  will  also  conduct  humanity  into 
pastures  new  and  strange.  The  study  of  the 
determinist  will  be,  not  so  much  'what  I 
ought  to  do,'  as  '  what  I  feel  carried  to,' 
'what  is  consistent  with  my  character  under 
the  present  weight  of  motives.'  Were  I  a 
determinist,  I  should  feel  a  certain  sense  of 
degradation  and  helplessness,  as  though  I  were 
no  longer  master  of  my  human  acts,  but  were 
reduced  to  the  role  of  a  spectator  of  the  goings 
on  at  the  domestic  hearth  of  my  own  soul. 
Instead  of  I  will,  I  should  be  apt  to  say  I  feel 
I  must ;  while  /  wont  would  subside  into  just 
at  present  I  can't.  And  when  the  deed  was 
done,  my  judgment  on  the  sinfulness  of  it 
would  take  the  form,  Hoivever  deplorable,  zvhat 
else  could  I  have  done  ?  I  think  I  should  even 
cease  to  speak  and  act  in  the  first  person,  and 
employ  the  third  instead,  as  children  do  before 
they  come  to  the  use  of  reason  and  before  their 
will  is  free.1  In  this  habit  of  mind  I  should 
still  retain  consciousness,  but  old-fashioned 
conscience  would  have  fled  with  the  sense  of 
remorse,  of  personality,  of  agency  of  my  own, 

1  Like  the  Greek  68c  avrjp  for  iyu>. 


262  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

and  of  that  self-application  which  is  a  function 
of  intelligence. 

I  believe,  however,  that  the  consciousness  of 
the  ego  in  man  is  a  consciousness  of  free  will, 
and  carries  conscience  with  it.  But,  like  other 
truthful  witnesses,  this  witness  of  conscious- 
ness to  free  will  easily  breaks  down  under 
cross-examination,  and  then  goes  discredited. 
It  is  a  witness  to  the  fact,  to  on,  of  free  will, 
not  to  to  Slotl,  or  the  kozu.  Time,  space,  self, 
free  will,  simple  things  enough  as  common 
experience  presents  them,1  become  a  perplexity 
and  a  puzzle  when  we  try  to  draw  them  out 
scientifically.  I  have  no  purpose  of  doing  so. 
So  far  as  I  may  theorise  on  the  subject,  I 
should  say  that  an  act  of  free  will  is  not  a 
reaching  out  to  the  absent,  but  a  clutching 
and  sustaining  of  something  already  present 
in  consciousness,  —  an  actuation,  endorsement, 
and  personal  acceptance  of  some  affection 
that  has  arisen  in  the  mind  spontaneously  by 
the    necessary    workings    of    causation.       The 

1  Did  ever  any  catechist  find  it  necessary  to  tell  any  child 
what  free  will  meant  ? 

"  One  of  the  first  experiences  of  an  infant  is  that  of  his  willing 
and  doing ;  and,  as  time  goes  on,  one  of  the  first  temptations  of 
the  boy  is  to  bring  home  to  himself  the  fact  of  his  sovereign 
arbitrary  power,  though  it  be  at  the  price  of  waywardness,  mis- 
chievousness,  and  disobedience  "  (Newman,  Grammar  of  Assent* 
p.  66,  ed.  1895). 


Morality  without  Free    Will  26" 


0 


spontaneous  is  necessary.  In  other  words,  soft 
determinists,  who  admit  nothing  beyond  spon- 
taneity, are  true  determinists.  Free  will  is 
something  beyond  spontaneity. 

It  remains  to  study  the  effects  of  deter- 
minism on  the  'plain  man.'  The  plain 
man  may  profess  determinism  as  some  pro- 
fess Christianity,  without  its  having  any  ap- 
preciable effect  upon  his  conduct.  He  may 
be  a  determinist  when  he  opens  a  book,  and 
a  vigorous  assertor  of  free  will  in  his  busi- 
ness  hours  and  his  ordinary  conversation.  I 
am  thinking  of  the  plain  man  when  he 
becomes  a  practising  determinist.  A  whole 
nation  may  agree  some  day  to  teach  morality 
independently  of  religion.  Up  to  a  certain 
point  the  thing  is  possible,  —  I  do  not  say 
possible  in  the  concrete,  but  theoretically  and 
in  the  abstract  possible,  —  in  so  far  as  ethics 
are  a  science  in  their  own  right,  distinct  from 
theology.  When  ethics  are  thus  adopted,  no 
longer  as  a  mere  speculative  study,  but  as  the 
sole  guide  of  action,  it  will  become  a  serious 
question  for  school  authorities  whether  they 
shall  teach  determinist  ethics,  and  hazard  the 
effect  of  such  teaching  upon  the  minds  of 
the  million.  It  is  to  be  feared  that  the  effect 
would  be  the  sending  out  of  a  multitude  of 
human    beings,  pretending    to    be    determined 


264  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

by  '  character,'  and  really  having  no  character, 
because  they  never  use  their  wills  as  their 
own,  —  young  men  and  women  of  an  emo- 
tional, passive  temperament,  drifting  about 
under  every  wind  of  impulse  and  every  breath 
of  sensational  excitement.  Most  of  these  soft 
determinists,  to  borrow  a  metaphor  from  Plato, 
would  prove  mere  stingless  drones,  their  own 
worst  enemies.  Some  of  them,  however,  would 
develop  cruel  stings ;  and  now  and  then  a 
soft  determinist,  grown  into  what  Plato  calls 
"  a  walking  drone  with  a  sting,"  would  com- 
mit a  crime  big  enough  to  amaze  the  world.1 

But  are  not  Orientals  generally  determinists, 
and  have  not  great  men  and  great  empires 
arisen  in  the  East,  and  that  under  the  con- 
scious influence  of  determinist  and  fatalistic 
principles  ?  No  doubt.  But  the  great  men 
and  empire-builders  of  the  East  were  deter- 
minists and  something  more :  they  were 
strong  theists.  They  believed  that  they  had 
a  mission  from  Heaven  to  go  forth  and  con- 
quer.    They  were  men  of  prayer  and  prophecy. 

1  "  These  winged  drones  have  been  fashioned  by  Providence 
all  without  stings :  but  as  for  those  drones  that  go  about  afoot, 
while  some  of  them  are  stingless,  others  have  got  awful  stings. 
For  the  former  sort  is  reserved  the  life  of  a  tramp  and  the  old 
age  and  death  of  a  pauper;  but  of  the  number  of  stinging  drones 
are  all  who  bear  the  name  of  belonging  to  the  criminal  class  " 
(Plato,  Republic,  VIII.  552  C). 


Morality  without  Free    Will  265 

They  had  the  strength  of  religion,  albeit  a 
false  religion,  at  their  back.  They  were  deter- 
minists  and  fanatics  to  boot.  And  thus  much 
of  the  great  men  of  the  East.  But  it  may  be 
doubted  whether  the  mass  of  Oriental  popula- 
tions have  not  lost  in  vigour  by  their  determin- 
ism, degenerating  into  apathy,  indolence,  and 
submission  to  preventable  calamities,  whether 
visitations  of  nature  or  the  tyranny  of  princes. 
Western  determinism,  prompted  by  a  belief  in 
pantheistic  evolution,  will  derive  no  support 
from  any  religion  that  can  stir  the  soul.  It 
will  be  a  gloomy,  godless,  mechanical  affair. 


ESSAY   VII 

THE   VALUE   OF   SENTIMENT   IN   ETHICS,   AN 
ILLUSTRATION 

There  exist  a  number  of  societies  having 
for  their  object  the  bringing  about  of  legisla- 
tion to  prohibit  entirely  the  use  of  the  knife,  or 
of  any  other  painful  application,  upon  living 
dumb  animals  by  way  of  experiment  for  the 
advance  of  biology.  The  most  powerful  is  the 
London  Anti-vivisection  Society,  which  has  its 
offices  in  Sackville  Street,  Piccadilly.  This 
society  has  issued  a  flood  of  pamphlets,  of  vary- 
ing degrees  of  merit,  in  support  of  its  cause. 
The  debate  is  of  interest  to  the  medical  stu- 
dent, also  to  the  moralist  and  political  philoso- 
pher. Speaking  in  the  latter  capacity,  I  see 
three  questions  arising  for  solution.  The 
reader  must  not  complain  if  to  these  questions 
I  return  only  partial  answers.  I  am  not  dogma- 
tising, but  enquiring.  I  wish  the  reader  to  use 
his  own  mind  along  with  mine. 

A.  Is  vivisection  wronsr?  I  answer:  Not 
intrinsically  and  absolutely  wrong,  nor  dare  I 
say  that  it  is  ever  wrong,  but  there  are  argu- 

267 


268  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

ments  against  its  being  always  right.  These 
arguments  I  produce  for  what  they  are  worth, 
without  pronouncing  on  their  value. 

B.  Is  it  within  the  competence  of  the  State 
to  forbid  vivisection  ?     I  say :  Yes,  it  is. 

C.  Should  the  State  forbid  vivisection  ?  All 
I  have  to  reply  is  an  hypothetical  negative. 
The  State  should  not  forbid  vivisection,  if  by 
vivisection  there  is  hope  of  ascertaining,  and 
without  vivisection  there  is  no  hope  of  ascer- 
taining, facts  of  importance  for  the  advance  of 
medicine  and  surgery;  or  again,  if  vivisection 
is  really  necessary  for  training  medical  stu- 
dents. Beyond  this  hypothetical  negative  I 
will  not  go.  Whether  this  hypothesis  is  veri- 
fied or  not,  it  is  for  the  medical  faculty  alone 
to  decide,  not  for  laymen,  however  many  medi- 
cal treatises  they  have  plodded  through. 

A.  I  presume  that  it  is  not  wrong  for  man 
to  arise,  kill  and  eat  (Acts  x.  13)  the  inferior 
animals.  I  do  not  wish  to  argue  with  the  man 
who  holds  that  meat  diet  is  sinful.  I  presume 
aeain  that  the  lower  animals,  such  at  least  as 
man  is  able  to  subdue,  are  by  nature  the  slaves 
of  man,  <j>vo-ei  SovXol,  as  Aristotle  says.  Other- 
wise, I  fail  to  see  how  man  can  be  justified  in 
killing  them  for  his  food.  The  essence  of  slavery 
consists  in  this,  —  that  the  slave  is  not  his  own, 
but  another's :  he  does  not  exist  for  himself,  but 


Sentiment  in  Ethics  269 

is  wholly  referable  and  referred  to  the  will  and 
convenience  of  his  master.  In  the  juridical 
order,  he  is  a  thing,  a  chattel,  a  piece  of  property, 
or,  to  use  a  term  which  I  have  elsewhere  em- 
ployed, heterocentric :  1  whereas  a  person,  being 
sui  juris,  existing  (under  limitations)  for  himself, 
and  not  being  the  property  of  any  other,  I  have 
called  autocentric.  Greek  philosophy  and  Ro- 
man law  and,  in  a  certain  age,  the  common 
consent  of  mankind  held  that  one  man  could 
be  another  man's  slave  in  this  full  sense  of  the 
word.  If  the  master  killed  his  slave,  cut  up 
his  body,  and  threw  the  flesh  to  feed  the  lam- 
preys in  his  fish-ponds,  he  was  not  in  excess 
of  his  legal  rights,  although  he  outraged  moral 
sentiment,  which  in  every  age  has  protested 
against  carrying  legality  in  this  matter  of  slavery 
to  all  lengths.  The  slave  had  no  rights  against 
his  master,  and  could  suffer  no  wrong  at  his 
hands.  He  was  not  a  fellow  of  the  society, 
of  the  tto\i%  or  rcspublica,  to  which  his  master 
belonged.2     As  for  human  society,  either  there 

1  In  the  biological  order  a  brute  beast  is  not  a  thing,  but  a 
sentient  nature.  No  one  for  a  moment  would  incline  to  Male- 
branche's  theory,  that  brutes  are  mere  automata.  Many  words 
bear  many  various  meanings,  according  to  the  antithesis  in  which 
they  are  used.  Thus,  nature  has  several  meanings  in  opposition 
to  art,  to  convention,  to  cultivation,  to  grace.  A  dumb  animal  is 
a  thing  in  contradistinction  to  a  person,  not  a  thing  as  a  stone  is 
a  thing,  devoid  of  life  and  feeling. 

2  Yet,  in  Roman  law,  by  what  seems  an  amiable   inconsis- 


270  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

was  no  such  thing,  or  it  consisted  only  of  free- 
men. Such  notions  could  be  in  vogue  only 
under  very  imperfect  conditions  of  humanity 
and  morality.  As  morality  progressed,  the 
slave's  condition  was  improved,  first  practically, 
then  also  legally.  In  fact,  he  ceased  to  be 
absolutely  and  thoroughly  a  slave.  Finally 
Christianity  invented  the  distinction  between 
the  living  body  of  the  man  and  the  labour  of 
the  man :  the  master,  it  was  said,  was  master 
of  all  the  labour  of  the  slave,  he  was  not  master 
of  the  body  and  soul  of  the  man.  He  could 
not  rightfully  kill  him,  or  strike  him  otherwise 
than  in  just  punishment,  or  outrage  him,  or 
prevent  or  compel  his  marriage,  or  control  his 
religion.  In  all  these  and  other  particulars  the 
slave  had  rights  against  his  master.  Only  in 
this  modified  sense  would  Christianity  ever 
recognise  slavery.  Such  slavery  was  slavery, 
as  Aristotle  and  Cato  knew  slavery,  no  longer. 
The  slavery  of  the  Aristotelian  <£ucret  SouXo? 
perished  in  the  recognition  of  a  common  human 
nature,  one  Lord,  one  faith,  one  baptism,  one  God 
and  Father  of  all (Eph.  iv.  5,  6). 

To  kill  a  living  creature  at  your  discretion, 
and  by  the  same  discretion  to  use  that  crea- 

tency,  the  slave  was  a  member  of  the  familia :  he  might  in  an 
extraordinary  case  even  be  the  heir :  and  if  of  the  fa?nilia,  then 
(logically)  of  the  respublica. 


Sentiment  in  Ethics  271 

ture's  flesh  for  food,  is  the  strongest  evidence 
in  practice  (or  in  actu  exercito,  as  the  school- 
men speak)  that  you  regard  that  creature,  not  as 
an  associate  or  ally  or  friend,  not  as  one  that  can 
stand  in  any  legal  relations  with  you,  or  has  any 
right  to  withstand  you,  but  simply  as  one  entirely 
to  be  referred  to  your  use  and  convenience,  as 
something  given  over  into  your  hands  as  prop- 
erty, and  existing  for  you  —  in  other  words, 
as  your  absolute  slave.  The  Roman  who  threw 
his  slaves  to  the  lampreys  was  rightly  regarded 
as  carrying  the  doctrine  of  slavery  to  all  lengths. 
Every  butcher's  shop  and  shambles  proclaims 
that  dumb  animals,  even  some  of  the  noblest 
of  them,  are  the  absolute  slaves  of  man.1  Nor 
will  this  judgment  ever  be  reversed  by  any  dis- 
covery of  a  common  specific  nature  between 
man  and  even  the  highest  of  dumb  animals. 
Stories  are  written  of  the  '  intelligence '  of  ani- 
mals ;  but,  for  every  instance  of  what  is  called 
intelligence,  a  hundred  might  be  recorded  of 
their  downright  stupidity.  The  lowest  savage 
can  be  taught  to  read,  —  even  children  born 
deaf,  dumb,  and  blind  can  be  taught,  but  neither 
elephant  nor  ape. 

The  death  of  sheep  and  oxen  in  our  shambles, 
though  rapid,  can  hardly  be  altogether  painless. 

1  I  suppose  the  only  reason  why  we  do  not  eat  dog  or  monkey 
is  because  beef  and  mutton  are  so  much  better  food. 


272  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

But  for  centuries  the  animals  whom  man  re- 
quired to  eat  had  to  be  hunted  on  the  prairie, 
and  killed  by  inches  with  imperfect  weapons : 
still  it  was  right  even  so  to  kill  them.  Man, 
their  master,  had  need  of  them,  and  took  them 
even  at  their  pain.  Nor  is  hunting  quite  obso- 
lete in  English  counties.  I  do  not  know  how 
many  anti-vivisectionists,  gentlemen  and  ladies, 
are  to  be  found  in  the  saddle.  One  form  of 
hunting  is  fishing.  Owing  to  their  compara- 
tive inaccessibility,  the  death  that  man  deals 
out  to  water-living  animals  is  almost  always 
a  painful  one.  It  makes  my  heart  bleed  to 
read  how  whales  are  killed  in  the  whale-fishery: 
how  the  calves  are  caught  and  beaten  till  their 
dams  come  up,  responsive  to  their  cries,  and  then 
the  latter,  too,  are  harpooned:  but  man  needs 
blubber  and  oil  and  whalebone,  and  ladies  will 
have  sealskin  jackets,  for  which  purpose  two 
hundred  and  fifty  thousand  seals  were  slaugh- 
tered recently  {Daily  Mail,  April  21,  1902); 
and  the  moralist  cannot  say  nay.  To  come 
now  to  vivisection.  I  have  written  elsewhere  1 
something  to  this  effect,  that  if  experiments, 
often  necessarily  painful,  on  living  dumb  ani- 
mals have  yielded,  and  are  still  yielding,  valu- 
able results,  otherwise  unattainable,  for  the 
treatment    of    human    maladies,    no    reasoned 

1  In  my  Ethics  and  Natural  Law. 


Sentiment  in  Ethics  273 

considerations  of  moral  science  can  forbid 
such  experiments,  yet  so  that  in  our  quest 
after  knowledge  we  be,  as  far  as  the  end  in 
view  will  allow,  mindful  of  mercy.  I  do  not 
see  how  any  one  is  to  deny  this  carefully 
guarded  statement,  unless  he  is  prepared  to 
forbid  hunting  and  fishing  and  many  other 
things  in  the  world  besides  vivisection.  Death 
and  pain  to  inferior  animals  for  man's  use  and 
benefit  is  one  of  nature's  laws.  It  is  a  myster- 
ious law,  as  all  is  mysterious  that  involves 
the  great  mystery  of  evil.  We  might  wish  it 
otherwise,  we  cannot  deny  it,  we  cannot  ignore 
it,  we  are  fain  to  act  upon  it.  Such  is  the 
subjection,  yea,  the  natural  slavery,  of  the  irra- 
tional to  the  rational. 

It  is  the  aim  of  science  rather  to  regard 
things  in  themselves  than  the  associations  of 
our  ideas.  We  associate  the  two  ideas  of 
slavery  and  cruelty ;  and  any  one  who  advo- 
cates any  form  of  slavery,  we  take  to  be  an 
advocate  of  cruelty.  But  there  is  no  cruelty 
in  the  enforcement  of  the  natural  service  of 
brute  to  man.  Cruelty  is  a  wayward,  passion- 
ate, unreasoned  thing.  But  the  order  of 
nature  is  a  rational  order.  Whatever  it  car- 
ries is  regulated  by  reason,  and  serves  a  defi- 
nite, proper  purpose  in  the  universe  as  a 
whole.     Man  is,  because    he  subordinates  the 


274  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

existence  of  other  animals  to  his  own,  nor 
can  he  exist  otherwise.  He  cannot  afford  to 
recognise  the  lower  animals  as  his  compeers, 
and  treat  them  as  he  is  bound  to  treat  his 
fellow-men;  and  in  point  of  fact  they  are  not 
his  compeers,  but  immeasurably  below  him. 
He  may  have  his  pets  and  favourites  among 
them.  A  favourite  horse  or  dog  is  screened 
with  special  care  from  all  hard  usage.  But 
the  favourite  remains  a  slave.  Even  if  he 
could  be  emancipated,  his  individual  emanci- 
pation would  not  involve  that  of  his  race. 
There  is  no  cruelty  about  any  subjection, 
however  absolute,  provided  it  be  natural.  As 
it  is  natural,  it  puts  ruler  and  ruled  each  in 
his  right  place,  and  makes  for  the  good  of 
both,  according  to  the  well-known  argument 
of  Aristotle  in  the  first  book  of  his  Politics. 
Aristotle's  mistake  there,  so  far  as  he  can  be 
said  to  be  mistaken,  lies  in  exaggeration  of 
the  difference  between  one  favoured  race  of 
mankind  and  the  rest.  The  mistake  of  the 
advocates  of  'animals'  rights'  lies  in  ignoring 
the  superiority  of  man  over  brute.  The  brute, 
I  repeat,  stands  to  man  in  the  relation  of  the 
<f>v<T€L  SovXog,  the  born  slave,  to  his  master. 
Not  on  that  account  —  I  should  say,  all  the 
less  on  that  account  —  may  he  be  treated  with 
cruelty.     But  he  may  be  hunted  and  run  down 


Sentiment  in  Ethics  275 

to  weariness,  wounds,  and  death  to  appease 
man's  hunger;  aye,  and  vivisected,  too,  if  by 
vivisection  alone  man  can  learn  the  secret  of 
overcoming  disease  and  saving  human  life. 
Therefore  I  have  said  that  vivisection  is  not 
absolutely  wrong,  inasmuch  as  in  at  least  one 
conceivable  and  possible  case  vivisection  would 
be  justifiable.1 

Argued  on  universal,  high  a  priori  grounds 
the  indictment  against  vivisection  appears  to 
me  to  break  down.  On  the  humbler  ground  of 
observation  and  statistics,  the  publications  of  the 
London  Anti-vivisection  Society  argue,  more 
plausibly,  that  vivisection  is  attended  with  ter- 
rible pain  to  dogs,  horses,  and  other  victims 
of  experiment;  that  much  of  this  painful  prac- 
tice is  useless;  that  probably  it  might  all  be 
replaced  by  more  careful  dissection  of  the  dead 
and  more  assiduous  walking  of  hospitals ;  that 
the  human  subject  is  in  many  subtle  but  vital 
points  so  unlike  the  lower  animals  as  grievously 
to  endanger  in  practice  any  conclusion  drawn 
from  the  latter  to  the  former.  Were  these  alle- 
gations proved,  —  I  do  not  say  that  they  are,  — 
but  were  these  allegations  proved,  vivisection 
might  assume  a  new  aspect  in  the  eyes  of  the 

1  What  if  the  operation,  now  so  common,  for  appendicitis 
could  have  been  learnt  only  by  vivisection  ?  Would  it  not  have 
been  worth  learning,  and  lawful  to  learn,  even  at  that  price  ? 


276  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

moralist.  Instead  of  being  part  of  the  service 
that  other  animals  must  submit  to  render  to 
man,  their  lord  and  master,  because  he  has 
need  of  them,  some  of  the  vivisection  that  goes 
on  might  turn  out  to  be  no  better  than  a 
pompous  and  pretentious  form  of  cruelty  to 
animals,  to  be  judged  as  all  cruelty  to  animals 
is  judged.  Cruelty,  for  present  purposes,  may 
be  sufficiently  defined  to  be  the  wanton  inflic- 
tion of  pain.  Here,  then,  recurs  the  question, 
so  often  asked  in  our  hearing,  a  question  which 
has  perplexed  many  a  modern  casuist  and  father 
confessor,  and  for  the  solution  of  which  you 
turn  to  old  books  in  vain :  Is  it  a  sin  to  be 
cruel  to  animals  ? 

When  they  hear  a  question  put,  simple  and 
ignorant  people  (also  malicious  people  some- 
times) are  apt  to  cry  for  a  plain  answer,  yes  or 
no.  On  the  other  hand,  people  who  have 
thought  most  about  the  question  are  the  least 
forward  to  answer  plain  yes  or  no  in  the  ears 
of  the  simple,  or  haply  of  the  malicious.  I  will 
not  say  that  it  is  a  sin  to  be  cruel  to  animals 
or  that  it  is  no  sin.  I  will  bring  forward  some 
considerations  to  help  any  one  to  make  up  his 
mind  who  has  not  done  so  already.  And  first 
we  will  discuss  the  following  passage  from 
St.  Thomas  (Summa  Tkeol.  ia-2ae,  q.  102,  art.  6, 
ad.  8) :  — 


Sentiment  in  Ethics  277 

Man  may  be  moved  by  reason,  and  he  may  be  moved  by 
sentiment.  So  far  as  motives  of  reason  go,  it  matters  not 
what  man  does  with  regard  to  brute  animals  :  because  all 
things  are  made  subject  to  his  power  by  God,  according  to 
the  text,  Thou  hast  subjected  all  things  beneath  his  feet 
(Ps.  viii.)  ;  and  from  this  point  of  view  the  Apostle  says  that 
God  has  not  care  of  oxen  (1  Cor.  ix.),  because  God  asks  no 
account  from  man  what  he  does  with  regard  to  oxen  or  with 
regard  to  other  animals.  But  looking  at  the  motive  of  senti- 
ment, we  find  that  man  has  feeling  even  for  the  lower 
animals.  For  since  the  sentiment  of  pity  arises  on  account 
of  the  afflictions  of  others,  and  even  dumb  animals  come  to 
feel  pain,  the  sentiment  of  compassion  may  arise  in  man 
even  for  the  sufferings  of  animals.  But  it  is  obvious  that 
one  who  is  exercised  in  the  sentiment  of  compassion  for 
animals  is  thereby  better  disposed  to  entertain  the  sentiment 
of  compassion  for  men  :  hence  it  is  said,  The  just  regardeih 
the  lives  of  his  beasts,  but  the  hearts  of  the  wicked  are  cruel 
(Prov.  xii.). 

The  distinction  here  drawn  between  reason 
and  sentiment  is  important  to  the  moralist,  as 
I  will  presently  show.  St.  Thomas  apparently 
denies  that  reason,  apart  from  sentiment,  has 
anything  to  say  against  cruelty  to  animals,  but 
I  should  be  far  from  ascribing  to  the  Angelic 
Doctor  any  such  opinion.  We  must  explain 
his  words  in  one  place  by  considering  what  he 
says  elsewhere.  Cruelty  is  wanton  and  irra- 
tional behaviour:  such  behaviour  cannot  be 
according  to  law,  for  "  the  rule  and  measure 
of  human  acts  is  reason"  (ia-2ae,  q.  90,  art.   1). 


278  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

Any  silly,  outrageous  conduct  comes  near  to 
being  sinful  conduct.  God  will  ask  an  account 
of  man  for  all  irrational  behaviour,  and  conse- 
quently for  all  cruelty,  to  whomsoever  shown. 
Again  St.  Thomas  argues  the  wrongfulness  of 
lying  from  its  being  "  an  act  falling  on  undue 
matter,"  words  being  used  in  opposition  to  the 
thought  which  they  are  meant  to  set  forth 
(ia-2ae,  q.  no,  art.  3).  May  we  not,  therefore, 
contend  that  cruelty  to  animals  likewise  is  an 
act  falling  upon  undue  matter,  animals  being 
made  subject  to  man  for  his  use  and  benefit, 
not  for  his  whim  and  caprice  ?  Such  cruelty 
is  an  abuse  of  the  noblest  work  of  God  in  the 
visible  order :  such  abuse  can  hardly  be  guilt- 
less. What,  then,  are  we  to  think  of  the  reckless 
felling  of  trees?  There  is  need  of  caution 
in  this  argumentation,  and  I  wish  to  proceed 
tentatively,  suggesting,  not  determining. 

There  is  one  argument  of  reason,  however, 
which  I  think  does  go  some  way  to  suggest 
a  duty  per  se  of  sparing  the  higher  animals  any 
considerable  reckless  infliction  of  utterly  need- 
less pain.  It  is  this :  As  God  is  to  man,  so  is 
man  to  dumb  animals,  a  sort  of  little  sod  in 
their  midst.  They  exist  for  him,  as  he  for  God. 
They  have  no  strict  rights  against  him,  as  he 
has  no  strict  rights  against  God.  He  is  a  mys- 
tery, to  them  incomprehensible  ;    and  God  is  to 


Sentiment  in  Ethics  279 

him  a  mystery,  above  his  comprehension.  But 
of  God  it  is  written :  Thy  power  is  the  begin- 
ning of  justice ;  and  because  thou  art  Lord  of  all, 
thou  makes t  thyself  gracious  to  all:  thou  being 
Lord  of  power,  dost  jtcdge  with  tranquillity,  and 
with  great  consideration  dost  thou  dispose  of  us 
(Wisdom  xii.  16,  18).  God  may  expect  us  to 
take  this  His  consideration  and  forbearance  in 
our  regard  for  some  pattern  of  our  conduct  to 
the  animals  whom  He  has  appointed  to  serve 
us.  Though  the  parable  of  the  unmerciful  ser- 
vant (Matt,  xviii.  23-33)  does  not  directly  incul- 
cate kindness  to  all  sentient  nature,  yet  it  well 
"  may  give  us  pause." 

The  value  of  sentiment  in  ethics  might  furnish 
a  theme  for  a  subtle  and  interesting  dissertation. 
I  have  never  seen  the  theme  handled  adequately. 
Sentiment  is  not  conscience,  for  it  does  not 
promulgate  and  proclaim  law.  Conscience  may 
err  in  the  individual  man,  but  sentiment  may 
err  still  more  easily.  It  is  less  rational,  less 
imperative,  not  so  safe  and  masterful  a  guide. 
Conscience  may  even  rise  up  against  sentiment 
and  proclaim  it  foolish.  The  sentiment  of 
honour  inculcated  duelling,  which  conscience 
condemned.  Christianity  was  preached  in  the 
face  of  the  sentiment  of  the  Roman  world. 
Sentiment  would  sometimes  punish  in  excess  of 
right,  e.g.  class  sentiment,  as  shown  in  the  sen- 


280  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

timent  of  the  sanctity  of  property  in  the  prop- 
ertied classes :  at  other  times  sentiment  would 
screen  the  guilty,' for  he  was  a  brave  fellow.' 
Sentiment  is  partly  natural,  and  above  the  vari- 
eties of  time  and  place,  e.g.  the  sentiment  of 
modesty;  partly  conventional,  local,  temporal, 
as  appears  in  different  determinations  of  the 
requirements  of  modesty,  e.g.  the  veiling  of 
women  in  the  East,  and  the  objection  of  some 
races  to  sitting  cross-legged.  The  growth  of 
sentiment  against  vivisection  therefore  is  not 
enough  for  the  moralist  at  once  to  pronounce 
vivisection  to  be  wrong.  Yet  from  an  ethical 
standpoint,  sentiment,  whether  it  be  natural 
and  universal,  or  whether  it  be  no  more  than 
the  convention  and  peculiarity  of  the  com- 
munity and  age  in  which  one  lives,  is  not  a 
thing  lightly  to  disregard  and  treat  with  scorn. 
There  is  a  frame  of  mind  stigmatised  by  Aris- 
totle as  Otjplottjs,  a  readiness  to  trample  on  the 
feeling  and  sentiment  of  the  society  in  which 
one  lives.  There  is  no  harm,  when  a  man 
dines  alone,  in  his  sitting  on  the  table  and  dis- 
pensing with  knife  and  fork.  One  might  even 
find  company  in  which  such  behaviour  would 
give  no  offence.  But  so  to  behave  in  any 
ordinary  dining  room  would  pain  and  insult 
the  guests,  and  that  would  be  a  sin.  It  is  sin- 
ful, so  all  theologians  say,  to  give  one's  neigh- 


Sentiment  in  Ethics  281 

bour  annoyance  without  any  proportionate  rea- 
son for  so  doing.  It  is  a  sin  against  charity, 
an  offence  against  what  economists  call  'social 
virtue.'  Not  an  absolute  deference,  but  a  large 
measure  of  deference  to  the  sentiment  of  the 
society  in  which  he  lives,  is  the  bounden  duty 
of  every  man.  The  sentiment  of  tenderness 
to  dumb  animals  is  growing  apace,  too  fast 
for  medical  students  or  casuists  to  ignore.  That 
it  has  already  grown  so  strong  as  to  render  vivi- 
section an  outrage  upon  public  sentiment  and  a 
sin  against  social  virtue,  is  more  than  I  would 
affirm. 

No  wise  moralist  would  wish  to  carry  out 
the  Stoic  programme,  to  cast  out  all  senti- 
ment in  the  dealings  of  man  with  man,  and 
live  by  reason  alone.  But,  as  the  quotation 
from  St.  Thomas  points  out,  to  tread  down 
the  sentiment  of  pity  for  animals  would  be 
to  weaken  that  same  sentiment  in  its  exer- 
cise upon  the  ills  of  human  kind.  We  may 
fear  the  effect  upon  the  moral  character  of 
the  vivisector, ,  and  still  more  of  the  young 
students  who  witness  his  operations,  —  fear  lest 
they  grow  hardened  to  cruelty,  and  come  to 
try  experiments  on  patients  of  the  more  help- 
less sort  of  their  own  species. 

B.  I  make  no  doubt  that  the  State  is  com- 
petent to  forbid  vivisection.    To  cut  up  animals 


282  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

alive  is  not  such  an  indefeasible  right  of  hu- 
manity as  cannot  be  abridged.  The  monarchi- 
cal, paternal  government  of  former  times,  which 
claimed  to  be  judge  of  whatever  was  for  the 
good  of  the  people,  in  the  exercise  of  its  discre- 
tion might  abridge  it.  The  modern  democratic 
State,  which  claims  to  be  the  impersonation  of 
the  will  of  the  people,  might  abridge  it :  surely 
the  people  need  not  vivisect  unless  they  like, 
and  may  definitively  resign  whatever  right  they 
have  in  that  direction.  Only,  one  would  wish 
to  see  vivisection,  if  it  is  to  be  abolished,  abol- 
ished by  a  crushing  majority  of  wills  against 
it,  not  otherwise,  not  by  any  '  snap  division  ' : 
nor  is  it  likely  that  any  modern  government 
would  abolish  it  unless  the  nation  were  practi- 
cally unanimous  in  desiring  its  abolition. 

C.  Should  the  State  forbid  vivisection  ? 
To  this  question  my  answer  has  already  been 
given.  The  State  should  not  forbid  vivisec- 
tion, if  — 

(a)  vivisection  leads  to  results,  valuable  in 
medical  science  for  the  cure,  alleviation,  or 
prevention  of  human  maladies,  or  the  training 
of  medical  students ; 

(6)  and  these  results  are  unattainable  other- 
wise than  by  vivisection. 

One  would  like  to  see,  in  the  interest  of  fair 
play,  a  Vivisection  League  founded  to  match 


Sentiment  in  Ethics  283 

the  London  Anti-vivisection  Society.  If  that 
league  would  accept  the  advice  of  a  humble 
outsider,  they  would  avoid  arguing  the  case  on 
moral  grounds  at  all.  The  league  should  con- 
fine their  publications  to  the  medical  and  utili- 
tarian ground,  showing  that,  if  vivisection  is  to 
be  entirely  forbidden,  medical  science  and  suf- 
fering humanity  must  inevitably  be  the  loser. 
I  have  spoken  of  '  publications  ' :  but  one  pub- 
lication of  thirty  pages,  clearly  and  irrefragably 
establishing  the  medical  necessity  of  vivisec- 
tion, would  be  sufficient  and  all  that  is  desira- 
ble. A  word  also  to  anti-vivisection  societies. 
They  would  do  well  likewise,  I  think,  to  es- 
chew further  diatribes  on  the  immorality  of 
vivisection.  Many  of  their  moral  essays  in 
this  direction  are  lamentably  ill  argued,  and 
only  prejudice  the  reader,  who  knows  anything 
of  ethics,  against  their  cause.  The  fact  is,  no 
humane  person  wants  to  vivisect,  except  inas- 
much as  he  considers  vivisection  indispensable 
to  the  progress  of  the  healing  art.  On  that 
point  let  issue  be  joined. 


VIII.     OCCASIONAL    NOTES 

A.     THE  ARISTOTELIAN  DIVISION  OF  JUSTICE 

In  the  Nicomachean  Ethics,  V.  ij.  12,  13; 
iv.  1,  Justice  is  divided  into  general  and  par- 
ticular;  and  particular  justice  again  is  divided 
into  distributive  (Siou'e/x^ri/o;)  and  corrective 
(SLop9o)TLKTrj).  The  term  commutative  justice  is 
not  found  in  Aristotle.  Where  post-Aristote- 
lian authorities  speak  of  commutative  justice, 
Aristotle  would  have  said  corrective  justice. 
But,  as  Sir  Alexander  Grant  observes  (vol.  I. 
p.  112),  "The  term  'corrective  justice'  is  itself 
an  unfortunate  name,  because  it  appears  only  to 
lay  down  principles  for  restitution,  and  there- 
fore implies  wrong:"  whereas  Aristotle  means 
it  to  apply  to  all  contracts,  as  well  voluntary 
contracts  as  those  which  he  calls  involuntary. 

If  we  are  still  to  hold  to  the  name  corrective 
justice,  we  may  do  well  to  subdivide  (though 
Aristotle  does  not)  the  virtue  so  named  into 
communtative  justice,  concerned  about  volun- 
tary contracts,  and  restittUive  justice,  concerned 
about  involuntary  contracts.  Thus  we  have 
the  following  schema  of  Justice. 

285 


286  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

Justice 


general  particular 


or 
legal 


I  I 

distributive  corrective 


I  I  I 

/    of  goods    \      (of        ishments)  /ofvoluntaryN  /of  involuntary  \ 

^and  rewards  J      v     r  '  V    contracts     /  \      contracts      I 

say 
appreciative  vindictive  commutative  restitutive 


The  reader  will  not  fail  to  observe  the  dif- 
ference between  vindictive  and  restitutive  jus- 
tice. The  former  carries  punishment  on  public 
grounds ;  the  latter  awards  compensation,  mak- 
ing up  the  pecuniary  loss  of  the  individual 
sufferer.  A  robs  B  of  five  pounds :  restitutive 
justice  gives  back  the  five  pounds  to  A  out  of 
B's  pocket ;  vindictive  justice  sentences  A  to 
a  month's  imprisonment  with  labour.  Vindic- 
tive justice  is  the  affair  of  the  State ;  restitutive 
justice,  if  not  provided  by  the  State,  may  be 
enforced  by  the  wronged  individual.  The 
term  vindictive  justice  must  not  be  taken  to 
imply  that  the  main  end  of  civil  punishment  is 
vengeance  or  retribution. 


Occasional  Notes  287 

B.     THE  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  TYPES  IN  THE  THEORY 

OF  MORALS 

There  are  men  potent  at  refutation,  but 
narrow  and  near-sighted ;  men  who  consider 
anything  hazy  and  indistinct  to  be,  not  im- 
perfectly known,  but  absolutely  unsubstantial 
and  unreal,  —  taking  for  clouds  the  faint,  far- 
off  outline  of  the  Delectable  Mountains  of 
highest  truth.  Against  such  men  I  feel  quite 
unable  to  set  forth  syllogistically  a  surmise 
that  long  has  haunted  me  of  an  unconsidered 
ground  of  morality.  I  will  state  it,  though  I 
would  not  undertake  to  defend  it  against  a 
captious  antagonist.  There  is  a  symbolism 
pervading  all  nature,  the  lowest  and  most  tri- 
vial things  being  types  of  higher  things,  and 
they  of  things  still  higher,  and  so  by  a  hier- 
archy of  types  up  to  the  highest  mysteries  of 
Godhead.  This  secret  was  let  drop  by  One 
who  knew  all.  The  habitual  employment  of 
parables  in  the  gospel  becomes  to  us  an  inci- 
dental lesson  to  look  for  types  and  allegorical 
meanings  in  all  the  processes  of  nature  and 
in  all  human  conduct.  Side  by  side  with  the 
literal  meaning  of  the  Bible  runs  the  mystical 
or  typical  sense,  often  the  more  important  of 
the  two,  as  in  the  Canticle  of  Canticles,  or 
Song   of    Solomon.       Cardinal    Newman    tells 


288  Political  and  Moral  Essays 

us  how  this  principle  of  interpretation  struck 
him. 

The  broad  philosophy  of  Clement  and  Origen  carried 
me  away.  .  .  .  Some  portions  of  their  teaching,  magnifi- 
cent in  themselves,  came  like  music  to  my  inward  ear,  as  if 
the  response  to  ideas  which,  with  little  external  to  encourage 
them,  I  had  cherished  so  long.  These  were  based  on  the 
mystical  or  sacramental  principle,  and  spoke  of  the  various 
economies  or  dispensations  of  the  Eternal.  I  understood 
these  passages  to  mean  that  the  exterior  world,  physical  and 
historical,  was  but  the  manifestation  to  our  senses  of  reali- 
ties greater  than  itself.  Nature  was  a  parable.  .  .  .  The 
visible  world  still  remains  without  its  divine  interpretation 
{History  of  my  Religious  Opinions,  pp.  26,  27). 

Now  for  the  bearing  of  all  this  upon  ethical 
theory.  Certain  actions  are  wrong,  because  in 
them  some  type  is  violated,  some  sacred  sym- 
bolism outraged,  and  the  dishonour  done  to 
the  type  redounds  upon  the  antitype  or  thing 
typified.  Such  I  conceive  to  be  the  radical 
reason  of  the  grievousness  of  sins  against 
purity.  There  are  hygienic  motives  for  that 
virtue,  as  there  are  for  abstinence  and  sobriety. 
But  the  hygienic  reason  for  purity  is  never  the 
whole  reason :  it  does  not  cover  the  entire 
ground  and  matter  of  the  virtue.  It  is,  I 
suppose,  possible,  however  hazardous  it  be  for 
youth  to  make  the  attempt,  yet,  I  suppose,  it 
is  possible  to  sin  wisely,  to  set  at  nought  some 
at  least  of  the  manifold  applications  of  the  pre- 


Occasional  Notes  289 

cept,  '  Thou  shalt  not  commit  adultery,'  and 
yet  survive  sound  of  limb  to  length  of  days. 
The  hygienic  reason,  closely  touching  as  it 
does  both  the  individual  and  the  race,  still  is 
not  the  principal  reason  for  purity.  It  fails 
to  account  for  the  peculiar  sacredness  of  the 
precept,  and  the  damning  wickedness  of  all 
serious  violation  of  the  same.  It  is  not  so 
very  important  as  all  that,  to  have  a  reverent 
care  of  our  health.  By  heroic  exercise  of  the 
love  of  God  and  of  his  neighbour,  a  man  may 
wear  out  his  body  more  speedily  and  more 
ruinously  than  by  a  life  of  dissipation.  The 
mischief  and  malice  of  such  a  life  is  not 
simply  its  unheal thiness,  or  its  undoing  of 
character,  or  even  its  uselessness  or  injury 
to  the  race,  but  further  its  offending  against 
the  symbolism  of  things  mighty  and  holy. 
This  surmise  and  suspicion  and  inkling  I 
leave  to  the  reflective  higher  student. 

C.     THE   THEORY   OF   VALUE 

Delivered  from  the  meddling  and  muddling 
of  Ricardo  and  Karl  Marx,  the  theory  of  value 
is  a  simple  thing  enough.  Value  —  I  mean 
value  in  exchange,  or  market  value  —  varies 
jointly  with  two  elements  —  social  demand  and 
difficulty  of  procurement.  The  more  clamor- 
ously society  cries  for  a  thing,  and  the  harder 


290  Political  and  Aloral  Essays 

the  thing  is  to  procure,  the  higher  market 
value  the  thing  will  bear,  provided  it  be  matter 
of  exchange  at  all.  A  thing  in  social  demand 
is  not  necessarily  difficult  to  procure,  as  water.1 
A  thing  difficult  to  procure,  a  live  badger,  for 
example,  is  not  necessarily  in  social  demand. 
These  two  distinct  elements,  social  demand 
and  difficulty  of  procurement,  are  the  determi- 
nants of  market  value.  And  they  alone  deter- 
mine it,  labour  or  no  labour. 

Difficulty  of  procurement,  as  a  determinant 
of  value,  is  not  to  be  identified  with  the  labori- 
ous expenditure  of  much  brute  force.  Herrings 
are  cheap,  notwithstanding  the  heavy  labour  of 
a  fisherman's  life.  From  the  standpoint  of  the 
market,  herrings  are  not  difficult  to  procure. 
Besides  bodily  labour,  an  object  of  value  often 
involves  what  is  more  difficult  of  procurement, 
—  skill  and  deftness  of  hand,  ingenuity,  the 
labour  of  the  mind,  genius.  Genius  is  valued, 
not  because  it  comes  into  operation  by  toilsome 
effort,  but  because  it  is  a  masterful  and  rare 
gift.  '  Genius  is  difficult  to  find,'  and  '  genius 
does  its  work  with  difficulty,'  are  two  different 
propositions.  The  former  is  true :  the  latter, 
on  the  whole,  is  false.  The  former  proposition, 
anyhow,  not  the  latter,  shows  the  reason  why 

1  Social  demand  bears  on  difficulty  of  procurement  inasmuch 
as,  where  the  supply  is  limited,  men  crowd  one  another  out. 


Occasional  Notes  291 

a  work  of  genius  commands  the  intelligent 
market.  It  is  not  true  that  the  high  price  of 
such  a  work  is  recompense  for  the  years  spent 
by  the  author  in  education,  a  sort  of  refunding 
of  his  school  pensions.  The  public  is  pro- 
foundly indifferent  whether  he  ever  went  to 
school  at  all,  or  whether  his  pensions  were 
paid  when  he  was  there.  It  appreciates  his 
work  purely  as  a  thing  desirable,  not  easily  come 
by,  i.e.  not  easy  for  the  purchaser  to  come  by, 
whatever  it  cost  or  did  not  cost  the  producer. 
Again,  it  is  not  true  that  property  is  valuable 
in  the  market  formally  and  precisely  inasmuch 
as  it  is  the  embodiment  of  bodily  labour,  or  in 
Karl  Marx's  quaint  phrase,  inasmuch  as  it  con- 
tains 'labour-jelly.'  'Labour-jelly,'  as  such,  is 
not  in  social  demand ;  and  bodily  labour,  of 
which  alone  Marx  seems  to  take  account,  is 
but  one  item  in  the  sum  total  of  difficulty  of 
production. 


INDEX 


Administration,  40,  41. 

Adoption,  32. 

Anthropology,  in  Catholic 
teaching,  177. 

Aquinas,  St.  Thomas,  quoted, 
62,  66,  119,  125,  130  note, 
150,  155  note,  166  note, 
186  note,  187  note,  231, 
232,  233,  276,  277,  278. 

Aristotle,  quoted,  4,  9,  18, 
22,  28,  32,  43,  45,  73,  82, 
92,  95,  no,  in,  115,  146, 
147,  148,  151,  152,  154, 
I57>  l7°>  25°  note,  268, 
274,  280,  285. 

Authority  (civil),  theoretical 
origin  of,  5-13,  42  sq. ; 
historical  origin  of,  13  sq. ; 
illustrated  by  a  my  thus,  15- 
20,  25,  26,  33,  34,  38,  39  ; 
how  far  dependent  on  con- 
sent of  the  governed,  42- 
46  ;  resistance  to,  47-49  ; 
extent  and  limitations  of, 
49-66 ;  origin  and  extent 
recapitulated,  72,  76;  mo- 
tive of  obedience  to,  99, 


100;  Suarezian  theory  of, 
102-113. 

B 

Barbaric,  or  patriarchal,  civ- 
ilisation, 27. 

Bible,  purpose  of,  177,  178; 
Bible  morality,  187,  188. 

Blood-feud,  34,  35. 

Bosanquet,  Mr.,  on  liberty, 
114,  115  ;  on  the  real  self, 
120  ;  on  the  real  will,  124- 
126  ;  on  obedience  to  self 
alone,  128-132;  on  rights 
and  the  State,  140,  141. 

Bride-money,  29. 

Bureaucracy,  40,  117. 


Capacity,  a  limitation  to  au- 
thority, 54. 

Casuistry,  197  sq. 

Character,  251,  264. 

Christianity,  first  appearance 
of,  156  sq. 

Church,  maintenance  of  nat- 
ural law  by,  188,  189. 

Church  and  State,  159-168. 


293 


294 


Index 


Citizen,  not  the  whole  man, 
58,  129,  130,  142,  144. 

City  walls,  79,  80. 

Civilisation,  meaning  of, 
1 79  ;  food  as  indication  of, 
181  ;  continuity  of,  194. 

Comte,  his  three  stages,  193, 
194. 

Concordats,  166  note,  168. 

Confessional,  the,  199  sq. 

Conquest,  44,  45. 

Cromwell,  69,  96,  149. 

Cruelty  to  animals,  273- 
279. 

D 

Determinism,  249  ;  hard  and 
soft,  250-252;  heretical, 
252  ;  determinist  morality, 
253-254 ;  determinist  pun- 
ishment, 255-257 ;  no  con- 
duct disgraceful  to  the 
determinist,  257,  258; 
effect  of  determinism  on 
character,  263-265  ;  in- 
compatible with  sin  and  re- 
morse, 259,  260 ;  deter- 
minist conscience,  261. 

Development,  the  Aristote- 
lian <£vo-is,  9  note,  119  note, 
135,  136;  development  of 
doctrine,  165. 

Disaffection,  political,  fruit 
of  poverty,  147  note. 

Divine  right,  5,  102-113. 


Dumb  animals,  devoid  of 
rights,  134,  135,  268-271, 
274. 

E 

Emperor,  mediaeval  concep- 
tion of,  164,  165. 

Equivocation,  216-218. 

Executive  function  of  gov- 
ernment, 40. 


Family,  primitive,  22-23; 
prospects  of,  in  socialism, 
245-247. 

Force,  as  an  element  in  gov- 
ernment, 43  note,  45,  46, 
117. 

Free  will,  Aristotle's  view  of, 
250  note;  freedom  from 
compulsion  and  freedom  of 
indifference,  252;  witness 
of  consciousness  to,  262  ; 
more  than  spontaneity,  262, 
263. 

G 

General  will,  the,  88,   89, 

1 21-12  7,  133  note. 
Genius   in   the   market,  290, 

291. 
Gierke,     Dr.,    his    political 

theories  of  the  Middle  Age, 

162-165. 
Government,    ideal    of,    47 


Index 


295 


note ;  government-making 
organ,  48 ;  local  govern- 
ment, 52,  53,  147  note; 
government  a  function  of 
the  few,  53  note;  paternal 
and  civil  government,  63  ; 
for  the  good  of  the  gov- 
erned, 92  ;  government  by 
the  majority,  92-94  ;  con- 
stitutional government,  95- 
98. 

Greek  City  States,  peculiar- 
ity of,  146-148. 

Green,  T.  H.,  on  legal  coer- 
cion,  1 1 6-1 19;  on  rights, 

I37-I39- 

H 

HOBBES,  81-86,  89,  90. 

Holiness,  not  the  aim  of  the 

State  as  such,  158. 
Horde,  the  primitive  society, 

16,  17,  20,  23;  horde  and 

tribe,  30-32. 


Ideal  order,  the,  12  note. 
Incapacity,  determinist  view 

of,  256,  257. 
Individualism,  114-117,  120, 

126. 
Insularity,  77. 

J 

Judicature,  evolution  of,  36, 
37,  60,  61. 


Justice,  division  of,  285,  286. 

K 

Karl  Marx,  his  labour-jelly, 
289-291. 

L 

Law,  fundamental,  55  ;  sub- 
tlety of  law,  211. 

Legislation,  not  a  primitive 
power  of  government,  38, 

39- 
Leo  XIIL,  quoted,  118,  127, 

165  note. 
Liberty,  114-119. 
Locke,  81,  82,  91. 
Lying,  essential  evil  of,  226- 

232  ;   Plato's  "noble  lie," 

258. 

M 

Matriarchy,  28-30. 
Mental  reservation,  218  sq., 

232>  233. 
Mill,  J.  S.,  on  Liberty,  114, 

"5- 

Minorities,  rights  of,  70  note, 
282. 

Monarchy,  origin  of,  18,  112, 
113  ;  difficulty  of,  54. 

Morality,  as  affected  by  de- 
terminism, 249  sq. ;  deter- 
minist definition  of  moral 
evil,  259  ;  morality  and  sen- 
timent, 279-281  ;  morality 
and   symbolism,    287-289. 

Moral  standard,  variability 


296 


Index 


of,  185-188,  191  note;  is 
it  yet  finally   fixed?    189- 
191. 
Moral  theology,  202  sq. 

N 

Natural,  meaning  of  the 
term,  7-1 1,  81,  82,  135 
note,  136  note,  269  note. 

Newman,  Cardinal,  quoted, 
10,  160  note,  165,  216, 
222,  262  note,  288. 

O 

Optimism,    determinist,    260. 
Oriental  fatalism,  264,  265. 


Patriarchal  family,  32  note. 
People,    the,    53   note,    in, 

112,  237. 
Philosopher  and  statesman, 

antithesis  of,  152-156. 
Philosophy,  the   higher  life, 

i5°-I57- 

Physical,  history  of  the  Eng- 
lish word,  82  note. 
Plato,  quoted,  3,  14,  34,  37, 

38>  39>  44,  59,  65>  66>  74, 
90,  92,  94,    95,    97,    131, 

145,   148  note,   150,   151, 

152  note,   153,   157  note, 

168   note,   169  note,   249, 

250,  256,  258,  264. 

Polity,  defined,  52. 

Primitive  man,  173,  174. 


Private  associations,  65,  66. 

Punishment,  capital,  61-63; 
determinist  theory  of,  255- 
257  ;  differs  from  compen- 
sation, 286. 

Purity,  inner  reason  for,  288, 
289. 

R 

Real  self,  real  will,  96 
note,  120,  124,  125,  128- 
132,  249. 

Religion,  influence  of,  upon 
the  formation  of  States,  2 1  ; 
attitude  of  the  State  to, 
67-69. 

Religious  Orders,  wealth  of, 
237,  238  ;  training  of  mem- 
bers, 238,  239 ;  mildness 
of  their  government,  242  ; 
unconstrained  entrance  in- 
to, 243. 

Remorse,  presupposes  free 
will,  259,  260. 

Rights,  natural,  58,  59  ;  need 
the  determination  of  posi- 
tive law,  59,  60 ;  rights  of 
the  citizen,  116;  what  a 
right  means,  134-140; 
rights  not  ends  in  them- 
selves, 140,  141. 

Rousseau,  86-88,  1 21-124. 


Savages,  23,  31,  87,  133  note, 

174  sq. 


Index 


297 


Savagery,  was  it  ever  coex- 
tensive with  mankind?  182- 
184. 

Secrets,  219. 

Segmentation  of  the  horde 
by  families,  31. 

Sentiment,  ethical  force  of, 
190,  279-281. 

Sin,  sense  of,  set  aside  by  de- 
terminism, 259,  260. 

Slavery,  268-270. 

Socialism,  bearing  on  the 
family,  52  note,  245-247; 
a  definition  of,  65  ;  an 
objection  to,  116,  117; 
further  objections,  240- 
244. 

Spontaneity,  short  of  free 
will,  262,  263. 

State,  self-sufficiency  of,  1-3; 
moral  personality  of,  3-5  ; 
inorganic  elements  in,  5, 
in  ;  nidus  of  thought,  13, 
154;  territorial  and  per- 
sonal area  of,  50  ;  whether 
yet  full-grown,  51,  52  ;  me- 
diaeval States,  53  note  ;  the 
State  as  causative  of  vir- 
tue, 57,  58,  144-152;  the 
State  not  all-licensed,  59 
note,  65  note,  133,  134; 
nor  all-sufficient,  169  ;  atti- 
tude of,  to  religion,  67-69, 
1 70 ;  Church  and  State, 
159  sq. ;  march  States,  78  ; 


relation  of  State  to  sub- 
ordinate societies,  141  ; 
common  weal  of  States,  3, 
143;  competence  of  State 
to  forbid,  281,  282. 

Suarez,  his  theory  of  civil 
authority,  102-113;  of  the 
power  of  the  Church  in 
temporals,  162. 

Supernatural,  the,  what,  159 
note. 

Symbolism,  as  a  ground  of 
morality,  287-289. 


Taxation,  75. 
Theocracy,  6,  159. 
Totem,  24,  25. 

U 

Universal  suffrage,  94,  125, 
126. 

V 

Value,  theory  of,  289-291. 

Vicarious  responsibility,  187. 

Virtue,  how  far  the  concern 
of  the  State,  57,  58,  144- 
152. 

Vivisection,  not  intrinsically 
wrong,  267-275  ;  condi- 
tions requisite  for  its  pro- 


2QS 


Index 


hibition,    268,   272;    argu- 
ments against  the  practice, 
275-2S1. 
Voluntary  public   control, 
69-72. 


W 

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PREPARATION  FOR  DEATH.  St.  Alphonsus  de  Liguori.  Considera- 
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PRODIGAL  SON;  or,  the  Sinner's  Return  to  God.  ||  net,  1  00 

REASONABLENESS  OF  CATHOLIC  CEREMONIES  AND  PRACTICES. 

Rev.  J.  J.  Burke.  *'o  35 

RELIGIOUS  STATE,  THE.  With  a  Treatise  on  the  Vocation  to  the  Priest- 
hood.    By  St.  Alphonsus  de  Liguori.  o  50 

REVELATIONS    OF   THE    SACRED    HEART    to  Blessed    Margaret   Mary. 

Bougaud     Cloth,  net,  1  so 

SACRAMENTALS    OF  THE   HOLY   CATHOLIC  CHURCH.    Rev.   A.    A. 

Lambing,   D.D.     Paper,  0.30;  25  copies,  4  50 

Cloth,  0.60;  25  copies,  9  00 

SACRAMENTALS— Prayer,   etc.     By   Rev.   M.    Muller,   C.SS.R.         ||  net,  1  00 

SACRED   HEART,  THE.     Rev.   Dr.  Joseph   Keller.  o  75 

SACRED  HEART,  THE,  Studied  in  the  Sacred  Scriptures.  Rev.  H.  Saint- 
rain,  C.SS.R.  net,  2  00 

SACRIFICE    OF    THE    MASS    WORTHILY    CELEBRATED,  THE.      By 

Rev.   Father  Chaignon,   S.J.  net,  1  50 

SECRET  OF   SANCTITY.    St.    Francis   de   Sales.  net,  1  00 

SERAPHIC  GUIDE,  THE.    A  Manual  for  the  Members  of  the  Third  Order 

of  St.   Francis.     By  a  Franciscan   Father.  to  60 

SHORT  CONFERENCES  ON  THE  LITTLE  OFFICE  OF  THE  IM- 
MACULATE  CONCEPTION.     Very    Rev.   J.    Rainep.  0  50 

SHORT    STORIES    ON    CHRISTIAN    DOCTRINE.     From   the  French    by 

Mary  McMahon.  net,  o  75 

SPIRITUAL     CRUMBS     FOR     HUNGRY     LITTLE     SOULS.  Mary     E. 

Richardson.  o  50 

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SPIRITUAL   EXERCISES    FOR   TEN    DAYS'    RETREAT.    Very   Rev    v 
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SODALISTS'  VADE  MECUM.  to  50 

SONGS  AND  SONNETS.    By  Maurice  Francis  Egan.  i  0o 

SOUVENIR  OF  THE  NOVITIATE.    By  Rev.  Edward  I.  Taylor,    net,  o  60 
ST.   ANTHONY.     Rev.   Dr.  Jos.   Keller.  o  75 

ST.  JOSEPH,  OUR  ADVOCATE.    By  Father  Huguet.  0  90 

STATIONS  OF  THE  CROSS.     Illustrated.  fo  50 

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STRIVING  AFTER  PERFECTION.     Rev.  Joseph   Bayma,  S.J.  net,  1  00 

SURE   WAY  TO  A  HAPPY   -MARRIAGE.     Rev.   Edward  I.  Taylor. 

Paper,    0.25;    25   copies,  3  7S 

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THIRTY-TWO  INSTRUCTIONS  FOR  THE  MONTH  OF  MAY.  Rev. 
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THOUGHT  FROM   BENEDICTINE  SAINTS.  net,  o  35 

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Men.     Rev.   P.  A.  Doss,  S.J.  ||  net,  1  25 

TRUE  POLITENESS.    Abbe  Francis  Demore.  net,  o  60 

TRUE  SPOUSE  OF  JESUS  CHRIST.  By  St.  Alphonsus  de  Liguori.  2 
vols.,   Centenary   Edition,  net,  2  50 

The  same  in   1  volume,  net,  1  00 

TWO    SPIRITUAL    RETREATS    FOR    SISTERS.      By    Rev.    E.    Zollner. 

net,  1  00 

VENERATION  OF  THE  BLESSED  VIRGIN.  Her  Feasts,  Prayers,  Re- 
ligious  Orders,   and   Sodalities.     By   Rev.   B.   Rohner,   O.S.B.  i  25 

VICTORIES  OF  THE  MARTYRS;  or,  the  Lives  of  the  Most  Celebrated 
Martyrs  of  the  Church.    Vol.  IX.     By  Alphonsus  de  Liguori.  net,  1  25 

VISITS  TO  JESUS  IN  THE  TABERNACLE.  Hours  and  Half  Hours  of 
Adoration  before  the  Blessed  Sacrament.  With  a  Novena  to  the  Holy 
Ghost   and    Devotions   for    Mass,    Holy    Communion,    etc.     Rev.    F.    X.    La- 

sance.     Cloth,  fj  25 

VISITS  TO  THE  MOST  HOLY  SACRAMENT  and  to  the  Blessed  Virgin 
Mary.     By  St.  Alphonsus   de  Liguori.  to  50 

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WAY  OF  INTERIOR  PEACE.     By  Rev.  Father  De  Lehen,  S.J.        net,  1  25 

WAV   OF   SALVATION   AND    PERFECTION.     Meditations,    Pious    Reflec- 
tions, Spiritual  Treatises.     St.  Alphonsus  de  Liguori.  net,  1  25 
WAY  OF  THE  CROSS.     Paper,  0.05;   100  copies,  250 

WORDS  OF  JESUS  CHRIST  DURING  HIS  PASSION.  Explained  in 
Their  Literal  and  Moral  Sense.  By  Rev.  F.  X.  Schouppe,  S.J.  *o.25:  100 
copies,  I7  00 

WORDS  OF  WISDOM.  A  Concordance  to  the  Sapiential  Books.  Edited  by 
Rev.  John  J.   Bell.  net,  1  25 

YEAR  OF  THE  SACRED  HEART.  A  Thought  for  Every  Day  of  the  Year. 
Anna  T.   Sadlier.  o  50 

YOUNG  GIRLS'  BOOK  OF  PIETY,  AT  SCHOOL  AND  AT  HOME.  A 
Prayer-book  for  Girls  in  Convent  Schools  and  Academies.    Golden  Sands. 

ti  00 

ZEAL  IN  THE  WORK  OF  THE  MINISTRY;  The  Means  by  which  Every 
Priest  May  Render  His  Ministry  Honorable  and  Fruitful.  By  Abbe 
Dubois.  net,  1  50 

7 


JUVENILES. 

ADVENTURES  OF  A  CASKET.  o  45 

ADVENTURES  OF  A  FRENCH  CAPTAIN.  o  45 

AN  ADVENTURE  WITH  THE  APACHES.     By  Gabriel  Ferry.  o  40 

ANTHONY.    A  Tale  of  the  Time  of  Charles  II.  of  England.  0  45 

ARMORER  OF  SOLINGEN.    By  William   Herchenbach.  o  40 

BERTHA;   or,   Consequences  of  a  Fall.  o  45 

BEST  FOOT  FORWARD.     By  Father  Finn.  o  85 

BETTER  PART.  o  45 

BISTOURI.     By  A.   Melandri.  o  40 
BLACK  LADY,  AND  ROBIN  RED  BREAST.    By  Canon  Schmid.        o  25 

BLANCHE  DE  MASSILLY.  o  45 

BLISSYLVANIA   POST-OFFICE.    By  Marion  Ames  Taggart.  o  40 

BOYS  IN  THE  BLOCK.     By  Maurice  F.  Egan.  o  25 

BRIC-A-BRAC  DEALER.  o  45 

BUZZER'S  CHRISTMAS.     By  Mary  T.  Waggaman.  o  25 

BY  BRANSCOME  RIVER.     By  Marion  Ames  Taggart.  o  40 

CAKE  AND  THE  EASTER  EGGS.     By  Canon  Schmid.  o  25 

CANARY  BIRD.     By  Canon  Schmid.  o  45 

CAPTAIN   ROUGEMONT.  o  45 

CASSILDA;  or  the  Moorish  Princess.  o  45 

CAVE    BY    THE    BEECH    FORK,    THE.    By    Rev.    H.    S.    Spalding,    S.J. 

Cloth,  o  85 

CLAUDE    LIGHTFOOT;    or,    How    the    Problem   Was    Solved.      By    Father 

Finn.                      •  o  85 

COLLEGE  BOY,  A.     By  Anthony  Yorke.     Cloth,  o  85 

CONVERSATION  ON  HOME  EDUCATION.  o  45 

DIMPLING'S   SUUCESS.    By  Clara  Mulholland.  0  40 

EPISODE?    OF   THE    PARIS    COMMUNE.    An   Account   of   the   Religious 

Persecution.  °  45 

ETHELRED    PRESTON;    or    the    Adventures    of    a    Newcomer.    By    Father 

Finn.  °  85 

EVERYDAY  GTRL.  AN.    By  Mary  C.   Crowley.  040 

FATAL  DIAMONDS.     By  E.  C.  Donnelly.  o  25 

FINN.  REV.  F.  J..  S.J.: 

HTS   FTRST  AND  LAST  APPEARANCE.    Illustrated.  1  00 

TTTF.    BEST   FOOT    FORWARD.  °  8? 

THAT   FOOTBATE   GAME.  °  85 

ETHFT.RFD   PRESTON.  °  85 

CT..WDE   T.TGHTFOOT.  °  85 

HARRY  DEE.  °  85 

TOM   PLAYFAIR.  °  85 

PERCY  WYNN.  °  85 

MOSTLY  BOYS.  °  85 

FISHERMAN'S  DAUGHTER.  °  45 

FIVE  O'CLOCK  STORIES;  or,  The  Old  Tales  Told  Again.  o  75 

FLOWER    OF    THE    FLOCK,    THE,    and    the    Badgers    of    Belmont.      By 

Maurice  F.  Egan.  °  85 

FRED'S  LITTLE  DAUGHTER.    By  Sara  Trainer  Smith.  o  40 

GERTRUDE'S   EXPERIENCE.  °  45 

GODFREY  THE  HERMTT.    Bv  Cavon  Schmid.  o  25 

GREAT-GRANDMOTHER'S    SECRET.  o  45 

HARRY  DEE;  or.  Working  it  Out.     By  Father  Finn.  o  85 

HEIR  OF  DREAMS,  AN.    By  Sallie  Margaret  O'Malley.  o  40 

HER  FATHER'S  RIGHT  HAND.  o  45 

R 


0 


HIS   FIRST  AND  LAST  APPEARANCE.    By  Father  Finn.  i  oo 

HOP  BLOSSOMS.    Jiy  Canon  Schmid.  02 

HOSTAGE  OF  WAR,  A.    By  Mary  G.  Bonesteel.  o  40 

HOW  THEY  WORKED  THEIR   WAV.     By  Maurice  F.  Egan.  075 
INUNDATION,  THE.    Canon  Schmid. 

JACK   HILDRETII   ON   THE   NILE.    By   Marion   Ames   Taggart.    c  ], 

0 

JACK  O'  LANTERN.     By  Mary  T.  Waggaman.  o  40 

KLONDIKE    PICNIC.    By    Eleanor    C.    Donnelly.  o  85 

LAMP  OF  THE  SANCTUARY.    By  Cardinal  Wiseman.  o  2> 
LEGENDS   OF   THE   HOLY   CHILD   JESUS   from   Many   Lands.       By   A. 

Fowler  Lutz.  0  -j- 

LITTLE  MISSY.     By  Mary  T.  Waggaman.  o   •■' 

LOYAL  BLUE  AND  ROYAL  SCARLET.    By  Marion  A.  Taggart.  o  ;•' 

MADCAP  SET  AT  ST.  ANNE'S.    By  Marion  J.  Brunowe.  o  ., 

MARCELLE.     A   True   Story.  0  4 

MASTER  FRIDOLIN.     By   Emmy   Giehrl.  o  2' 

M1LLY  AVELING.    By  Sara  Trainer  Smith.    Cloth,  o  i 

MOSTLY  BOYS.    By  Father  Finn.  0  85 

MYSTERIOUS  DOORWAY.    By  Anna  T.  Sadlier.  o  40 

MY    STRANGE   FRIEND.    By   Father  Finn.  025 

NAN  NOBODY.     By  Mary  T.  Waggaman.  o  40 

OLD  CHARLMONT'S  SEED-BED.    By  Sara  Trainer  Smith.  o  40 

OLD   ROBBER'S   CASTLE.     By  Canon   Schmid.  o 

OLIVE  AND  THE  LITTLE  CAKES.  o  4 

OVERSEER  OF   MAHLBOURG.     By  Canon   Schmid.  o  25 

PANCHO  AND  PANCHITA.    By  Mary  E.  Mannix.  o  40 

PAULINE  ARCHER.     By  Anna  T.  Sadlier.  0  40 

PERCY  WYNN;  or,  Making  a  Boy  of  Him.     By  Father  Finn.  o  85 

PICKLE  AND  PEPPER.     By  Ella  Loraine  Dorsey.  o  85 
PRIEST  OF  AUVRIGNY. 

QUEEN'S  PAGE.     By  Katharine  Tynan  Hinkson. 

RICHARD;  or,  Devotion  to  the  Stuarts.  0  45 

ROSE  BUSH.    By  Canon  Schmid.  o  25 

SEA-GULL'S  ROCK.    By  J.  Sandeau.  o  40 

SUMMER  AT  WOODVILLE.     By  Anna  T.    Sadlier.  0  40 

TALES  AND  LEGENDS  OF  THE  MIDDLE  AGES.    F.  De  Capella.  o  75 

TAMING  OF  POLLY.     By  Ella  Loraine  Dorsey.  o  85 

THAT  FOOTBALL  CAME:  and  What  Came  of  It.     By  Father  Finn.  085 

THREE  GIRLS  AND   ESPECIALLY  ONE.    By  Marion  A.  Taggart.  o  40 

THREE  LITTLE  KINGS.    By  Emmy  Giehrl.  o  25 

TOM   PLAYFAIR;   or,   Making  a   Start.     By  Father  Finn.  o  85 

TOM'S  LUCKPOT.     By  Mary  T.   Waggaman.  o  40 

TREASURE   OF   NUGGET  MOUNTAIN.    By  M.   A.   Taggart.  o  8S 

VILLAGE  STEEPLE,  THE.  0  45 

WINNETOU,  THE  APACHE  KNIGHT.     By  Marion  Ames  Taggart.  o  85 

WRONGFULLY  ACCUSED.    By  William  Herchenbach.  0  40 

NOVELS   AND    STORIES. 

ASER,  THE  SHEPHERD.    A  Christmas  Story.     By  Marion  Ames  Tagcart. 

net,  o  3  s 

BEZALEEL.     A   Christmas   Storv.     By   Marion   Ames   Taggart.             net,  o  35 

CIRCUS  RIDER'S  DAUGHTER,  THE.    A  Novel.     By  F.  v.  Brackel.  i  25 

9 


o  45 
o  49 


CONNOR  D'ARCY'S  STRUGGLES.    A  Novel.    By  Mrs.  W.  M.  Bertholds. 

DION  AND  THE  SIBYLS.    A  Classic  Novel.     By  Miles  Keon.    Cloth,    i  25 
FABIOLA;  or,  The  Church  of  the  Catacombs.     By  Cardinal  Wiseman.    Pop- 
ular  Illustrated   Edition,  0.90;   Edition   de  luxe,  5  00 

FABIOLA'S     SISTERS.      A     Companion     Volume    to     Cardinal    Wiseman's 
"  Fabiola."     By  A.   C.  Clarke.  i  25 

HEIRESS  OF  CRONENSTEIN,  THE.     By  the  Countess  Hahn-Hahn.  i  25 

IDOLS;  or,  The  Secrets  of  the  Rue  Chausee  d'Antin.     De  Navery.  i  25 

LET  NO   MAN  PUT  ASUNDER.    A  Novel.     By  Josephine  Marie.  i  00 

LINKED  LIVES.    A  Novel.     By  Lady  Glktrude  Douglas.  i  50 

MARCELLA    GRACE.    A    Novel.     By    Rosa    Mulholland.    Illustrated    Edi- 
tion. 1  25 

MISS  ERIN.    A  Novel.     By  M.  E.  Francis.  i  25 

MONK'S   PARDON,  THE.    A  Historical   Novel  of  the  Time  of  Phillip   IV. 

of  Spain.     By  Raoul  de  Navery.  i  25 

MR.   BILLY  BUTTONS.    A  Novel.    By  Walter  Lecky.  i  25 

OUTLAW  OF  CAMARGUE,  THE.    A  Novel.    By  A.  de  Lamothe.  i  25 

PASSING  SHADOWS.    A  Novel.     By  Anthony  Yorke.  i  25 

PERE  MONNIER'S  WARD.    A  Novel.    By  Walter  Lecky.  i  25 

PETRONILLA.     By  E.   C.   Donnelly.  i  00 

PRODIGAL'S  DAUGHTER,  THE.     By  Lelia  Hardin  Bugg..  i  00 

ROMANCE  OF  A  PLAYWRIGHT.     By  Vte.  Henri  de  Bornier.  i  00 

ROUND  TABLE  OF  THE  REPRESENTATIVE  AMERICAN  CATHOLIC 
NOVELISTS.     Complete   Stories,   with    Biographies,    Portraits,   etc.     Cloth, 

1  So 

ROUND  TABLE  OF  THE  REPRESENTATIVE  FRENCH  CATHOLIC 

NOVELISTS.     Complete   Stories,   with    Biographies,    Portraits,   etc.     Cloth, 

1  50 

ROUND  TABLE  OF  THE  REPRESENTATIVE  IRISH  AND  ENGLISH 

CATHOLIC  NOVELISTS.    Complete  Stories,  Biographies,  Portraits,  etc. 

Cloth,  1  50 

TRUE  STORY  OF  MASTER  GERARD,  THE.     By  Anna  T.  Sadlier.     i  25 
VOCATION   OF   EDWARD   CONWAY.    A   Novel.    By   Maurice   F.   Egan. 

1  25 
WOMAN  OF  FORTUNE,  A.     By  Christian  Reid.  i  25 

WORLD  WELL  LOST.    By  Esther  Robertson.  o  75 


LIVES    AND    HISTORIES 

AUTOBIOGRAPHY   OF   ST.    IGNATIUS   LOYOLA.    Edited  by  J.   F.    X. 

O'Conor.     Cloth,  net,  1  25 

BLESSED    ONES    OF    1888,   THE.     Bl.    Clement   Maria   Hoffbauer,    C.SS.R.; 

Bl.    Louis   Marie   Grignon   de    Monfort;    Bl.    Brother   Aegidius    Mary   of   St. 

Joseph;   Bl.  Josephine  Mary  of  St.  Agnes.     From  the  original  by  Eliza  A. 

Donnelly.     With  Illustrations,  o  50 

HISTORIOGRAPHIA  ECCLESIASTICA  quam  Historic  seriam  Solidamque 
Operam   Navantibus,  Accomodavit  Guil.   Stang,   D.D.  ||  net,  1  00 

HISTORY  OF  THE  CATHOLIC  CHURCH.     Brueck.    2  vols.,  net,  3  00 

HISTORY    OF    THE    CATHOLIC    CHURCH.      By    John    Gilmary    Shea, 

LL.D.  1  50 

HISTORY    OF    THE    PROTESTANT    REFORMATION    IN    ENGLAND 
AND   IRELAND.     By  Wm.   Cobbett.     Cloth,  net,  0.50;   paper,        net,  o  25 

LETTERS    OF    ST.    ALPHONSUS    LIGUORI.    By    Rev.    Eugene    Grimm, 
C.SS.R.     Centenary  Edition.     5  vols.,  each,  net,  1  25 

LIFE  OF  BLESSED   MARGARET  MARY.    By  Mgr.   Bougaud,   Bishop  of 
Laval.  net,  1  50 

LIFE  OF  CHRIST.     Illustrated.    By  Father  M.  v.  Cochem,  i  25 

10 


LIFE   OF    FATHER    CHARLES    SIRE,   of   the   Society   of  Jesus.     By    Rev. 

Vital  Sire.  net,  i  oo 

LIFE  OF  FATHER  JOGUES,  Missionary  Priest  of  the  Society  of  Jesus.     By 

Father  I-'.   Martin,  S.J.  net,  o  75 

LIFE  OF  FR.   FRANCIS  POILVACHE,  C.SS-R-     Paper,  net,  0  20 

LIFE  OF  MOTHER  FONTBONNE,  Foundress  of  the  Sisters  of  St.  Joseph 

of  Lyons.     By  Abbe  Rivaux.     Cloth,  net,  1  25 

LIFE  OF  OUR  LORD  AND  SAVIOUR  JESUS  CHRIST.  Cloth,  net,  5  00 
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Augustine.     By   Rev.   Thomas   Wegener,   O.S.A.  net,  1  50 

LIFE   OF   ST.   ALOYSIUS   GONZAGA.     Edition   de  luxe.     By   Rev.    Father 

Virgil  Cepari,  SJ.  net,  2  50 

LIFE  OF  ST.  ALOYSIUS  GONZAGA,  of  the  Society  of  Jesus.    By  Rev.  J. 

F.  X.  O'Conor,  S.J.  net,  o  75 

LIFE  OF  ST.  CATHARINE  OF  SIENNA.  By  Edward  L.  Ayme,  M.D.  ||i  00 
LIFE  OF  ST.   CLARE  OF  MONTEFALCO.    Locke,  O.S.A.  net,  0  75 

LIFE    OF    THE    BLESSED    VIRGIN.      Illustrated.      By    Rev.    B.    Rohner, 

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LIFE   OF   THE   VEN.    MARY   CRESCENTIA    HOESS.     By    Rev.    C.    Dey- 

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LITTLE   LIVES   OF   SAINTS   FOR   CHILDREN.    Berthold.    111.    Cloth, 

0  75 
LOURDES:     Its    Inhabitants,    Its    Pilgrims,    Its    Miracles.      By    Rev.    R.    F. 

C)  ARKE,     S.J.  °    75 

NAMES   THAT   LIVE   IN   CATHOLIC   HEARTS.      By   Anna  T.    Sadlier. 

1  00 

OUR  BIRTHDAY   BOUQUET.     By   Eleanor   C.    Donnelly.  i  00 

OUR  LADY  OF  GOOD  COUNSEL  IN  GENAZZANO.    A  History  of  that 

Ancient   Sanctuary.     By  Anne   R.    Bennett-Gladstone.  o  75 

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F.   E.   Gigot,   S.S.  II  net,  1  50 

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REMINISCENCES    OF    RT.    REV.    EDGAR    P.    WADHAMS,    D.D.,    First 

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ST    ANTHONY,  THE  SAINT  OF  THE  WHOLE  WORLD.     Rev.  Thomas 

F.   Ward.     Cloth,  °  75 

STORY  OF  THE  DIVINE  CHILD.  By  Very  Rev.  Dean  A.  A.  Lings,  o  75 
VICTORIES  OF  THE  MARTYRS.  By  St.  Alphonsus  de  Liguori.  net,  125 
VISIT  TO    EUROPE  AND  THE  HOLY   LAND.     By   Rev.   H.   Fairbanks. 

1  50 

WIDOWS    AND    CHARITY.      Work    of    the    Women    of    Calvary    and    Its 

Foundress.     Abbe   Chaffanjon.     Paper,  II  net,  o  50 

WOMEN  OF  CATHOLICITY.    By  Anna  T.  Sadlier.  i  00 

THEOLOGY,    LITURGY,    SERMONS,    SCIENCE   AND 
PHILOSOPHY. 

ABRIDGED  SERMONS,  for  All  Sundays  of  the  Year.  By  St.  Alphonsus 
de  Liguori.    Centenary   Edition.     Grimm,   C.SS.R.  net,  1  25 

BAD  CHRISTIAN,  THE.  By  Rev.  F.  Hunolt,  S.J.  Translated  by  Rev.  J. 
Allen,   D.D.     2  vols.,  »ef>  5  00 

BLESSED  SACRAMENT,  SERMONS  ON  THE.  Especially  for  the  Forty 
Hours'  Adoration.  By  Rev.  J.  B.  Scheurer,  D.D.  Edited  by  Rev.  F.  X. 
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